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Isaiah Allen, Paul the Bigot? Reading the Cretan Quotation of Titus 1:12 in Light of 
Relevance Theory, Doctor of Philosophy, Middlesex University/London School of 
Theology, 2019. 
According to prevalent readings of Titus 1:12, the author sympathizes with the statement, 
“Cretans are always liars, evil brutes, lazy gluttons.” Such conventional, prima facie 
interpretations are unsustainable when examined in light of Relevance Theory (RT). 
Although its application to Biblical Studies has been limited, the Theory provides crucial 
insights for both evaluating previous interpretations and for guiding historically and 
linguistically responsible readings. I argue that key insights of RT illuminate critical 
evidence for properly interpreting the Cretan quotation of Titus 1:12. I aim to both clear an 
interpretive impasse regarding this problematic text and demonstrate a relevance-guided 
biblical hermeneutic. The Introduction discusses representative interpretations and their 
inadequacies, then it outlines the promise of RT for supporting linguistically sound biblical 
interpretation. Each subsequent chapter focuses respectively on three pivotal insights: 1) 
the inferential nature of communication, 2) the role of the hearer in communication, and 3) 
the non-propositional dimensions of communication. I describe the insight in detail and 
demonstrate the impact of its application by both evaluating representative interpretations 
and offering a fresh interpretation of the passage in light of RT. The Conclusion 
summarizes the main contributions and implications of my thesis. These include a practical 
application of RT fundamentals to Biblical Studies; a linguistically-grounded examination 
of Titus and critique of existing secondary literature; a proposal regarding the letter’s 
historic message—namely, that it exposed rather than endorsed bigotry in the church; and 
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Introduction—Unresolved Issues in Titus 1:12 and the 
Promise of a Relevance-Guided Biblical Hermeneutic 
I. Prevailing Interpretations of Titus 1:12 
“Cretans are always liars, evil brutes, lazy gluttons” (Titus 1:12b). The writer’s point is 
obvious: Cretans, qua Cretans are ne’er-do-wells. It is one of the New Testament’s more 
well-known quotations. Few biblical sayings have so firmly entered popular parlance and 
exhibited such cultural currency. So, Cretan has come to label someone wicked, 
untrustworthy, morally inferior, or reprobate.1 This understanding of Titus 1:12 is almost 
irresistible. The epithet loses its geographic reference to the Mediterranean island of Crete 
and stands as a moral insult. 
The Paul we know from Romans, Galatians, and even Acts would never have 
written such a disparaging statement about a tender, predominantly Gentile, congregation. 
He might more likely have opposed anyone who advanced such a notion. Therefore, 
scholars are justified to conclude that the historical Paul did not write Titus. The Apostle 
could marshal scathing language to defend or to shame, but Paul’s missionary strategy did 
not seem to involve sweeping insults of an intrinsic nature.2 The conclusion that the 
Apostle Paul did not write Titus is as obvious as the interpretation of this passage. But, 
unexamined assumptions underlie this prevalent interpretation of Titus 1:12. 
A Plausible Alternative Interpretation 
As this study progresses, I will be exposing and explaining some of the problems with 
prevalent interpretations of Titus 1:12 on socio-historical, exegetical, and linguistic 
grounds and proposing what I think to be a simpler and more likely interpretation, one that 
attracted several earlier interpreters but that was dismissed through the history of 
interpretation on what I argue to be flawed assumptions. 
 
1 William D. Mounce, for instance, explains, “This verse ... has given rise to the colloquial use of ‘Cretan’ to 
describe a reprobate person.” See Pastoral Epistles, vol. 46, WBC (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2000), 398. 
2 Paul defends his congregations from opponents that he refers to as the circumcision: “I wish those who 
unsettle you would castrate themselves!” (Gal 5:12, NRSV); “Beware of the dogs, beware of the evil 
workers, beware of those who mutilate the flesh” (Phil 3:2, NRSV). He also defends them from greedy, 
presumptive leaders: “For such boasters are false apostles, deceitful workers … his [Satan’s] ministers” (2 
Cor 11:13‒15, NRSV). Paul directly addresses a congregation: “You foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched 
you?” (Gal 3:1, NRSV). Paul expresses each of these colorful rants to target a group for its problematic 
behaviors but not to berate his missionary congregations or to assert that they possess intractable faults. 
2 
My reading is as follows: In Titus 1:10–12, Paul described troublemakers in the 
Cretan church, most of whom were Jewish (μάλιστα οἰ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς, 1:10). Divisive 
people (αἱρετικόν ἄνθρωπον, 3:10) disrupted the church (ὅλους οἴκους ἀνατρέπουσιν, 
1:11) by teaching that Cretans, as Gentiles, were morally and religiously inferior. The 
troublemakers’ interest in genealogies, quarrels over Torah (γενεαλογίας, μάχας νομικὰς, 
3:9), Jewish myths (Ἰουδαϊκοῖς μύθοις, 1:14), and other trappings of Jewish religious 
culture reinforced an attitude of superiority over any who did not have credentials and 
tokens of status that were valid in their system—namely, Gentile Cretans. When Paul 
framed the famous quotation (1:12), he was completing his general description of the 
troublemakers with a specific and characteristic example of their teaching. The group from 
which the speaker that concerns Paul comes is the group of troublemakers. In their eyes, 
but not in Paul’s, this foul-mouthed bigot was a prophet (ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης, 
1:12a). The quotation may or may not have survived as a fragment of ancient Cretan 
literature. For the troublemakers, it justified their doctrine of ethno-religious 
inferiorization. Although we cannot confirm it, if a Cretan originated the saying, then 
anyone who used the slur could have pointed back with a shrug and said, “Even they speak 
this way about their own kind!” For Paul, the quotation contradicted the transformative 
power of the gospel (3:3–7), but he knew of a certainty (ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀληθής, 
1:13a) that someone among the troublemakers (τις ἐξ αὐτῶν, 1:12a) was propagating it. 
Whoever was doing so and the community that encouraged them needed to be stopped and 
corrected (οὓς δεῖ ἐπιστομίζειν, 1:11a; ἔλεγκε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, 1:13b). Although it is 
quite common for readers of this verse in Titus (1:12) to assume that Paul was participating 
in bigotry, I think that he may rather have been exposing and rebuking it. Over the course 
of this study, I trust that the reasons for considering this plausible reading and for calling 
into question key assumptions of other interpretations will become increasingly clear. 
Many prevalent interpretations of this passage contradict my sense of the broad 
thrust of the Bible, the personality of the purported writer (Paul), and the message of the 
biblical book in which it appears (Titus). Its history of interpretation is contentious and 
riddled with contradictory proposals, making it a problem passage. Interpreters need 
consistent hermeneutical strategies to illuminate alternative possibilities.3 A strategy that 
 
3 Anne Furlong argues that literary interpretation too often depends upon different interpreters accounting for 
a “different set of facts” (quoting Kiparsky). Hence, the need for a consistent hermeneutic. This concern 
3 
recommends itself to constituencies who approach the text from diverse starting points—
whether denominational, scholarly, skeptical, or confessional; whether of a linguist, 
historian, theologian, or literary critic—could ameliorate contention.4 To develop such a 
strategy, I will explain three key insights from a well-tested theory of utterance 
interpretation (Relevance Theory) and demonstrate their practical application upon Titus 
1:12 and representative interpretations thereof. The theory provides sound rationale for 
questioning some conclusions in preference to others and offers a hermeneutical 
foundation for reexamining the issues this passage presents. To appreciate prevailing 
interpretations of this passage in Titus, we must first understand some critical matters 
regarding the book. 
The Provenance of Titus 
Assumptions about provenance influence meaning even when interpreters give no explicit 
comment, extended attention, or intensive study to the issue. For Titus, the two crucial 
issues are authorship (Who wrote it?) and composition history (What is it?).5 Although my 
thesis is substantially unaffected by and, therefore, ambivalent about provenance, 
assumptions about these matters influence interpretation enough to require comment. 
1. Authorship 
The church has received the book of Titus as a letter by the Apostle Paul to his junior 
colleague, Titus, outlining instructions for church leadership and laity along with some 
moral and theological teaching. It has normally appeared with 1 and 2 Timothy, forming a 
trio that has been commonly designated the Pastoral Epistles, a de facto collection within 
the Pauline corpus of the New Testament canon.6 Throughout this study, I will use Paul as 
 
 
applies to biblical interpretation, especially of problem passages. See “Relevance Theory and Literary 
Interpretation” (PhD Diss., University College of London, 1995), 36–37. 
4 Tim Meadowcroft argues that Relevance Theory promises a “mediating category” by which to resolve some 
of the tensions between the critical environment of his scholarship as an Anglican and his Evangelical 
institutional setting. He aimed to “discover a hermeneutic that makes sense of the polarities and holds them 
together in some way.” See “Relevance as a Mediating Category in the Reading of Biblical Texts: Venturing 
Beyond the Hermeneutical Circle,” JETS 45 (2002): 611‒27, at 613. 
5 See Raymond F. Collins’s succinct introduction to his entry in “Pastorals ‒ Biblical Studies,” Oxford 
Bibliographies Online, Pastorals, http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/view/document/obo-
9780195393361/obo-9780195393361-0089.xml (accessed 9/9/17). 
6 These three books have been known as the Pastoral Epistles (PE) for as long as can be remembered. A 
similar designation goes back at least to Thomas Aquinas as per Charles K. Barrett. In the first instance, this 
4 
shorthand to refer to the writer without committing to any particular meaning for that name 
other than the author of Titus, which I avoid simply because it is clumsy. 
Although other issues, such as views toward women and church organization, 
interest scholars of the Pastoral Epistles (henceforth, PE), Raymond Collins explains that 
“the issue of the authorship of the Pastorals has dominated scholarly investigation of these 
texts … and the concomitant issues of interpretation that the views on authorship entail.”7 
Modern scholars are dubious of the traditional provenance of Titus and the other PE.8 This 
uncertainty calls for a measure of tentativeness. Nevertheless, several factors, including 
certain principles of Relevance Theory (RT) that I outline below, make us optimistic about 
discerning authorial intentions by careful analysis. 
Even while taking the PE to be pseudonymous, Annette Bourland Huizenga says, 
“Modern readers may still presume that he [the author of Titus] has painted a realistic 
picture of the structure and dynamics of at least some Christian communities of his own 
place and time. As a result, he formulates a representation that would be historically 
plausible to the earliest readers.”9 For this reason, modern readers should not dismiss the 
potential of these letters to illumine real historical issues. Towner makes a similar point: 
“The PE are recognized as presenting a coherent theological and ethical argument to a real 
church or churches somewhere in time.”10 
 
 
label did not imply their compositional unity but their topical commonality. See The Pastoral Epistles in the 
New English Bible, New Clarendon Bible: New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 1. 
7 Collins, “Pastorals.” 
8 Statistical analysis was a factor that, especially in the 1970s through 1990s, swayed many to regard the PE 
as “un-Pauline.” See A. Dean Forbes, “Statistical Research on the Bible,” ABD 6 (1992): 185–206 at 204. He 
writes, “Most distressingly, we have repeatedly seen investigations embarked upon with sweeping claims of 
assent-demanding objectivity only to witness their ultimate invalidation through special pleading and 
selective attention to results. One need not be a statistician to detect when an outcome has hinged on a 
researcher/thaumaturge [wonder-worker] and audience blinking at critical moments.” Mounce, although 
generally ambivalent about authorship, nevertheless provides one of the most thorough critiques of style-
based arguments against the authenticity of the PE. See Pastoral Epistles, xcix‒cxviii. Problems reconciling 
known history with representations in the PE also influenced many to doubt their authenticity. But, 
concerning the correspondence between historical realities and even authentic literary reconstructions of 
them, James W. Aageson writes, “It would be a methodological fallacy to assume congruence between the 
two when there may in fact be little or none.” See Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Early Church, Library 
of Pauline Studies (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008), 10. 
9 Annette Bourland Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, ed. Sarah Tanzer, vol. 53 of Wisdom Commentary, ed. 
Barbara E. Reid (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2016), xlviii. 
10 Philip H. Towner, “Pauline Theology or Pauline Tradition in the Pastoral Epistles: The Question of 
Method,” TynBul 46 (1995): 287–314 at 288. 
5 
Since assumptions about authorship affect interpretation and vice versa, it is 
equally as valid to form conclusions about authorship beginning with a close study of the 
text as to form conclusions about meaning from the standpoint of an assumed 
compositional history. The same stands for those who accept one of the numerous 
proposals for pseudonymity and also for those who view the letters as authentically 
Pauline. We may legitimately approach the question from either orientation—that is, 
authorship’s implications for interpretation or interpretation’s implications for authorship. I 
do not aggressively address this otherwise important issue, because the main contentions of 
my proposal will stand whether the book is authentically Pauline or pseudonymous. Like 
Aageson, I begin “by assuming neither the authenticity nor pseudonymity of” Titus.11 
Rather, I seek to discern the meaning of a passage on the basis of the available evidence. 
My research, nevertheless, bears implications for the question of authorship. 
2. Composition 
The commonalities of the PE prompt interpreters to consider how each letter addresses the 
themes they share. We do not, however, know the nature of their relationship, the direction 
of influence or dependency. The average reader may not realize how numerous and 
complex the proposals are of how these books relate to one another. Some hold that these 
were individual letters that the church collected and passed down as it had done with 
Philippians or Galatians.12 Others suggest that portions of actual Pauline correspondence 
were incorporated into the documents.13 David Cook attacks this last theory—the 
fragmentary hypothesis—on the grounds that the purported “fragments” were in the same 
style as the rest of the compositions.14 I. Howard Marshall rebuts that an author 
incorporating fragments might cast them in his own style, therefore the style is not a 
 
11 Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, 11. He refers to all three Pastorals. 
12 E.g., Donald Guthrie, The Pastoral Epistles: An Introduction and Commentary, 2nd rev. ed., vol. 14, 
TNTC (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1990); Philip H. Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, NICNT 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006); Luke Timothy Johnson, The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, vol. 35A, AB (New York: Doubleday, 2001). Claiming 
Pauline authorship does not make the history of composition, collection, and distribution simple, as can be 
seen in David Trobisch’s Paul’s Letter Collection: Tracing the Origins (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994). 
13 For example James D. Miller, The Pastoral Letters as Composite Documents, SNTSMS 93 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Burton Scott Easton, The Pastoral Epistles: Introduction, Translation, 
Commentary and Word Studies (New York: Scribner’s, 1947); Robert Alexander Sir Falconer, The Pastoral 
Epistles: Introduction, Translation, and Notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937); P.N. Harrison, The 
Problem of the Pastoral Epistles (London: Oxford University Press, 1921). Why the fewest number of such 
fragments should appear in the longest of the letters (1 Timothy) suggests that this hypothesis is 
unsatisfactory as an explanation of origins. 
14 David Cook, “The Pastoral Fragments Reconsidered,” JTS 35 (1984): 120–31. 
6 
decisive argument against the presence of fragmentary material.15 Nevertheless, scholars 
do not agree on which portions constitute authentic fragments and, therefore, cannot 
distinguish them from the rest of the material with confidence. The common view that 
these letters were written as a single composition possibly intended to simulate a private 
letter collection has influenced interpretation most profoundly and requires additional 
comment. 
The most common assumption about the origins of the PE is that they were initially 
written as a single composition to imitate a personal letter collection. Philip Towner thinks 
that uncritical acceptance of this theory has biased interpretation.16 He argues that reading 
the letters solely as a corpus skews their individual meaning and reinforces the assumption 
that they are inauthentic and inferior without regard to their actual substance. Luke 
Timothy Johnson describes this prevalent theory: 
The letters to Timothy and Titus are, therefore, not real letters in the sense 
that they were sent to actual individuals with the names Timothy and Titus, 
or even that they were composed separately and sent to anyone. Rather, the 
three “letters” actually form a single literary production in which each 
“composition” plays a distinct role. The “Pastoral Letters” are, in this 
understanding, not real correspondence, but the fictional rendering of a 
correspondence. Thus they are not to be read with reference to Paul’s letters 
(written some generations earlier), but only with reference to one another 
and, possibly, to other literature considered contemporaneous to their 
production.17 
Even when commentators do not explicate their starting assumptions, the theory has 
influenced most modern scholarly interpretations of these books.18 As Johnson has opined, 
 
15 I. Howard Marshall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, ICC (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1999), 72–73. For an early and multi-faceted analysis of problems with the fragmentary 
hypothesis, see C.F.D. Moule, “The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles: A Reappraisal,” BJRL 47 (1965): 430–
52. 
16 Towner, Letters to Timothy and Titus, 27–28. David Trobisch advanced a proposal that Paul engaged in the 
conventional authorial practice curating and publishing his own letter collection. See Paul’s Letter 
Collection. Ancient letter collections typically contained letters that, although redacted, represented actual 
correspondence. The single document hypothesis requires that the PE did not circulate separately at all; their 
appearance as letters was a ruse. 
17 Johnson, First and Second Letters, 79. Here and throughout this thesis all emphases are original. 
18 Treatments of provenance are typically concerned with the implications of pseudonymity for canon, 
whereas my main concern is its implications for interpretation. These treatments are customary in the 
literature, and it is not necessary for me to revisit all of the issues here. The following scholars represent 
various angles: Terry L. Wilder argues against pseudonymity in principle. See Pseudonymity, the New 
Testament, and Deception: An Inquiry into Intention and Reception (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 2004). David G. Meade considers kinds of and conditions for accepting pseudonimity. See 
Pseudonymity and Canon: An Investigation into the Relationship of Authorship and Authority in Jewish and 
Earliest Christian Tradition, WUNT 39 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986). Armin Daniel Baum, examining 
several ancient critiques of irregular authorship claims (including in the PE), explains that apostolic 
7 
numerous readers believe the PE to be a forged letter collection because they were told so 
in college, not because they have personally examined them. He writes: 
Little real discussion of the issue of authenticity still occurs. But I remind 
the reader that this consensus resulted as much from social dynamics as 
from the independent assessment of the evidence by each individual 
scholar. For many contemporary scholars, indeed, the inauthenticity of the 
Pastorals is one of those scholarly dogmas first learned in college and in no 
need of further examination.19 
Johnson later argued “that the grounds for declaring them inauthentic are so flawed as to 
seriously diminish the validity of the scholarly ‘majority opinion.’”20 Adopting the single 
document hypothesis profoundly influences how one interprets the PE, but the reasons for 
doing so are highly contested. So, in order to examine Titus afresh, I begin transparently 
with its literary self-presentation as an individual letter. The reasons for this choice will 
become clear. 
Several scholars in recent years have argued, based on distinctions between the PE, 
that they were individual letters addressing specific local situations.21 Although not 
everyone gives the question extended critical energy, assumptions regarding provenance, 
nevertheless, underlie their readings. Interpreting passages from the PE without at least 
tacitly subscribing to some conclusion (often furnished by another, trusted scholar) about 
their compositional history is almost impossible. Concluding a survey on PE scholarship 
from 2000 to 2010, Marshall’s first point was that in recent years, “A number of writers 
 
 
authorship was not a sufficient criterion for canonicity but that it was nevertheless a necessary one. See 
“Literarische Echtheit als Kanonkriterium in der alten Kirche,” ZNW 88 (1997): 97‒110. Baum addresses the 
issue of stylistics, which is perhaps the most common angle of argument for or against PE authenticity in 
“Semantic Variation within the Corpus Paulinum: Linguistic Considerations Concerning the Richer 
Vocabulary of the Pastoral Epistles,” TynBul 59 (2008): 271–92. Baum offers his original assessment of the 
stylistic argument against Pauline authorship more fully in Pseudepigraphie und literarische Fälschung im 
frühen Christentum: mit ausgewählten Quellentexten samt deutscher Übersetzung, WUNT 2.138 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2001). According to Marshall, differing convictions about provenance do not utterly negate an 
solid evidence-based interpretation. He writes, “I do not think that at any significant point my exegesis is 
incompatible with a more conservative hypothesis regarding authorship.” See “The Pastoral Epistles in 
Recent Study,” EG, 268–312, at 274‒5. 
19 Johnson, First and Second Letters, 55. 
20 Ibid., 91. 
21 Rüdiger Fuchs, Unerwartete Unterschiede: Müssen Wir Unsere Ansichten Über Die “Pastoralbriefe” 
Revidieren? (Wuppertal: Brockhaus, 2003); Jens Herzer, “Zwischen Mythos und Wahrheit: Neue 
Perspektiven auf die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe,” NTS 63 (2017): 428–50; Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral 
Epistles. Marshall identifies others who argue the individuality of the letters. See “Pastoral Epistles,” 304–8. 
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are emphasizing the individuality of the Pastorals as three separate compositions.”22 He 
then summarizes their various reasons and positions. These scholars include James W. 
Aageson, Rüdiger Fuchs, Jens Herzer, Michael Prior, and Philip Towner.23 Marshall shows 
that scholars representing several cross-sections of opinion on authorship and authenticity 
nevertheless argue for the individuality of the PE. Understanding Titus deeply involves 
wrestling with the questions of authorship and composition. In harmony with the general 
movement in PE scholarship toward seeing these letters as distinct compositions, this study 
treats Titus as an individual letter. This choice does not materially affect the linguistic 
aspects of my thesis; but it keeps my focus narrow, my parameters firm, and my approach 
transparent. 
I will now explain and demonstrate how assuming the single document hypothesis 
described above unduly biases interpretations of Titus. The two issues stemming from this 
assumption that most profoundly affect interpretation are, first, the tendency to treat the 
concerns of all three PE as an undifferentiated amalgam and, second, the tendency to 
assume a lack of coherence in their structure and message. These tendencies have a self-
confirming and self-reinforcing effect, but recent research questions them. 
a. Amalgamation of the Pastorals 
Assuming that the PE constitute a single literary composition has led to the amalgamation 
of their particular messages and personalities, conflicts and remedies. C. K. Barrett 
demonstrates the constraints of this conventional wisdom when he presumes to discuss 
“the false doctrine the author [of the PE] had in mind,”24 as “difficult to ascertain,” 
because Barrett feels obliged to read the three books as a single work. Examples of 
homogenizing tendencies skewing interpretation are numerous, but one of the more 
unfortunate is when the theology of Titus is regarded as a static and lifeless deposit 
 
22 The names identified here with the years of the works Marshall was interacting with are merely 
representative of the very thorough overview given in Marshall, “Pastoral Epistles,” 308. 
23 E.g., Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral Epistles; Fuchs, Unerwartete Unterschiede; Michael Prior, Paul the 
Letter-Writer and the Second Letter to Timothy, vol. 23, JSNTS (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1989); 
Towner, Letters to Timothy and Titus. This trend has not diminished since Marshall’s writing. Jens Herzer, 
has advanced the argument with additional evidence and analysis. See “Was Ist Falsch an Der ‘Fälschlich Do 
Genannten Gnosis’?: Zur Paulusrezeption Des Ersten Timotheusbriefes Im Kontext Seiner Gegnerpolemik,” 
Early Christianity 5 (2014): 68–96; and “What Is Wrong with the ‘Falsely-Called Gnosis’ (1 Tim 6:20)? The 
Transformation of Pauline Ecclesiology in Light of Rising Gnostic Movements.” (Conference Paper paper 
presented at the SBL Annual Meeting—Program Unit: Disputed Paulines, Baltimore, MD, 2013). His ideas 
on the letters’ individuality have been incorporated into his quite recent “Zwischen Mythos und Wahrheit.” 
24 Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 12. Furthermore, Barrett (21) makes the odd connection that “Timothy must 
cease to abstain from wine” (1 Tim 5:23), because “To the pure all things are pure” (Tit 1:15), rather than by 
Paul’s own logic—“for the sake of your stomach and frequent ailments”! 
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(παραθήκη, 1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:12, 14), a word or idea that arguably does not represent 
Paul’s perception of the gospel in the Epistle to Titus, if even in the letters to Timothy.25 
Another error takes the argument from one of the PE to strictly interpret the other PE in 
spite of intra-contextual evidence. For example, Barrett says that, as far as the PE are 
concerned, “women have no place” in the ministry “from theological grounds (I Tim. 
2:13f...).”26 He cites Titus 2:4, which does not contribute to the argument as Barrett frames 
it, but ignores 2:3, which instructs older women to be good-teachers (καλοδιδασκάλους)—
i.e., teachers of what is good. In Titus, teaching is a leadership role.  
Viewing these letters as a single composition and amalgamating their distinctives 
leads Huizenga to claim that “Indeed, the Pastorals assert that the organization of the 
whole cosmos is based on God’s οἰκονομία, ‘household management’ (1 Tim 1:4);”27 even 
though that Greek lemma appears only in 1 Cor 9:17; Eph 1:10; 3:2, 9; Col 1:25; and 1 
Tim 1:4 among all the NT epistles—a surprising distribution for a concept she considers 
both un-Pauline and pivotal to Titus. The lemma also appears in Isaiah 22:19, 21 (LXX) 
and Luke 16:2‒4. Paul compares the elders (πρεσβύτερος, 1:5) Titus is supposed to 
appoint with a metaphorical household manager (οἰκονόμος, 1:7), but this is a different 
claim than Huizenga makes of a programmatic theology across the PE. Furthermore, 
οἰκονόμος also has a telling distribution in the NT: Luke 12:42; 16:1, 3, 8; Rom 16:23; 1 
Cor 4:1, 2; Gal 4:2; Titus 1:7; 1 Pet 4:10. It is difficult to see this pattern as distinctively 
PE and un-Pauline. Whereas Marshall, Towner, and others consider topical redundancy in 
the PE a reason to doubt their original unity,28 Huizenga claims that the author repeats 
material between the Pastorals “to add authoritative weight to his opinions.”29 That 
significant concerns are not shared by some Pastorals casts doubt on this contention, which 
assumes that the Pastorals are more univocal about topics between component letters than 
Paul’s undisputed works. Furthermore, Huizenga’s claim that Paul articulates the nature of 
conflict in his undisputed letters but not in the Pastorals is not sustainable upon closer 
examination.30 I explain below how the author of Titus is more specific than typically 
appreciated in identifying the cause of upheaval in Crete. 
 
25 For a representative example of this particular error, see ibid., 31. 
26 Ibid., 32. 
27 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, xlii. 
28 E.g., Marshall, Critical and Exegetical, 1‒2. 
29 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 133. 
30 Ibid., xliv. 
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The single document hypothesis obscures the context of Titus, amalgamates its 
themes and concerns with the other PE, and stifles its unique voice. Marshall exposes an 
example of these problems when he discusses the relation of ἐγκράτεια (discipline, Acts 
24:25; Gal 5:23; 2 Pet 1:62; and cognates ἐγκρατεύομαι, 1 Cor 7:9; 9:25; and ἐγκρατῆς, 
Titus 1:8) and σωφροσύνη (discipline and cognates in Titus 1:8; 2:2, 4, 5, 6, 12; 1 Tim 2:9, 
15; 3:2; 2 Tim 1:7). They are part of a cluster of virtues that, commentators repeat the 
claim, are both characteristic and distinctive of the PE. Marshall points out, however, that 
they do not have the same prominence or sense in 2 Timothy that they have elsewhere.31 
He explains that ἐγκράτεια was common in Greek virtue lists but that it had less 
importance for Paul’s concerns in the Pastorals as contrasted with his prolific use of 
σωφροσύνη and cognates in Titus and 1 Tim but not in 2 Tim.32 
As Johnson explains, some scholars disallow the undisputed Paulines from 
illuminating issues in Titus, even though these books share many themes and ideas.33 
Commentators commonly refer to the features of the PE as a whole, even when those 
features do not obtain in particular books. As Guthrie writes, “These three Epistles … have 
always been treated as a single group.”34 For example, T. Christopher Hoklutubbe makes 
assertions about the PE on the basis of a fine examination of the presence and development 
of the language of piety (e.g., εὐσέβεια) as it appears in 1 Tim. He makes minimal 
reference to its development or presence in Titus or 2 Tim and shows minimal appreciation 
for this word group elsewhere (e.g., Rom 1:18, 25; 4:5; 5:6; 11:26; 2 Thess 2:4).35 The 
Pastoral Epistles in the subtitle of Hoklutubbe’s published dissertation could, therefore, 
mislead uncritical readers. Impressed by his thorough inquiry into 1 Tim and notions of 
piety in the ancient world, they might think that the same considerations obtain, not in the 
undisputed Paulines or other NT books, but evenly across Titus and 2 Tim. However, the 
actual distribution of εὐσέβεια does not unambiguously support this claim. We find two 
instances in Titus (1:1; 2:12) and eight in 2 Pet (1:3, 6, 7; 2:5, 6, 9; 3:7, 11). Although 
Hoklutubbe’s argument that this word group was of special interest under Trajan and 
Hadrian is probably correct as far as coinage, inscriptions, and monumental history are 
concerned, its distribution across the NT canon seems ambivalent to this scheme. Compare 
 
31 See Critical and Exegetical, 182–83. 
32 Ibid., 185. 
33 See First and Second Letters, 35A:79. 
34 See Pastoral Epistles, 19. He is correct as long as, by “always,” he means in the modern era. 
35 Civilized Piety: The Rhetoric of Pietas in the Pastoral Epistles and the Roman Empire (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2017). 
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five instances of its cognate ἀσέβεια and none of εὐσέβεια in Jude (4, 153, 18) with the 
pattern in Romans—four instances of ἀσέβεια (1:18; 4:5; 5:6; 11:26) and one non-prefix 
cognate (σεβάζομαι, 1:25). A key text from Titus where the cognates ἀσέβεια and εὐσεβῶς 
are used virtually as antonyms (2:12) casts doubt on the counter-argument that the 
presence of a common root does not entail a close relation of ideas. 
The dual tendency to amalgamate the issues presented in Titus with those of the 
other Pastorals and to distinguish them carefully from the undisputed Paulines is 
methodologically unsound. This common practice leads to the assumption that these books 
have never had an independent life of their own but have always shared an identical 
historical and literary context. Nevertheless, as I have mentioned, a growing number of 
scholars propose that these books were written and circulated separately, even that they 
may have had distinct provenances in terms of place, time, authorship, and so forth.36 
The practice of harmonizing all PE polemic to present one vague, monolithic 
opponent to the PE community does not yield lucid interpretations. Careful observation 
reveals that the offending parties in Crete were distinct. Towner exposes the tacit treatment 
of the PE as a single, inseparable composition and shows that the amalgamation of 
opposition presented in each locale with that of the others is a problematic consequence of 
this tendency.37 Derek Brown provides one of the many examples of this amalgamating 
tendency. In a recent paper, he omitted the fact that neither Satan nor devil, not to mention 
false teaching per se, appear in Titus to argue that the PE represent a marked development 
in the Pauline tradition toward attributing contrary doctrine to evil, non-human agents.38 
As I will show, Titus’s opponents in Crete had specific characteristics and arguments. 
Our ability to discern the exact nature of opposition in Titus is admittedly limited. 
On the surface, Paul does not articulate the troublemakers’ teaching directly; rather, he 
derogates it with epithets such as stupid, worthless, and empty (3:9); and he instructs his 
delegates, Titus and the elders he appoints (1:5‒9), to rebuke its practitioners (1:9, 13; 
2:15; 3:9‒10). As Barrett explains, “He was more concerned to combat the evil moral 
effect of his adversaries’ teaching ... than to analyze their beliefs.”39 Certain limitations 
 
36 E.g., William A. Richards, Difference and Distance in Post-Pauline Christianity: An Epistolary Analysis of 
the Pastorals, vol. 44, Studies in Biblical Literature (New York: P. Lang, 2002); Herzer, “Zwischen Mythos 
und Wahrheit.” 
37 See Letters to Timothy and Titus, 27–36. 
38 See “Satan: The Author of False Teaching in the Pastoral Epistles” (paper presented at the SBL Annual 
Meeting—Program Unit: Disputed Paulines, Atlanta, 2015). 
39 Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 12. 
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may prevent us from reconstructing the troublemakers’ teaching and practices in satisfying 
detail, but we must be cautious not to carelessly mingle Titus’s distinct portrayals with 
those of the other PE. Now, let us consider one other implication that stems from accepting 
the single-document hypothesis. 
b. Incoherence of the Pastorals 
Assuming that the PE are a literary unit, one rightly wonders whether they have a coherent, 
cohesive message. The question might not arise apart from the single document 
hypothesis.40 If the PE are a patchwork of Pauline fragments arranged arbitrarily or were 
simply composed with very little attention to argument, then readers are under no 
obligation to discern a message. Barrett refers to a number of passages that P.N. Harrison 
considered to be authentic Pauline fragments within the PE as “artless—and in some ways 
pointless.”41 Some commentators are fashionably unimpressed with the “artless” Pastorals 
and view them as logically incoherent, impersonal, theologically and rhetorically 
impoverished.42 Several level the criticism that the Pastorals present an arbitrary and 
incoherent collection of material.43 Anthony Tyrrell Hanson writes, “The Pastorals are 
made up of a miscellaneous collection of material. They have no unifying theme; there is 
no development of thought.”44 Frances Margaret Young describes the general “scholarly 
estimate of the theology of the Pastorals” as “a fairly arbitrary, inconsistent, unthought-out 
amalgam with little coherence.”45 Even advocates of Pauline authorship level such 
criticisms. Guthrie writes of the PE, “There is a lack of studied order, some subjects being 
 
40 If the PE constitute a single composition, a second question arises: In what order they should appear? The 
canonical ordering may not be original, as Quinn, Marshall, and others suggest, pointing to some manuscript 
evidence. Their order affects interpretation of the presumed whole. See Jerome D. Quinn, The Letter to Titus: 
A New Translation and Commentary and an Introduction to Titus, I and II Timothy, the Pastoral Epistles, 
vol. 35, AB (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 2–3; and Marshall, Critical and Exegetical, 1–2. Both Quinn and 
Marshall deliberately order their works to comment on Titus first, out of the canonical order, because they 
argue that their approach may follow the appropriate historical and literary order more closely. For both of 
them, however, the more pressing concern is pulling Titus out of 1 Timothy’s shadow. 
41 Pastoral Epistles, 11. He interacts with P.N. Harrison, The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1921). 
42 E.g., Cook, “Pastoral Fragments,” 122. He argues against the Pauline nature of the Pastorals and attempts 
to foreclose the suggestion that any portion came from the hand of Paul. Moule generally agrees that they are 
“artless” (Barrett’s term), but he attributes the artlessness to the hand of an amenuensis—Luke. I cannot 
agree that the hypothetical effect of Luke’s involvement in writing “at Paul’s behest” would have 
downgraded their quality. See “The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles,” 433–34. 
43 See references in Andreas J. Köstenberger, “Hermeneutical and Exegetical Challenges in Interpreting the 
Pastoral Epistles,” EG, 1–27. See also Miller, Pastoral Letters, 61, 100, 139, et passim. 
44 The Pastoral Epistles, NCB (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 42. 
45 The Theology of the Pastoral Letters, New Testament Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 47. 
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treated more than once in the same letter without apparent premeditation.”46 So, the books 
appear to lack the typical Pauline touch. 
Recent arguments have critiqued these views. Commentators’ general agreement 
about the logical outline of Titus, in particular, has shown its straightforward organization. 
Ray Van Neste has extensively argued that the PE have a telling structure and logical 
coherence.47 Although Lewis R. Donelson does not believe them to be Pauline, he 
recognizes that “the Pastorals appear to present carefully structured arguments which 
follow the paraenetic canons of their day.”48 Most scholars consistently observe, especially 
in Titus, a simple logical outline. 
A generation ago, after a flurry of renewed critical interest in the formerly drab PE, 
Donelson observed, “a change in mood on the Pastoral Epistles. No longer do scholars 
simply assume, as they did for several generations, that these letters are awkward 
combinations of diverse literary forms.”49 In a review of Miller’s published dissertation, 
Towner points out that Miller acknowledged “the current trend in Pastorals research which 
maintains that the author of the Pastorals … succeeds in communicating a dynamic 
message replete with coherent theological and ethical substance.”50 Scholars increasingly 
appreciate the coherence of the Pastorals regardless of their stance on whether they are 
Pauline. Köstenberger quotes Marshall’s assessment that “there is a growing body of 
evidence that the Pastoral Epistles are not a conglomerate of miscellaneous ideas roughly 
thrown together with no clear plan, purpose or structure. On the contrary, they demonstrate 
signs of a coherent structure and of theological competence.”51 The critical move toward 
viewing the PE as separate compositions probably aids this perception. 
Even if critics see the PE as artless compositions, attending to matters of theme and 
structure supports interpretation more than presuming their rhetorical poverty. Donelson 
 
46 Pastoral Epistles, 20. 
47 Ray Van Neste, Cohesion and Structure in the Pastoral Epistles, JSNTSup 280 (New York: T & T Clark 
International, 2004); Ray Van Neste, “Cohesion and Structure in the Pastoral Epistles,” EG, 84–104. 
48 Lewis R. Donelson, Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles, Hermeneutische 
Untersuchungen Zur Theologie 22 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 69. 
49 Lewis R. Donelson, “The Structure of Ethical Argument in the Pastorals,” BTB 18 (1988): 108–13; also 
cited in Van Neste, “Cohesion and Structure,” 87. 
50 Philip H. Towner, review of The Pastoral Letters as Composite Documents, by James D. Miller, JBL 118 
(1999): 372–74; see Miller, Pastoral Letters. Miller otherwise uses the assumed incoherence of the PE as a 
starting point for his inquiries. I suspect, however, that interpreters may claim that a text is incoherent when 
they object to or have not grasped its message. Conflicting opinions cause one to question whether the 
artlessness ascribed to the letters is a matter of their composition or reception. 
51 Köstenberger, “Hermeneutical and Exegetical Challenges,” 12. He quotes from Marshall, “The Christology 
of Luke-Acts and the Pastoral Epistles,” in Crossing the Boundaries: Essays in Biblical Interpretation in 
Honour of Michael D. Goulder, ed. Stanley E. Porter et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 167‒82. 
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presumes the need to “pretend to find another theological genius lurking in these rather 
pedestrian letters” as compared with what “we detect in [the undisputed] Paul;” yet he sees 
that they display a perceivable logic, albeit counter to Donelson’s reading of the authentic 
Paul.52 The expectation of encountering a coherent message comports with the approach of 
reading each letter on “its own terms” practiced and advocated by Aageson.53 
Describing his own approach to the PE, Aageson says that he “takes seriously the 
literary and conceptual world of each of the individual letters as discrete documents that 
have integrity in their own right.” He goes on to say, “This is not the case in much 
scholarship on the Pastorals. They are often treated as a Pastoral corpus, which disguises 
the substantive differences between them.”54 Based on its form of presentation, he hears 
Titus as an individual letter prior to investigating peculiarities that may lead him toward 
some other theory of compositional origins.55 Similarly, I treat Titus as a stand-alone 
composition with its own author, audience, and setting (both real and implied). I do not 
argue that it must only be read in this fashion; but I think that lucid interpretations depend 
on first hearing the book in its own epistolary context without undue influence from other 
texts, even the Pastorals.56 The present form of Titus was composed at least to look like 
and implicitly be treated as a single epistolary composition. So, all else being equal, 
therefore, I take the literary-context of the letter itself to be the weightiest evidence in 
interpretation—before the “co-text” of the PE, the Pauline Corpus, and the NT.57 Having 
outlined two broad issues that influence interpretations of Titus, I will now examine 
common interpretations of the Cretan quotation. 
The Prima Facie Interpretation—Definition and Explanation 
As with any biblical passage, interpretations of Titus 1:12 are diverse. No single reading 
prevails, but most readings feature several basic assumptions that I describe and evaluate 
below. To the extent that an interpretation adheres to this set of assumptions, I refer to it as 
 
52 See Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument, 1. 
53 Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, 11, 18. 
54 Ibid., 16.  
55 The tendency to amalgamate the PE places a burden upon readers of the secondary literature to sift through 
comments and assertions to discern their relevance or accuracy for individual letters. So, throughout this 
study, I present scholars’ comments on the Pastorals as comments on Titus to the extent that they apply 
without further qualification. 
56 Johnson also argues for this approach in First and Second Letters, xi, 14, 357, 369, et passim. 
57 See Vernon K. Robbins, Exploring the Texture of Texts: A Guide to Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation 
(Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 1996). I qualify my weighting of the evidence by 
acknowledging that external evidence can profoundly affect interpretation. This does not imply, however, 
that we can construe the book to mean something contrary to its intra-contextual assertions. 
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a prima facie reading. Although scholars in recent decades have approached this text with 
sensitivity and sophistication, most seem unable to escape the gravitational pull of the 
prevalent assumption that Paul tacitly sympathizes with the quotation’s crude description 
of Cretans. Over the course of this study, I call this assumption into question. According to 
a prima facie interpretation, the Cretan quotation, irrespective of other factors, was also the 
substance of Paul’s opinion of the Cretans; furthermore, he advanced the quotation’s 
assessment of Cretans as the view Titus should have going forward in his ministry. 
Whatever merits this letter might otherwise have, surely the presence of a truly 
bigoted remark would be a blemish upon the book, perhaps even an affront to the canonical 
Paul, the “apostle to the nations” (Rom 11:13) who would “become all things to all people 
in order to save some” (1 Cor 9:22). Titus has the tough luck of leading a community of 
existential reprobates. Jerome D. Quinn is representative of this reading: 
With deadly seriousness the author of Titus has Paul vouch for the truth of 
the cruel ancient jibe, thus solemnly joining the witness of an apostle to the 
oracle of the prophet-poet. The latter is cited as ‘a prophet’ not only because 
the Hellenistic world so conceived him but also with an irony pointed at the 
Jewish-Christian troublemakers. 
Quinn links his interpretation to a specific attribution in spite of the evidence he presents 
later that the quotation could not be traced to Epimenides or any other Cretan writer and 
that it was a narrow group of troublemakers that deserved rebuke, not the Cretan 
populace.58 
Given the influence of prima facie readings, it is not surprising that Huizenga 
fiercely critiques the consequences of that conventional interpretation and charts a reading 
strategy against the text: 
What I … find especially troubling is that the negative assessments of Jews, 
Jewish traditions, and the ethnic Cretans seem to have influenced several 
modern commentators to adopt a similar prejudice, which then leads to a 
tendency to read the rest of the letter as if it were written to a culturally and 
morally backward community.59 
The five features that characterize what I am calling a prima facie interpretation are 
as follows: 1) Paul’s authorial sympathy with the quotation’s linguistically-encoded 
contents, 2) contextual discontinuity between the thrust of the quotation and the 
surrounding material, 3) ancient literary or archaeological corroboration of the veracity of 
the quotation, 4) conflation of the troublemakers and the general Cretan church populace, 
 
58 Letter to Titus, 109. 
59 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 141. 
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and 5) dubious attribution of the quotation to Epimenides of Crete. Interpretations align 
with my prima facie categorization to the extent that they depend upon or emphasize some 
or all of these points. I will briefly describe each of the five features of a prima facie 
reading along with their weaknesses. Then, I will offer a more substantial critique while 
interacting with their adherents. 
1. Authorial Sympathy 
First, prima facie interpretations commonly assume the author’s sympathetic attitude 
toward the contents of the statement as linguistically-encoded. So, Paul presumably had an 
approving attitude toward the statement, “Cretans are always liars, evil brutes, lazy 
gluttons” (1:12). RT adds technical precision to this description. It asserts that linguistic 
expression is underdetermined, requiring readers to distinguish between linguistically-
encoded propositional meaning and the speaker’s intended meaning. Therefore, the 
speaker’s attitude toward sentences is pivotal to utterance interpretation.60 
2. Contextual Discontinuity 
Second, the prima facie reading requires an abrupt change in topic within the paragraph 
(1:10‒16). Rather than the quotation functioning within a continuous argument against 
troublemakers in the Cretan church, Paul supposedly begins railing against ethnic Cretans 
mid-paragraph and returns to address presumptive leaders after this brief, non sequitur 
interruption. Whether or not commentators discuss the discontinuity between addressing 
inappropriate leadership and insulting the Cretan populace, this maneuver is assumed in 
most interpretations. The argumentative structure of Titus is otherwise so straightforward 
that it is surprising more interpreters do not question the break in thought assumed by the 
prima facie reading. Jerome (347‒420 CE; Comm. Tit. 1.12‒14), however, agonized over 
the presumed break in Titus 1:10‒16. He could not see why such an insult would appear in 
the midst of Paul’s otherwise continuous concern with belligerent Jewish leaders. In the 
end, he sided with Clement of Alexandria (150‒215 CE; Strom. 1.14) on account of respect 
for his authority.61 
 
60 Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, “Pragmatics,” Cognition 10 (1981): 281–86 at 281, et passim. See also 
Gene L. Green, “Relevance Theory and Theological Interpretation: Thoughts on Metarepresentation,” 
Journal of Theological Interpretation 4 (2010): 75–90. 
61 See Jerome’s full dialogue on Titus 1:10‒16 in Commentaries on Galatians, Titus, and Philemon, trans. 
Thomas P. Scheck (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). See telling excerpts in Peter 
Gorday and Thomas C. Oden, eds., Colossians, 1-2 Thessalonians, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, Philemon, ACCS 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2000), 291. 
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3. Ancient Corroboration 
Third, many scholarly adherents to a prima facie reading assume that ancient literary or 
archaeological testimony objectively and unambiguously demonstrates that the Cretan 
people actually were or were purported to be just as the quotation describes. Several 
commentators search, find, and present evidence that appears to corroborate the 
linguistically-encoded view of the quotation. In which case, Paul supposedly joined a host 
of critics and echoed the verdict of history—namely, Cretans are innately delinquent. 
Significant methodological problems accompany this approach. Commentators present 
ancient literary reports of Cretan malfeasance to show that some Cretans at some time in 
history were accused of some kind of wrongdoing or an inclination toward it. Those 
writers typically are not careful either to correlate the nature of the reported wrongdoing 
with the moral concerns of the quotation and of the book of Titus or to correlate the era of 
the reported wrongdoing with the era of the book of Titus. It suffices them merely to find 
any ancient evidence that harmonizes with negative stereotypes toward Cretans, even when 
the broader context of the evidence does not suggest that Cretans were of special concern 
to the ancient writer. Anna Strataridaki argues, in agreement with early twentieth-century 
classical historian and archaeologist Henri Van Effenterre, that “no good reason exists for 
these people to have had a bad name either in their early history or in later times.”62 
Furthermore, commentators typically do not demonstrate that the Cretans were more 
despised or more accused than people of other ethnicities or that the same amount of 
disparaging material could not also be found for any ethnicity if one searched for it. I will 
critique specific examples in greater detail as they arise. 
4. Conflation of Targets 
Fourth, several prominent interpreters conflate all targets of Paul’s critical rhetoric so that 
their interpretations do not maintain the categorizations established in the discourse itself. 
The block quotation from Huizenga at the beginning of this section exemplifies this 
tendency.63 Paul seems to vocalize criticisms of various categories of people and practices. 
For instance, he references features of Jewish religious culture (circumcision 1:10, 
commandments 1:14, genealogies 3:9), troublemakers in the church (1:10‒11), and—
through the quotation—native Cretans. Interpreters, however, tend to read the negative 
 
62 “Epimenides of Crete: Some Notes on His Life, Works and the Verse ‘Κρῆτες Ἀεὶ Ψεῦσται’” (Rethymno: 
University of Crete, 1988), 14. 
63 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 141. 
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judgments surrounding the Cretan quotation as levelled against all of these groups. 
Tracking the corrective logic of Titus requires more careful attention to exactly whom Paul 
targets. RT illuminates the need and process for interpreters to assess when an author is 
writing descriptively or interpretively—when their words represent their own opinions or 
those of others. 
5. Dubious Attribution to Epimenides of Crete 
Fifth, and finally, most commentators who discuss attribution assume that a fifth- 
or sixth-century (BCE) Cretan poet, Epimenides, originated the quotation, but this is far 
from assured. The quotation has no reliable attribution. Modern writers invoke his name 
over-confidently, but ancient authors painted a vague and contradictory picture of his era, 
occupation, and characteristics. They hardly provide the kind of evidence to support strong 
assertions that Paul borrowed authority from a well-known Cretan to lend credibility to an 
insult he wished to level against Cretans. None of Epimenides’s writings remain extant, so 
we cannot verify the claim. Furthermore, some scholars have advanced other ancient 
writers for consideration. The five tendencies described above comprise the quintessential 
array of assumptions for what I call prima facie readings. Most interpretations of Titus 
1:12 rely on some or all of them. I will now address critical problems with these readings. 
Critical Problems and Representative Examples 
The prima facie interpretation has been an invisible accomplice in many unsustainable 
interpretations of Titus 1:12. Most treatments of the passage require or assume some level 
of adherence to this surface reading. The secondary literature on Titus exhibits diverse 
hermeneutical approaches, so I have selected several representative interpreters with whom 
to engage regarding the critical issues I raise. I will demonstrate that available evidence 
challenges interpretations that rely on prima facie reading assumptions. Subsequent 
chapters will show that these are also questionable when examined in light of RT. 
1. Contextual Problems 
Scholars recognize that the pejorative essence of the Cretan quotation contradicts the 
canonical image of Paul. What is less commonly acknowledged is that it also conflicts with 
its immediate and book context in Titus. The prima facie reading presents problems at four 
levels of context: immediate grammatical context, discursive paragraph context, 
compositional book context, and broad literary-canonical context. Whereas Reggie M. 
Kidd claims that the quotation is programmatic of Paul’s moral instructions throughout 
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Titus and tries to ameliorate the apparent topical breech without undermining the 
conventional reading,64 I argue that the contextual features I describe below and the 
foundational assumptions of the prima facie reading are incompatible. They cannot both be 
sustained. I introduce the problems here and revisit them throughout the study. 
First, accepting the prima facie interpretation risks causing readers to overlook the 
grammar of the passage and assign unsuitable values to words. Second, it results in readers 
assuming that the writer diverts from his topic, thus muddying up one of the most vivid 
and incisive passages in Titus. Third, it leads readers to distort the epistle’s moral and 
theological instruction in order to comport with a degraded view of the Cretan 
congregations. Fourth, and finally, adhering to that surface reading discounts the weight of 
the literary-canonical context of Titus—that is, the conceptualization of persons, places, 
and situations inherited by its writer and readers. Below, I describe each of these four 
contextual problems and provide some examples. 
a. Overlooking the Grammar of the Immediate Context 
Adherents to a prima facie reading often overlook some aspects of grammar in the 
immediate context. George W. Knight, for example, without explaining the unusual 
maneuver, assigns Cretans as the referent of their (αὐτῶν) in 1:12.65 Because Huizenga 
aims to locate and expose aspects of the Pastorals that may be construed as negative 
toward the disenfranchised, she takes special interest in the quotation.66 Even though Paul 
attributes the quotation to someone else, Huizenga pins it directly on him: “One of his 
most offensive tactics is to put into writing an ethnic insult.”67 
The relative pronoun in Paul’s statement whom [someone] should silence (οὓς δεῖ 
ἐπιστομίζειν, 1:11) clearly refers to the troublemakers introduced in the previous verse and 
not to Cretans in general. Nevertheless, some scholars conflate these groups. In a single 
paragraph, Jouette Bassler writes, “Through it [the Cretan quotation] the opponents are 
dehumanized (Gk. kaka thēria; NRSV: ‘vicious brutes’), and the accompanying 
instructions are to muzzle or gag them (Gk. epistomizein; NRSV: ‘silence’). Moreover, all 
 
64 “Titus as Apologia: Grace for Liars, Beasts, and Bellies,” HBT 21 (1999): 185–209. 
65 The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 298–
99. 
66 Huizenga is transparent about the purpose of her commentary and the Wisdom series. See 1-2 Timothy, 
Titus, xli–lii. 
67 Ibid., 139. 
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Cretans are included in this brutal condemnation.”68 What Bassler refers to as 
“accompanying instructions” appear four clauses earlier, so she confuses the object of 
Paul’s criticism. Bassler asserts that Paul was condemning both the troublemakers in Crete 
whom Paul identifies as a particular group (1:10‒11) and the entire Cretan populace. If all 
Cretans are included, then the instruction to gag them is absurd, especially as a missionary 
strategy. This reading also renders Paul’s description of the troublemakers extraneous and 
misleading (1:10‒11). 
An often ignored or tacitly mis-assigned pronoun within the context provides 
another example of grammatical contextual problems with the prima facie reading: Paul 
instructs Titus to rebuke certain people severely, using the personal pronoun them (αὐτοὺς, 
1:13). This usage prompts the question, Whom is Titus expected to rebuke? Interpreters 
usually assume that the pronoun refers either to Cretans or to presumptive leaders in the 
Cretan church, with whom Paul seems to be concerned (1:9b‒12a). Is Paul instructing 
Titus to sternly rebuke an entire ethnic group on the basis that they are genetically 
vicious? This seems offensive, ridiculous, and implausible. On the other hand, if Paul is 
instructing Titus to rebuke the troublemakers of 1:10-11, then why assign them as the 
referent to the personal pronoun in 1:13 but not in 1:12? Commentators do not adequately 
address this dilemma. Wolfgang Stegemann, following the first option, says that Paul 
“assumes that all members of the ethnic group of the Cretans have negative characteristics, 
which disqualify them morally and in the end place them outside the human race.”69 
William D. Mounce follows the second option by recognizing that the rebuke of Titus 1:13 
is aimed at the troublemakers of 1:10‒11 but then paraphrasing the verse exactly as 
follows: “‘rebuke them [the Cretans] sharply’ (Titus 1:13).”70 He mistakes the referent of 
this pronoun (them, αὐτοὺς, 1:13) for the target of the derogatory quotation (1:12b). 
Mounce recognizes the comparisons and contrasts between the Cretan population and 
troublemakers within the church who held distorted views of Cretans (à la the Cretan 
quotation), but he conflates the troublemakers in specific with the Cretans in general. For 
Mounce, the object of rebuke includes the very people disparaged by the Cretan quotation, 
but he does not address Paul’s concern with those who were disparaging them.71 Thomas 
Aquinas considered the troublemakers of 1:10‒11 worthy of rebuke, but he justified it 
 
68 Jouette M. Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, ANTC (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 190. 
69 Quoted by Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 140. 
70 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 392. 
71 See ibid., 408, 438. 
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based on 2 Tim 2:14 rather than Titus 1:13 nearby. He also typifies the prima facie reading 
by assuming a shift in topic between 1:11 and 1:12 and missing the continuity between 
Paul’s concerns with ethno-religious bullies and his rebuke throughout 1:10‒16.72 We now 
address perceptions of such contextual shifts. 
b. Assuming a Topical Diversion within the Paragraph Context 
After the epistolary introduction, the first chapter of Titus focuses on leadership—good 
(1:5‒9) and bad (1:10‒16). Mounce explains that for (γάρ, 1:10) connects the paragraph 
under examination (1:10‒16) with the preceding (1:5‒9).73 The macro relationship 
between the paragraphs is one of hortatory substantiation—instructions followed by 
rationale.74 Paul instructed Titus to appoint elders of noble character in each town (1:5‒9) 
because of the presence of presumptive leaders (1:10‒16). Titus 1:10‒16 primarily 
concerns these troublemakers, their moral character and behavior, what Titus is supposed 
to do about it and why. 
Writers can move from topic-to-topic freely and without warning, but they 
customarily relate one sentence to another in sensible and transparent ways or mark off 
diversions with caveats and resumptive words or phrases—for example, the resumptive 
discourse functions of οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν in 2 Cor 12:2, 3 or καί in Eph 2:6. The prima 
facie reading allows for scant contextual relations between the contents of the quotation 
and the surrounding sentences. Commentators do not seem to question their assumptions 
when they affirm that Paul jumps from one topic to another in Titus 1:12 with almost no 
sense of continuity. Paul, however, seems to have thought that his presentation of the 
quotation had a clear logical relation to the material both before and after, using 
resumptive logical connectives and cross-contextual referentials such as the personal and 
relative pronouns of 1:12‒13, which I will discuss in Chapter One under the heading Basic 
Pragmatic Processes. 
In contrast to the dense structure of 1 Tim, which meanders through diverse topics 
with negligible traces of logical or thematic progression, Titus’s structure is fairly 
 
72 Commentaries on St. Paul’s Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s, 
2007), 164-165 (comments on Titus 1:10-16). I have not seen a commentator correlate the disqualification of 
bullies (πλήκτης, Titus 1:7) with the behaviors of the troublemakers in Crete—e.g., upsetting entire 
households (ὅλους οἴκους ἀνατρέπουσιν, 1:11). Paul’s instructions concerning moral character and behavior 
do not form in a vacuum; they correlate to Titus’s actual context. 
73 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 395–96. 
74 For descriptions of such logical relationships, see David R. Bauer and Robert A. Traina, Inductive Bible 
Study: A Comprehensive Guide to the Practice of Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 
107–8. 
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transparent. Its organization and argument are relatively easy to grasp, except when readers 
tacitly assume a topical diversion between 1:12 and its surrounding verses. Huizenga 
recognizes that “Jewish opponents [are] mentioned in 1:10 and 1:14;” but she assumes that 
the verse in the very middle (1:12) is Paul’s statement against Gentiles.75 In Chapter Two 
under the heading Salience for Original Audiences versus Modern Eavesdroppers, I 
propose one reason why readers see a diversion here. 
Rather than seeing a topical diversion, Mounce conflates the subjects of Paul’s 
complaint about the troublemakers in 1:10‒11 with the subjects of the Cretan quotation in 
1:12b.76 He is correct that the vices of children that disqualified their parents from 
becoming elders (1:7) paralleled the troublemakers’ traits (1:10‒11), but he does not 
adequately distinguish between the very specific designation Paul gives of the 
troublemakers—especially those from the circumcision (μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς, 
1:10)—and the much more generic subject of the quotation—Κρῆτες (Cretans, 1:12). 
c. Distorting the Moral and Theological Instruction in the Book Context 
Paul does not transparently develop a concern with gluttony, laziness, or even lying as 
such later in Titus.77 He does, however, evoke relations between Jews and Gentiles and 
between Christians and the society around them. The troublemakers impressed ethnic 
Cretans with a sense of religious and moral inferiority. The power brokers of the religious 
community questioned Cretan legitimacy. When Paul mentions Jewish religious and 
cultural interests, he addresses the contention that Gentiles could not be full members of 
the Christian community without attending to the traditions of Jewish religious culture—
circumcision (1:10) chief among them.78 Rather than seeing Paul develop the ethical 
instruction of Titus in this palpable social context, many commentators take their cue from 
the prima facie interpretation of the quotation and assume that Paul’s subsequent 
admonitions are remedial and defensive.79 Some scholarly treatments of Titus imply that 
its ethic is primarily informed by concerns for legitimacy in the broader world rather than 
 
75 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 173. 
76 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 390, 392 (comments under Titus 1:7b and 1:9b). 
77 Contra Kidd, “Titus as Apologia,” 185–209; and Riemer A. Faber, “‘Evil Beasts, Lazy Gluttons’: A 
Neglected Theme in the Epistle to Titus,” WTJ 67 (2005): 135–45. 
78 See Chapter Two under the heading Contextual Assumptions. 
79 Beyond the scope of this thesis, the paraenesis of Titus is far more nuanced than generally appreciated, and 
its soteriology is profoundly transformational. 
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the gospel itself. In other words, the ethics of Titus is about Christian public relations and 
damage control.80 
d. Discounting the Literary-Canonical Context of Titus 
Most scholars assume that the audience of Titus did not have direct personal knowledge of 
Paul and Titus and knew them primarily as literary and historical figures. Therefore, 
appreciating the contribution that Titus makes to the NT canon involves understanding 
how it presumes the audience’s familiarity with inherited notions of Paul and Titus. Robert 
Wall explains that the author of Titus, in an attempt to carry on the “Pauline Apostolate” 
for new generations of Christians with relevant adjustments for his contemporary church, 
relied on the audience’s knowledge of Paul from other canonical scriptures.81 Therefore, 
we rightly ask, What feature of Paul’s literary persona in the NT is more prominent than 
that he was the “Apostle to the Gentiles” (Rom 11:13); the one who memorably said, “I 
have become all things to all people” (1 Cor 9:20‒22) and “The same was mighty in me 
toward the Gentiles” (Gal 2:8)? 
Although they may articulate it in different terms, most scholars judge that the 
literary-canonical context of early Christian writings is more relevant to the interpretation 
of Titus than the socio-historical context of Paul’s actual relationship with Titus during his 
lifetime. If they are right, then it is reasonable to suspect that the author of Titus intended 
to evoke Paul’s subversions and objections to ethno-religious stratification as seen in his 
undisputed writings (à la Gal 3:28; 4:17; 5:3‒4, 12; Phil 3:2-7). Furthermore, it is 
reasonable to consider how the author might have portrayed Paul as subverting, not 
endorsing, the bigotry evident in the Cretan quotation. A prima facie reading overlooks 
this literary-canonical aspect of Titus. 
Suppose the pseudonym aimed to evoke the authentic Paul to the extent he could. 
He may have bumbled Paul’s style or contradicted Paul’s theology in subtle ways, but 
interpreters hardly noticed for hundreds of years—the deception was so convincing. If not 
personally, then the pseudonym knew Paul through his letters and perhaps through Acts.82 
Based on these, no biographical attribute seems more prominent than Paul’s radically 
 
80 E.g., Kidd, “Titus as Apologia”; and Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety. I discuss this more in Chapter Three 
under the heading Ethics and Redemption in the Sound Doctrine of Titus. 
81 Robert W. Wall and Richard B. Steele, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, Two Horizons New Testament 
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 332, et passim. 
82 Mounce finds it curious, “In light of the frequent scholarly distrust of the reliability of Acts, it is interesting 
that here its reliability becomes the standard against which the PE are judged.” See Pastoral Epistles, lxxxv. 
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inclusive mission to the Gentiles. Some commentators have even gone so far as to consider 
specific undisputed Pauline texts anti-semitic (e.g., Gal 2:21; 3:10; 5:12; Phil 3:2).83 
Likewise, based on the treatment of Jewish religious culture in Titus (e.g., 1:10, 14; 3:9), 
several scholars label the author anti-Semitic.84 It, therefore, seems unreflective to claim 
that the author was using the Cretan quotation to disparage the island’s primary (Gentile) 
ethnic group. Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann explain that the Cretan quotation 
serves “to add local flavor” to the pseudonymous epistle by peppering it with concrete 
ethnic references and a famous slur, thus reinforcing the ruse of Pauline authorship.85 But, 
Does the pseudonym do so by having Paul assert something that everyone knows is out-of-
character for the Apostle? Whose reconstruction of the Apostle Paul would disparage his 
missionary population? A writer capable of the literary accomplishment, ethical argument, 
and theological coherence of Titus could have portrayed a more passable Paul. Yet, this 
problem only exists for the prima facie reading. 
2. Social and Historical Problems 
Now that I have critiqued a sample of the literary contextual problems with a prima facie 
reading, I will consider some of the social and historical problems. I have organized these 
under two headings—first, I will address critical issues with prima facie readings at a 
social level, then I will examine some of the efforts of scholars to bolster such 
interpretations. 
a. Social Implications of the Prima Facie Reading 
The Cretan quotation invites easy categorizations of the other. Huizenga claims that Paul 
“has simply adopted the common perceptions about Cretans that designate them as the 
‘other.’” Accordingly, Paul’s “rhetoric serves to set them apart from ‘good’ Greeks and 
‘good’ Romans and now excludes them from the category of ‘good’ Pauline Christians.”86 
Having heard the quotation, one no longer needs to wonder about the character of Cretans. 
This ready refrain will be at-hand alongside “Never trust an elf!” (spoken by a dwarf from 
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Middle Earth) and “Ferengi are greedy, misogynistic, untrustworthy little trolls” (spoken 
by a human from Star Fleet). One has no reason to doubt the assessment until they are 
encountered. Titus, however, was supposed to encounter ethnic Cretans daily, so How was 
this quotation supposed to serve his mission? 
Despite Paul’s famous inclusivity and accommodating ministry, according to 
Mounce, Paul abandoned his signature missionary strategy when it came to the Cretan 
church. Why? Mounce says that it was because “the Cretan social standards were evidently 
so low that there was, in essence, nothing to which Paul could accommodate.”87 Paul 
himself was, after all, “A person who says that Crete is full of liars, evil beasts, and 
gluttons.”88 Mounce clearly holds some assumptions of the prima facie reading. He writes, 
“The problems in Crete are those expected of a young church in a pagan environment. Paul 
wants their salvation from lives of sin (Titus 1:12‒13…).”89 This diagnosis obscures the 
ethno-religious character of the problems to which Paul alluded (1:10‒16; 3:9‒10). 
Although Paul pointed to Jewish believers (1:10–12), Mounce essentially agrees with the 
quotation’s assessment that the problem with the church in Crete was its pagan converts 
(i.e., Cretans) and their commensurate degradation. 
Stegemann acknowledges the Jewish religious interests of Paul’s opponents; but, 
instead of concluding that they would have favorable attitudes toward Jews and 
disfavorable attitudes toward Cretans, he considers all ethnic references to contribute to a 
singular, generalized bigotry. He blends Paul’s correctives, writing of Titus 1:10–16, “the 
rejected group is connected with implicit prejudices about Judaism and explicit prejudices 
about the Cretans.”90 Huizenga pits Paul against the entire local population, without 
differentiating Paul’s argument as for or against specific constituencies, when she writes, 
“He assumes that his audience will agree with his depiction of his opposition (‘those of the 
circumcision,’ Cretans, and others) as belonging to the broad category of ‘corrupt and 
unbelieving…detestable, disobedient, unfit for any good work.’”91 These writers conflate 
the purveyors of bigotry with its targets. 
Another example of the social problems with prima facie readings comes from 
Jerome Quinn. The quotation appears to have come from a poetic source—it is a Greek 
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90 Stegemann, “Anti-Semitic and Racist,” 284; see also 273, 280–91. 
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hexameter sentence, the first strophe of which appears extant in a hymn by Cyrenian poet 
and scholar Callimachus (310‒240 BCE; Hymn. 1.8‒9). Quinn, therefore, notes its poetic 
features and attempts to convey its aesthetic nature in a more conventional English form: 
Liars ever, men of Crete, 
Nasty brutes that live to eat.92 
Re-poeticizing the quotation may help English readers to appreciate its aesthetics, but it 
has dubious value for interpretation. First, the quotation had already been excised from its 
poetic context to function as a crude slur. Second, recapturing the poetic effect does not 
solve the problem of why Paul mentioned the quotation in a context addressing leadership 
malpractice. 
Conclusions that follow from accepting the prima facie interpretation are 
alarmingly prejudicial. Marshall characterizes the Cretan church as one “struggling to 
break free from depraved patterns of behavior, such as were widely associated with 
Crete.”93 Even though Greg A. Couser acknowledges that Paul’s main conflict in Crete had 
“a Jewish, law-based flavor,” he assumes that Paul used the quotation to judge Cretan 
culture: “What stridency we find arises from the potential threat and, maybe more so, the 
challenge posed by the Cretans’ cultural heritage (or lack thereof, 1:12).”94 Couser thus 
demeans Cretan culture. Johnson writes, “the unsavory character of the local population 
that was already suggested … becomes explicit: even a native Cretan prophet testified truly 
to their coarse and evil ways.”95 Tacitly sympathetic to the quotation’s negative view of 
Cretans, Johnson asks of instructions for young women in Titus 2, “Is this a sign of the 
savageness and incivility of the native population, that responses ordinarily thought to be 
‘natural’ should require teaching?”96 These comments are merely representative. I could 
list dozens more, but I have chosen scholars who are recognized authorities. Doubtless, 
reading the text in this way has affected people’s opinions about Cretans. Some take it 
even further, however, and attempt to prove the validity of a prima facie reading. 
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b. The Scramble for Corroborating Evidence 
Several interpretive problems in Titus 1:12 came to light when Anthony C. Thiselton 
vehemently criticized commentators’ dubious practice of garnering evidence for the 
historical accuracy of the attitude expressed in the Cretan quotation in a scathing 1994 
article.97 Many scholars essentially try to corroborate the prima facie reading through 
evidence in ancient literature and archaeology.98 Thiselton objected to the modern quest to 
demonstrate that the quotation’s assessment of Cretans was historically justified. First, the 
quest fails on historical grounds, because the evidence is weak. Second, the quest fails on 
literary grounds, because it asks the wrong question. Huizenga also critiques this quest: 
The value judgments of Cretan culture as untruthful and gluttonous (and 
thus, rudimentary, corrupt, savage, uncivil, etc.) do not arise from any 
“sociological” studies of the population but rather from the simple 
proverbial sayings and ancient reports. It is impossible for later readers to 
tease out the facts about life on Crete during the Roman Empire, and we 
cannot know the cultural realities for various people and groups when they 
are framed in such polemical and stereotypical ways.99 
The scramble to find corroborating evidence for the prima facie interpretation represents a 
misuse of socio-historical critical methods. Scholars have attempted to gather historical 
evidence that implicates Cretans in any kind of wrong-doing that can be found—regardless 
of the kind of wrong-doing or its chronological distance from the era of Titus. 
Mounce assumes that Paul shared the view of Cicero (106‒43 BCE) who wrote in 
Latin more than one hundred years earlier than Titus that “Moral principles are so 
divergent that the Cretans … consider highway robbery honorable” (Rep. 3.9.15).100 Titus 
1:12, however, does not mention any kind of theft or assault. Patrick Gray infers that 
Odysseus’s impersonation of a Cretan man in the second half of the Odyssey (14.41‒199) 
reflected the prevalence of Cretans’ unfavorable reputation, but such a conclusion is not 
strongly suggested by the context. The impersonation begins at line 199, but the story is 
favorable or ambivalent to Cretan moral character. The whole purpose is to build up the 
drama of Odysseus and what he went through to survive the Trojan War and to protect his 
identity. Gray, however, overplays his assumption: “So pervasive is this view of Crete that 
it finds its way into the pages of the NT. The author of the Letter to Titus describes the 
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local population as ‘always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons.’”101 Yet, it is uncertain that an 
ancient prejudice about Titus’s missionary outpost, as reflected in classical Greek myth, 
aids interpretation here. Commentators, nevertheless, accumulate evidence to support the 
notion that Cretans historically were vicious or were at least considered to be so by an 
ancient writer. Baugh gathers evidence of Cretan malfeasance (e.g., piracy, treason), but 
his examples do not correspond to the specific moral concerns of the quotation or come 
from a close historical period or geographic location.102 
Interpreters often must distinguish between a writer mentioning someone else’s 
opinion and expressing her own. Exodus 5:7‒9 provides an analogy. Pharaoh considered 
the Hebrews to be lazy liars, but scholars have generally known better than to seek 
historical justification for that opinion. They understand that it was expressed within a 
context that reveals it as an unreliable claim, revealing more about the Pharaoh’s attitude 
toward the Hebrews than about the Hebrews themselves. Seeking corroborating evidence 
for the veracity of Pharaoh’s opinion from ancient writing and archaeology would rightly 
be critiqued as anti-Semitic; and, to Huizenga’s point above, Could any truly relevant, 
representative, or useful data really be found from such a quest? 
Chiao Ek Ho presents an incriminating list of offensive Cretan actions: “known for 
its warring cities, piracy, wild pagan worship, and immoral practices. Lying was 
apparently regarded as acceptable in Cretan culture; thus the coining of the term κρητίζω 
(from the island’s name, Crete [Κρήτη]), which means ‘to play the Cretan,’ that is, ‘to 
lie.’”103 Ho derives most of these behaviors from archaeological and literary depictions 
which are geographically and chronologically removed from first-century CE Crete, and he 
includes some behaviors that do not coincide with the quotation. He may establish that 
certain people at some point considered Cretans to be wicked people, and historical 
evidence may assert that some Cretans did bad things. Does Paul rightly disparage them 
then? According to Ho, Paul uses the quotation for straightforward description. He seems 
to be neglecting the more relevant question: What is Paul doing with this quotation? Ho’s 
only comment on its rhetorical thrust is that Paul contrasts Cretan liars (ψεῦσται, 1:12) 
with the unlying God (ἀψευδὴς θεὸς, 1:2). Although Ho argued in his doctoral thesis that 
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Paul was always controlled by a “missionary outlook” in the Pastorals, this prima facie 
interpretation does not trouble him.104 
Aside from its unsavory ring, two additional counterpoints deflate attempts to 
historically prove the moral reprobation of Cretans: First, the biblical portrayal of Cretans, 
although not prolific, is generally not negative (see 1 Macc 10:67; Acts 2:7‒11; 27:7‒13, 
21). Second, one may scour written history with a selective brush, to locate unflattering 
commentary about any selected ethnicity (e.g., see comments below on Cicero, Republic 
3.9.15). Anyone with a search engine can muster a collection of disparaging judgments 
against a given ethnicity from its detractors and its internal critics and, thus, rally literature 
and archaeology to censure an ancient or modern category of people—just enter the term. 
Such pursuits constitute confirmation bias more than truly discovery-oriented 
socio-historical research. Although he does not speak in terms of confirmation bias, 
Thiselton argues that commentators have been grasping for “further empirical grounds” to 
validate the content of Paul’s supposed assertion.105 They want to verify it historically, but 
doing so requires a speculative reconstruction of Paul’s, Titus’s, and the Cretans’ cultural 
exposure to the writings and histories of writers widely dispersed in time, space, and 
discipline (e.g., philosophy, history, poetry, geography). Besides this limitation, the 
approach also ignores historic literature that is positive about the Cretans. 
The moral teaching in Titus may amount to a lifestyle apologia, as Kidd argues. In 
the context of the letter, however, this aspect of ethics is predicated on Paul’s operating 
assumption that Cretan society is morally discerning and is concerned with reputation. 
Kidd does not make a strong enough case that the moral concerns of the quotation align 
with Paul’s moral instruction elsewhere in the letter. Along with others that I critique in 
this section, Kidd pairs disparate evidence as he relies on some of the literary evidence I 
re-assess below (e.g., Pliny, Nat 8.83; Plutarch, Inim. util. 86C) while arguing that the triad 
of Hellenistic moral virtues in 2:12 are a corrective against the triad of Cretan vices in 
1:12.106 
Those who assert that Cretans were historically notorious often do not match their 
evidence with the moral issues that the quotation raises, diminishing the applicability of 
their claims. The quotation’s only other extant form besides Titus seems to echo a 
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misunderstanding, not an actual offense. The initial phrase, Cretans [are] always liars 
(Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται), appeared in Callimachus, Hymn. 1.8‒9. In this poem, Callimachus 
accused Cretans of being superlative liars; because he supposed that they claimed to 
possess the tomb of the immortal Zeus, who cannot die. The tomb in question was actually 
for a Cretan man named Zeus. John Calvin, citing ancient interpreters, explained that the 
quotation’s initial claim was based on this historical misunderstanding. He, nevertheless, 
took the quotation at face value as Paul’s opinion of the Cretans, commenting on Titus 
1:13, “Paul accepts the truth that he has spoken, for there is no doubt that the Cretans … 
were very wicked men. The apostle … would not have spoken so harshly of the Cretans 
without the best of reasons.”107 
Even though Greek historian Polybius (200‒116 BCE) was specifically criticizing 
Crete’s libertine land ownership and private property rights with the biased voice of a time 
in Crete hundreds of years removed from the NT era, Mounce considers Polybius’s 
comments pertinent: “Greed and avarice are so native to the soil in Crete, that they are the 
only people in the world among whom no stigma attaches to any sort of gain whatever” 
(Polybius, Hist. 6.46).108 Polybius was not critiquing Cretan character but the liberality of 
their laws that made it possible for citizens to secure unusual wealth. His comments are 
pertinent not to Titus 1:12 itself but to a prima facie interpretation of it and only when 
removed from their literary and historical context. Mounce also cites Greek writer Plutarch 
(46‒120 CE); but the context of that story, although including stereotypical 
disparagements of Cretans, pivots to show that the story’s villain is actually cheating a 
band of mercenary Cretans—an act referred to as κρητίζων πρὸς Κρῆτας (Cretanizing the 
Cretans, Aemil. Paul. 23).109 
Mounce also cites a narrative by Livy (c. 64 BCE‒c. 12 CE) in which, first, he told 
of Perseus’s talented and trusted Cretan Lieutenant being unable to finish a rallying speech 
because the Macedonian crowd saw their king’s grief and, then, he told of a mishap in 
which underpaid Cretan mercenaries accidentally sank a ship they were trying to board (Ab 
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Urbe Condita 44:45).110 The narrative mentions Cretans but is not about Cretan character 
in general. Various ancient writers may have stereotyped the Cretans and other ethnic 
groups as vicious, but such does not prove their actual reprobation or get Paul off-the-hook 
for bigotry simply because others shared his supposed opinion. 
Commentators cite Cicero’s Republic (3.9.15) to corroborate the view that ancient 
people had little esteem for Cretans.111 Within the same literary context where Cicero 
refers to Cretan acceptance of “piracy and brigandage,” however, he also lists the supposed 
moral concessions of Egyptians, Gauls, Athenians, Lacedemonians, Carthagenians, and 
others. Scholars typically cite the portion that is unfavorable toward Cretans; while, in the 
larger section, Cicero was highlighting differences of opinion among nations of the world, 
rather than accusing any single nation of having an intrinsically and objectively corrupt 
character. No ethnicity is exempt from accusation or bigotry. Aside from the fact that these 
were hearsay accusations and historically removed by one hundred or more years from 
Titus, they also do not coincide with the kinds of moral degradation mentioned in the 
Cretan quotation. I, therefore, question the applicability of this evidence to the task of 
interpretation. 
To emphasize how common human corruption and intrigue was in every nation, 
Plutarch mentioned a rumor that Crete alone did not have any haunts for wild animals. The 
rumor is also found in a naturalistic context by Pliny the Elder (23-79 CE), who said, quite 
without any negative connotations toward the people of Crete, that the island seems to 
have “no baneful animal,” except a certain spider (Nat. 8.83). Plutarch’s original point was 
that depraved humans were so much more common than depraved animals, that there was 
even a nation that was rumored not to have the latter—although it certainly had the former. 
Plutarch continued, “A government which has not had to bear with envy or jealous rivalry 
or contention—emotions most productive of enmity—has not hitherto existed” (Inim. util. 
86C); that is, every nation exhibits these negative features. Quinn embellishes Plutarch’s 
meaning concerning Crete not having wild beasts as evidence that Cretans, above other 
nationalities, are vicious people. Quinn writes, “The poet asserts that the human beings 
there give the lie to that belief. They are beasts of prey, not working for their food but idly 
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prowling about for something to satisfy their hunger.”112 Following Quinn, Mounce writes, 
“While most countries had to deal with wild beasts, in Crete the same problem was posed 
by people who, in the absence of wild animals, assumed the role themselves.”113 These 
connections emerge not from a careful reading of Titus or other ancient literature but from 
the assumptions that pertain to a prima facie interpretation. They are, nevertheless, 
representative of mainstream scholarship on the topic. Grasping for historical narratives 
that sketch a generally negative portrait of the Cretans has led even the most respectable 
scholars toward biased and irrelevant sources that do not really help us to understand what 
Paul is doing with this quotation. 
The scramble to find corroborating evidence does not even reckon with the fact that 
a great deal of material in the ancient world was complimentary toward Crete and Cretans. 
For instance, Polybius commended the Cretan governmental constitution (Hist. 6.43). In a 
modern analogy, many supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump scrambled to cover for 
him when he reportedly called a category of nations “sh*thole countries” in a closed-door 
meeting, where he thought his words would remain private.114 Like the scramble to 
corroborate Paul’s supposed negative opinion of the Cretans, these supporters attempted to 
rationalize Trump’s words. Among their excuses and explanations, defenders said he was 
justified because he was referring to sanitation facilities. Others simply rebutted that he 
was expressing the deplorable condition of certain nations.115 In this defense of Trump, as 
in the prima facie interpretation, adherents attempt to marshal real-world facts to justify a 
prejudicial statement rather than acknowledging that the statement had a pragmatic sense 
beyond the semantics of the sentence. The quest to reinforce highly selective knowledge of 
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ancient Cretans with additional facts even when those facts are in most other ways 
irrelevant can be misguided and embarrassing. So, what are the alternatives? 
3. Inadequate Solutions 
Interpreters tend to accommodate their readings to prima facie assumptions largely without 
questioning them. Bruce J. Malina and John J. Pilch, for instance, attempt to illuminate 
Titus with sensitivity to “an array of social sciences such as anthropology, social 
psychology, sociolinguistics, and the like;”116 but they reiterate dubious assumptions that 
are foreign to the text, attributing the Cretan quotation to Epimenides, advancing already-
ancient and—they admit—oblique legends of Cretan malfeasance, and the author’s 
sympathy with the quotation’s linguistically-encoded propositions. “The Pastor concurs!” 
they exclaim.117 Their readers do not derive new insights regarding the Cretan quotation, 
because their “social-science” approach leans upon the accretions of interpretive history. 
Several scholars recognize that the contents of the quotation seem to correlate to 
Paul’s concerns with the troublemakers, but they still generally assume that Paul tacitly 
and uncritically holds a negative view of the Cretans. Towner, for instance, concludes that 
Paul employs the quotation to highlight a comparison between the proposition of the 
quotation and the behavior of the presumptive leaders (1:10‒16) as well as a contrast with 
a good leader’s character (1:5‒9). This is likely the case, but Towner betrays the power of 
the prima facie reading to influence interpretation when he goes on to assume that Paul 
was also providing a description of the Cretan population. Towner suggested that 
households were being disrupted by “dangerous teaching that was tinged with Cretan 
permissiveness (and other elements more Jewish perhaps).”118 “Cretan permissiveness” 
does not appear in the context of the text on which he is commenting but is only visible on 
the basis of assuming Paul’s sympathy with the quotation. The silent accomplice of prima 
facie reading also emerges when Towner says that instructions to older women in ch. 2 
were “to show themselves as older wives who had successfully emerged from the Cretan 
way of life.”119 In the end, most scholars concede a reading that requires Paul to either 
tacitly agree with or even advance an extremely negative and essentially bigoted view of 
the Cretan ethnicity. 
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In its original, lost context, the quotation could have had many possible meanings 
other than a simple slur, such as irony, sarcasm, humor, lament, or political jab. I suggest 
that the passage portrayed Paul as recognizing the out-of-context use of this quotation. I 
will argue that he exposed those who violated both its original literary meaning and, more 
importantly for Paul, the Cretans’ self-valuation. Although this quotation influenced other 
people’s view of the Cretans, its context in Titus suggests that Paul was also troubled by its 
power to affect Cretans’ view of themselves. They considered themselves inferior to Paul’s 
opponents on ethno-religious bases. Ben Witherington, III proposes that this jab is directed 
only against leaders who were ethnically Cretan, but this view does not comport with the 
fact that Paul does not portray the troublemakers of Titus 1:10‒11 as primarily of Cretan 
ethnicity or that the syntax of the quotation or its frame does not clearly target them.120 
Most readers readily acknowledge a disjuncture between the attitude of the Cretan 
quotation and the reputation of the Apostle Paul. The broader ethical, theological, and 
anthropological teachings of Titus, especially as represented in the gospel summaries of 
2:11‒14 and 3:3‒7, understand God’s activity in history and in individual lives to be 
redemptive and transformative. The prima facie reading and its accompanying assumptions 
do not countenance such change. 
The text of Titus exhibits more subtlety than the prima facie reading allows, but 
scholars continue to hold some of its doubtful assumptions. Thiselton, for instance, 
proposes that Paul presented a classic logical paradox, a deliberate contradiction to expose 
the severe limitations of language to truthfully define people. Thiselton explains that, in 
order to reset the controversy in Crete, Paul demonstrated the absurdity and futility of 
labelling selves and others on account of the asymmetry between third- and first-person 
speech.121 Paul indicated that the quotation was spoken in the third person. On the lips of a 
Cretan, however, it could be taken ironically, humorously. A “liar paradox” was a device 
well-known and enjoyed in antiquity. Thiselton rightly insists that identifying the group to 
which Paul’s speaker belonged is essential to interpretation. I discuss this germane point in 
Chapter One under The Speaker’s Attitude toward a Sentence. Thiselton explains that the 
grammatical distinction between first- and third-person speech leads to a logical 
conundrum that uncovers Paul’s real point—the Cretans had been mislabeled as 
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irredeemably vicious, which would be a problem for the gospel in Crete. According to 
Thiselton, Paul wanted his audience to see that first-person self-contradictions are 
unreliable means of labelling persons. But, Paul seems to be more disturbed by this group 
of troublemakers than Thiselton’s explanation suggests. He did not ask for a cordial 
apology; rather, he ordered a stern rebuke (1:13). Thiselton’s proposal also depends upon 
assuring the attribution of this quotation, which is demonstrably unreliable.122 
I find three fundamental assumptions of Thiselton’s proposal problematic: First, his 
interpretation assumes that Paul draws the quotation from a Cretan, specifically 
Epimenides. This attribution is uncertain but necessary for his reading. The self-
contradictory logic of the liar paradox disintegrates in the mouth of a third-person speaker. 
It is not certain that Paul pointed to the speaker of this statement as someone other than a 
contemporary troublemaker; the possible ancient origins of the quotation do not appear to 
concern Paul. Thus, Thiselton acquiesces to one of the key premises of the prima facie 
reading. Second, his interpretation requires that several of the pronouns in the context have 
an unusual usage (e.g., cataphoric, rather than anaphoric; resumptive, rather than 
continuative) or difficult-to-process referent (e.g., null or distal). I will discuss the 
pronouns of the passage in Chapter One under Referentials. Third, his view requires 
multiple steps of reasoning and considerably specific background knowledge to process 
properly, making it less plausible if a more straightforward interpretation is available. I 
will discuss processing costs and multi-step reasoning in Chapter Three under The 
Economy of Cognitive Effects. 
As I will explain in more detail in Chapter One under Higher-Level Explicatures, 
distinguishing between a quotation’s use and initial meaning in an original context and its 
mention by a speaker in a new context is integral to interpretation.123 A certain Cretan 
Epimenides may have been its initial author, and its initial context may have invoked a liar 
paradox, but these possibilities do not assure Paul’s own concerns with the quotation in its 
biblical context. Marshall discusses some of the difficulties in placing who this Epimenides 
might have been: no extant works exist, and ancient writers referred to their Epimenides in 
various eras and in descriptions that do not quite fit what little context Paul provides.124 I 
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contend that the quotation was scavenged from its original, perhaps ironical or humorous, 
context and co-opted by troublemakers in Crete as a slur to reinforce their teaching of 
Gentile inferiority. 
I have shown how scholars assume that Paul’s use of the quotation simply aligned 
with general negative attitudes toward Cretans. To Mounce, for instance, the quotation 
stood on its own as Paul’s indictment against them, “in agreement with the worldwide 
reputation of the Cretans.”125 This claim, however, does not comport with Mounce’s 
structural observation that Paul contrasted ideal leaders in 1:5‒9 with the “opponents’ 
characteristics” in 1:10‒16.126 The troublemakers’ behavior was just as much in view as 
their character, and referring to genealogies in 3:9 further suggests a hereditary-ethnic 
dimension to the problem. Mounce recognizes that Paul objects to those “who taught 
Jewish myths and human commandments (1:10‒16),” but consider how degrading the 
Cretan populace (1:12b) might have expressed an ethno-religious superiority myth against 
which Paul contended.127 
Some scholars attempt to reconcile the Cretan quotation to the surrounding literary 
context (1:5‒16) regarding leadership responsibilities, qualifications, and deficiencies in 
Crete. Kidd highlights what he sees as a chiasm encompassing all of the moral material of 
Titus. The attempt does not aid or harm his main argument. The moral concerns of the 
quotation are, in fact, not prominent in the rest of the book.128 The prima facie reading and 
its corollary assumptions, however, retain much of their influence. 
Several unproblematic claims about the Cretan quotation fit under the following 
descriptions: First, some demonstrate that the substance of the quotation compares with the 
behavior of the troublemakers of Titus 1:10‒16.129 Second, some contend that Paul 
employed subtle uses of logic and rhetoric to subvert the surface meaning of the 
quotation.130 Third, many recognize the thrust of the quotation as inherently disparaging, 
although they pursue different solutions—e.g., harmonizing it with Paul’s other concerns 
for the church131 or highlighting prejudicial attitudes elsewhere in the book.132 These 
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helpful intermediate conclusions do not unambiguously lead to a satisfying understanding 
of Paul’s use of the quotation. One thing that gets in the way, as I have shown, is that each 
interpreter succumbs to one or all of the questionable assumptions of the prima facie 
reading. 
Paul’s use of the Cretan quotation is mainly a question for those who are interested 
in Titus at the level of ostensive communication—uses of words that have communicative 
intent, as opposed to various forms of “word salad,” logs, or other forms of writing not 
intended to convey a coherent message. The fuller phrase ostensive inferential 
communication is always implied, because of the inferential nature of all 
communication.133 Some approaches to Titus do not set out to ascertain its meaning within 
its context as a distinct literary production with communicative intent. Among these are 
those that assume the fragmentary nature of the Pastorals or their artless assembly. “In 
modern scholarship,” Jay Twomey writes, “They have compared the innovation of Paul to 
the traditionalism of the Pastor, and they have found the Pastor wanting.”134 Attempts to 
contextualize Paul’s use of the quotation, under such views, are misguided and futile. 
Extracted units of meaning that would otherwise be the building blocks of an argument 
only serve to answer anachronistic questions.135 
The view that the Pastorals are a patchwork of Pauline fragments and/or late first- 
and early second-century traditions crudely cobbled together has lost currency. Scholars 
now generally accept that they were composed with coherence and purpose. The coherence 
of Titus involves a clear contextual progression: a paragraph on the trouble with 
presumptive leaders (1:10‒16) fittingly follows a paragraph on appointing good leaders 
(1:5‒9), affecting an immediate and satisfying logical contrast. I have seen no evidence to 
suggest that 1:10‒16 or any part thereof is an interpolation, and the quotation occurs in the 
middle of this paragraph. My attempt to interpret it within its immediate context stands 
substantially unaffected by conclusions to the effect that the passage is fragmentary. The 
question still remains: Why insert the quotation here? If one is predisposed toward the 
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prima facie interpretation, then Paul might appear to have gone off on an inexplicable 
tangent within the context of 1:5‒16. I am more inclined to question our own modern 
prejudices in reading than to dismiss the ancient author’s writing as erratic. The author 
presented the book of Titus as a letter from Paul, which, in addition to any other 
approaches employed, calls for a reading strategy that wrestles constructively with the 
literary context and implied historical setting. If we presuppose that features of the text 
contribute more or less to a contextual argument, then exposing a pseudonymous writer’s 
strategies for achieving credibility can only partially illuminate the rationale for including 
any portion (e.g., the Cretan quotation). Therefore, to the extent that scholars view features 
in the Pastorals, such as the Cretan quotation, as mere reinforcement for the ruse of Pauline 
authorship, they leave the question of meaning unanswered.136 Now that we have seen how 
various interpreters defy some, but not all, of the assumptions of a prima facie reading, we 
will examine one critical assumption in greater detail—the historical attribution of the 
Cretan quotation. 
4. Problems with Historical Attribution 
The over-confident assumption that Paul’s Cretan quotation comes from Epimenides, a 
Cretan poet of the fifth- or sixth-century BCE, is not an assured fact. Even ancient writers 
confuse exactly who Epimenides was; and none of Epimenides’s writings remain extant, so 
we cannot confidently verify the claim. Several ancient commentators attributed at least a 
portion of the quotation to another figure, and some modern scholars have advanced other 
ancient writers as the originators of the sentence.137 The quotation has no reliable 
attribution. 
Clement of Alexandria was the first to attribute the quotation to Epimenides of 
Crete (Strom. 1.14). Following him, Jerome and Socrates of Constantinople (380‒439 CE) 
also said that it was excerpted from the works of Epimenides. If this attribution is correct, 
then it suggests that the original context was poetic, perhaps ironic, caustic or humorous, 
but unlikely merely descriptive. J. Albert Harrill, however, suggests that Clement 
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originally made this attribution casually and that it is not reliable. Harrill writes, “This 
identification of Epimenides as the original author of the text comes to Clement as 
obvious, showing no signs that Clement is aware of any debate over the attribution.”138 
Jerome seems to depend on Clement but to consider the precise attribution unimportant 
(Comm. Tit. 1.12‒14). In the discourse, “On the Emperor’s Prohibiting Christians Being 
Instructed in Greek Literature, [etc.],” Socrates may also be dependent on Clement’s claim 
when he refers to “the oracles of Epimenides” (Ecclesiastical History 3.16). After 
describing a process of elimination undertaken by Jerome (following Origen, whose 
commentary on Titus is no longer extant), Harrill explains that Jerome reasoned 
Epimenides of Crete was “that island’s most famous poet.”139 In other words, they came to 
these conclusions apart from any emphasis on Paul’s part. Succeeding generations of 
commentators followed this well-established lead in spite of its dubious nature, until it 
became the majority opinion. Jerome explicitly resists Clement’s attribution on account of 
the grammatical context of the passage but accepts it on Clement’s authority (Comm. Tit. 
1.12‒14). Quinn acknowledges that Jerome’s attribution to Epimenides was tentative, 
based on a second-hand report (dicitur).140 Towner writes, “But in fact the attribution of 
the saying to [Epimenides] is somewhat uncertain.”141 Some pre-modern authors represent 
early countervailance to the now-conventional attribution to Epimenides. Theodore of 
Mopsuestia (350‒428 CE) was one of several who identified Callimachus, and not 
Epimenides, as the originator of the quotation.142 
Commentators who seek historical or literary justification for the offensive saying 
have difficulty explaining why it appears in its present context. Mounce writes, “It is 
somewhat surprising to find such a strong condemnation in the letter, offensive as it would 
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have been to the Cretans.”143 Thiselton’s criticism is incisive: In sum, the writer is not 
using the quotation descriptively of the Cretans at all; and a search for real-world evidence 
that Cretans, as distinct from any other ethnic group, should be portrayed in such vicious 
terms is misguided.144 Marshall is one of a few commentators who briefly discuss the 
cloistered debate regarding attribution; but, in the end (and after unsatisfying argument), he 
pronounces, “We are left with some uncertainty …. But the probability is that the author 
thought that he was citing Epimenides.”145 Lorenz Oberlinner indicates that there are two 
problems regarding attribution: who originated the quotation and what was meant in its 
original context. The second may have no importance for Paul, but Oberlinner, like Harrill, 
suggests that the traditional attribution to Epimenides may have simply been convenient.146 
Clement (Strom. 1.59.2) was the earliest writer to attribute the quotation to anyone beside 
Paul’s contemporaries, and he may have grasped for Epimenides as the only or the most 
famous Cretan poet he knew.147 What harm could it cause? 
a. Who Is Epimenides? 
Supposedly, a Cretan poet named Epimenides was speaking about people of his own 
ethnicity—whether it was in lament, humor, irony, or something else cannot be 
ascertained. Numerous commentators on Titus rely on or mention the typically 
unexamined attribution to Epimenides, but we cannot say with confidence exactly who he 
was. Multiple Cretan Epimenides are known from antiquity—a philosopher, a diviner, and 
possibly a poet as well, although ancient writers have confused them with each other 
(Plato, Leg. 1.642, D‒E; Aristotle, Ath. pol. 1‒2; Rhet. 3.17.10). Plutarch described a 
certain Epimenides as a seventh-century BCE Cretan priest whose cultic genius was in 
demand in ancient Greece, Athens in particular (Sol. 12). Scouring Greek literature for 
appearances of this figure reveals that none of his works are extant and that there was a 
general confusion about his identity—Was he a poet, a politician, a soothsayer, or a 
scholar? The few ancient sources that mention an Epimenides do not agree on when he 
lived or what he did.148 The seemingly assured attribution of this quotation to Epimenides 
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has given scholars more confidence to make assertions about its meaning than is merited 
by our limited historical knowledge or by its use in the context of Titus. 
Plato did not refer to the ancient Cretan soothsayer named Epimenides as prophet 
(Leg. 1.642; cf. Titus 1:12). Diogenes Laertius (3rd cent. CE) claimed that Epimenides 
could predict the future (Lives 1.114); but that claim would not necessarily qualify him as a 
prophet in prominent Judeo-Christian conceptions of the role, neither does it lend the kind 
of authority to the quotation that the prima facie reading expects.149 Lucian (3rd cent. CE) 
called Epimenides a soothsayer (χρησμολόγος, Tim. 6) and associated him with the initial 
portion of the Cretan quotation, but he was probably just following Clement in this 
attribution.150 Cicero listed Epimenides of Crete alongside other ancient soothsayers who 
artlessly attempted to predict the future in a prophetic frenzy (vaticinantibus per furorem, 
Div. 1.34), but his sketch of Epimenides diverges still from others I mentioned. Cicero 
attributed “prophetic” characteristics to Epimenides, but he did not describe him as a poet 
or a prophet by any standard that early Christians would recognize. One would not 
associate Cicero’s and Paul’s figures with each other except because of the coincidental 
English cognate prophet used in the English translation of Cicero’s words—Cicero’s 
behavioral and Paul’s literary descriptions of these people do not coincide. No single 
ancient figure fits the description of Epimenides the Cretan poet. George Leonard Huxley 
claims that Plato erred in his description (Leg. 1.642, D‒E), but he also acknowledges a 
general confusion about who Epimenides was, which would seem to have been less of a 
problem had there been a repository of his works at-hand.151 Although modern writers 
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does not strongly support assertions that Paul borrowed authority from a known Cretan to 
vouch for the veracity of the insult he wished to level against Cretans. 
Over-confidence that this quotation came from a Cretan poet has resulted in 
misleading translations and interpretations that would not have been likely without a 
commitment to this attribution. The NEB translates εἶπεν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος αὐτῶν 
προφήτης (Titus 1:12a) very loosely as “It was a Cretan prophet, one of their own 
countrymen, who said.” Several interpretive choices in this translation are indebted to 
assumptions of the prima facie interpretation and have introduced misleading semantic 
ideas into the English text of this verse—e.g., ethnicity (Cretan) and nationality 
(countrymen). These ideas are not native to the context, which seems to point at 
troublemakers as an improvised group not defined strictly by ethnicity or nationality but 
more so by religion and theology.152 Assuming the attribution to Epimenides as well as the 
appropriateness of the label prophet, the more recent ESV renders the portion, “One of the 
Cretans, a prophet of their own, said.” The NRSV translates ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη (this 
testimony, Titus 1:13a) as that testimony, an interpretive choice that takes the proximal 
discourse deictic as a distal temporal deictic.153 These translational choices can be traced to 
the assumption that the quotation originated with a certain Cretan Epimenides, a point Paul 
may not have been interested in making. Taking the quotation out of its grammatical 
context, which does not suggest that a Cretan said it, Felix Jacoby inserts a clarification 
into his collection of ancient references to Epimenides: “εἶπέν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν (scil. τῶν 
Κρητῶν), ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης.”154 If Jacoby had not assumed the traditional, but 
uncertain, attribution, he would have no reason to include the biblical verse in his list, let 
alone his supposed clarification. 
Commentators frequently claim that Epimenides originated the entire hexameter 
quotation, but none of Epimenides’s writing survives. Many modern scholars accept this 
attribution without question. Barrett, for instance, writes that it was “almost certainly 
Epimenides of Crete (6th‒5th century B.C.).”155 The attribution is not necessarily 
incorrect, but attention to this quotation’s origin obscures an appreciation of Paul’s use of 
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the quotation in its context. Titus is the full quotation’s earliest extant witness, and Paul 
never precisely identifies its originator. We may too readily assume that his audience 
recognized the quotation and its author. Nothing clearly suggests that ancient origins were 
either important or even known to Paul. He refers elliptically to the speaker of this 
quotation, without a clear indication that its original historical and literary contexts had any 
bearing on his choice to present it to Titus.156 Not only is the attribution to Epimenides far 
from certain, scholars from the modern and premodern eras have advanced others as the 
original source of the quotation in Titus 1:12. 
b. Who Else Could Have Written It? 
The earliest commentators on Titus were not certain about the origins of the quotation. 
Outside of Titus, the only extant portion appears in the works of Callimachus (Hymn. 1.8‒
9).157 He may have borrowed the phrase from an earlier poem by Epimenides and 
incorporated it into his own work as an ironic jab against the misconstrued atheism of the 
Cretans. Along with some Patristic writers, Calvin knew that Callimachus’s proposition 
about Cretan lying was based on a misconstrual of Cretan claims to possessing the tomb of 
the Zeus. He, nevertheless, asserted that Paul had “the best of reasons” for considering the 
Cretans to be “very wicked men.”158 Callimachus’s first Ode to Zeus ridiculed the seeming 
audacity of the Cretans in claiming to host the tomb of Zeus—a lie, of course, because you 
[Zeus] did not die, because you are for ever (σὺ δ᾽ οὐ θάνες, ἐσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί, Hymn. 1.9). 
Actually, the grave for Zeus on Crete did not reference the Greek God, but a Cretan hero. 
So, Callimachus was not addressing lying in general but piously castigating the Cretans for 
claiming to have buried Zeus. He was mistaken about which and what kind of Zeus the 
Cretans claimed to have buried. 
Quinn recognizes that the quotation cannot be attributed with confidence and cites 
early Christian attempts to identify the someone (τις, Titus 1:12) who was saying these 
things. He writes that, as early as Theodore, people suspected that, “the citation was a 
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popular proverb rather than a quotation of an ancient poem as such.”159 This suggests that 
the quotation’s ancient purveyors may have been either ignorant or ambivalent about its 
supposed Cretan origins and casts doubt on interpretations that depend upon an attribution 
to Epimenides. In addition to Theodore of Mopsuestia, Origen of Alexandria (184‒253 
CE) attributes the quotation to Callimachus, showing full knowledge of the statement and 
its context from Callimachus but not from Epimenides (Cels. 3.43.1‒35). Origen also 
seems to know only the portion of the quotation found in the Callimachus hymn as being 
of ancient origin. Among other early writers, Athenagoras (c. 133‒c. 190 CE) knew the 
quotation from Callimachus and probably Titus but does not mention Epimenides (Leg. 
30.3‒5). Athenagoras was not, however, making explicit claims about the relationship 
between the Epistle to Titus and the Callimachus hymn.160 
Huxley devotes a chapter to Epimenides in his 1969 Greek Epic Poetry, and 
Mounce refers to Huxley’s argument as “either unknown or not followed.”161 Huxley 
points to three main factors that, for him, make Epimenides unlikely to be the author of the 
quotation: First, he judges the brief sentence to be written in the Doric Greek dialect—
what Huxley refers to as “Hesiodic language.”162 Second, the only fragment purported to 
be original to Epimenides appears to regard the voyage of Argo.163 Huxley conjectures that 
Epimenides may have invented a Cretan stop on that voyage to add prestige to his island 
which may have led a Delphic, non-Cretan poet to retaliate by insulting the Cretans.164 
Third, Huxley considers the attribution to Epimenides the “Apostle’s mistake;” because, as 
he observes, saying that “Cretans are always liars” would be a logical contradiction if 
spoken by a Cretan. Huxley ignores two important possibilities: first, that Paul was not, in 
fact, attributing the quotation to a Cretan; and second, that Paul could have deliberately 
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exploited it as a logical contradiction, as Thiselton argues.165 Weaknesses in Huxley’s 
argument aside, he raises doubts about the quotation’s conventional attribution. 
Christof Zimmer recognizes that the attribution to Epimenides is conjectural, based, 
even from the earliest sources, only on indirect references.166 Zimmer makes an often-
neglected argument that the quotation should actually be attributed to Eubulides of Miletus 
and not a Cretan at all. A great portion of Zimmer’s argument has to do with the historical 
development of the liar paradox in Greek philosophy, and it deserves consideration. He 
builds up to the following assertion: It is therefore obvious that a connection between the 
liar paradox and Epimenides could at best have an illustrative character, but by no means 
any historical one.167 It must be understood that Zimmer is not referring to the assignment 
of the paradox to Epimenides in general but to the quite specific attribution of this 
supposed instance of it in Titus to Epimenides. The plausibility of this quotation not 
originating with a Cretan undermines interpretations based on the presence of a liar 
paradox. Zimmer cross-examines proposals for the origin of the quotation and suggests 
that Clement’s attribution to Epimenides—followed unquestioningly by numerous scholars 
thereafter—was a matter of convenience and conjecture. Epimenides was simply the most 
famous Cretan that came to Clement’s mind.168 With the attribution to Epimenides so 
assured in the minds of many, few have interacted with Zimmer’s claims. I see only one 
integral weakness in Zimmer’s argument: He makes a very simple, but critical, oversight—
he assumes that the pronouns Paul uses to frame the quotation expect an ethnic Cretan as 
their referent, which is why Zimmer and many others categorize the quotation as a liar 
paradox. In Chapter One, under Basic Pragmatic Processes, I will argue that even this 
assumption is due to the prevalence of the prima facie reading. 
From dubious attributions to embarrassing attempts at historical proof, the history 
of interpreting this passage exhibits attempts to excuse and attempts to validate Paul’s 
bigotry. These are especially misdirected if he was not even asserting the substance of the 
quotation in the first place. The linguistically-encoded content of the quotation, 
nevertheless, represents a slur on the Cretan people. Careful scholars from the earliest 
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period to the present day do not accept some of the assumptions commensurate with a 
prima facie reading, but I think that an interpretation that adequately accounts for the 
evidence has yet to be proposed. Given that the Apostle Paul is the purported author of this 
letter, this interpretive history causes us to ask, Why does Paul appear to be such a bigot 
here? Does this passage merely serve to disparage Cretans and give readers a negative 
impression of their innate characteristics and candidacy for redemption, or are we 
misreading it? 
Scholars have expended significant energy answering the question: Who is 
responsible for the statement, “Cretans are always liars, evil brutes, lazy gluttons”? In the 
process of arguing this thesis, I will propose a plausible resolution and show that the 
question is a red herring that distracts from more important interpretive issues in the 
passage. Paul was repeating the words of another, but exactly whose is unclear, and too 
rarely do commentators consider whether Paul agreed or disagreed with those words. A 
specific but dubious attribution customarily accompanies and lends an air of validity to 
prima facie interpretations. I contend, however, that one can arrive at a valid interpretation 
simply by grasping the information that Paul supplied about the quotation’s origins within 
the letter itself. Such contextual information is a more secure basis for confident 
interpretation.169 Clement of Alexandria’s possibly mistaken but well-intentioned 
attribution does not get Paul off-the-hook for bigotry and may have even hampered 
unbiased interpretation.170 
RT now helps us to explain what makes the prima facie interpretation so difficult to 
resist. As with other passages, the accidents of interpretive history have influenced 
prevailing interpretations of Titus 1:12 more than the text itself. In other words, Paul 
appears to be such a bigot in Titus as a result of our interpretations and not as a result of 
the epistle’s language. I have described several unresolved problems within the history of 
interpretation of Titus 1:12. Now, I will describe the promise of a Relevance-based 
interpretive strategy to ameliorate an interpretive impasse in this passage. 
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II. Relevance Theory—A Basis for a Historically and Linguistically 
Responsible Interpretive Strategy 
Relevance theorists base their claims in the observable success of human language, so RT 
offers a promising foundation for a reading strategy less prone to the dubious assumptions 
and problematic conclusions described earlier. Instead of favoring specific indicators of 
meaning such as grammar, lexicon, general historical knowledge, or social inquiry, it sees 
language as functioning at the intersection of these and other factors in countless particular 
contexts. It reckons all matters of context within its explanation of how meaning is 
conveyed through language. So, Anne Furlong argues that RT supplies an ideal framework 
for literary interpretation studies. In her words, “Relevance theory provides just the kind of 
coherent, unified approach that the field needs.”171 What is relevant to a context constitutes 
the key to explaining how hearers arrive at a given interpretation; because, as theorists 
hold, hearers follow one governing principle—relevance—in the process of interpretation. 
I introduce the theory below and will expand on its details throughout this thesis. 
Although RT provides an explanation of how hearers find meaning in language, it 
is not a method of interpretation per se. Its tasks are to analyze and describe how humans, 
in fact, interpret natural language communication. Theorists do not decode language as 
much as reverse engineer it. RT does not prescribe the creation or interpretation of 
utterances; but its insights, properly understood, can illuminate the process of 
interpretation and sensitize interpreters to critical linguistic evidence, on the one hand, and 
expose faulty assumptions, on the other. In this sense, RT can be the basis for a historically 
and linguistically responsible interpretive strategy appropriate to the biblical text as written 
communication. 
Several scholars have argued for and demonstrated the application of RT to 
literature. For instance, Seiji Uchida explains that features appearing to be unique to 
literary texts (e.g., suspense and twist) actually accomplish communicative functions that 
parallel spoken language. He asserts that the basic explanatory claims of RT (à la Dan 
Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s classic 1986 treatment) apply to written as well as spoken 
language.172 According to Uchida, the human mind uses the same basic strategies and 
processes to interpret both live speech and literary texts. The cognitive principle and the 
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communicative principle (defined below) apply to both, although the process with written 
texts can be slowed down and drawn out, as eyes can return where ears cannot. Because 
the biblical text is written language that ostensively conveys some meaning, RT is a fitting 
discipline to apply. Regina Blass argues that the linguistic features of written and spoken 
discourse do not fundamentally differ so the interpretive insights of RT are applicable to 
texts.173 Furlong provides several reasons why RT is suited to literary interpretation, and 
here she asserts no decisive difference between the comprehension of written and spoken 
language: 
An account of literary interpretation is best placed within a general theory 
of communication and cognition [i.e., relevance theory]... literary 
interpretation is a special case of the interpretive strategies used in 
spontaneous comprehension, rather than a deviation from them.174 
While practicing biblical hermeneutics, few commentators articulate a philosophy 
of language; yet clarity, transparency, and consistency regarding language is appropriate 
for the Bible as written communication. In any paragraph, a commentator may assume that 
a lexeme is paramount; in another, it is the syntax. Elsewhere, the same interpreter will 
emphasize the nuance of fluid and non-literal use and then decode meaning on the grounds 
of monumental history, inscriptions, a cultural artifact or practice. Another interpreter may 
cycle through a completely different set of considerations without a transparent or 
consistent guideline for weighing evidence and evaluating between possible 
interpretations. Few discuss ahead-of-time how they see language functioning in general. 
Working from a single principle (relevance) that is appropriate to the kind of material 
under examination, I expose flaws with some interpretations and draw attention to 
neglected evidence for understanding Titus 1:12. This study will illuminate some of the 
issues with this passage and should demonstrate the potential of a relevance-guided 
biblical hermeneutic. 
Escaping the gravitational pull of a prima facie reading requires a strategy that can 
disentangle texts qua utterances from the assumptions imposed upon them by their history 
of interpretation—a strategy illuminated by but not tethered to historic, traditional, or 
conventional readings. So, as David R. Bauer and Robert A Traina argue concerning 
biblical hermeneutics in general, the strategy must be inductive, evidence-based, and 
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radically open to the results of inquiry.175 While being radically open, the strategy cannot 
be amorphous or incoherent; it must aid interpreters in the careful process of reconstructing 
meaning faithful to the original context. The strategy needs to appreciate the kind of object 
Titus is—a written specimen of ostensive inferential communication from which readers 
seek to discern an authorial aim.176 Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. writes, “A widely-held 
assumption in contemporary cognitive science is that listeners’/ readers’ recognitions of 
speakers’/authors’ intentions is a crucial aspect of utterance interpretation.”177 Although 
arguments for and against Pauline authorship may be inconclusive, readers can assert that 
Titus has sufficient coherence in its canonical form to posit a purpose. The primary route 
into the meaning of the composition begins with the document’s self-presentation and 
reception as a letter. 
Owing to trends in philosophical psychology, art criticism, and literary 
interpretation in the mid- to late-twentieth-century, it had become passé a couple of 
generations ago to assert a retrievable authorial intention. Gibbs examines the cognitive 
linguistic and hermeneutical aspects of the question of intention and criticizes the 
abandonment of speaker/author intention as a dubious consequence of theoretical 
approaches and a contradiction of overwhelming empirical evidence. The most current 
work in pragmatics, and specifically RT, assumes that communication involves ostensive 
intention and that it is not only a worthwhile objective to discern this intended meaning but 
an achievable one, too. Whereas, Gibbs notes, “Continental philosophers and literary 
theorists have proclaimed that authorial intentions do not constrain the interpretation of 
literary and philosophical texts,” the current turn in cognitive linguistics has reaffirmed the 
importance of intention on the part of speakers and writers.178 Due to current linguistic 
theory, it is becoming, once again, absurd to suggest that the intentions of a speaker or 
writer are either irretrievable (on account of diverse subjective factors in the hearer or 
reader) or irrelevant to the enterprise of discerning meaning. Noël Carroll outlines the 
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communication. 
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history of mistrust in the enterprise of discerning authorial intention (a.k.a. the intentional 
fallacy) in the modern era and argues that it was misguided and self-contradictory.179 
The starting premise of RT is the observation that ostensive inferential 
communication has tended to be successful for humanity. Seiji Uchida and Robyn Carston 
explain that the phrase encompasses speaker intention, hearer processing, and cooperative 
effort.180 Because communication is inferential, the hearer has a significant but delimited 
role. Theorists, then, investigate how humans successfully comprehend utterances given 
the indeterminacy of linguistically-encoded semantic representations (i.e., sentences). RT 
begins descriptively by examining successful instances of utterance interpretation and 
moves inductively toward more encompassing claims about how language functions. 
Because communication is ostensive, a retrievable speaker intention is assumed. Gibbs 
explains: 
Authorial intentions provide the main criterion for textual interpretation that 
enables literary analysis to be objective … Without authorial intentions 
there is simply too much indeterminacy and instability in the public 
linguistic conventions governing meaning, hence there is no stable object 
for literary study and criticism.181 
Over the past generation, theorists have developed and refined the discipline of RT 
so that it is increasingly informed by empirical evidence and rigorous critical dialogue.182 
At this stage, the theory is mature enough to illuminate the development of a biblical 
reading strategy. In this thesis, Titus 1:12 is a test case for such a strategy built upon and 
sensitive to the insights of RT. By developing and demonstrating this strategy, I not only 
offer an alternative perspective on the Cretan quotation but I also introduce an interpretive 
strategy that may be amenable to scholars who recognize the need for more attention to 
linguistic theory—not simply to discrete issues of language such as lexicon and 
grammar—in biblical hermeneustics. 
I find RT suitable for the following four reasons: The first is appropriateness—
Scripture is written communication and expression, subsisting in (or inhabiting) language; 
no discipline is more fitting for the nature of the subject. The second is timing—RT, over 
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the past generation, has matured as a discipline and become prominent within linguistics, 
although its exposure in biblical scholarship is very limited. The third is material—Titus 
and its particular issues have never received a thoroughgoing treatment from a RT 
viewpoint. The fourth is promise—After considering methods of socio-historical criticism, 
cultural hermeneutics, empire criticism, and others, RT seemed to offer the most potential 
for delivering what is needed in the case of Titus 1:12—a fresh look. RT appears worthy of 
effort and confidence, particularly because it incorporates the most eclectic sources of 
evidence and evaluates them by a single, economic scale—relevance. I will now describe 
RT with reference to key theorists and explain my rationale for developing a reading 
strategy from it. 
Rationale and Description 
Because Titus takes the form of a letter, it calls for an interpretive approach that 
appreciates its communicative intent. I base this study, therefore, in the linguistic discipline 
of RT, which shares the narrow scope of linguistic pragmatics that is regularly dubbed the 
British-American (sometimes, Anglo-American) model. I must note the definitional 
distinction between two broad schools of pragmatics to more narrowly indicate the branch 
that informs my research. Stephen C. Levinson explains the Continental versus the British-
American approaches, which each school calls pragmatics. The main difference is scope. 
The Continental school is broadly applied across psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic, 
anthropological, and other disciplines without sharp boundaries, while the British-
American school is linguistics-focused.183 For the sake of narrow focus and material 
appropriateness, this thesis is guided by the British-American model of linguistic 
pragmatics of which RT is a species.184 
1. Genealogical Development of RT from Pragmatics 
According to Yan Huang, pragmatics is “the study of language in use.”185 Levinson 
regards the pioneer of pragmatics to be Charles Morris, who first coined the term 
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pragmatics in reference to one aspect of semiotics. According to Levinson, one of Morris’s 
major contributions to semiotics was his introduction of a “trichotomy” that included 
semantics, which dealt with the relationship between signs and the things they represented; 
syntax, which dealt with the relationships between signs; and pragmatics, which dealt with 
the relationship between signs and their interpreters. Morris’s conceptions were broad and 
non-technical and did not constitute a theory of language.186 
H. Paul Grice applied pragmatics specifically to natural language use. His inquiries 
were sparked by the assumptions inherent in this synthetic question: How are humans able 
to understand one another consistently and successfully, even when the linguistically-
encoded meanings of their utterances to each other are incomplete?187 
Pragmatics recognizes the inferential nature of human communication and, in 
semiotic terms, focuses on the relation between signs and their interpreters.188 For Sperber 
and Wilson, the chief maxim of pragmatics is that utterances must be relevant to the 
context in which they are spoken.189 While RT was still in its infancy during the 1980s, 
Levinson and other linguistic pragmaticists often appealed to the principle of relevance in 
working out implicatures.190 RT defines these with technical precision: an implicature is 
“an ostensively communicated assumption that is derived solely via processes of pragmatic 
inference.”191 It is an implication of an utterance that the speaker intends to convey. 
Implicatures can be either weakly or strongly implied. Levinson also observed that 
relevance seemed to be the only maxim in Gricean pragmatics that could not be flouted for 
effect and that relevance has a binding effect upon the other maxims.192 It is not relevant to 
say something that is patently uninformative, something that is not of concern in the 
broader discursive enterprise, something that disregards the course of the discussion, 
something of no usefulness or interest to the audience, and so forth. I show how 
conventional interpretations of Titus 1:12 may contradict this fundamental principle. 
 
186 Levinson, Pragmatics, 2. 
187 H. Paul Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, vol. 3, 
Syntax and Semantics (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41–58. My synthetic question tries to draw out 
the thrust behind assumptions, inquiries, and conclusions that he does not succinctly state in a single place. 
188 Levinson, Pragmatics, 2–3. 
189 Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Pragmatics: An Overview. CLCS Occasional Paper No. 16 (Dublin: 
Dublin University, Trinity College (Ireland), Centre for Language and Communication Studies, 1986), 16, et 
passim. 
190 E.g., “Incidentally, exactly how the appropriate implicatures ... are to be predicted remains quite unclear, 
although the maxim of Relevance would presumably play a crucial role.” See Levinson, Pragmatics, 111. 
191 Carston and Uchida, Relevance Theory, 297; see also Clark, Relevance Theory, 78–79. 
192 Levinson, Pragmatics, 111–12. 
53 
Within the broader discipline of pragmatics, RT provides a unified theory of 
utterance interpretation governed by a single, economic assumption: An assumption is 
relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual effects in the context are large and to 
the extent that the effort required to process it in the context is small.193 This governing 
rule of RT is a succinct articulation of the economy of cognitive effects. Sperber and 
Wilson, the theory’s principal architects, argue that this is what makes it a theory, in 
contrast to Gricean pragmatics, which offers some broad, mostly philosophical insights 
about how language works but lacks a simple, cohesive explicative framework.194 
2. How RT Works 
To support this economic theory of language, RT makes two standard assumptions—one 
about human cognition and one about human communication: 
1) The Cognitive Principle of Relevance—Human cognition is geared towards the 
maximization of relevance (that is, the achievement of as many contextual effects as 
possible for as little effort as possible). 
2) The Communicative Principle of Relevance—Every ostensive stimulus 
communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.195 
Blass, a student of Wilson, offers a helpful expansion of the communicative 
principle: “By demanding attention from the audience she [the speaker] suggests that the 
information she is offering is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s attention.”196 
Explicature is a critical concept for understanding the process of utterance 
interpretation according to RT. Sperber and Wilson’s own definition may be helpful: 
What we are calling the explicature is close to what might be 
commonsensically described as the explicit content, or what is said, or the 
literal meaning of the utterance. The less explicit the meaning, the more 
responsibility the hearer must take for the interpretation he constructs.197 
 
193 Carston and Uchida, Relevance Theory, 299, paraphrased. 
194 Clark explains various aspects of the development of Grice’s intuitions and philosophical linguistic 
speculations into a proper theory, acknowledging, as others have, that Sperber and Wilson were pivotal to 
clarifying and consolidating the discipline theoretically. See Clark, Relevance Theory, 43, 67–68, 84. For 
their own articulation of these issues, see, e.g.,Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, Meaning and Relevance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1‒27. Pragmatics and RT bear an integral kinship, so I refer 
to concepts from either interchangeably when they are true of both. 
195 These are standard definitions. See, e.g., Carston and Uchida, Relevance Theory, 298. For further 
explanation, see Clark, Relevance Theory, 29–34. 
196 Relevance Relations in Discourse, 43. 
197 “Pragmatics,” in Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford Handbooks Online. (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 468–504, at 481. 
54 
Gene L. Green offers this more technical definition: “The explicatures of an utterance 
consist of the information encoded in the sign system and all the information inferentially 
connected to it through reference assignment, disambiguation, and enrichment.”198 
According to Sperber and Wilson, hearers take the following actions in discerning 
utterance meaning: construct an appropriate hypothesis about explicatures by developing 
the linguistically-encoded logical form; construct an appropriate hypothesis about the 
intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises); and construct an appropriate 
hypothesis about intended contextual implications (implicated conclusions).199 By 
implicated premises they do not mean what is implied by the utterance in an informational 
sense but rather what is required to make sense of the utterance from the standpoint of 
cognitive effects. Billy Clark condenses the aforementioned: “working out explicatures, 
working out implicated premises, and working out implicated conclusions.”200 They are 
careful to note that these steps are logically sequential but that they actually occur rapidly 
and virtually simultaneously in the human mind. These three actions correspond to the 
three insights that organize this thesis—the inferential nature of communication, the 
hearer’s role in communication, and the non-propositional dimensions of communication, 
respectively. 
Importantly, theorists do not claim a specific ordering of these actions, and they 
outline several specific tasks that may be required in the process of utterance interpretation. 
These include disambiguation of terms, reference assignment, decoding deictic terms, 
determining explicatures, deciphering implicatures, interpreting vague expressions, and 
working out ellipsed material. All of these more narrow tasks are logically discrete but 
virtually simultaneous and pro re nata (born for the present circumstance). Not all tasks 
are required in each instance of utterance interpretation. Clark speaks of these tasks as 
questions that might need to be answered, allowing that different utterances require 
different sets of questions or tasks.201 
Theorists do not claim that the processes are sequential or that a given set of tasks 
is comprehensive or exclusive. Instead, they emphasize two critical facts about actual 
utterance interpretation: first, it is a dialectic process, such that necessary tasks are 
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completed in dependence upon the results of each; and, second, the necessary processes are 
generally rapid and intuitive. The tasks may be logically separable but are functionally co-
dependent. Nevertheless, theorists base their outlines of processes upon a narrow set of 
shared principles that generally vary only somewhat in detail and terminology. 
Some features of RT apply globally to all instances of interpretation, because RT is 
based on patterns of human cognition. First, the hearer’s assumption of relevance instigates 
a desire for worthwhile cognitive effects in the processing of an utterance. That is, a hearer 
seeks to derive cognitive effects that will satisfactorily reward the processing effort 
expended.202 Second, interpretation involves a non-sequential, dialectic process that, from 
the standpoint of natural languages, is rapid, intuitive, and virtually simultaneous.203 
Therefore, cross-reference between the insights that I outline below is critical. Third, RT 
elevates the importance of speakers, hearers, and the effects of the utterances upon them 
over the semantics of words and structures in the process of interpretation. For these 
reasons, the introductory definitions I provide below will be essential as well as free cross-
reference, just as in human cognition, to Relevance-theoretical principles. 
3. From a Theory to a Method 
To be clear, RT is not a method of interpretation. It is a theory about how hearers 
successfully interpret utterances (or fail) when the linguistically-encoded form is 
profoundly underdetermined. The success of natural language through human history is the 
theory’s empirical bedrock. That natural language has tended to work for humans is taken 
for granted; RT is interested in explaining how. Theorists have developed a “relevance-
guided comprehension heuristic” with a well-defined set of tasks, but fluent language users 
accomplish them rapidly and almost involuntarily.204 Natural language comprehension, as 
empirically observed, is not typically self-conscious and deliberate, so RT explains the 
complex and intuitive processes of interpretation by delineating logically distinguishable 
tasks, testing hypotheses, and extrapolating more general claims. Most theorists are 
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primarily interested in answering the empirically-based question How are language users 
so adept at understanding one another? RT delineates the mental processes humans follow 
to arrive at meaning even though humans understand language without formally learning 
these processes.205 Because of the delineation and extrapolation, the insights of RT are 
particularly helpful for interpreting utterances for which the intuitive, organic, rapid, and 
complex processes that original audiences employed to discern meaning are no longer 
available, as is the case for Bible readers. 
Even though RT is not an interpretive method, scholars can strategically apply its 
valid and well-tested insights to biblical interpretation. I define the approach that I describe 
and demonstrate in this dissertation as a strategic application of key insights from RT to the 
linguistically and historically responsible interpretation of biblical texts. Titus 1:12 is my 
test case. I label such an approach a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic. I will now 
discuss the task of applying RT to scriptural texts. 
4. RT and the Bible 
Relevance theorists seek not only to understand how interlocutors comprehend one another 
but also to explain why they sometimes misinterpret utterances. Misunderstandings often 
involve a mismatch between the speaker’s expectations of which assumptions the hearer 
should access and which assumptions the hearer actually does access. Difference in idiom 
as well as distance in time and space, and thus culture, can compound and exacerbate 
problematic mismatches between speaker assumptions and listener assumptions, as when 
modern readers interpret ancient documents. 
Biblical scholars widely agree that the literary, linguistic, and socio-historical 
contexts in which the Bible was produced are pertinent to interpretation; but RT holds that 
interpreting utterances (sentences in their contexts) demands such a specific set of 
assumptions that our encyclopedic knowledge of literature, semantics, and socio-historical 
background can often be insufficient or misleading. Insufficient, because it lacks the 
extreme specificity of a given instance of communication; misleading, because it includes 
a host of facts that are prominent to us but that may not have been prominent to ancient 
readers. Therefore, our best indications of which assumptions influence particular instances 
of communication come from the text itself. The principle of relevance compels audiences 
to derive meaning attuned to the narrow scope of context rather than the broader literary 
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environment, the semantics of lexemes and syntax, or historical backgrounds. Audiences 
draw upon real-world knowledge as the literary context requires it. 
I have described several problems with interpretations of Titus 1:12; and I now 
identify the location of those errors, in semiotic terms, as between the text and its 
interpreters, not a misunderstanding of semantics or syntax. Some sensible corrections in 
syntactic and semantic understanding are needed, as well, but my concern is with 
pragmatics. Specifically, I will explain how relevance reveals where interpreters have 
erred and how it points to evidence for deriving historically and linguistically responsible, 
contextually appropriate interpretations. I will now introduce the three key RT insights that 
illuminate my examination of Titus 1:12. 
Three Key Insights 
After studying RT, its development, and adjacent disciplines, I have found three insights to 
be key—first, the inferential nature of all communication; second, the role of the hearer in 
communication; and, third, the non-propositional dimensions of communication. These 
three represent central assumptions that theorists consistently advance; they differentiate 
RT from other disciplines; and they complement one another interdependently. Each 
chapter of this thesis applies one of these insights to Titus 1:12 and evaluates previous 
interpretations thereof. The insights are global to RT, not logically sequential or 
hierarchical, so their applications overlap. As this thesis progresses, I explain both my 
interpretation of Titus 1:12 on the basis of these RT insights as well as what I consider to 
be interpretive errors made by neglecting or violating these insights. 
As I pointed out earlier, scholars recognize these three insights under somewhat 
different rubrics. For instance, Furlong identifies the writer’s intention and the question of 
responsibility in interpretation as “those aspects most pertinent to literature.”206 She then 
explains that these aspects involve 1) “vagueness and indeterminacy,” which corresponds 
to what I call the inferential nature; 2) literary or “poetic” effects, which corresponds to 
what I call the non-propositional dimensions; and 3) distinguishing “between 
interpretations produced in the search for optimal relevance (exegetical) from those 
produced in the search for actual or maximal relevance (eisegetical),” which corresponds 
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to what I call the hearer’s role.207 The centrality of these insights will become even clearer 
as I now introduce them in conversation with prominent theorists. 
1. The Inferential Nature of All Communication 
The underdeterminacy of linguistically-encoded speech is the central assumption of 
pragmatics. Linguistic pragmaticists and Relevance theorists have been critiquing, 
refining, and developing the discipline for nearly fifty years, but Grice is still considered 
both pioneering and influential in the field. One of his major contributions was proposing a 
philosophy and grammar for calculating and describing the gap between the linguistically-
encoded content of a statement and a speaker’s intentions with the actual utterance and for 
explaining how hearers successfully and consistently bridge that gap in natural 
languages.208 He recognized that natural language has an inferential dimension and that 
speakers and hearers, as well as writers and readers, are involved in a cooperative 
process—hence, his Cooperative Principle. Grice presents this principle as follows: “Make 
your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”209 He 
understood much natural language to require inference, but later Relevance theorists would 
extend this pragmatic claim to say that communication is inherently inferential. Grice’s 
maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relevance, and Manner with their sub-maxims give more 
specific parameters for what was assumed in his governing cooperative principle.210 
Within a generation, a discipline within pragmatics arose, and Sperber and Wilson 
were its chief proponents and architects. They seminally argued that all of Grice’s maxims 
could be subsumed under a single principle of Relevance, properly and technically 
defined.211 Hence, RT became a central extension of pragmatics, bringing technical 
precision to the broader discipline. They came to call it Relevance Theory, because it built 
upon Grice’s maxim of Relevance: “Make your contribution relevant.”212 Two 
developments were crucial: First, RT became a comprehensive theory of utterance 
interpretation built on a single principle of relevance, so that RT is more properly dubbed a 
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species of pragmatics than a sub-field within pragmatics.213 Second, RT gave technical 
precision to several aspects of Grice’s proposals. Such precision was necessary to make it a 
viable theory, whereas pragmatics had been a thoughtful (even historically pivotal) but 
inexact conception of how humans succeed in communicating through natural language.214 
Grice had mainly been concerned with the recognized deictic, referential, and 
ambiguous features of speech and explaining how hearers discern the meaning of 
components such as pronouns, references to time, and non-literal speech. He objected to 
pure semanticism in which the meaning of an utterance is held in the linguistically-
encoded forms to the neglect of the relationship between signs and their interpreters. He 
argued that people do not comprehend utterances simply by grasping the meanings of 
words (lexical semantics) and their relations to each other (syntax). Grice aimed at 
explicating how hearers filled utterances with meaning in order to consistently arrive at 
speakers’ intended meanings. 
For Sperber and Wilson, Grice had not gone far enough in recognizing the degree 
to which language was inferential. Grice said that inferential processes were necessary 
once the propositional content of what is said had been clarified by means of a more 
conventional process of disambiguation, reference assignment, and clarifying 
ambiguities.215 In other words, inference was necessary for deriving implicatures. 
Relevance theorists insist that language is inherently inferential and that deriving a 
speaker’s explicatures as well as implicatures requires inferential processes. A speaker’s 
explicatures include critical information about how linguistically-encoded content is meant 
to be taken (e.g., as literal or figurative, as direct or indirect). Sperber and Wilson explain, 
“According to our account, the recovery of both explicit and implicit content may involve 
a substantial element of pragmatic inference.”216 Since Grice, pragmaticists have been 
using the term implicatures in a technical sense, but Sperber and Wilson introduced the 
idea of explicatures to add precision to Grice’s less technical label what is said.217 Furlong 
expresses the need for inference at every level of comprehension: “Even in establishing 
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what is actually ‘stated’ rather than implied by a work, a substantial element of 
interpretation and inference is involved.”218 Sperber and Wilson explain how this 
development fit into the history of the discipline: 
A major development in pragmatics over the past thirty years (going much 
further than Grice envisaged) has been to show that the explicit content of 
an utterance, like the implicit content, is largely underdetermined by the 
linguistically encoded meaning, and its recovery involves a substantial 
element of pragmatic inference … 
Grice and others … have tended to minimise the gap between sentence 
meaning and speaker’s meaning.… Relevance theorists have argued that 
relevance-oriented inferential processes are efficient enough to allow for a 
much greater slack between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning, with 
sentence meaning typically being quite fragmentary and incomplete, and 
speaker’s explicit meaning going well beyond the minimal proposition 
arrived at by disambiguation and reference assignment.219 
The processes involved in Gricean pragmatics focus on how humans decipher referential 
speech and ambiguity, but RT holds that all communication has an inferential character. 
The distinction between the linguistically-encoded meaning of a sentence and the speaker’s 
intended meaning in uttering it is crucial in both schemes, but RT recognizes that speakers’ 
observable linguistic behaviors convey signals about how to understand the sentences they 
utter, not just what those sentences mean. Disambiguation and reference assignment are, 
nevertheless, necessary components in the larger inferential program of human 
comprehension. Let us now look at those basic processes. 
a. Basic Pragmatic Processes 
Although RT expanded the former boundaries of pragmatics, it recognizes the need for 
basic pragmatic processes in the interpretation of utterances. Pragmatic processing 
involves a number of tasks that a hearer’s mind employs selectively, pro re nata, without a 
prescribed sequence, rapidly, intuitively, and virtually simultaneously. Theorists logically 
delineate discrete tasks; but, from a functional standpoint, they are practically inseparable. 
A relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic will apply these processes as an initial step in 
evaluating and forming interpretations. They include resolving ambiguities, vaguenesses, 
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and indeterminacies; assigning referents; decoding deictic terms; restoring missing or 
ellipsed material; and recovering implicit content.220 
Grice articulated somewhat common-sense assumptions about the rules speakers 
adhere to in the process of conversation. Foremost was the assumption of cooperation—the 
cooperative principle—that persons in a conversation observe certain unstated patterns of 
cooperation in order to make speech work. Under this principle, Grice outlined four 
maxims, one of them concerning manner.221 The second sub-maxim under his maxim of 
manner is “Avoid ambiguity.”222 This more narrow expectation emerges from the 
assumption of cooperation but does not prevent speakers from using ambiguous 
expressions. It would be virtually impossible, or at least intolerable, to exclude all 
expressions that are intrinsically ambiguous. Rather, he meant that competent speakers 
tend not to use expressions that are ambiguous to their hearers. We could phrase the sub-
maxim as a rule in the following way: Do not use expressions that will be difficult for your 
hearer to disambiguate. 
Assuming that a speaker or writer wishes to be understood, she will use expressions 
that are likely to be understood by her hearer or reader.223 For that purpose, she may likely 
use expressions that are unconventional or would be ambiguous to a third party or an 
eavesdropper but are easily decipherable by the intended audience. Combining this 
flexibility of language with the particularity of conversational, historical, and situational 
contexts, it is easy to see how people who are not from the original audience, such as 
modern readers of ancient texts (eavesdroppers), can misunderstand. They do not share the 
same cognitive environment or situational context. Green explains how narrow the 
contextual particularity can be: 
According to RT, the context of an utterance is not all the information 
available from the discourse in which a sentence is embedded (such as a 
paragraph, a section of a book, or a book as a whole), the wider literary 
corpus of a particular author (such as the writing of Paul), nor the wider 
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cultural context shared by communicators and their addressees (such as the 
history and cultures of the Jewish and wider Greco-Roman worlds). Rather, 
context is a subset of all the salient or available information to the 
communicator and the addressee, which is accessed in the communication 
of an utterance.224 
Whereas Grice’s starting point was an implicit contract between interlocutors that 
mainly influenced the speaker’s behavior, Relevance theorists approach utterance 
interpretation as a cognitive process from the hearer’s perspective. This subtle difference 
is theoretically important. RT endeavors to delineate how hearers think through language. 
The role of the hearer is crucial in Grice’s scheme, but his key assumption of cooperation 
issues in a catalog of maxims that speakers supposedly follow. 
Most Relevance theorists, although they appreciate Grice’s groundbreaking legacy, 
insist that he did not adequately reckon the extent to which utterance meaning must be 
inferred. Lists of interpretive tasks offered by Relevance theorists are typically not 
universal or exhaustive, not because they lack agreement, but because they generally agree 
that interpreters cannot prescribe a sequence or standard list of necessary actions in the 
process of recovering meaning. Nevertheless, certain tasks are commonly needed. The 
following is a synthesis of similar lists found in the literature: disambiguation, reference 
assignment, recovery of ellipsed material, general enrichment processes, and the recovery 
of indirectly communicated implications—i.e., implicatures.225 Uchida provides the 
following list of basic pragmatic processes: “Three subtasks are involved here: (a) 
disambiguation, (b) identification of the reference of referring expressions, and (c) 
enrichment of the logical form or semantic representation of the sentence uttered.”226 As 
with other theorists, he does not intend this list to be exhaustive, detailed, or universal. 
What distinguishes RT is how theorists regard all of these inferential processes as 
serving to decipher both explicit and implicit content and how they argue that a single 
principle of relevance governs their application in countless specific contexts. 
Comprehending explicit and implicit content and even accessing contextual assumptions 
require basic pragmatic processes. The discrete tasks into which theorists delineate these 
processes are essential; and they ground the comprehension of higher-level explicatures, to 
which we now turn. 
 
224 Green, “Relevance Theory and Biblical Interpretation,” 268. My emphasis in bold, his italics. 
225 E.g., Clark, Relevance Theory, 121. 
226 “Text and Relevance,” 161–63. 
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b. Higher-Level Explicatures 
Speakers are always communicating explicatures, which are assumptions necessary to 
properly understand the linguistically-encoded content of their speech. According to 
Uchida and Carston, an explicature is “an ostensively communicated assumption which is 
inferentially developed from the incomplete conceptual representation (logical form) 
resulting from linguistic decoding.”227 
Suppose a commuter asks, When is the train coming? A listener might reasonably 
derive the explicature, The speaker wishes to know [when the train is coming]. This 
explicature is not only reasonable but necessary to comprehend her communicative intent. 
If the truth-conditions were right, responding verbally with three o’clock might be 
appropriate. A hearer adept at dealing with open questions would recognize this. If the 
commuter utters this example sentence (When is the train coming?) in a context in which it 
is a rhetorical question, the adept hearer will need to recognize a higher-level explicature. 
According to Uchida and Carston, a higher-level explicature “involves embedding the 
proposition expressed by the utterance in a higher level description such as a description of 
the speaker’s propositional attitude, a speech act description or some other comment on the 
embedded proposition.”228 Now, suppose everyone on the train platform is well aware of 
the time and the train schedule, but the train is quite late. Without any announcement, it is 
clear to everyone that the travelers are equally informed. Then, someone shouts, When is 
the train coming? [guttural exhale]. In such a context, a perfectly reasonable higher-level 
explicature might be The speaker is agitated that she does not know [when the train is 
coming] or The speaker is frustrated that [when the train is coming] is no longer 
predictable. An eye-roll and a tisk might be appropriate responses in this context, although 
they would be unacceptable responses to the open question in the former context. If one of 
the travelers responds with the scheduled arrival time (e.g., three o’clock), thinking it to be 
an open question, he might receive a retort of laughter or ridicule! Additional explicatures 
are possible, and hearers tend to be remarkably adept at intuiting which are appropriate. 
In the example above, the circumstantial context restricted interpretation. Settings 
can restrict interpretation as much as the semantics of words, but speakers often embed 
higher-level explicatures verbally. Suppose the traveler said, I’m not asking, When is the 
 
227 Carston and Uchida, Relevance Theory, 297; see also Clark, Relevance Theory, 78–79. 
228 Carston and Uchida, Relevance Theory, 297; for further explanation, see also Clark, Relevance Theory, 
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train coming? anymore. The higher-level explicature might be The speaker has given up 
her effort to find out [when the train is coming] or The speaker is frustrated that [when the 
train is coming] is no longer predictable. These explicatures concern the speaker’s attitude 
toward a statement, and they are necessary for understanding the meaning of that 
statement. 
The speaker’s attitude is crucial to interpretation and it is an explicature—part of 
what is said, in Gricean terms.229 Therefore, discerning the speaker’s attitude is an 
inferential task. When Clark lists the tasks involved in recovering explicatures, he includes 
disambiguation, reference assignment, the recovery of ellipsed material, narrowing down 
the intended meaning of vague terms, and deciding whether thoughts represented are being 
entertained by the speaker or attributed to someone else.230 Importantly, Sperber and 
Wilson also include the recovery of the speaker’s attitude toward what is said in their list 
of tasks for pragmatic inference.231 This recovery is paramount for understanding some 
kinds of speech, such as jokes, irony, and antagonistic rhetoric. Interpreters of Scripture 
who understand the array of inferential tasks that occur virtually simultaneously in a 
listener’s mind can apply them systematically to Scripture as literature, because it 
constitutes a relatively fixed conversational contribution. 
A speaker always communicates explicatures that convey her attitude toward what 
is said—that is, whether it is her own thought, whether it is her attribution of someone 
else’s thoughts, and so forth. Recovering such information is critical. Ostensive inferential 
communication—the stock and trade of RT—involves a speaker making her 
communicative intention manifest. This making manifest implies a desire on the part of the 
speaker for sympathy. Rather than express her own idea directly, the speaker may present 
another person’s idea with an implicit judgment so that her hearer has the opportunity to 
make the same judgment.232 Her judgment may be an implicature, but the fact that the idea 
is not her own is usually an explicature. The speaker wants her audience to enter into her 
mental processes and conclude with her, feel with her, agree with her, be convinced with 
 
229 As noted earlier, explicatures in RT overlap with what is said in Gricean pragmatics. They also overlap 
with conventional implicatures—linguistic forms that are not dependent upon truth conditions or lexical 
semantics but are derived from shared conventions (e.g., “That is all I am saying;” “You can …” or “They 
say that ...” and many others). See Levinson, Pragmatics, 127–31. 
230 Clark, Relevance Theory, 166. Theorists use “missing or ellipsed material” and “implicit content” 
interchangeably. See, e.g., ibid.; cf. Sperber and Wilson, Pragmatics, 11. 
231 Sperber and Wilson, Pragmatics, 9. 
232 I will expand upon this idea, which is foundational for irony from a RT perspective, in Chapter Two under 
Higher-Level Explicatures. 
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her, and respond with her. Paul trusts that his readers will share his conclusions, including 
his attitude toward the ideas he presents. Now that I have introduced the two main aspects 
of the inferential nature of all communication that I will explore in detail in Chapter One, 
let us turn to the second key insight that I will apply in a relevance-guided biblical 
hermeneutic—the role of the hearer in communication. 
2. The Role of the Hearer in Communication 
Relevance Theory shifts the focus from obligations communication presumes upon the 
speaker or writer, à la Gricean pragmatics, to cognitive processes hearers and readers 
engage in to infer meaning. As Sperber puts it, “relevance theory … approaches verbal 
comprehension as a psychological process.”233 Like its kindred discipline, pragmatics, RT 
views communication as a cooperative endeavor, but this assumption uncovers meaning 
from the perspective of the hearer. Why? Because hearers’ success in human 
communication throughout history vouches for the success of speakers as comprehension 
completes the talk exchange.234 Appreciating the role of the hearer is especially crucial in 
biblical interpretation, because modern interpreters differ from earlier audiences in 
language, culture, experience, and other factors. They customarily have, therefore, 
mismatched contextual assumptions and see different aspects of the text as salient, thus 
skewing interpretation. Let us now consider how interpreters may account for and 
ameliorate these divergences. 
a. Mismatched Contextual Assumptions 
Hearers must supply some of the material needed to fill the gap left by language’s 
underdeterminacy. Theorists refer to this audience-supplied material as contextual 
assumptions. These assumptions combine with the utterance to yield enough cognitive 
effects to make the utterance satisfactorily relevant. The two main types of contextual 
assumptions are the cognitive environment (informational) and implicated premises 
(logical). These assumptions differ between interpreters in proportion to various kinds of 
distance (e.g., space, time, culture, language). 
If biblical interpreters sketch the assumptions that ancient interlocutors shared 
plausibly, they can then derive implicatures and conclusions based on assumptions closer 
to those held by original audiences. I discuss and demonstrate such processes in Chapter 
 
233 Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), 495. 
234 See Frank Brisard, “H.P. Grice,” PPP (2011): 104–24, at 113; Grice, “Further Notes on Logic and 
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Two, but I will first introduce the two types of contextual assumptions—cognitive 
environment and implicated premises—in more detail. 
i. Cognitive Environment 
A hearer’s cognitive environment provides the informational assumptions needed to 
interpret an utterance. Specific historical-contextual information, from the macro (e.g., 
imperial) scale to the micro (e.g., domestic) scale, is included, but discursive context also 
significantly influences one’s cognitive environment. Biblical exegetes normally bring 
historical facts and perspectives to bear upon an interpretation—what was meant by what 
was said. Based on insights about human cognition, however, a relevance-guided biblical 
hermeneutic would accentuate two values: first, it would prioritize the evidence, 
recognizing that the discourse itself signals the comparative relevance of historical-
contextual information; second, it would result in the evaluation of alternative 
interpretations upon a consistent set of criteria. RT essentially explains how hearers are 
able to understand utterances and, just as importantly, why non-original readers err. A 
fitting complement to the aim of explaining utterance interpretation is RT’s capacity to 
explain why certain interpretations are less satisfactory. The outcome of a relevance-
guided hermeneutic is not only an interpretation but the evidential basis for evaluating one 
interpretation over another. 
Uchida and Carston define cognitive environment as follows: “the set of 
assumptions which are manifest to an individual at a given moment.”235 This does not 
include the hearer’s encyclopedic knowledge of their world or the sum total of their 
memory; it is constantly changing and limited by matters of accessibility, which can be 
increased and decreased by several factors, including the utterances themselves. 
Communicators’ minds are the fund, machinery, and product of their speech; so 
what they say represents what is on their minds more reliably than general knowledge of 
monumental politics, popular religion, grammar, and culture. Interpreters can sketch the 
cognitive environment of ancient communicators through close linguistic analysis and 
relevance-guided historical and interdisciplinary inquiry. Evidence from the discourse 
grounds a plausible representation of communicators’ shared cognitive environment. This 
evidence includes suggestions of mutual, layered assumptions about each other’s memory 
and environment. The starting point, then, is the dialogue itself. Interpreters take cues from 
 
235 Carston and Uchida, Relevance Theory, 295, their emphasis. See also Clark, Relevance Theory, 115. He 
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the conversation as to which historical and other matters are pertinent rather than assuming 
that any historical fact was relevant ex ante. 
Scholars already endeavor to augment their knowledge of the ancient world in 
order to adequately understand the original circumstances of biblical texts and to interpret 
them with faithfulness to their historical and literary context. It is impossible, however, to 
fully reconstruct the situational context of any biblical text. Guided by the principle of 
relevance, with sensitivity to the potential mismatch between audiences’ contextual 
assumptions, interpreters should focus their historical and inter-disciplinary inquiries on 
signals from the text as they discern which aspects of history and culture are relevant to a 
specific conversation. 
Hearers intuitively enrich the meanings of otherwise underdeterminative, 
linguistically-encoded speech with material from their cognitive environment. Adept 
speakers leverage their hearers’ cognitive environment to fill the gaps. Factors such as 
recency of mention, salience, rhyme, and topical relation significantly influence people’s 
available memories.236 A common illustration of the power of these features of discourse 
to affect a hearer’s cognitive environment are statements like Do not think about flying 
purple elephants. In spite of the linguistically-encoded imperative meaning of the sentence, 
the hearer almost certainly has flying purple elephants on his mind. The sentence 
deliberately defeats itself. This power suggests, first, that the linguistically-encoded 
meaning of a sentence is not a determinative indicator of utterance meaning; and, second, 
that a relevance-guided hermeneutic could help interpreters to more strategically apply 
knowledge of history and custom, words and syntax. 
Historical information, linguistic analysis, and sociological inquiry help to 
eliminate or subordinate certain interpretations in favor of others, so lacking a detailed 
understanding of the exact circumstances behind each utterance does not entirely prevent 
us from making some reasonable claims about a text’s meaning. The literary context of 
utterances within a biblical book or NT epistle is a rich, albeit incomplete, source of 
evidence for sketching the cognitive environment of original communicators. The 
documents themselves reveal critical historical and situational knowledge. As Aageson 
points out regarding the PE, “Perhaps no other set of documents in the NT points to such a 
 
236 Clark, Relevance Theory, 104, 149; R. Reed Hunt, “Does Salience Facilitate Longer-Term Retention?” 
Memory 17 (2009): 49–53. Theorists highlight empirical studies of the Fodorian modularity of the mind 
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broad range of conflicted issues in the early church as do the epistles of 1 & 2 Timothy and 
Titus.”237 These texts especially aid investigation into particular problems within the early 
church. This may be most profoundly evident as they stand between the Apostle Paul and 
the contemporary church and render what the historical church has accepted as an 
authoritative interpretation and application of the Pauline apostolate. So, the utterances 
within their contexts in the form of the text that we have constitute the instance of 
ostensive inferential communication that interests relevance-guided biblical interpreters.238 
The objectives, processes, and outcomes of relevance-guided historical inquiry 
would be distinct from those of various forms of socio-historical biblical interpretation. 
The ancient world is not the object of relevance-guided historical inquiry as much as the 
ancient mind, influenced by matters of language, social concern, everyday culture, political 
and economic circumstances. This kind of inquiry concerns itself with the thought-world 
of writers and readers, focusing on evidence from the texts themselves. The propositional 
thrust of an utterance is logically founded on a combination of the explicatures, derived 
from the linguistically-encoded form, and reasonable contextual assumptions.239 A 
plausible sketch of the cognitive environment of communication participants combines 
with implicated premises and a lexical-grammatical analysis of the logical form of an 
utterance to yield reasonable intermediate conclusions. But, for RT, propositions are not 
final. The end-product of comprehension is multi-dimensional, including the propositional 
as well as the social-behavioral, because what is truly relevant has real-world 
consequences. 
In sum, the principle of relevance mediates the influence of monumental history 
and politics, archaeological and literary knowledge of daily life, lexicography and 
grammar upon interpretation. The text cues modern interpreters as to what aspects of 
history, language, anthropology, and so forth are pertinent to interpretation. Readers cannot 
assume ex ante that a city’s status under the Roman Empire, broad cultural shifts, details of 
household social relations, market practices, coinage, or any other prescribed set of facts 
are equally or entirely pertinent to a pericope under examination. Certain matters may be 
profoundly relevant; but the utterance within its context, rather than a general exegetical 
 
237 Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, 16. 
238 Some speculate the canonical ordering of the PE as Titus, 1 Tim, 2 Tim on very little hard evidence. 
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rule, controls whether, which, and to what extent. The text is that component of the ancient 
environment that interpreters can have the most confidence of affecting readers’ 
perceptions of the world, their thinking and their behavior. We now turn to the other major 
kind of contextual assumption—implicated premises. These pertain to the logic necessary 
to interpret utterances. 
ii. Implicated Premises 
Language is underdetermined not only informationally but also logically. Interpretation 
requires logical assumptions that cannot be derived solely on the basis of the linguistically-
encoded meaning of the sentence uttered. Whereas hearers fill informational gaps in the 
underdeterminacy of language by drawing on content from their cognitive environment, 
they also fill logical gaps by supplying implicated premises.240 Levinson explains that, in 
order for a hearer to maintain the assumption of a speaker’s cooperation, the hearer must 
assume some unstated premises, which the speaker takes for granted. As Levinson puts it, 
“It must be supposed that S think that q.”241 Many intermediate premises do not carry the 
final communicative thrust of an utterance or reflect its non-propositional dimensions. 
An illustration might be helpful: Nearing dinnertime, I shout upstairs, “You can get 
the drinks.” Here is the enriched propositional sentence meaning after disambiguation, 
reference assignment, and some basic pragmatic processes: You, Barnabas David Allen, 
have the functional capacity to retrieve drinks of some kind that are somehow 
distinguished from other things (by the definite article). If that is what my son honestly 
interprets my utterance to mean, he will be puzzled and fail to perceive the relevance of my 
statement. It is this presumption of relevance that drives hearers to interpret utterances with 
more success. In order to understand my utterance as relevant, my son will need to assume 
the premise that no drinks are at the dinner table yet, even though my statement does not 
include that information. His assumption of relevance causes him to trust my cognitive 
environment, which includes real-time knowledge of the table setting. Further, he will 
understand that my use of the definite article distinguishes the drinks he will get as the 
drinks our family will imbibe at this evening’s dinner as long as he complies. 
Levinson outlines the logic of implicated premises as follows: 
(i) S has said that p 
 
240 Ibid., 227. 
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(ii) there’s no reason to think S is not observing … the co-operative 
principle 
(iii) in order for S to say that p and be indeed observing the … co-operative 
principle, S must think that q 
(iv) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that q must be supposed if S is 
to be taken to be co-operating 
(v) S has done nothing to stop me, the addressee, thinking that q 
(vi) therefore S intends me to think that q, and in saying that p has 
implicated q242 
The speaker is a prime agent in Levinson’s outline, but note how he describes the 
inferential process from the hearer’s perspective. This logical outline of deriving 
implicated premises corresponds to the standard Relevance-theoretical approach. 
The presumption of relevance combined with the fact that an utterance has been 
made can suggest certain implicated premises. Hearers infer both implicated premises and 
implicated conclusions dialectically employing “mutual enrichment processes”—that is, 
inferences at one level interact with linguistically-encoded content to make inferences at 
the next level.243 A mundane example demonstrates the dialectic between sentence-
meaning and logical and informational contextual assumptions: Suppose that my wife and 
I share the assumption that I am waiting to take a shower. My wife says Barney is out of 
the shower. The sentence does not indicate that Barney was taking a shower; but any 
hearer would assume so, not because he derives it semantically or observes it contextually, 
but because he infers it logically. Because I know that our house has a single shower, I 
bring this real-world knowledge to the comprehension process as a contextual assumption, 
and I conclude that the only shower in our house is now available to me. Her utterance is 
relevant, because it means that I can now take a shower. The sentence is uninteresting 
informationally; Barney, in fact, spends most of his life out of the shower. It is only 
satisfyingly relevant if I assume both what is logically implied and contextually known. 
We turn now to the second major aspect of the hearer’s role in communication—salience. 
Because it differs between cultures, salience demands the attention of relevance-guided 
biblical interpreters. 
 
242 See ibid., 113–14. Because of the non-propositional dimensions of communication (Chapter Three), a 
statement of ability may only be relevant if the ability is employed, unless the purpose of the utterance was to 
implicate a judgment upon the ability of the hearer. 
243 Uchida, “Text and Relevance,” 161–62. 
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b. Salience for Original Audiences versus Modern Eavesdroppers 
Because of the simple economy of comprehension, hearers accept interpretations that 
require the least effort as long as they yield appropriate cognitive effects and satisfy their 
expectations of relevance. Therefore, ideas that are salient can achieve greater relevance. 
Several factors may contribute to salience in the mind of a hearer (e.g., recency, repetition, 
boldness).244 To use an audiological metaphor, salient ideas have higher volume, because 
they speak more loudly than their less noisy neighbors within the context. In fact, they may 
be so loud that their less salient neighbors’ voices recede. Unfortunately, modern 
interpreters hear statements at different volume levels than their original audiences. 
Consequently, modern readers may fulfill their expectations of relevance by taking as 
salient a different idea than the ancient writer had expected. What original audiences took 
as background information may sound more salient to modern audiences and vice versa. 
This phenomenon corresponds to the problem of figure and ground ambiguity in 
Gestalt psychology. A hearer can accidentally or deliberately confuse the assertions that a 
speaker wants to convey with the background required to present them.245 Typically, 
cooperative interlocutors in an original conversational context have no problem 
distinguishing between front- and back-ground details, but modern eavesdroppers must be 
careful not to allow what is salient for them to drown out what the ancient speaker 
intended to convey. 
According to Wilson and Sperber’s communicative principle, hearers presume the 
optimal relevance of an utterance.246 Clark explains that this leads interpreters to “follow a 
path of least effort in deriving effects and … stop when expectations of relevance are 
satisfied.”247 Modern readers interpreting ancient texts complicate this process. Biblical 
scholars know that their situational context in the modern world does not supply all of the 
cognitive material necessary for interpretation, so they deliberately augment their available 
store of knowledge and exercise tentativeness.248 Such positive attitudes and behaviors 
ameliorate somewhat the tendency to interpret texts solely on the basis of a modern 
 
244 Empirical studies show that humans have shorter recall times for topics, ideas, words, and domains that 
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cognitive environment, replete though it may be with historical knowledge. It is, 
nevertheless, difficult for modern readers to escape the gravitational pull of a salient (to 
them) interpretation.249 For example, the salience of talent as a word that has come to 
mean ability, rather than an arcane unit of measure, may be hard to overcome when 
interpreting the Parable of the Talents (Matt 25:14‒30). Or, consider the tendency to attach 
the sense of religious giving to Jesus’s discourse on judgmentalism and forgiveness in 
Luke 6:27‒42. The salience of give read as tithes and offerings is too powerful to resist 
even though it does not cohere with the discursive context. The church has bills to pay, for 
goodness’ sake! 
To interpret ancient texts well, modern readers have to contend with the tempting 
salience of interpretations that emerge when Scripture collides with modern sensibilities. 
They do so by constructing reasoned estimations of ancient cognitive environments. This 
must be done with as much particularity and precision as the evidence suggests but with 
the tentativeness that our severe limitations require. The original audience’s knowledge 
and intuitions are not available to us, but RT illumines utterance interpretation in such a 
way as to allow us to sensitively and systematically follow the processes of natural 
language comprehension. As noted above, the end-products of interpretation, according to 
RT, are real-world outcomes, not mere propositions, so we now turn to the third and final 
insight that drives this thesis—the non-propositional dimensions of communication. 
3. The Non-Propositional Dimensions of Communication 
Language does more than convey information. Its inherent underdeterminacy suggests that 
information transfer may not even be the primary function of language. Scholars have 
indicated how prevalently speakers use language to accomplish other tasks.250 Relevance 
theorists use the term cognitive effects as technical language for what utterances produce 
when properly comprehended. The outcome of utterance interpretation is not merely a 
propositional form but a changed context.251 So, communication is fully successful when 
its implications are realized, not simply when its propositions are understood. A speaker’s 
intention in ostensive inferential communication can rarely be reduced to a set of 
propositions. Hearers must recognize the real-world implications of utterances. 
 
249 Furlong addresses problems with diachronic interpretation in “Relevance Theory,” 196–97. 
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Bonnycastle, In Search of Authority: An Introductory Guide to Literary Theory, 3rd ed. (Broadview, 2007), 
122. 
73 
Grice rightly contended that the linguistically-encoded form of an utterance stands 
in for a fuller sense of the speaker’s meaning, but the interpretive end-product he assumed 
was basically informational, propositional. He considered other language uses to be 
special. Even with reference to speech acts, Grice taught that the implicatures of an 
utterance could ultimately be expressed in the form of enriched propositions.252 In another 
development from Gricean pragmatics, RT recognizes that every utterance involves 
expectations about how its propositional content will translate into attitude and action on 
the part of the hearer. Understood in this way, imperatives are not entirely different from 
declaratives; just the syntax makes the speaker’s intentions more or less transparent.253 
According to Kevin J. Vanhoozer to comprehend Scripture in spite of our limitations is to 
recognize that “words demand things of us,” regardless of our equivocations.254 
Sperber and Wilson describe three components of an enrichment process that 
hearers follow to derive implicatures and explicatures from an utterance. Their description 
illuminates the non-propositional dimensions of communication. First, hearers develop the 
linguistically-encoded logical form to arrive at explicatures; second, they discern the 
intended contextual assumptions (e.g., time of day, stakeholders, topic); and, third, they 
construct the implications of the utterance (i.e., implied content that is necessary for 
relevance and its actionable conclusions).255 In natural language as empirically observed, 
these processes frequently lead to implications beyond the acquisition of knowledge. 
Actionable conclusions are outcomes of the interpretive process. 
Suppose that hours after instructing my teenager to clean her room, she lies on the 
couch. She is displeased to hear me say, Your room has not been cleaned yet. Her 
displeasure does not result from receiving disappointing information that she did not have 
before I spoke. The essential function of my utterance is not informational. My daughter’s 
displeasure comes from the implications of the utterance—my attitude of disapproval 
toward the proposition encoded by my statement, the negative moral connotations of her 
lack of obedience that I intimate, and the inconvenience of apparently being expected to 
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cease her current leisure to comply with my previous instructions. Other implications may 
be possible, but these seem strongly implied. My daughter might correctly arrive at 
actionable conclusions, but even her discomforting emotional response is a non-
propositional outcome of my utterance inasmuch as I intend or expect it. 
Utterances can have greater or lesser non-propositional dimensions, and an 
interpretive method that is informed by cognitive linguistics can help readers identify and 
appreciate them. So, we will now overview RT’s definition of cognitive effects—the actual 
outcomes of speech—and their customary social and behavioral correlates. 
a. The Economy of Cognitive Effects and Processing Effort 
Theorists outline three basic kinds of positive cognitive effects that hearers can derive: 1) a 
contextual implication, 2) strengthening an existing assumption, and 3) contradicting an 
existing assumption.256 Clark defines a cognitive effect as “a change in an individual’s 
representation of the world.”257 These cognitive effects are positive because they have a net 
impact on hearers’ representations of the world, not because they benefit hearers. Hearers 
intuitively seek these effects, whether the consequence promises to be pleasant or 
unpleasant. Hearers act upon their outward world based on these representations; therefore, 
internal cognitive effects indirectly but inevitably affect a shared material environment.258 
Modern readers of the Bible must deliberately seek to discern implicatures that would have 
led to cognitive effects satisfying to original audiences even if those effects do not interest 
the modern reader. 
Hearers typically expend a level of energy commensurate with the anticipated 
power of the cognitive effect—greater effects should reward greater processing effort. So, 
economy is a rule for deriving implicatures as well as for constructing utterances. Speakers 
can be more efficient, and thereby effective, by relying on accessible memories or 
prominent features of their shared cognitive environment to form implied premises; for, as 
Sperber and Wilson claim, hearers “follow a path of least effort.”259 
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258 Although this comment treads upon the socio-cultural and cognitive-behavioral dimensions of pragmatics 
that I identified as outside the scope of my thesis, recognizing this boundary area that interpretation naturally 
leads toward is critical for appreciating that the task of interpretation does not end with a set of propositions 
but rather with a set of deeds. 
259 See Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), 474. This is the first general step in what they call a 
“Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic.” For a summary, see Clark, Relevance Theory, 34–40. 
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Theorists speak in terms of processing effort because RT considers communication 
from the hearer’s perspective.260 When speech is straightforward, hearers can derive 
cognitive effects without much effort. Anaphoric referential speech, for example, requires 
less effort to process than cataphoric referential speech, because the antecedent reference is 
already in mind and requires no suspension or place-holding. Among the factors that affect 
processing effort and, thereby, the relevance of an utterance, Clark lists, “recency of use, 
frequency of use, perceptual salience, ease of retrieval from memory, linguistic or logical 
complexity, and size of the context.”261 These factors affect the accessibility of contextual 
assumptions. So, vividness, brevity, and recency, for instance, are factors that can decrease 
processing effort. An adept speaker intuitively adjusts the economy of her utterances to 
avoid pitfalls that could make them less relevant. Too much vividness could distract; 
brevity could fail to supply critical details; and recency could confuse referents, for 
example. Modern readers of ancient texts cannot intuitively discern such fine-tuning. They 
need more conscious, deliberate practices. 
Along with their principle of relevance, Sperber and Wilson outline certain 
hypotheses about the economy of cognitive effects. They claim that “other things being 
equal, the more contextual implications a proposition has, the more relevant it will be, and 
that other things being equal, the greater processing effort it requires, the less relevant it 
will be.”262 So, in brief, the higher the quantity of contextual implications, the more 
relevant; and the more efficient (i.e., the less “processing effort”), the more relevant. 
Reaching further back in memory, deciphering obscure references, untangling 
complex logic, or interpreting vague or ambiguous speech typically increases processing 
effort, but the expense can be worthwhile if the hearer derives sufficient cognitive payoff. 
Poetry, for instance, appears, on the surface, to break some economic rules of 
communication. Rather than being straightforward, it is typically elliptical and ambiguous. 
Yet, it gives people many cognitive rewards.263 
The economy of ostensive inferential communication is not a single-value system 
such that shorter statements are necessarily more relevant than longer statements or that 
 
260 e.g., Clark, Relevance Theory, 106, 365. 
261 Ibid., 104. 
262 Pragmatics, 20. 
263 Regarding poetry, Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Markus Tendahl acknowledge that “we are sometimes 
willing to spend quite a deal of effort in utterances with the expectation of gaining some extra benefits.” See 
“Cognitive Effort and Effects in Metaphor Comprehension: Relevance Theory and Psycholinguistics,” Mind 
& Language 21 (2006): 379–403, at 389. 
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perspicuous statements are necessarily more relevant than ambiguous ones simply because 
longer or more ambiguous statements require greater processing effort. The calculus has 
multiple factors. It is true that hearers tend to “follow a path of least effort,”264 but hearers 
who expect the cognitive effects to be great enough will expend more effort. Hearers, 
however, do not consciously decide on how much effort to expend. They work out the 
implicatures of ambiguous speech virtually involuntarily, because the assumption of 
relevance and the promise of cognitive effects are inherent in utterances. 
Comprehension involves a process of mutual adjustment whereby hearers negotiate 
the implications of explicit and implicit content. Mutual adjustment evokes the process’s 
dialectic nature. Hearers adjust their understanding of an utterance’s explicatures and 
implicatures until they infer conclusions that yield adequate cognitive effects. So, hearers 
accept the word meanings and speaker attitudes, for instance, that they must assume in 
order for their interpretation to achieve optimal relevance (i.e., the greatest available 
cognitive effects).265 
Indirect or non-literal speech typically requires more processing effort; but it can be 
potent, yielding greater cognitive effects than similar propositions uttered literally, making 
the expenditure worthwhile. Non-literal speech can also provide hearers a shortcut to 
comprehension, actually decreasing processing effort. Many Relevance theorists regard 
literal and figurative uses of language to be degrees on a sliding scale.266 The implicatures 
of figurative language are a subset of all possible implicatures of the same utterance, but 
interpreting a speaker’s figurative use of language literally will usually deny the hearer 
adequate cognitive effects. Therefore, natural language listeners are usually able to detect 
figurative use and interpret appropriately. 
Consider an example: Lance is my dog and Lance is my best friend can both have 
literal and figurative meanings; they can also be synonymous when one is figurative while 
the other is literal. Either could stand in for Lance is a pet canine that I care for and that 
belongs in my household or Lance is a human confidant with whom I have an affectionate 
relationship.267 Given the conversational context, a hearer will rapidly and virtually 
involuntarily arrive at the proper interpretation, deriving satisfactory cognitive effects. 
 
264 Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), 474; Clark, Relevance Theory, 37, 69, 120. 
265 Clark, Relevance Theory, 242. 
266 Deirdre Wilson, “The Pragmatics of Verbal Irony: Echo or Pretence?” Lingua 116 (2006): 1722–43; 
Clark, Relevance Theory, 253–79 (Ch. 9—Figurative Language: Metaphor). 
267 I take several intermediate assumptions for granted to derive these implicatures. 
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Increased personal knowledge is an inevitable result. Imagine the difference between a 
figurative use and a literal use. A literal use can increase social distance, while a figurative 
use can decrease it. A statement like Lance isn’t my dog; he’s my best friend can have 
multi-dimensional (e.g., social, cognitive) effects. It does not merely inform; it invites the 
hearer into the speaker’s personal life, her affection for and valuation of a family member, 
thereby strengthening social bonds. Figurative language, therefore, has the potential to 
produce strong cognitive effects when deployed strategically, even though more direct, 
literal uses may be easier to process. 
Relevance theorists regard cognitive effects as the primary outcomes of 
communication, but these internal effects in the hearer’s mind have profound influence on 
interlocutors’ external world. They are interpersonal, social and frequently intended to 
materially affect behavior.268 These may be indirect outcomes that the speech and the 
speaker cannot control, but they are not of secondary importance. A relevance-guided 
biblical hermeneutic must consider these non-propositional dimensions of speech. 
b. Social and Behavioral Outcomes 
Cognitive effects are changes in how a hearer perceives the world in his mind. As at least 
one theorist has summarized, context1 + utterance = context2.269 Context2 essentially 
constitutes a new environment. The three basic kinds of positive cognitive effects—
contextual implications, strengthening existing assumptions, and contradicting existing 
assumptions—lead to commensurate, albeit indirect, external outcomes. A biblical writer’s 
intentions toward such outcomes are often transparent, but natural language listeners are 
adept at perceiving them even when they are not semantically obvious. 
Pertinent to my inquiry, Speech-Act Theory (SAT), as first advanced by John L. 
Austin, delineates logically distinct dimensions of speech as simultaneous acts. A locution 
is a direct act of speaking something that has sense and reference. An illocution, intrinsic 
to many (and some argue all) locutions, is an act accomplished by speaking the locution 
(e.g., inviting, arguing, promising, forgiving) in the right felicity conditions. A perlocution 
is generally accomplished by the speaker only with the hearer’s cooperation or up-take 
(e.g., informing, convincing, surprising, grieving, as transitive acts).270 Richard S. Briggs’s 
 
268 Additionally, although not germane to my thesis, theorists are beginning to test the neurological and 
physiological affects of speech. 
269 I do not think that I originated this formulation, but I cannot recall where I saw it. 
270 Helpfully summarized in Richard S. Briggs, Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical 
Interpretation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 38–43; originally proposed in John L. Austin, How to Do 
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published dissertation discusses the implications of SAT for biblical studies. With respect 
to meaning-making agency, he presents SAT mainly from the perspective of what speakers 
accomplish. Because perlocution is not guaranteed, it is not considered intrinsic to speech. 
So, Briggs elevates self-involvement as a critical criterion for identifying and 
understanding illocution.271 Perlocution, as an indirect act, however, is commensurate with 
intention in speech. I will address the relationship between SAT and RT in Chapter Three. 
For now, my general point is that language not only affects the mind; it affects a shared 
world, even if indirectly. 
Commonplace figures, devices, and modes of speech do more than simply inform. 
For instance, Nam Sun Song outlines some of the relational effects that obtain with the use 
of metaphor.272 He points out that some cognitive effects specifically reinforce 
camaraderie, trust, a sense of privileged insight or social inclusion, a sense that the speaker 
is vulnerable and trusting, drawing listeners into a shared experience. Song admits that 
some of these effects are based on weak implicatures; that is, they may not constitute the 
central communicative content of an utterance, but they are intentional and can be 
rhetorically powerful.273 In rhetorical terms, they may lead to increased ethos. 
The Epistle to Titus provides examples where Paul’s speech held crucial social 
implications. Consider his affectionate language in the greeting of Titus: to [my] true son, 
Titus, according to [our] shared faith (1:4). The communicative context, more than the 
semantics of the constituent words, conveyed social intimacy; the first-person pronouns 
supplied in translation are meant to convey the effect. As a letter read before a community, 
this was a public display of affection. Paul also effectively transfered a mantle of authority 
to Titus when he wrote, these [things] teach and encourage and rebuke with every 
sanction; no one [is to] disregard you (2:15). Such a statement in its context does not 
merely transmit information; it bolsters confidence, courage, and accountability beyond the 
linguistically-encoded semantic values. It implies Paul’s authority vested in Titus. 
 
 
Things with Words, ed. J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 2nd ed., The William James Lectures (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 83–108; see also Levinson, Pragmatics, 236. Whether they consider 
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271 See Briggs, Words in Action. 
272 Song, “Metaphor and Metonymy,” 94. 
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Ambiguity and non-literal speech requires trust, because speakers must rely upon 
hearers to derive the correct meaning. Ken-Ichi Seto contends that irony, a mode of speech 
that presumably requires comparatively more processing effort, yields positive relational 
effects.274 For example: Suppose a speaker witnesses someone committing an idiotic act 
then says to her neighbor, What a genius! Her hearer feels invited into an inside joke and 
derives significant effects beyond the propositional payload. The speaker could simply say, 
I think that person has done an idiotic act; but, by doing so, she would not also invite her 
hearer to enjoy a snicker with her. The cognitive effects or rewards of good utterance 
interpretation can involve a valuable connection with the speaker or other social outcomes. 
Through the three key insights discussed above, RT is able to suggest why some 
interpretations are less likely than others and why certain interpretations should be favored, 
without resorting to a confessional, emotional, or traditional appeal. Given that, as I argue, 
conventional interpretations of the Cretan quotation of Titus 1:12 are unsatisfactory, How 
can Relevance Theory illuminate interpretations of Titus 1:12? I explain and demonstrate 
the application of these key insights from RT in the body of my thesis. 
III. Thesis Statement and Explanation 
Prevalent readings of Titus 1:12 and its famous Cretan quotation are unsustainable on 
linguistic, literary and historical grounds; so I apply key insights from Relevance Theory 
to incisively evaluate previous interpretations and to discern a historically and 
linguistically responsible reading, thereby also suggesting the promise of a relevance-
guided biblical hermeneutic. 
I have already stated and supported two claims: first, that prevailing interpretations 
of the Cretan quotation of Titus 1:12 are unsustainable and, second, that insights from RT 
may supply grounds for both critiquing unsatisfactory interpretations and illuminating 
more linguistically sound ones. I now explain how I will proceed with this thesis. 
Explanation 
The three insights from RT that govern the structure of this study are global insights with 
theory-wide importance. Although I do not describe the theory in full detail, I provide 
sufficient explanation for my readers to, first, grasp how the specifics that I address fit into 
the theory; second, appreciate its impact upon interpretations of Titus 1:12; and, third, 
 
274 Seto, “On Non-Echoic Irony,” 244‒5. 
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discern the value of a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic for interpreting Scripture 
generally. 
Each of the next three chapters corresponds to one of the three key insights outlined 
above: Chapter One—The Inferential Nature of All Communication, Chapter Two—The 
Hearer’s Role in Communication, and Chapter Three—The Non-Propositional Dimensions 
of Communication. In each, I will explain the key insight more thoroughly and apply it to 
Titus 1:12 and representative interpretations thereof while identifying some specific values 
and practices involved in a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic. 
In due course, I propose an interpretation that I think coincides better with the 
evidence; namely, that Paul was rebuking bigotry in the Cretan church, not participating in 
it. If RT can help interpreters read this problematic passage with greater clarity, it can 
potentially illuminate other texts. I will finish this introduction by outlining the context 
into which my research fits and the specific contributions I see it making. 
Context and Contribution 
1. A Strategy for Applying RT to Biblical Texts 
I demonstrate a strategy for applying key insights of RT to the interpretation of biblical 
texts. Applying these insights allows me to evaluate previous interpretations from a fresh 
perspective that has not been widely applied to the Bible. While I am conscious of their 
broader applicability to other texts, I apply them intensively and rigorously to the 
interpretation of Titus. This approach recommends itself particularly to the interpretation 
of problematic texts—i.e., texts with a contentious and unresolved history of interpretation. 
2. A Contribution to Critical Secondary Literature on Titus and the Pastoral Epistles 
The juncture of Biblical Studies and RT is still quite new. Some scholars have outlined 
strategic applications of Relevance-theoretical principles to the task of biblical 
interpretation and translation.275 Few, however, have organized entire studies around RT 
principles and demonstrated the results.276 More commonly, the theory illumines particular 
points.277 But, no biblical scholar to my knowledge has yet given a concentrated or 
 
275 E.g., Gene L. Green, “Relevance Theory and Biblical Interpretation;” Ernst-August Gutt, Relevance 
Theory: A Guide to Successful Communication in Translation (Dallas: SIL International, 1992). 
276 E.g., Joseph D. Fantin, Lord of the Entire World: Lord Jesus, a Challenge to Lord Caesar? (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Phoenix, 2011); Stephen W. Pattemore, Souls under the Altar: Relevance Theory and the Discourse 
Structure of Revelation (New York: United Bible Societies, 2003).  
277 E.g., Benson Goh, “Honoring Christ, Subverting Caesar: Relevance-Historical Reconstruction of the 
Context of Ephesians as an Honorific Discourse Praising Jesus the Great Benefactor” (PhD Diss., Asbury 
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thorough treatment to Titus or the Pastorals using a Relevance-theoretical approach. For 
the most part, Relevance-theoretical insights have been restricted to informing the 
translation of these texts.278 So, I shed fresh light on the issues by applying a strategy of 
evaluation and interpretation that has not been used with Titus before. This constitutes a 
unique contribution to material on Titus and the Pastorals—a critical view of critical 
views. Although I ultimately aim for my work to resolve an impasse, it at least offers an 
alternative approach and a plausible interpretation. 
3. An interpretation of the message of Titus for the modern church that corresponds to 
its ancient meaning 
On the basis of my research, I propose an interpretation of Titus 1:12 that does not rely on 
prima facie reading assumptions but that emerges from sound linguistic analysis. I argue 
that the writer of Titus is not affirming the substance of the Cretan quotation; rather, he is 
addressing and rebuking a form of bigotry in the church. Each of the three Relevance-
theoretical insights reinforces the notion that Paul exposes, corrects, and restoratively 
rebukes bigotry in the church and does not tacitly participate in it. This interpretation has a 
great deal of import and applicability for the modern church, which continues to be fraught 
with classist tendencies, religio-cultural one-upmanship, and bald-faced bigotry. 
Furthermore, self-examination regarding the church’s comfort level with the prima facie 
interpretation may also lead to healthy repentance and restoration. 
4. Suggested implications for the history and canonical esteem of Titus and the 
Pastoral Epistles 
My thesis and its interpretative results suggest implications for the history and canonical 
esteem of Titus and the Pastorals that call into question the presumed scholarly consensus 
and conventional assumptions about their Kompositionsgeschichte and their Sitz im Leben. 
Although my thesis will stand whether or not critics initiate or accept such a reevaluation, 
this is an important implication of the reading that I propose.
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Chapter One – The Inferential Nature of All 
Communication 
Natural language users bridge a significant gap between the semantics of words and syntax 
in a sentence, on one hand, and the speaker’s intended meaning, on the other. Huang 
explains, “In Anglo-American pragmatics, it has been widely accepted that the 
linguistically encoded meaning of a sentence radically underdetermines the proposition a 
speaker expresses when he or she utters that sentence. This is generally known as the 
linguistic underdeterminacy thesis.”1 Several scholars argue that RT applies to written 
communication inasmuch as authors intend to affect readers just as speakers do hearers.2 A 
major difference is the amount of time allowed for producing and processing text versus 
speech. Because the insights of RT apply no less to interpreting textual communication 
than spoken, they illuminate biblical interpretation. 
Linguistic pragmaticists recognize that communication involves inference. The 
words, syntax, and discourse features of what is said leave much for audiences to infer. 
What is said is Grice’s semi-technical language for explicit speech (sentences as uttered), 
as distinct from what is meant, which for him was a propositional form enriched by 
pragmatic processes.3 The meaning of an utterance is not equal to the value of the words 
and syntax even in a semantically decoded propositional form. As Regina Blass explains, 
“The grammars of natural languages fall far short of relating utterances to the thoughts 
they were designed to convey.”4 Hearers must and, in fact, successfully do make countless 
inferences in order to comprehend utterances. 
In what follows, I will address two facets of this key insight that I call Basic 
Pragmatic Processes and Higher-Level Explicatures. These two facets correspond to a 
development in the discipline from Gricean pragmatics to Sperber and Wilson’s RT. 
According to RT, hearers must make inferences not only at the linguistic decoding level 
but also at the second-order conceptual level. In fact, studies of language acquisition have 
 
1 “Micro- and Macro-Pragmatics,” 153. For an iteration in the context of biblical scholarship, see Green, 
“Relevance Theory and Theological Interpretation,” 79. For an explanation pertaining to verbal irony, see 
Wilson, “Pragmatics of Verbal Irony,” 1733. 
2 Uchida, “Text and Relevance”; Blass, Relevance Relations in Discourse, 43–92; Silviu Serban, “Gricean 
Pragmatics and Text Linguistics,” Annals of Spiru Haret University, Journalism Studies 12 (2011): 96–101. 
3 See “Logic and Conversation,” 44, 46, 51, 52, 58, et passim. 
4 Blass, Relevance Relations in Discourse, 42. 
83 
shown that both levels are inherent to comprehension.5 In this chapter, I explain and 
demonstrate the application of these two facets to the specific features of Titus 1:12 and 
propose general guidelines grounded in this insight for what I am calling a relevance-
guided biblical hermeneutic. 
I. Basic Pragmatic Processes 
Sentences are formal and symbolic, comprised of words and their syntactical arrangements 
apart from presentational factors such as intonation and visual signals (e.g., eye roll, 
gesture). By sentence, Relevance theorists technically mean the “linguistically-encoded 
semantic representation” or the “logical form.”6 Utterances are sentences spoken or written 
within specific social and discursive contexts. In order to discern how hearers grasp 
utterance meaning, given the underdeterminacy of sentences, Relevance theorists apply 
what I categorize as basic pragmatic processes to arrive at a propositional form. This 
artificial form expands the sentence’s details and is as precise as the sentence allows and as 
open-ended as it requires. Clark explains, “Within relevance theory, the proposition 
expressed is the propositional form arrived at by fleshing out a linguistically-encoded 
semantic representation.”7 Basic pragmatic processes are required to accomplish this 
“fleshing out;” but this procedure is not equivalent to interpretation, which involves more 
than semantic decoding.8 
Relevance theorists observe that natural language comprehension is typically a real-
time process that does not require intermediate steps. That is, hearers do not go through 
two separate processes—one, in which they decode a semantic representation into a full 
proposition, and another, in which they interpret the proposition according to higher-level 
contextual assumptions. Audiences work on both levels simultaneously, dialectically. So, 
theorists distinguish logically between what I am calling basic pragmatic processes 
(Clark’s “fleshing out”) and second-order processing—that is, thoughts about thoughts or 
meta-analysis, of which higher-level explicatures are a type. Theorists do not, however, 
claim that these two levels are sequential. 
 
5 See Levinson, Pragmatics, 282. 
6 E.g., Clark, Relevance Theory, 200, 244, 299. See also, Sperber and Wilson, Pragmatics, 6–7, 32 and 
Meadowcroft, “Relevance as Mediating Category,” 622. 
7 Clark, Relevance Theory, 200. 
8 Huang, “Micro- and Macro-Pragmatics,” 136, 152. 
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As natural language users ourselves, we readily acknowledge the gap between 
sentence meaning and utterance meaning, and we recognize that hearers regularly bridge 
that gap to successfully understand speakers. For the sake of biblical interpretation, Gene 
L. Green asks, “How, then, do we fill the gap between sentence and utterance meaning?”9 
Pragmatic inference is the process by which humans fill the gap, and Relevance theorists 
define the tasks and constraints involved. Green continues, “The gap between sentence 
meaning and utterance meaning is filled by an inferential process constrained by the 
principle of relevance.”10 Through this principle, theorists articulate a simple, coherent 
framework for understanding how pragmatic processes function, especially when 
pragmatic steps conflict with one another—for example, when the cognitive effects upon a 
listener of using an ambiguous statement outweigh the risks to the speaker of being 
misunderstood. 
Basic pragmatic processes are tasks that must be accomplished in order to decode 
the “logical form” and to achieve higher-level (or second-order) comprehension. This does 
not imply a necessary sequence. These aspects of comprehension occur simultaneously or 
dialectically in real time. Hearers typically need to understand what pronouns refer to, 
what sense of a word the speaker uses, and so forth. So, pragmatic processes include 
disambiguation and reference assignment, as well as an array of tasks intended to resolve 
vagueness and indeterminacy or restore ellipsed material. These tasks include discerning 
the meaning of explicit and implicit logical connectives, analyzing lexical pragmatics, and 
deciding where to place items on the literal-figurative continuum. 
In their seminal overview of pragmatics, Sperber and Wilson outline the pragmatic 
tasks that are employed in the interpretation of utterances as follows: 
The choice of an actual interpretation involves a variety of related tasks: 
disambiguation, reference assignment, resolution of vaguenesses or 
indeterminacies and restoration of missing or ellipsed material. These tasks 
are genuinely pragmatic and must be handled by a theory of utterance 
interpretation rather than a theory of sentence meaning [semantics].11 
Over the past several decades, Sperber and Wilson have become leaders in the field of 
pragmatics and have refined their ideas, but they have made only slight changes to what 
they outlined as the main tasks of pragmatics.12 In the following sections, as I apply select 
 
9 Green, “Relevance Theory and Biblical Interpretation,” 267. 
10 Ibid., 271. 
11 Sperber and Wilson, Pragmatics, 2. 
12 See Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), esp. 478–84. 
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aspects of pragmatic processing that are especially relevant for interpreting Titus 1:12, I 
cover the tasks outlined above under categories that fit the material under examination. The 
first category is Referential and Deictic Speech. 
Referential and Deictic Speech 
Referentials are words and phrases that stand in for a more specific referent or target (e.g., 
someone, it, that). The meanings of deictic words depend upon their conversational or 
discourse context (e.g., now, I, here). Both types of words are context-dependent. With 
both reference and deixis, processing effort is crucial in weighing alternative 
interpretations, because these types of speech widen the gap of indeterminacy by supplying 
less specific semantic information. Take the following sentence for example: I like it, and 
so do they. In the second clause, do efficiently replaces the verb and object of the first. The 
words it and they also have a referential function. The referents are outside the sentence 
and would normally be in the conversational context. The adverb so has a deictic and a 
discursive function; it points to the kind of action and expresses a context-specific 
relationship of comparison between the two propositions. 
Referential and deictic speech typically identifies a prominent element in the 
discourse or in the conversational context. This kind of speech is most often anaphoric. 
That is, the target has usually already been mentioned within the near context. Levinson 
describes anaphora as “where some term picks out as referent the same entity (or class of 
objects) that some prior term in the discourse picked out.”13 When speakers or writers use 
an alternative word or phrase to refer to or replace a word or phrase from earlier in the 
context, it is anaphoric. Cataphoric references require more processing effort, because they 
force the hearer to suspend the more ambiguous reference until he hears what it is pointing 
to later in the conversation. According to Dan Cristea and Oana-Dianna Postolache, “a 
cataphoric relation is given by a pair of coreferring mentions in which the first one 
introduces the referent and is information-poorer than the subsequent one.”14 Michael B. 
Smith claims that cataphoric pronouns are not superfluous or ornamental but have a 
specific function. He compares the function achieved by “shell nouns” (examples of which 
grammarians often refer to as casus pendens) which are also cataphoric.15 Smith’s 
 
13 Levinson, Pragmatics, 67. 
14 Dan Cristea and Oana-Diana Postolache, “How to Deal with Wicked Anaphora?” AP 263 (2005): 17–46, at 
36. 
15 See “Cataphoric Pronouns as Mental Space Designators: Their Conceptual Import and Discourse 
Function,” in Cognitive and Communicative Approaches to Linguistic Analysis, ed. Ellen Contini-Morava, 
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description of their linguistic function clearly expects greater-than-usual processing effort 
(i.e., suspending a mental space to await the referent). Speakers might use cataphora to 
catch hearers off-guard, to build suspense for effect, or to briefly topicalize a subject; but 
as Smith explains, “Cataphors are appreciably less common than anaphors.”16 Cristea and 
Postolache summarize a corpus analysis that shows “cataphorae” occurring fewer than one 
in two hundred and fifty uses of referential speech.17 Writers may use reference and deixis 
to avoid repetition, but their choice of which alternative to use frequently contributes to the 
meaning of its target by signaling how to conceive of it. 
Because anaphora relies on a known target fresh from the preceding context, it 
requires significantly less processing effort. Empirical studies of language and 
neuroscience have demonstrated what linguists have hypothesized, namely, that “recency 
of use” decreases processing effort.18 We will now look more closely at these kinds of 
speech in Titus, starting with Reference. 
1. Reference 
Referentials exhibit various kinds of ambiguity that can indicate or identify a more specific 
target in the world outside the text (e.g., a topic of conversation), within the text (e.g., a 
character), or created by the text (e.g., a logical claim or grammatical feature). This last 
kind may be labelled discourse referential. Gradeschoolers learn that speakers can use 
referentials for style and convenience, but choosing referentials over narrower descriptive 
terms or choosing one type of referential over another also has pragmatic benefits. These 
choices contribute to meaning beyond simply replacing another more specific word. In this 
section, I will disambiguate several referentials in Titus 1:10‒16 and argue that they 
consistently point to troublemakers in the Cretan church, not to Cretans in general. The 
pronouns of this passage are pivotal to understanding Paul’s meaning. Although assigning 
referents is a relatively basic task, doing so correctly is a critical part of interpretation. 
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Misconstruing a referent can lead to profound misinterpretation. Therefore, understanding 
where interpreters have assumed false referents and why those misconstruals had seemed 
so apt is crucial in evaluating their interpretations. 
Paul introduced a large group (many [people], πολλοί 1:10) of presumptive, 
unsanctioned leaders over whom he repeatedly expressed angst (1:11; 2:8, 15; 3:9‒11).19 
The epexegetical phrase especially those of the circumcision (μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς, 
1:10) refers not to the entire category of troublemakers but to a (probably numerically) 
significant portion of them. Mounce cites ancient evidence that there were a significant 
number of Jews living in Crete in the first-century CE.20 Quinn recognizes that this phrase 
refers almost exclusively to Jewish Christians—Jewish in ethnicity, Christian in faith, and 
Cretan only in geographic residence. Yet, he claims that Paul uses the Cretan quotation to 
target them, too.21 Although scholars are not confident that, historically speaking, Paul is 
addressing a problem of Jew-Gentile relations within the Cretan church; nevertheless, he 
likely used this phrase to activate the assumption that Jewish believers were en force 
among the troublemakers. Several statements in Titus strongly suggest that those who 
ascribed to and elevated features of Jewish religious culture were instilling a sense of 
ethno-religious inferiority in Cretan believers. I discuss this evidence in Chapter Two 
under Cognitive Environment. Presumptive leaders impressed upon believers that those not 
adhering to the trappings of Jewish religious culture were second-class. That teaching, of 
course, was contrary to Paul’s gospel and healthy doctrine (1:9, 13; 2:1‒2, 8); furthermore, 
it upset entire households (1:11). We may not know the extent to which this represents a 
 
19 Although the effect upon my thesis is negligible, one textual variant in Titus 1:10 deserves comment. It 
includes καί and reads as follows: Εἰσὶν γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνυπότακτοι. It is one of the few plausible variants in 
this section of Titus. The καί appears in D F G I Ψ 1739 and some other, especially Western and Byzantine, 
texts. The UBS5 gives the variant a “C” rating. The questionable text subtly affects Paul’s introduction of the 
troublemakers. Without καί, πολλοί (1:10) is an attributive adjective, as most English translations convey. 
The variant has more than one translational possibility. Bruce M. Metzger judges the alternative reading as 
either a case of awkward hendiadys (using two descriptors in a parallel construction to attribute a single 
compound quality—e.g., nice and easy) or straightforward attributive speech. See A Textual Commentary on 
the Greek New Testament (Stuttgart: Deutsche Biblegesellschaft, 1994), 584–85. Marshall says that the 
variant reading results in pleonasm—using extra words to describe the problematic offenders. He suggests 
that it may have been original but that it was dropped by scribes. See Critical and Exegetical, 193. The main 
translational choice is between there are many insubordinate ones (accepted reading) or there are many and 
insubordinate ones (variant reading). To expand the variant reading for clarity: there are people, who, 
because they are insubordinate, are [too] many (i.e., more than there should be). This understanding of the 
variant is preferred, rather than that the troublemakers are both numerous and insubordinate. 
20 Pastoral Epistles, 396. 
21 Letter to Titus, 98. 
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real historical issue, but the writer portrays it as one that comports with representations in 
other NT books. 
Later in Titus, Paul did not transparently develop his ethical instruction on the vices 
identified in the quotation.22 He did, however, consistently address issues that undermined 
the Cretans’ moral and spiritual reputation. The power brokers of the religious community 
and those sympathetic to their arguments questioned Cretan legitimacy, and troublemakers 
impressed a sense of religious and moral inferiority upon ethnic Cretans. Each time Paul 
mentioned Jewish religious and cultural interests he countered the notion that Gentiles 
could not be full-fledged members of the church without attending to certain traditions, 
circumcision (1:10) being chief among them. 
The first words that require disambiguation appear in the quotative frame: someone 
from [among] them—a prophet of their own—said (εἶπέν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος αὐτῶν 
προφήτης, 1:12a). In this translation, I am trying to convey in English the sense that the 
speaker belonged to whatever group Paul had been talking about. The partitive genitive 
pronoun αὐτῶν, coupled with ἴδιος, emphasizes this belonging. Most commentators note 
the label prophet within the subject phrase as peculiar but few satisfyingly address the 
unusual syntactic construction. Mounce asserts that the repetition of αὐτῶν is classical.23 
Marshall says that the τις ἐξ αὐτῶν is “typically vague.”24 In fact, it is difficult to translate 
the exact thrust into English. Although one can find a few constructions with some 
similarities among Greek literature, this syntax does not seem to constitute an established 
idiom; it is unusual. Under the rubric of Grice’s maxim of manner—namely, be brief, 
Levinson explains why speakers might not adhere to the maxim. He reasons, “Wherever I 
avoid some simple expression in favour of some more complex paraphrase, it may be 
assumed that I do not do so wantonly, but because the details are somehow relevant to the 
present enterprise.”25 The assumption is that non-conventional verbiage signals special 
meaning. Let us examine more closely the referential components of this quotative frame. 
Because of its partitive use, let us address the first αὐτῶν and then return to the 
sequentially prior τις. This genitive plural pronoun in ἐξ αὐτῶν (from [among] them, 1:12) 
references a group or category of people that probably corresponds with οἵτινες 
 
22 Although some scholars outline subtle correlates. See Kidd, “Titus as Apologia;” and Faber, “‘Evil Beasts, 
Lazy Gluttons.’” 
23 Pastoral Epistles, 399. 
24 Critical and Exegetical, 198. 
25 Levinson, Pragmatics, 107–8. Note that relevance is essential to this explanation. 
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(who[ever], 1:11), which itself refers to the troublemakers mentioned earlier (1:10). Paul 
mentions another plurality of persons further from the context of 1:12, in the previous 
paragraph (τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, the contradicting [people], 1:9). No other references to a 
group of people commend themselves as the target of αὐτῶν. In terms of literary context, 
πρεσβυτέρους (elders, 1:5) is distant and unlikely as a referent, because Paul shifts his 
focus from good leaders to bad in the paragraph that begins at 1:10. 
Many commentators take the referent of this pronoun to be Cretans.26 Although the 
prima facie reading assumes that Κρήτῃ (Crete, 1:5) signals the target, Paul’s mention of 
this place is not only distant but primarily geographical. Hearers typically expect referents 
to correspond substantially with their pronouns on a conceptual level, and referentials 
normally correspond in kind (e.g., number, gender, conceptual type) with their referents.27 
As a singular proper name for Paul’s former and Titus’s current location (1:5), Paul 
probably did not expect readers to suspend the place name in their mind while he discussed 
other topics and people for a stretch of eight finite clauses (seven verses) before referring 
to the people who dwell in that place as αὐτῶν. 
Cristea and Postolache provide a detailed technical outline of the factors affecting 
reference resolution.28 Although Koine Greek is not one of the languages they account for 
in their investigation, they are making cross-linguistic claims about language cognition, so 
their findings have some applicability to biblical literature. Blass argues that Relevance-
theoretical observations are valid cross-linguistically and that languages that differ on the 
surface level of forms do not differ as much on the cognitive level.29 One of the factors 
Cristea and Postolache identify for successful reference resolution under “positional 
features” is “intervening discourse units.”30 They found “that the great majority of the 
anaphors can find an antecedent within this range,” which they earlier identified as “a 
vicinity of five sentences.”31 Resolving a referent farther away in the discourse typically 
 
26 E.g., Knight, Pastoral Epistles, 298–99. 
27 Incidentally, all of Smith’s dozens of English and German examples follow this pattern. His examples, 
even of cataphora, reveal that when it functions, the referent is able to replace the cataphoric pronoun or noun 
with very little grammatical adjustment. See “Cataphoric Pronouns.” One caveat with his study is that he was 
not examining all possible types of cataphors, but it suggests that similar rules are normal. Cristea and 
Postolache, in outlining the factors of referent resolution, note that grammatical equivalence can occasionally 
be a misleading indicator of resolution, so grammatical mismatches should not stand alone in dismissing a 
word or discourse unit as a referent. See “How to Deal,” 21–24. 
28 “How to Deal,” 21–25. 
29 Relevance Relations in Discourse, 90. 
30 Cristea and Postolache, “How to Deal,” 23. 
31 Ibid., 24. 
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requires the referent to be remarkably salient, another factor in reference resolution that 
these and other authors mention. Crete just does not seem to stand out as salient in 
comparison to the racy intervening material between 1:5 and 1:12. 
Conventional, prima facie readings of Titus 1:12 require unlikely syntactic 
maneuvers, taking the referent of αὐτῶν (of them, 1:122) to be either distant or cataphoric. 
On account of their linear (incremental) processing hypothesis, which does not need to be 
argued here, Cristea and Postolache, are dubious of all purportedly cataphoric usage. They 
suggest that when analysts suspect cataphoric usage, they should examine other referential 
alternatives before resolving a referring expression as such.32 This suggests that Cretans 
(1:12b) is most likely not the proper reference assignment for αὐτῶν. A more appropriate 
antecedent is readily available in the preceding context, and its proximity as an anaphoric 
referent makes it far more likely. The relevant subset of people who dwell in Crete is the 
same referent as that of οἵτινες (who[ever], 1:11). Therefore, αὐτῶν probably refers to the 
troublemakers in the Cretan church. 
If the personal pronoun (αὐτῶν) refers to Cretans in general, this reference could 
not be coterminous with Cretans in any normal sense (e.g., ethnic, geographic, political). 
The pronoun could not refer to Cretan Christians, for none of the poets to whom the 
quotation is attributed lived during the Christian era. The context suggests a more 
straightforward reading. The troublemaking presumptive leaders—described as rebellious, 
idle-talking, deceptive, and especially from the circumcision (1:10)—are its most likely 
antecedent. Because Paul gives a relatively vivid description of that group, the idea that the 
pronoun refers to Cretans (either as a far-reaching anaphor or as an unusual cataphor) is 
doubtful. Paul was concerned with the tertiary discursive use of the possibly-famous 
refrain about Cretans, not its origins. 
On the basis of natural language comprehension, a simple linear processing 
exercise should demonstrate how the tradition that the quotation is from Epimenides is 
superfluous to grasping Paul’s use. After reading the book of Titus through to the quotative 
frame (1:12a), but not the quotation itself (1:12b), we may then ask simply on the basis of 
the text and not its history of interpretation, What do we know about the speaker to which 
 
32 Ibid., 36‒38. Τheir corpus analysis shows that there is usually some suggestion of the identity of referents 
within the few sentences prior to referring expressions. They address several complexities with referential 
language and, echoing other scholars, say, “In cases where a pronoun precedes a noun but the text contains 
an earlier more informative mention of the same entity, ... the pronoun should be resolved against the 
preceding text as in ordinary anaphora” (37). Titus 1:10‒16 features this pattern. 
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Paul refers? Does Paul convey sympathy or trust toward this speaker? The analysis below 
continues our examination of referentials and suggests an answer. 
The pronoun τις (someone, 1:12a) refers to a member of the group to which αὐτῶν 
refers. As I have shown, the group is not coterminous with ethnic Cretans or Cretan 
Christians generally, so a critical question is, What is the whole and what is the part? 
According to a typical iteration of the prima facie reading, the whole is ethnic Cretans and 
the part is a poet of Cretan descent—namely, Epimenides. This conventional reference 
assignment effectively excludes Jews, so we reasonably ask, Whence this concern with 
circumcision (1:10) and Jewish myths (1:14)? The intuitive natural language exercise 
described above casts these assumptions about the identity of the whole and of the part into 
doubt. A more natural reading is that αὐτῶν (used twice for intensity) is anaphoric and 
refers to the presumptive leaders. It was from [among] them (ἐξ αὐτῶν, 1:12a) that the 
quotation had re-emerged with a new and ugly pejorative purpose, and Paul became aware 
of its currency. He may not have known or cared about the original attribution of this 
quotation. What mattered was that the unidentified troublemaker (τις, 1:12a) who 
employed the ghastly slur was one of those who presumed to be leaders and teachers 
among the congregation. One of their tactics in advancing and maintaining their status was 
utterly objectionable to Paul—that of accentuating the supposed ethno-religious inferiority 
of the Cretan populace. The author portrayed Jew-Gentile relations as a significant issue in 
the Cretan church. I will discuss the themes of both church leadership and Jew-Gentile 
relations in Titus in Chapter Two under Cognitive Environment. 
The indefinite pronoun τις (someone, 1:12) may be used to refer to someone whose 
identity is well-known in order to downplay the fame or importance of the individual—as 
in, “As some pop singer once said, ‘Beat it.’” The conventional reference assignment, 
however, assumes that Paul draws upon Epimenides as some sort of authority, which does 
not cohere with a choice to deliberately understate his importance. Therefore, I judge that 
this non-typical use of the indefinite pronoun does not apply in this case. Typically, τις is 
used when some feature of its referent (i.e., exact identity) is not known or not relevant. It 
is not clear that Paul knew the author of the quotation or its original poetic context. His use 
of τις corresponds to not being able to identify with certainty the person or persons who 
were using it. He may not have known the quotation outside its tertiary (an echo of an 
echo) and inappropriate context—the Cretan church. 
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To whom did Paul credit the saying? Whether or not Epimenides authored the 
quotation at some point in his vague career is not pertinent to Paul’s use. He discloses no 
knowledge of or interest in Epimenides. The near context indicates that this τις was part of 
a troublesome group (1:10‒12a). While natural language hearers process referential speech 
in real-time, modern readers must look again to the context, especially the preceding 
verses, for the most likely referent. Evidence from context strongly suggests that Paul was 
concerned with someone from among the group of troublemakers, regardless of whether 
this τις was echoing the words of someone who came before, such as Epimenides. 
Although many interpretations of Titus 1:12 depend upon assigning the quotation to this 
figure, pragmatic reference assignment does not commend the tendency. 
Another word deserves attention—ἴδιος ([their] own, 1:12a). Grammatically and 
morphologically, this word is an adjective, but it almost always has a referential function.33 
Taking adjectival forms, it matches the inflection of its head noun, which frequently 
obscures the number and gender of its target, requiring pragmatic inference on the basis of 
context. This feature makes it a prime example of the underdeterminacy of linguistically-
encoded speech. Every use of ἴδιος elsewhere in Titus is anaphoric, taking a referent from 
the preceding context (1:3; 2:5, 9). When this word appears in comparable NT epistolary 
literature to make reference to persons (as it does in 1:12; 2:5, 9), the use is also 
anaphoric.34 When anaphoric, the referent typically appears in the immediate near context, 
never more than a few clauses away. Not only is ἴδιος typically anaphoric, its referent is 
typically explicit, yet prima facie readings require that the referent is implied and not 
explicit because no group or person that appears in the text is coterminous with what 
various iterations of the reading expect. This evidence, too, points to the troublemakers of 
1:10‒11 as the group from which the speaker of 1:12 comes. 
 
33 Based on its referential function, some classify it alongside pronouns. See Archibald T. Robertson, A 
Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, 3rd ed. (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1919), 692; James H. Moulton and George Milligan, Vocabulary of the Greek Testament 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1930), 298. Moulton and Milligan explain that grammarians who equate 
ἴδιος with the possessive pronoun are missing its often rich emphasis on belonging. 
34 The instance in the epistolary greeting (Titus 1:3) would only be an exception if the target of ἰδίοις is taken 
to be λόγον and not ζωῆς or ἐλπίδι or any other preceding word, which would be an odd reading. I have 
examined every use of ἴδιος in the PE (1 Tim 2:6, 3:4‒5, 3:12, 4:2, 5:4, 5:8, 6:1, 6:15; 2 Tim 1:9, 4:3), the 
Pauline corpus (Rom 8:32, 10:3, 11:24, 14:4‒5; Gal 2:2, 6:5, 6:9), and Hebrews (4:10, 7:27, 9:12, 13:12). 
These instances are exhaustive of every use within their respective books, which were chosen as 
representative. They demonstrate that cataphoric use is rare. In all of these examples, the referent appears in 
the preceding context. Prima facie readings require unusual (unlikely) syntactical maneuvers. 
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Finally, let us look at the immediate context following the Cretan quotation. The 
pronoun αὐτούς (them, 1:13c) refers to the direct object of a severe reproof. Paul issued the 
command to reprove (ἔλεγχε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, rebuke them severely, 1:13c) on the basis 
of (δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν, on account of which reason, 1:13b) the evidence he presented (ἡ 
μαρτυρία αὕτη, this testimony, 1:13a). The near proximity of the claim that someone was 
advancing the insult suggests that the demonstrative here (αὕτη, this, 1:13a) refers to the 
testimony Paul gives concerning the troublemakers in Crete—namely, that they are 
propounding a characterization of ethnic Cretans inconsistent with the gospel and social 
reality. For this reason, Paul commands Titus to severely rebuke them—i.e., the 
troublemakers. 
The prima facie reading typically assumes either that Paul was instructing Titus to 
rebuke Cretans generally or that his command to rebuke resumed his concern with the 
troublemakers, which he supposedly suspended in vv. 12‒13a. Although the latter of these 
assumptions has the benefit of not being completely absurd, it ignores how connected the 
passage is by virtue of the density of referentials in vv. 12‒13. The relative pronoun (ἣν, 
which, 1:13b) should not be separated from its referent to the extent this latter reading calls 
for. That is, the reason corresponds to the offenses Paul lists in 1:10‒11, and the slur of 
1:12 is one of the offenses. All of the offenses Paul lists constitute a single testimony or 
reason (μαρτυρία, αἰτίαν, 1:13) for rebuke. The quotation represents an egregious example. 
I describe evidence for this logic more under Procedural and Logical Connectives and 
Particles below. For now, let us consider Deixis. 
2. Deixis 
Deictics, also known as indexicals, serve a pointing function. They link words and 
sentences to other things—features of time, place, person, status, discourse, and so forth—
without necessarily replacing them.35 In his discussion of deixis, Levinson includes 
discourse deixis (a.k.a. text deixis), which is pertinent for interpreting Titus 1:10‒16 and 
other biblical literature and for evaluating interpretations thereof. Discourse deixis points 
to a proximal or distal text or argument, linking components of the utterance to 
components of the broader discourse context.36 It points to other speech, not to actual or 
imagined objects. The following example is adapted from Levinson: “That’s a rhinoceros; 
 
35 Levinson, Pragmatics, 62–64. 
36 Ibid., 85. 
94 
spell it for me.”37 The pronoun in the second clause does not refer to an animal in the 
world outside the discourse, but to the mention of the animal within the discourse. 
Mentions can become complex, because speakers may have in mind entire sentences, 
ideas, or ad hoc components of their speech. Speakers mention things to process, critique, 
or evaluate them. In the case above, the speaker asks the hearer to process (spell) 
rhinoceros. I detail the technical use of mention in RT later in this chapter. 
This testimony is true (ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀληθής, 1:13) presents interpreters 
with a neglected question: Does ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη point to the world outside or the world 
inside the discourse? I have yet to see a commentator addressing this important concern. 
Marco Rocha has developed a set of rules for determining the target of demonstratives.38 
In his corpus analysis, the largest percentage of successful demonstrative referent 
resolutions was discourse deictic. In other words, to grasp the meaning of the 
demonstrative in most cases required discourse knowledge as opposed to any other 
strategy, such as collocation, “first-candidate search” (i.e., the closest prior noun), or “first-
candidate chain” (i.e., preceeding phrase or sentence).39 Prima facie readings suggest that 
this testimony (1:13) refers to the quotation about Cretans—i.e., the preceeding sentence. 
Some interpreters describe some nuance that Paul added. For instance, he winked at the 
logical contradiction inherent in the liar paradox that would obtain if a Cretan stated the 
quotation. Paul, tongue-in-cheek, affirms that it is true, thus deliberately creating a 
contradiction of his own. As Thiselton suggests, “The additional comment ‘This testimony 
is true’ is not a sign that the writer (or an editor) is oblivious to the nature of paradox; it is 
more likely to have been intended as a light touch underlining the absurdity of a regress ad 
infinitum.”40 I have noted before, however, that this view depends upon the attribution of 
the quotation to Epimenides, which is at least unassured if not doubtful. Alternatively, if 
Paul was primarily concerned with troublemakers in the Cretan congregation who used the 
quotation as a slur against Titus’s missionary congregation, the demonstrative likely has a 
 
37 Ibid., 86. 
38 See “Anaphoric Demonstratives: Dealing with the Hard Cases,” AP 263 (2005): 403–27. Rocha aimed for 
an extremely precise analysis, because he wanted to program computers to execute a repeatable process for 
analyzing text. He provides valuable insights, even though he does not entirely succeed. The problem is that 
most computerized linguistics projects tie analysis to form so that the system can compute all instances, 
which makes relevance theorists balk. Rocha worked with corpuses of English and Portuguese, and his 
analysis found similar patterns in both languages. He argues that his findings apply cross-linguistically and, 
therefore, reflect cognitive linguistics. 
39 Ibid., 409. 
40 “Logical Role,” 207. 
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discourse deictic function. It points to Paul’s testimony against the troublemakers, not to 
his agreement with a prejudicial assessment of the Cretans. In Chapter Two under 
Contextual Assumptions, I explain the cognitive framing and activation of Paul’s 
courtroom language. 
The near demonstrative pronoun οὕτος (this, 1:13) was distinguished as the marker 
of proximity in classical Greek from ἐκεῖνος (that). By the era of the Greek NT, it might 
have lost some of its distinctive force in Koine so that it occasionally differed little from 
the personal pronoun αὐτός (it) in usage;41 but the NRSV translation, That testimony is 
true (1:13a), suggests an underlying far demonstrative. If one assumes that Paul is 
concerned with an ancient Cretan poet, then a far demonstrative would be appropriate, but 
the Greek does not lean in such a direction. If Paul is pointing, however, to his own 
exposure of a problem in his case against the troublemakers, then the near demonstrative 
that we find in the passage is fitting. The author of Titus knows how to use both οὕτος 
(this, 1:13) and ἐκεῖνος (that, 3:7) distinctively, so it is reasonable to argue that they should 
be differentiated. 
The author of 2 Timothy clearly knew how to distinguish between near and far 
demonstratives in discourse deixis, pointing to referents in the near discourse as οὗτοι 
(these [ones], 2 Tim 3:8) and the far discourse as ἐκείνων (those [ones], 3:9) to distinguish 
between οἱ ἐνδύνοντες (the ones slyly entering, 3:6) and Ἰάννης καὶ Ἰαμβρῆς (Jannes and 
Jambres, 3:8), respectively. To avoid confusion while skipping over another demonstrative 
to reach the target, the writer chose the far demonstrative in the second instance. This 
suggests that the near demonstrative in Titus 1:13 retains its proximity-marking force. The 
proposal that the same author wrote each PE reinforces this claim. 
If ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη (this testimony, 1:13a) points to a saying that had currency in 
the Cretan church and that Paul was affirming, then it depends upon a truth-conditional 
proposition. Inquiries into historical (opinions about) Cretan malfeasance would, then, be 
understandable. Given that Paul identified the subject of the predicate adjective true as a 
testimony, we reasonably ask, In what sense could the poetic saying be categorized as a 
testimony?42 This question deserves attention. But, evidence suggests that Paul pointed to 
his own description of the troublemakers’ malfeasance in Crete as a testimony that 
 
41 Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 318. 
42 In Chapter Two under Contextual Assumptions, I explain the effect of activating a courtroom. It suffices 
here to note that αἰτία can mean “a basis for legal action,” which fits Paul’s use. See entry in BDAG, 31. 
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prosecuted their demeaning speech (1:12) and disrupting behavior (1:10‒11). The deixis 
likely targets Paul’s own discourse, rather than some truth-conditional content in the 
outside world for which modern scholars should feel obliged to find corroborating 
evidence. 
Social deixis is also relevant for interpreting the Bible. It involves aspects of 
language that encode the social identities of participants or the social relationship between 
each other or other persons referred to.43 Writers, as well as speakers, regularly choose 
their words based on their propriety both to describe real-world objects (semantic 
appropriateness) and to describe them properly to specific hearers (social appropriateness). 
In languages with honorific systems and formalities, Levinson notes, “it is almost 
impossible to say anything at all which is not sociolinguistically marked as appropriate for 
certain kinds of addressees only.”44 Native speakers of any language (including English) 
are usually not conscious of the extent to which social deixis affects their seemingly 
intuitive choices of lexeme and syntax. 
For example, consider how the following list of congratulatory phrases reflects 
various levels and registers of celebration as well as types of relationship between the 
speaker and the hearer: I’m proud of you; I applaud you; I admire you; Yay! Each 
statement is appropriate to the same occasion but evokes different social arrangements. 
They may exhibit semantic differences, but their pragmatic differences are more 
significant.45 Levinson explains, “Social deixis is concerned with the grammaticalization, 
or encoding in language structure, of social information.”46 Social deixis signals social 
roles such as differentiations between first, second, and third persons and the social 
categories among them as well as indications and invocations of privilege, deference or 
disdain. Levinson observes that almost any utterance has social deictic features. 
The Cretan quotation may have evoked a liar paradox in its original setting, and 
Paul may deliberately accentuate the logical contradiction involved.47 I follow Thiselton, 
however, in considering the contradiction to be even more dramatic and effective if it 
 
43 Definition based closely on Levinson, Pragmatics, 89. 
44 Ibid., 90. 
45 Social deixis also relates to material in Chapter Three—The Non-Propositional Dimensions of 
Communication. 
46 Levinson, Pragmatics, 93. 
47 Although we cannot recover it completely, the quotation was likely not a general statement about Cretans 
in its original context. It was within the context of pious pagan poetry, and the broad accusation emerged 
from one offense. The lie that started it all seems to have been that Zeus (the Cretan man by that name) was 
dead—actually true in that limited sense. Cretans, in fact, were not considered, in general, to be liars. 
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exposes the failure of third parties (i.e., the presumptive leaders) to speak anything 
objectively true by taking up this quotation as a slur.48 According to the prima facie 
reading, part of the validity structure for Paul is that the quotation emerges from within the 
Cretan community (i.e., first-person reference), but it can only be true if it is used from 
without (i.e., third-person reference). The troublemakers, rather than Paul, leaned on this 
validity structure, whereas Paul exposed the absurdity of the quotation in their mouths by 
pointing to their dubious logic—they relied on a lie to tell what they purported to be a 
truth. 
Paul’s self-designation is an example of social deixis. He referred to himself as a 
servant of God, an apostle, moreover, of Jesus Christ (1:1). Thus, he introduced the letter 
by signalling aspects of his vocation in relation to God and, implicitly, Titus and the 
church. He set himself as an authority representing the unlying God (1:2). So, when he 
sanctions Titus to execute certain authoritative actions (e.g., appoint 1:5; rebuke 1:13), he 
invokes multiple layers of social obligation—for instance, when he says, I desire you to 
insist on these [things] (3:8). 
Did Paul use the honorable title prophet (προφήτης, 1:12) to refer to a pagan poet, 
Epimenides? As far as Acts 17:28 is concerned, Paul knew how to say poet when referring 
to a pagan author.49 If Paul agreed with the quotation and wanted to elevate the status of its 
originator, he might have done so by naming him a prophet. His usage, however, seems to 
suggest special marking which is often signaled by non-customary usage.50 Towner thinks 
that Paul’s use of this inappropriate, honorific title is likely sarcastic.51 It had distinct 
 
48 See Thiselton, “Logical Role,” 207–23. He develops his interpretation from arguments of linguists J.L. 
Austin, J.R. Searle, and others (esp. 218-221). As I have suggested, his is one of the best and most nuanced 
treatments of this passage in history. His great contribution was in calling people’s attention to the gross 
mistreatment of this passage on the basis of flawed historical inquiry. In the end, however, his conclusion 
does not convince me, because it requires a specific and fragile set of contextual assumptions (implicated 
premises, to be exact; see my Chapter Two) that I do not think it is reasonable to expect. I think my final 
interpretation is more plausible. 
49 Craig S. Keener incidentally suggests that Epimenides was also a possible source for a phrase of Paul’s 
poetic quotation in Acts 17:28, which may have actually been an amalgam (note the plural source, poets). 
Because none of Epimenides’s works survive extant, this can only be conjecture. Keener’s footnotes show 
the second-hand nature of these attributional claims. Some excess references fail to corroborate the 
attribution of the Acts quotation to Epimenides but are merely ancient literary mentions of Epimenides. I 
discuss the scholarly confusion about exactly who Epimenides was and when he lived in the Introduction, 
where I note every one of the references Keener cites (Acts: An Exegetical Commentary, vol. 3, 4 vols. 
[Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012], 2657). 
50 See Steven E. Runge, Discourse Grammar of the Greek New Testament: A Practical Introduction for 
Teaching and Exegesis, Lexham Bible Reference Series (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010), 61–68; 
Levinson, Pragmatics, 307–8. 
51 Letters to Timothy and Titus, 700, 742. 
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significance in a Jewish ethno-religious context; as Quinn notes, “Prophetic credentials 
were found and valued among the Jewish Christians.”52 A descriptive use would have 
flattened its significance. After describing the troublemakers (1:10‒11), Paul downplayed 
the speaker’s importance (someone from among them) then upplayed the speaker’s 
credentials (prophet). This is a standard tactic in irony, as when friends observe someone’s 
ridiculous behavior and remark, “What a genius.”53 
Paul subverted the normal meaning of the descriptor by pointing snidely to a 
presumptive leader who only posed as a prophet in the scenario recounted in Titus 1:10‒
12. Only in the crooked company of the troublemakers, and perhaps in his own mind, was 
the speaker of this quotation considered a prophet. To have such a prophet as this—now 
that Paul has exposed him—is a source of shame. Suwon Yoon explains how honorific 
titles can be deployed subversively to achieve dramatic pragmatic effects.54 In the case of 
Titus 1:12, prophet is actually not an honorific title but a sarcastic dismissal. Now that I 
have proposed resolutions to critical referential and deictic language in Titus 1:12 and its 
conext, let us examine the connective strategies in the passage from a pragmatic 
perspective. 
Procedural and Logical Connectives and Particles 
Titus 1:12 and its context have discursive features that require inferential processing, and 
the discipline of Discourse Analysis (DA) can be especially helpful for discerning the 
logical connections between sentences and discourse units as encoded in language. 
Linguist Robert E. Longacre developed one of the earliest methods of DA applied to the 
Hebrew Bible. He used it to analyze the stable, discourse functions of words and phrases 
and considered objectivity and reliability to be important strengths of the method. It 
straddles the domains of semantics and pragmatics, stripping formal components of 
language of numerous erroneous semantic accruements while asserting their stable 
 
52 Letter to Titus, 109. 
53 See, e.g., Wilson, “Pragmatic of Verbal Irony;” Francisco Yus, “Relevance Theory and Contextual 
Sources-Centered Analysis of Irony: Current Research and Compatibility,” in Relevance Theory: Recent 
Developments, Current Challenges, and Future Directions, ed. Manuel Padilla Cruz (Amsterdam: 
Benjamins, 2016), 147‒71; Seto, “On Non-Echoic Irony.” I explain irony in more detail in the second half of 
this chapter. 
54 “Semantic Constraint and Pragmatic Nonconformity for Expressives: Compatibility Condition on Slurs, 
Epithets, Anti-Honorifics, Intensifiers, and Mitigators,” Lang.Sci. 52 (2015): 46–69. 
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functional core.55 Because it is now practiced by a broad array of interpreters and linguists, 
it exhibits diversity in method, philosophy, and level of precision. 
Outlining two broad trends within DA will reveal its relation to RT: One broad 
grouping of discourse analysts emphasize formal and code-driven phenomena, 
ameliorating some of the subjective tendencies of interpretation. So, it is about decoding 
what an author has encoded by observed patterns of cohesion, coherence, and 
development. The attraction of DA for these interpreters is its presumed objectivity since it 
is based on disinterested verifiable textual data rather than on impassioned, rhetorical 
readings. For example, Runge claims that each Greek connective “brings to bear a unique 
semantic constraint to the relationship of the clause that follows with some other portion of 
the discourse.”56 
The other grouping of analysts emphasize that the patterns they observe do not 
place semantic constraints upon utterances as much as trigger pragmatic inferences. For 
example, Mira Ariel writes, “Hence, we cannot simply argue for or against specific 
semantic analyses based on prevalent discourse patterns, for the correct account for the 
pattern may be pragmatic, rather than semantic”57 Along these lines, Blass explains, 
“Discourse is not a purely linguistic notion, and can therefore not be investigated in purely 
formal linguistic terms.”58 
This breadth of opinion and method is actually illuminating. Linguists such as 
Runge and Blass, representing different perspectives on the role of DA, provide nuanced 
discussions of how formal components of language affect discourse interpretation. 
Analysts from the semantic maximalist strain emphasize stable encoding, whereas analysts 
from the pragmaticist strain emphasize flexibility and context-dependence. These 
emphases parallel the dialectic that RT holds to be essential to comprehension. DA 
complements RT in that it demonstrates the linguistic encoding of some pragmatic 
functions while also appreciating the influence of context. The meaning of ἀλλά, for 
example, is not contained in an English word that glosses it, such as but or rather. Instead, 
 
55 Robert E. Longacre, The Grammar of Discourse, Second Ed., Topics in Language and Linguistics (New 
York: Plenum, 1996). 
56 See, Runge, Discourse Grammar, 51 (my emphasis). See also ibid., 19. Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. 
Pitts regard the objectivity of DA as an asset in finding ways to locate Variant-Unit Boundaries for text 
criticism. See Fundamentals of New Testament Textual Criticism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 80–86. 
57 “What Discourse Can(Not) Teach Us,” Int.Rev.Prag. 6 (2014): 181–210. See also Blass, Relevance 
Relations in Discourse, 7–42. 
58 Blass, Relevance Relations in Discourse, 41. 
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ἀλλά pragmatically signals a context in which an audience is to expect the correction of an 
inadequate or incomplete view—namely, the view that the speaker articulates in the 
immediately preceding clause.59 So, the pragmatic and semantic features of language 
combine. 
Consider the extended ἵνα purpose clause contained in Titus 1:13‒14. The intention 
of the stern rebuke (1:13) is to remove attention away from Jewish myths and 
commandments of men who are turning from the truth (1:14). These diversions, however, 
are not clearly related to the content of the quotation. Do such myths and commandments 
cause generalized moral failure? The substance of the quotation cannot be the reason for 
the rebuke. Addressing gluttony or laziness, for instance, would not accomplish the ends 
described above in any transparent way. If the church in Crete was exercising excessive 
austerity (e.g., fasting) under the influence of Jewish myths and commandments of men, as 
some commentators hold,60 it is difficult to understand how rebuking them for gluttony 
will solve the problem. If, however, Paul wanted Titus to rebuke the presumptive leaders 
for advancing a degraded view of Cretans, then one of the results of rebuking them could 
be that they cease teaching their corrupt doctrine which involved Jewish myths (of ethno-
religious superiority). These presumptive leaders were the men who are turning from the 
truth (1:14), not the Cretans in general. Although they were in the church, their doctrine 
and social concourse did not agree with Paul’s. If Titus was supposed to rebuke Cretans for 
general and intrinsic moral failure, it would not transparently lead away from paying 
attention to these myths and commandments. Τhe instrumental connection that Paul 
envisaged between the imperative and its stated purpose would be extremely weak. 
Consider also Paul’s use of ἀλλά in 1:15. Greek writers typically use this 
conjunction to correlate two ideas while making a correction or completion in the second 
clause (the one beginning with ἀλλά) and usually keeping the principle claim from the first 
clause intact.61 Titus 1:15 may be translated as follows: to the clean [ones], all things [are] 
clean; while to the defiled and faithless ones, not one thing [is] clean; instead, both their 
thinking and conscience [are] defiled (πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς· τοῖς δὲ μεμιαμμένοις 
καὶ ἀπίστοις οὐδὲν καθαρόν, ἀλλὰ μεμίανται αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις). While 
leaving the principle claim intact that not one thing [being] clean pertains to persons who 
 
59 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 55–57. 
60 E.g., Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, 80; Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 127, 132, 145; Bassler, 1 
Timothy, 27–28; Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 402; Twomey, Pastoral Epistles, 224. 
61 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 55‒57. 
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have been defiled and are unfaithful, the ἀλλά clause completes this idea by explaining 
why. It is crucial, therefore, to understand whom Paul is referring to as clean [ones], 
unclean [ones], and related designations. The play on words suggests a religio-cultural 
conflict. Paul places the very people who advance Cretan unworthiness on the wrong side 
of this poignant comparison, drawing as it does upon religious connotations salient for 
Jews. 
Let us consider two conjunctions (δέ and γάρ) side-by-side for reasons that will 
soon become apparent. The coordinating conjunction δέ is part of the connecting tissue of 
Titus, appearing in the letter relatively frequently; and, although it has a range of possible 
nuances, it nevertheless advances the logic of an argument in consistent ways. The 
conjunction marks development and comparison (with contrast, when appropriate) between 
concepts. In vernacular terms, δέ basically indicates that not enough has been said, so it 
signals I must add something more and could be paraphrased what’s more… The need to 
say more is not so much a logical necessity as an authorial compulsion; in order to satisfy 
the communicative intention, the author must add what follows the δέ. 
The logical conjunction γάρ is used to strengthen or confirm a previous proposition. 
Although it can, in context, have a causal force, that force derives from the nature of the 
material introduced by γάρ, not by the semantics of the conjunction itself. According to 
Runge, γάρ “adds background information that strengthens or supports what precedes.”62 
The notion of background information is critical in DA, because one of the discipline’s key 
insights is that authors place things in the background as a means of accentuating and 
enriching the focus (i.e., what summons audience attention). Typically, γάρ marks these 
logical relationships between major components of an argument at the sentence level. 
When γάρ marks a causal relationship, component A (the first unit) is the effect, and 
component B (the clause or paragraph containing the conjunction) is the cause. Some 
Greek authors tended to use γάρ at the more macro level for major argument components, 
and some deployed γάρ so frequently that demarcating argument components becomes 
difficult.63 Titus exhibits the former of these two usage tendencies. 
Although δέ does not appear in Titus 1:12 according to the NA28 accepted text, it 
does appear there in fourth-century Codex Sinaiticus (original hand). The quotative frame 
therein builds upon verse 11, adding δέ, and may be translated, moreover, someone from 
 
62 Ibid., 52. 
63 Runge describes uses of this conjunction in line with my description here (ibid., 51–54). 
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them—a prophet of theirs—said (1:12a).64 This same variant appears in ninth-century 
codices F and G, eleventh-century codex 81, and a few other minor witnesses. Although 
Sinaiticus is a significant witness, the total evidence for this variant is not strong, and the 
preferred reading (without δέ) is probably original. Nevertheless, this variant suggests that 
early interpreters saw continuity and development between Titus 1:11 and 1:12, rather than 
divergence. Twelfth-century codex 103 inserts γάρ in the place where δέ appears in these 
others. This variant may have been an interpretive move and suggests that the scribe saw 
continuity between the verses and logical support for 1:11 in 1:12. That is, someone 
speaking (εἶπέν τις 1:12) the quotation coincides with disrupting households and teaching 
what they ought not (1:11). 
Greek authors often abutted sentences without explicit connectives. This asyndeton 
can also be a conjunctive strategy. Runge explains that asyndeton—“linking clauses 
without the use of a conjunction”—is the default means of conjoining clauses in Koine 
Greek.65 By default, he does not mean the most common but the most unmarked. Writers 
often used it when the connection between clauses is obvious on the basis of context, not 
primarily when they change topics. The clauses that meet between Titus 1:11 and 1:12, 
according to the favored NA28 reading, do not feature an explicit conjunction. What could 
this asyndeton mean? Wilson and Sperber write, “A conjoined utterance is presented as a 
unit, encouraging the hearer to process the two utterances jointly and in parallel, looking 
for implications derivable from both.”66 The author chooses not to make the linkage 
explicit but to allow the context of the conjoined clauses to signal their relationship 
because, as Runge puts it, “the writer judges that the implicit relation between the clauses 
is sufficiently clear.”67 
A sentence tends to follow one of two broad logical-semantic directions after 
asyndeton: first, the sentence could break with the previous material, typically forming a 
new paragraph; second, it could develop the previous material through an implicit logical 
relationship, exhibiting more or less continuity. When authors take the second direction, 
 
64 For high-quality photographic scans of the original manuscript, see British Library, London, “Codex 
Sinaiticus,” http://www.codexsinaiticus.org/en/manuscript.aspx?book=49&lid=en&side=r&zoomSlider 
=0#49-1-12-2 (accessed 5/28/18). 
65 Discourse Grammar, 20–21. 
66 Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, “Pragmatics and Time,” RTAI (1998): 1–22 at 19. Wilson and Sperber 
also point to Diane Blakemore, Semantic Constraints on Relevance (New York: Blackwell, 1987). She 
suggests the same effect of conjoined pairs, namely, that both are required for a full interpretation. The 
second-order processing requires greater effort, but it yields greater cognitive effects. 
67 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 20. 
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the implicit relationship tends to be one of particularization.68 As I have shown, Titus 
1:12‒14, especially the referential material, builds and depends upon 1:10‒11. The 
asyndeton does not signal a level of discontinuity that constitutes a break. Rather, the 
quotation with its frame logically develops Paul’s description of the troublemakers. 
Specifically, 1:12 presents a particular example of their behavior, so the relationship 
between the major clauses that abut at the juncture of verses 11 and 12 seems to be one of 
particularization.69 That is, uttering the insult is a specific example of the troublemakers’ 
behavior that had been resulting in upsetting entire households (1:11b) and that should be 
addressed by the implicit injunction [someone] ought to silence [them] (οὓς δεῖ 
ἐπιστομίζειν 1:11a).70 Therefore, Paul’s use of the Cretan quotation had a primarily 
argumentative function rather than a descriptive function. He was not interested in 
describing the Cretans but was both exposing an incriminating example of leadership 
malpractice and rendering a verdict with damages (to echo Paul’s courtroom imagery).71 
This common use of asyndeton as a move from general to particular with essential 
continuity between clauses is exhibited in several more specific logical-semantic 
relationships. Stephen H. Levinsohn lists other common relationships that correlate to 
asyndeton: “orienter-content,... generic-specific,... conclusion-grounds;” all of which 
would comport with the interpretation I have been suggesting.72 
Wilson and Sperber offer a helpful way to understand the pragmatic effect of 
conjoined clauses without an explicit conjunction. They say that the speaker sometimes 
raises a question in the first part of the utterance that she answers in the second part. What 
question does Titus 1:10‒11 raise, and how does 1:12 answer it? Because Paul portrayed 
the troublemakers and the fruit of their work in such general terms in 1:10‒11, the question 
of what exactly they were teaching and how exactly they were upsetting households 
remains until 1:12. It seems natural, then, that he would answer the question with an 
example of their most egregious or representative offense. Thus, he frames and echoes the 
 
68 Ibid., 23. 
69 See ibid. 
70 Literally, whom [someone] ought to silence or gag (although this second gloss is likely more belligerent 
than fitting). 
71 Discussed in Chapter Two under Cognitive Environment. 
72 Discourse Features of New Testament Greek: A Coursebook on the Information Structure of New 
Testament Greek (Dallas: SIL International, 2000), 122. I have not reproduced Levinsohn’s peculiar 
formatting in this quotation. 
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quotation that exemplifies the troublemakers’ whole attitude toward the Cretan people, not 
least of all those in the congregation. 
Observing the asyndeton between 1:12 and 1:13 is also a starting point for grasping 
the relationship between the quotation and its frame and the consequences Paul begins to 
outline.73 The referential and deictic features that I have outlined above suggest a 
significant level of continuity, not a change in topic; but, by using asyndeton, Paul does not 
explicate the kind of relationship these verses have to each other. Hearers must infer it 
from context. Given its deictic reference, this testimony is true (1:13a) is most likely an 
explanatory comment upon verse 12. It explains the entire verse; the Cretan quotation itself 
is merely an embedded clause within the sentence. A consequential imperative tightly 
follows this comment—for which reason, rebuke them severely (1:13b). We may infer, 
then, that the relationship between verses 12 and 13 is one of explanation with hortatory 
causation. So, Paul instructs Titus to rebuke the presumptive leaders severely because of 
the trouble they are causing stemming from attitudes exemplified by the quotation. Let us 
now consider a third and final basic pragmatic process—disambiguation on the basis of 
lexical pragmatics. 
Lexical Pragmatics 
Individual word meaning depends upon its usage in context. This context includes the 
entire communicative environment—both spoken words and social circumstances.74 
Lexical pragmatics is the area of RT that deals with questions of word meaning. I explore 
two basic concepts regarding lexical pragmatics that have particular bearing upon the 
interpretation of Titus 1:12—literalness versus figurativeness and words as ad hoc 
concepts. 
Whereas lexical semantics concerns the intrinsic and stable meanings of words, 
lexical pragmatics concerns the meaning of words as they appear in particular utterances in 
natural language.75 Clark explains that, upon hearing a word, an audience accesses three 
kinds of conceptual information: 1) lexical information, which includes the technical 
 
73 I only address instances of asyndeton that appear immediately before and after the Cretan quotation. Runge 
judges that asyndeton is the default approach for conjoining clauses in NT epistolary and speech material, so 
it is not surprising to see several more instances in Titus. See Discourse Grammar, 17–26, esp. 20–23. 
74 See Gene L. Green, “Lexical Pragmatics and the Lexicon,” BBR 22 (2012): 315–33; Patricia Kolaiti and 
Deirdre Wilson, “Corpus Analysis and Lexical Pragmatics: An Overview,” Int.Rev.Prag. 6 (2014): 211–39. 
75 Lexical semantics is not confined to dictionaries, but lexicographers endeavor to incorporate as much 
semantic content as forms convey, even though they can never quite accomplish this goal. The same holds 
for grammars and grammarians as they attempt to account for various uses and combinations of words. 
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specifications of a word, word type, where the word fits into a language, and so forth; 2) 
logical information, such as what concepts the word contributes to the sentence and the 
role (including grammatical) of the word in the sentence; and 3) encyclopedic information 
that comes from an individual’s understanding and associations involving that word and 
the real world. Every human being has a different set of encyclopedic information to 
access, and the senses of words differ in both degree and quality, so the variations of 
meaning for a given word are virtually innumerable.76 In order to understand a speaker’s 
intended meaning, a hearer engages in a quest for cognitive effects. Relevance theorists 
refer to this process as mutual adjustment and enrichment. Upon hearing the encoded form, 
hearers engage in a dialectic (mutual) process and adjust their assumptions based on the 
level of cognitive effects that they derive from a particular meaning (enrichment).77 
Therefore, the process is not completely open-ended but is “constrained by the principle of 
relevance,” like a gravitational pull toward the speaker’s intended meaning.78 With this 
basic understanding of lexical pragmatics, let us consider how hearers discern where words 
fall on the literal-figurative continuum. 
1. The Literal-Figurative Continuum 
The service representative on the telephone says, We’ll be there in no time. She does not 
intend her hearer to take this common statement literally. Relevance theorists do not hold, 
as Grice did at first, that literalness is the default mode of speech.79 Clark explains, 
Relevance theorists have always assumed what is sometimes called “the 
continuity hypothesis” on which loose, hyperbolic, and metaphorical 
utterances are not different in kind or processed in significantly different 
ways from literal utterances. On this view, literalness is a matter of degree, 
and utterances may be more or less literal. Full literalness is not the norm 
but an exception at one end of the range of possibilities.80 
Literalness or figurativeness can have humorous, ironic, sarcastic, and other connotations 
when extended to the wrong end of the spectrum. Patricia Kolaiti and Deirdre Wilson 
explain, “There is no clear cut-off point between literal use, approximation, hyperbole and 
metaphor, but merely a continuum.”81 So, a more appropriate question to ask than whether 
 
76 Clark, Relevance Theory, 244–52. 
77 This process will be developed further in Chapter Two under Contextual Assumptions and Implicated 
Premises. 
78 Green, “Lexical Pragmatics and the Lexicon,” 325. Clark details this process in Relevance Theory, 240–52. 
79 See Kolaiti and Wilson, “Corpus Analysis,” 219–21; Garmendia, “A (Neo)Gricean Account,” 42; Sperber 
and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), 485–90. 
80 Clark, Relevance Theory, 251. 
81 “Corpus Analysis,” 222. 
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a writer’s words are literal or figurative is What kind or degree of literalness or 
figurativeness does the writer exhibit here? 
Although Relevance theorists have since updated Grice’s concepts, his analysis of 
non-literal speech can be helpful to biblical interpreters. According to Grice’s intuitions, 
when someone hears a sentence that obviously does not conform to the maxim of quality—
that is, a sentence that is false, strictly speaking—he does not dismiss it as senseless. 
Instead, he gets to work at understanding what the speaker could mean in an alternative, 
non-literal sense that she conveys by “flout[ing] the maxim.”82 Relevance theorists raise 
two main objections to Grice’s original intuitions about non-literal speech: first, he 
assumed literal speech to be the default mode for natural language; second, he assumed a 
two-step process for comprehension.83 Relevance theorists prefer a more direct explanation 
for non-literal communication. This preference corresponds to the aim of explaining the 
functional success of natural language rather than prescribing a method of interpretation. 
The speed with which hearers typically intuit figurative use necessitates a real-time model 
that corresponds to the rapidity of actual language comprehension.84 Grice’s procedure, 
nevertheless, may be conceptually useful, because it divides interpretation into logically 
discrete steps.85 Relevance theorists would not expect an original audience to engage in 
such an effort-intensive process, but modern interpreters of the Bible have little choice. 
Grice correctly reasoned that statements that are untrue from a literal standpoint are not 
thereby considered meaningless or false; hearers engage in a process for interpreting their 
non-literal meaning. His two-step process for interpreting utterances—finding the literal 
meaning and then canceling it and considering others—has its shortcomings, but it helps 
interpreters to appreciate the reasoning behind a relevance-guided hermeneutic. 
Consider again Paul’s use of the word prophet (προφήτης, 1:12). We do not have 
access to the writer’s tone of voice, but evidence we do have suggests that Paul used 
prophet not only non-literally but ironically. Expectations of poetic style and divine 
inspiration are often commensurate with being labelled a prophet in the NT, even when the 
 
82 Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” 53–54. Garmendia explains, defends, and corrects Grice’s account of 
non-literal speech, specifically his treatment of irony. See “A (Neo)Gricean Account,” 42, 58, et passim. 
83 Furlong explains that Grice assuming literalness to be the default mode of speech derives from Aristotle 
and classical approaches to literature and language. In this sense, Grice’s conception of language was 
antiquated even as he blazed new trails with his linguistic theories. See her “Relevance Theory,” 7–8. 
84 I discuss this issue in Chapter Three under The Economy of Cognitive Effects. 
85 Grice provides an explanation of his basic scheme for understanding not-literal speech in “Logic and 
Conversation,” 46–49. 
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label is misapplied. Paul, however, was not referencing Israel’s classic prophets whose 
written works were featured in the canon of Jewish Scripture, and he was not referencing 
NT-era contemporaries in the church who exercised corresponding gifts of inspired speech 
(cf. prophet in 1 Cor 12:28‒29; 14:29, 32, 37‒38; Eph 2:20; 3:5; 4:11; 2 Pet 2:16). 
Conventional readings of Titus 1:12 assume that he was using the word in a unique and 
more generic sense: a person with the capacity to speak a poignant truth that defies or 
surpasses the wisdom, knowledge, or convention of the culture of which he or she is a part. 
Certainly, Paul could draw on non-Jewish and non-Christian authorities to vouch for a 
teaching that he wished to advance, but Why do interpreters think that Paul was doing so 
in Titus 1:12? I suspect that its history of interpretation influences this assumption.86 
The common view that Paul deliberately vested the originator of the quotation with 
authority by labelling him a prophet is doubtful. First, it presumes the attribution of the 
quotation to a Cretan, Epimenides—a dubious assumption on literary-historical and 
grammatical grounds. Second, it requires that Paul advanced the substance of the Cretan 
quotation in toto, which has the problematic socio-historical implications and literary-
canonical contradictions I outlined in my Introduction. Third, it assumes a topical break 
within the paragraph that is unsustainable on the basis of connective, referential, and 
deictic language throughout the context. Fourth, nothing else in the context suggests that 
Paul views the speaker, whom he refers to using the indefinite pronoun τις (someone, 
1:12), to be a trustworthy source. Fifth, Paul’s theological and moral concerns in the rest of 
the book do not find expression in the quotation itself, whereas reporting the quotation as 
an example of the disruptive behaviors of a Judaizing contingent in the church does 
correspond to concerns he consistently raised in Titus. 
A pragmatic sense for prophet, derived ironically from the literal senses above, 
would have had special significance for a target with a Jewish background. The speaker is 
immersed in a cohort of presumptive leaders within the church. Rather than achieving the 
title of prophet honorably, however, he wears it illegitimately. Paul ridiculed the 
untrustworthy, self-appointed and self-satisfied speaker by calling him a prophet 
 
86 Other NT epistolary literature reveals that referring to someone as prophet was not necessarily positive. 
The Apostle Paul acknowledged that not all who are seen or who see themselves as prophets should be 
recognized as such, especially when their speech results in disruption (1 Cor 14:37‒38). Furthermore, calling 
a person a prophet is not automatically an endorsement (2 Pet 2:16). 
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ironically.87 Negative implications carry over to any wheedling, head-nodding, self-
approved troublemakers who endorse such slurs. The redundant third-person pronouns 
coupled with the marked syntax of the quotative frame serves to distance the speaker from 
Paul and convey that this prophet is not so much one of ours as one of theirs. He is a 
prophet, but to them (i.e., the troublemakers) not to us (i.e., Paul, Titus, and the church). 
2. Words as Ad Hoc Concepts 
Without denying that words inherently contain some semantic information, Sperber and 
Wilson argue that every instance of a word differs from every other instance of that same 
word. Humans create an ad hoc concept every time they perceive an object or infer the 
meaning of a semantic representation.88 Clark explains this lexical pragmatic doctrine: 
“Pragmatic processes create ‘ad hoc’ concepts, derived by modifying the encoded concepts 
in order to find interpretations which satisfy their [hearers’] expectations of relevance.”89 
This involves concept broadening and narrowing. Theorists understand that virtually every 
concept or every word that encodes a concept has some flexibility or looseness and needs 
adjustment within the context of the utterance. For example, to say Thelma is a princess 
involves understanding that Thelma exhibits some qualities of a princess and that not all 
princesses possess every pertinent quality. Thus, broadening and loosening frequently 
occur at the same time. 
A technical definition of flat might be consisting of all points on a plane without 
interruption or omission. To say Kansas is flat means that one understands flat to include 
things that are not completely flat. Clark points out that the concept encoded by the word 
flat is not something that anyone actually experiences in the world, so every time we use 
that word we are adjusting the concept.90 Therefore, Kansas can be flat; and a person’s 
haircut can be a flattop; and a tire, although primarily round, can be flat when it loses air 
pressure so that its downward edge is more flat than it ought to be. 
Other concepts or words have equally strict definitions but are derived on 
historical, cultural, or other bases, rather than scientific or mathematical. As Green 
observes, “Ad hoc concept formation occurs on every page of the biblical text.”91 Some 
 
87 I explain other features of irony evident in Paul’s use of prophet as well as why I refer to the troublemakers 
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88 Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), 485–90. 
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critical words in Titus derive their meaning on the basis of legal or religious practice, such 
as prophet (1:12), testimony and accusation (1:13), clean and defiled (1:15). 
According to the lexical-pragmatic analysis of Kolaiti and Wilson, hearers furnish 
sufficient inferences to understand what meanings speakers intend. Kolaiti and Wilson 
argue that differences between the lexical-semantic assumptions that one hearer holds 
versus another do not present obstacles to comprehension; because speakers presumably 
provide sufficient information to disambiguate, narrow, and specify what they mean.92 In 
instances of effective communication, hearers bring contextual assumptions that maximize 
their perception of relevance.93 So, a speaker can draw an idea from “left field,” while the 
listener understands the “heart” of the matter. Why? Because, in acts of communication, as 
opposed to mere verbal exercises or non-communicative sonic acts, both parties are 
interested enough in accomplishing a shared meaning that they cooperate in their 
respective processes.94 
The word prophet, as a survey of its uses demonstrates, is flexible and must be 
understood in its specific context. Kolaiti and Wilson conclude “that lexical narrowing and 
broadening are highly flexible and context-dependent processes which can combine in the 
interpretation of a single word, and support the view that there is a continuum of cases 
between literal, approximate, hyperbolic and metaphorical use.”95 Distance in time, space, 
language, and culture separates modern interpreters from first-century Christians, and our 
respective signaling systems are not entirely compatible. Because what was intuitive for 
them is not intuitive for us, our task is to listen for the clues that help to disambiguate the 
concept prophet. Our knowledge of the ancient world and of the basic linguistically-
encoded meaning of words is only a starting point. Prophet activated something for Paul’s 
 
92 Kolaiti and Wilson, “Corpus Analysis,” 228‒9. Presumably means in an effective act of communication. 
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93 Ibid., 230.  
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intended listeners that satisfied their expectations of relevance and increased their 
cognitive effects as they understood the sentence within its conversational context.96 
Paul certainly does not use the word prophet literally in the sense that it points the 
speaker out as either an ancient Hebrew prophet or a spiritually gifted Christian. Prophet 
here is a metonym that is only co-terminous with the speaker of the quotation when the 
word is adjusted in contextually relevant ways. Song quotes Anna Papafragou: “The 
speaker … wants to indicate … the appropriateness of the metonymy to name the referent 
of a non-lexicalized ad hoc concept.”97 With Papafragou, Song contends that the speaker’s 
purpose is to appropriately name the referent when the actual referent does not have an 
exact lexicalized concept available. Speakers limit the directions in which processing may 
proceed. Although a word’s meaning differs with each utterance, several factors—
including lexical norms, verbal context, topic, theme, and personality—provide boundaries 
to word meaning even as they present trajectories upon which word meaning can vary. 
Commentators frequently note how peculiar Paul’s use of prophet (1:12) is in this 
context. Barrett suggests that labelling the speaker of this quotation a prophet was like the 
epithet ascribed to Caiaphas in John 11:51—not necessarily a personal compliment but a 
circumstantial fact.98 Ceslas Spicq, also assuming the attribution of the quotation to 
Epimenides, associates the original speaker with Balaam’s ass because neither of them was 
conscious of the truth they told.99 Calvin attributed qualms about applying the title prophet 
to pagan writers as superstitious scruples; “All truth is from God,” after all.100 These 
suggestions explain the odd usage by assuming, first, that Paul was referring to the original 
author of this quotation and, second, that Paul agreed with its contents. It is not certain, 
however, that Paul was doing either. It is worth noting again that ancient references to 
Epimenides never call him a prophet. 
 
96 See Clark, Relevance Theory, 249. 
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As noted, Paul used a marked construction for the quotative frame (1:12a).101 
Quinn claims that it intensifies the individual’s belonging to a group, but he assumes that it 
is a group of ethnic Cretans.102 It seems, however, that Paul is intensifying the speaker’s 
belonging to the contingent of troublemakers (1:10‒11). The troublemakers are Paul’s 
reason for the instructions of 1:5‒9 (causal conjunction γάρ in 1:10). While advancing this 
slur, the prophet holds elevated status within a contingent that presumes to lead the Cretan 
church. Even if the title does not literally apply to the originator of the quotation, it is 
appropriate for use within a community that values Jewish notions of status, such as the 
Cretan church. Thus, we disambiguate a term that the original audience would have rapidly 
recognized as elevated, figurative, ironic, and even ridiculous. 
Basic pragmatic processes are necessary to relevance-guided biblical hermeneutics, 
but they only bring the reader to a point of grasping the conceptual representation or 
logical form of the linguistically-encoded sentence.103 That is, they help to accomplish the 
essential step of decoding semantic values, but utterance interpretation requires other levels 
of comprehension. An audience has only grasped a speaker’s meaning when it grasps the 
higher-level explicatures of her utterance. To this, we now turn. 
II. Higher-Level Explicatures 
Grice reasoned that bridging the gap between sentence meaning and utterance meaning 
involved completing basic pragmatic processes like those discussed above; once a hearer 
had resolved ambiguities and assigned references from the logical form, it only remained 
to infer what the speaker meant, but did not say.104 Huang recounts how pioneering 
Relevance theorists, Sperber and Wilson, recognized the need for pragmatic inference to 
interpret even some explicit features of utterances.105 In other words, speakers overtly 
signal critical cues to meaning that are not either lexicalized or grammaticalized; they are, 
nevertheless, recoverable on the basis of explicit features of language, so they coined the 
 
101 Marked language illuminates speaker attitude. Levinson calls this his M-Principle and explains: “Indicate 
an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use 
to describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situations.” Quoted in Clark, Relevance Theory, 88. 
102 Quinn, Letter to Titus, 109. 
103 The italicized phrases are virtually interchangeable in RT for the [intermediate] end-product of applying 
basic pragmatic processes to a sentence. For example and explanation, see Clark, Relevance Theory, 298, 
306; see also Uchida, “Text and Relevance,” 162. 
104 Although the words meant and said do not sound technical, these were terms Grice use consistently in his 
writing to refer to implicit, inferentially enriched speech and explicit, linguistically encoded speech, 
respectively. See Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” passim. 
105 “Micro- and Macro-Pragmatics,” 153–54. 
112 
term explicature. In live speech, these features may include facial expressions and vocal 
inflections; in written discourse, readers must examine contextual indicators. 
Let us have a working definition for explicature. According to Raymond Gibbs and 
Markus Tendahl, explicatures are “elaborations of the expression’s logical form that 
respect speaker’s intentions.”106 Green says that an explicature “is the linguistically 
encoded meaning in addition to the information linked to it that is pragmatically inferred 
from context.”107 Theorists distinguish between strong and weak explicatures based on 
how critical the explicature is for understanding a speaker’s intended meaning and how 
prominent the speaker has made it.108 I will speak of explicatures as all of the information 
that a hearer derives on the basis of formal features of an utterance, even those that 
require some level of inference as opposed to straightforward semantic decoding. 
To understand how complex speech-types, such as irony, operate through a 
Relevance-theoretical model we must realize that a speaker always communicates higher-
level explicatures—i.e., those explicatures that convey her attitude toward what is said.109 
Higher-level explicatures reveal whether a statement is the speaker’s own thought or the 
speaker’s attribution of someone else’s thought, whether sentences render a positive or 
negative judgment or serve a dismissive hearsay function, for instance. These explicatures 
also regard how deeply layered the assumption of reciprocal knowledge is (i.e., the speaker 
thinks that the hearer knows that the speaker believes that the hearer desires that …). 
Utterances communicate more than the sum of the words and syntax in their linguistically-
encoded sentences, because an utterance is sentence plus context. One of the most 
important facts about an utterance that hearers must determine is the speaker’s attitude 
toward what she is saying. In fact, unless we understand the speaker’s attitude, we fail to 
correctly interpret her statement. 
The Speaker’s Attitude toward a Sentence 
A speaker communicates both propositional content and her attitude toward it, which 
impacts the meaning of sentences significantly. Recognizing this is nowhere more crucial 
than when the speaker has a disassociative or critical attitude toward a statement. Even 
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John L. Austin, original Speech-Act theorist and contemporary of Grice, considered the 
importance of ascertaining speaker attitude toward a sentence. Without the refined 
categories of later theorists, Austin recognized that sentences do not unambiguously carry 
meanings apart from a speaker’s intentions. In short form, one of the ways he expressed 
this hypothesis was in his claim that saying “p” does not imply “I believe p.”110 Each 
utterance involves the speaker’s choice to express her own thoughts or to present the 
thoughts of another. Theorists refer to these as descriptive use and interpretive use, 
respectively. In the second type, rather than her own thoughts, the speaker expresses her 
attitude toward other (sometimes fabricated or supposed) ideas or persons. Relevance-
guided interpretation must interrogate the attitude Paul conveys toward what he says when 
he employs irony, metonymy, and other types of interpretive, rather than descriptive, 
language use.111 
The pragmatic difference between Sue is so beautiful and Sue thinks she is so 
beautiful is the nature of the explicature. It pertains to the attitude of the speaker toward the 
proposition Sue is beautiful. All-important to the truth-conditional content of the first 
utterance is whether or not, by the measure implied in the relationship between speaker and 
audience, Sue actually is so beautiful, but such is not important to the truth-conditional 
content of the second utterance. Only the attitude of the speaker is. The semantic difference 
resides in the word thinks, which does not in itself imply a negative attitude, but it does 
remove the notion Sue is so beautiful from the speaker herself. This distancing leads the 
rational hearer to infer two explicatures: first, that the speaker is not expressing this as her 
own thought and, second, that she has a critical attitude toward the sentence. Only the 
pragmatic effect of the utterance is subject to truth-conditional evaluation. The hearer must 
infer the speaker’s attitude or fail to comprehend. A hearer would not understand either 
utterance properly without ascertaining the attitude of the speaker toward the statement, 
even if he had exhaustive semantic knowledge of the lexemes and syntax at use.112 
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Grice was not far from recognizing the importance of what Relevance theorists now 
call explicature. Clark writes, “Perhaps the key thing to notice here, given its importance in 
the development of RT, is that Grice is assuming that working out what is being 
communicated involves making rational inferences about the communicator’s 
intentions.”113 So, authorial intention is crucial to meaning. If Paul intended to expose the 
offences of a divisive group in the community and to prescribe a remedy—which seems to 
be the case in Titus 1:10‒11 and 1:13—then we are compelled to ask, How does verse 
twelve fit in? The verse appears to represent a central problem by providing a disconcerting 
example of leadership malpractice. This reading complements and contributes to Paul’s 
overall development of the theme of ethno-religious division in Titus.114 
Are not speaker intentions passé in a post-modern literary-critical environment? 
As Gibbs notes, “There has been heated debate in many areas of philosophy, anthropology 
and literary theory as to whether intentions play a significant role in the interpretation of 
both oral and written discourse.”115 Gibbs describes three views about speaker intention 
within cognitive linguistics: 1) the independence view, in which utterance meaning 
emerges from a two-step process of linguistic decoding, then encyclopedic enrichment; 2) 
the constructivist view, in which the speaker’s utterance forms ideas within the hearer’s 
mind that fluidly incorporate both semantic and real-world information; and 3) the 
intentional view, in which the hearer takes sentence meaning and encyclopedic information 
into account but arrives at a meaning in harmony with the speaker’s intentions based on 
common knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes.116 In contrast to the independence view, the 
intentional view holds that speaker intention is also a necessary category of information for 
utterance processing. In contrast to the constructivist view, the intentional view holds that 
speaker intention is an essential constraint upon what semantic and encyclopedic 
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information is appropriate to utterance interpretation. The intentional view coincides with 
the importance of the dialectic of speaker attitude in RT as both content and constraint. 
Gibbs surveys fascinating empirical research on textual communication that found 
people willing to spend significant time trying to figure out anomalous (non-sensical) 
sentences if they believed them to be produced by a poet rather than a computer. Subjects 
quit deciphering difficult sentences more quickly if they believed them to be produced by a 
computer rather than a human. This research suggests that authorial intention is pivotal 
even to a hearer’s decision to invest effort in interpreting an utterance. In RT, utterances, as 
ostensive inferential communication, definitionally involve intention.117 
Against the fashionable assumption within the humanities (especially criticism of 
art and literature) that meaning is not constrained by authorial intent, I quote Gibbs at 
length explaining the position of cognitive linguistics: 
On the one hand, critics of the intentional view often conceive of literature 
and other texts as having a life of their own and consequently claim they 
should not be interpreted under the constraints of any possible 
communicative intentions of the producer(s) of that text. This ‘autonomy of 
meaning’ position views linguistic interpretation as a critical practice that 
can be extended in time beyond that associated with understanding of 
everyday speech and writing to exploit the multitude of possible meanings 
that are ‘in the text.’ Cognitive scientists, on the other hand, mostly assume 
that language understanding refers to immediate psychological and 
linguistic processes that occur in real-time to derive speakers’/authors’ 
primary communicative intentions. Understanding, under this view, is a 
goal-oriented, unconscious mental activity that seeks to recover 
communicative intentions within the time-frame in which everyday speech 
and writing are ordinarily comprehended.118 
Contrary to currents in the humanities, Relevance theorists expect that speaker intention is 
not only recoverable, but essential. Utterances provide both explicit and implicit 
indications of a speaker’s attitude toward what she said.119 Often, retrieving and 
understanding this attitude is as crucial to interpretation as any other information, but 
successful retrieval depends upon a hearer’s attention to contextual indicators that can 
become more opaque to secondary audiences. These indicators are both discourse-
contextual and situation-contextual, both linguistically-encoded and pragmatically-
inferred. In the case of Titus, historical-contextual and canonical-contextual evidence, 
when used with discernment, can help to reconstruct some of these indicators. 
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We do not claim to possess exclusive insight into the author’s identity or make 
unverifiable assertions as to his psychological state when we endeavor to ascertain Paul’s 
attitude toward sentences in Titus.120 We merely try to discern, on the basis of linguistic 
evidence that is readily available to any careful examiner, whether and in what way Paul 
has implicated his own attitude toward a statement. Discerning intention or attitude does 
not require sophistication or inordinate effort. As Furlong states, “Ordinary hearers have 
some mechanism (generally successful, as far as we know) for recognizing speakers’ 
intentions.”121 
The peculiar quotative frame (Titus 1:12a) seems to implicate Paul’s attitude not 
only toward what is said but also toward who said it as a higher-level explicature of 
distance and disapproval. It serves a disassociating function and appears to be hearsay 
functional. Allow me to use colloquialism to paraphrase: one o’ the boys—some prophet of 
theirs—even said. Obviously, this is not a literal translation, but I want to express in 
English the thrust of Paul’s distancing language. It is difficult to capture the thrust of the 
quotative frame in English without grasping for an idiom to convey the distance and 
possible contempt. Reiko Itani calls hearsay an indicator of “diminished speaker 
commitment.”122 Such higher-level explicatures imply the degree of a statement’s 
trustworthiness or lack thereof. 
In ostensive communication, speakers make their communicative intention 
manifest. This making manifest involves the speaker’s desire for sympathy. By plainly 
recounting an objectionable behavior (1:12), Paul trusted his readers to conclude what he 
concluded, just as he had. He distanced himself from the quotation and its speaker. He was 
not expressing his thoughts about Cretans as such; he was testifying that some 
troublemaker was saying unacceptable things about them. In this way, he invited his 
hearers to see the stark bigotry. Huizenga, in contrast, exemplifies an interpretation that 
assumes Paul’s sympathy toward the substance of the Cretan quotation. She refers to “the 
author’s prejudices about Jews and Cretans.”123 To her, Paul merely expressed his view of 
the Cretans using straightforward, descriptive language. Let us now examine other specific 
aspects of speaker attitude that appear in Titus and yield higher-level explicatures. 
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Use versus Mention 
Relevance theorists distinguish between a speaker’s use versus her mention of a statement. 
One speaker may use “Yeah, right,” to convey the linguistically-encoded content of an 
answer in the affirmative. Another may mention “Yeah, right,” while expressing distance 
or disassociation from the statement. In the latter instance, she is speaking ironically, and 
her meaning happens to be virtually the opposite of the linguistically-encoded meaning of 
the words she spoke. Speakers may convey numerous degrees of distance along the 
continuum between sympathetic use and disassociative mention; and these can be complex, 
especially with multiple layers of indirect speech. Every utterance involves some 
implication of the speaker’s attitude toward the sentence; use and mention are RT’s 
technical designations for naming this fundamental distinction.124 
The distinction between using [sorts of] language and mentioning [sorts of] 
language—between using sentences and mentioning sentences—is important for 
understanding echoic speech. An utterance that uses a sentence reflects the speaker’s own 
thoughts, whereas an utterance that mentions a sentence reflects another person’s thoughts 
or the speaker’s thoughts from another time. Relevance theorists usually call this second 
type of speech echoic. 
The following example demonstrates the scaling back of linguistically-encoded 
indicators for recognizing echoic speech: Suppose a parent waits thirty minutes for her 
fifteen-year-old daughter to prepare for a school function. The parent grumbles, “‘Five 
minutes,’ she says; ‘Five minutes’!” The echo is explicit, as is the subject (she), the 
speaker’s daughter. Suppose the parent mutters, “‘Five minutes,’ huh?!” This, again, is an 
echo of her daughter’s utterance with the same level (although a slightly different kind) of 
disassociation but without the linguistically-encoded subject to indicate that the words 
were not the parent’s own. Typical adult English-speakers would discern that she 
implicitly critiques someone else’s speech because of the distancing mechanism in her 
echoic utterance. The mother could adequately convey an ironic sense by muttering, “‘five 
minutes,’?!” The parent holds the phrase five minutes up for criticism. Connotations 
include, My daughter is making me wait longer than she admits. The identity of the 
original speaker of the phrase and the exact phrase itself are both of secondary importance 
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for interpretation. What matters according to a relevance-guided hermeneutic is her attitude 
toward the sentence. 
According to Seto, in echoic use, a speaker mentions the thoughts of another while 
leaving the interpretative nature of the representation implicit. In irony, the interpretive 
nature typically remains implicit.125 Paul was not using the term prophet (1:12) in a literal 
or descriptive sense, and he seems to have been speaking echoically. Seto quotes Sperber 
and Wilson regarding echoic mentions: 
Some have their source in actual utterances, others in thoughts or opinions; 
some have a real source, others an imagined one; some are traceable back to 
a particular individual, whereas others have a vaguer origin. When the 
echoic character of the utterance is not immediately obvious, it is 
nevertheless suggested.126 
Paul was echoing the supposed designation of the speaker that his fellow troublemakers 
would have given him (perhaps in Paul’s imagination). 
A common but dubious assumption when interpreting this passage is to ascribe to 
Paul (even tacitly) a sympathetic attitude toward the speaker of the quotation. Although, as 
Gibbs states, “experimental evidence demonstrates that readers can easily distinguish irony 
that is speaker-intended from irony that is not speaker-intended;” he explains that 
interpreters who are removed from the original social context of an utterance—and are, 
thereby, eavesdroppers—are especially susceptible to the error of misattributing attitudes 
to speakers who do not hold those attitudes but rather hold other, contrasting attitudes.127 
Echoic language is not direct, but attributive. The speaker engages in a meta-
representative mode of speech that implicitly attributes statements to another speaker or to 
the speaker at an earlier time. A speaker using attributive language can be sympathetic 
toward her statement, but she implies that the word or idea is not her own. For instance, 
upon experiencing an unanticipated influx of bad fortune, a speaker may say, “When it 
rains, it pours.” She may or may not consciously trace this slogan back to the early 
twentieth-century Morton Salt Company advertisement, but she is probably cognizant that 
she did not invent it and that her hearers also know this. Her speech is echoic and 
attributive, yet she affirms the substance of the slogan in her usage. This maneuver, 
however, often disassociates the speaker from the statement and allows her to convey, even 
while she makes the statement, a critical attitude toward its content. In this example, the 
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critical attitude might be toward the inappropriateness of spouting pithy slogans when a 
crisis is afoot or toward a pessimistic outlook that might otherwise steal her levity. Wilson 
contends that irony is primarily accounted for as an echoic use of language, and she says 
that two actions are typical: first, echoic attribution to another person or group of people or 
to people in general and, second, conveying disapproval toward the statement.128 Paul did 
these two very things: First, he made it known that the words he stated were not his own by 
attributing the quotation to someone among them (1:12). Second, he conveyed his 
disapproval of attitudes represented by such words by, for instance, instructing Titus to 
rebuke them (1:13). The next aspect of speaker attitude that we will examine involves the 
dynamics of insult language in Titus 1:12. 
In-Group and Out-Group Insult Language 
It matters who says things. Just imagine the difference in implications between Katy Perry 
singing her hit song I kissed a girl, and I liked it, versus Justin Bieber singing the same 
lyrics. Paul spoke of a situation that Titus needed little effort to comprehend. As Sperber 
and Wilson explain, hearers seek “an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning that satisfies 
the presumption of optimal relevance,” while following “a path of least effort.”129 Paul 
assumed that Titus knew of an ethno-religious superiority contest within the Cretan church. 
Readers can determine this fact without making any particular commitment to the 
interpretation of Titus 1:12. The historical circumstances of Pauline mission in the Gentile 
world and Paul’s down-grading of Jewish and quasi-Jewish religo-cultural interests in the 
epistle (1:10, 14; 3:9) reinforce the perception that ethno-religious tensions obtained in the 
church.130 More specifically, a false sense of ethno-religious inferiority was a problem for 
the Cretan church and for the gospel on the island. In the context of a leadership discussion 
(1:5‒16), Paul exposed one of the prime examples of malpractice. The presumptive leaders 
were inferiorizing the Cretan people.131 No wonder Paul calls for a stern rebuke (1:13)! 
Regardless of the particular interpretation one holds, the Cretan quotation 
represents an insult (whether playful, ironic, or caustic) in some select context. Linguists 
have recently become more prolific about the social effects of disparaging humor and 
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devoted a significant amount of scholarship to the various ways speakers employ insult 
language.132 Such usage often retains not only the content of its target but also of the 
archetypal user of the insult or slur. For instance, the racial slur “n----r” carries not only 
semantic content (e.g., person of African descent) but also the situational content that 
reproduces the archetypal social relation between people when the word is used. The user 
of the slur relates to the target of the slur as a white plantation owner, and recreates the 
social context that makes the speaker a social superior and the target an inferior. Even 
when appropriated for more positive in-group uses as a term of affection, speakers still 
echo some of its original social dynamics, which is one reason that it is not an appropriate 
cross-group epithet. Thus, insults do not merely reproduce semantic content but also socio-
pragmatic content. Yoon argues that this fact operates across languages and is a macro-
linguistic reality.133 
If Paul were intending to reproduce the situational content of the quotation as from 
a trustworthy Cretan source, his choice to refer to the speaker with an indefinite pronoun 
(τις, someone, 1:12a) could subtly undermine this goal. Rather, Paul downplays the 
original social context of the quotation (as from Epimenides, for instance, assuming he 
knew the origin) in order to emphasize the tertiary contemporary context of the quotation 
as it concerns Titus’s vulnerable congregation. Somebody—presumably considered to be a 
prophet among the people with whom Paul has voiced concern—was propagating the 
sentiment expressed in this quotation. By attesting to the quotation’s currency among the 
troublemakers, Paul exposed the deeper problem of ethno-religious bigotry and bullying.134 
In historical contexts of bigotry, where members of high-status categories use slurs 
and insults to target members of low-status categories, people from the latter group 
occasionally adopt (a.k.a. appropriate) slurs with which to refer to themselves. Because 
who is speaking affects the significance of degrading language, attribution of the quotation 
is pivotal. The prima facie reading assumes that Paul drew it directly from Epimenides’s 
own in-group banter, but we have already cast doubt on the helpfulness or accuracy of this 
attribution. If the quotation originated with Epimenides (a possibility), Paul either 
 
132 E.g. Donald A. Saucier, Conor J. O’Dea, and Megan L. Strain, “The Bad, the Good, the Misunderstood: 
The Social Effects of Racial Humor,” Translational Issues in Psychological Science, The Psychology of 
Humor 2 (2016): 75–85, at 77. They survey recent studies and conduct original cognitive linguistic research. 
133 See Yoon, “Semantic Constraint,” 47. He presents research on the reproduction of social relations in 
Korean and English. 
134 Paul uses the terms μισέω (hate, 3:3) and πλήκτης (bully, 1:7) to refer to corresponding ideas in Titus. 
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downplayed or did not know its origin, possibly because the troublemakers were using 
Epimenides’s Cretan credentials as an excuse to insult the Cretans. 
Assuming Paul’s sympathetic attitude toward the quotation by pointing to its 
dubious historic attribution has more recent analogies. Allow me to illustrate: Controversy 
surrounded then President-Elect Donald Trump’s announcement that Steve Bannon would 
be his Chief Strategist, because Bannon had provided a platform for alt-right and white-
supremacist political voices on his Breitbart News Network. See how his successor at 
Breitbart, Joel Pollack, defended him in this excerpt from an interview with Steve Inskeep: 
INSKEEP: And let me ask another thing. And this is another Bannon quote, 
and we can pull out quotes. But it’s a quote that he made in a 2011 radio 
interview that gets to maybe what he wants to do inside the country. He 
criticized feminists. He said, “Women that would lead this country would 
be pro-family. They would have husbands. They would love their children.” 
And I’m just reading the quote here – “They wouldn’t be a bunch of dykes 
that came from the Seven Sisters schools.” What’s he driving at there? 
POLLAK: I don’t know. But there is a political correctness in this country 
that would say that if you said that once on a radio show, that you should be 
drummed out of public life. I would defy you to find a person in the 
LGBTQ community who has not used that term either in an endearing 
sense, or in a flippant, jovial, colloquial sense. I don’t think you can judge 
Steve Bannon’s views.135 
Pollak’s defense was that Bannon used terms that people within “the LGBTQ community” 
themselves use. Essentially, he supposes that their use grants permission for outsiders of 
the group to also use such language. This logic is tacitly accepted in much of human 
society, as when someone asserts, I can say this; I heard it from a [term for a member of 
an ethnic, racial, gender, or other group]. Conventional interpretations imply that Paul 
relied on this logic, but it seems to me more likely that his opponents did. 
In an original research article on the psychology of humor, Donald A. Saucier, 
Conor J. O’Dea, and Megan L. Strain explain why humans generally apply different 
expectations to insiders versus outsiders for either’s use of in-group language. Some 
speakers attempt to use racial humor subversively to defy social hierarchy, but such 
attempts have the potential of reinforcing that structure whether intentionally anti-social or 
misunderstood as such.136 I contend that Paul has been misunderstood. Lauren Ashwell 
 
135 Steve Inskeep, “Breitbart Editor Joel Pollak: Trump Strategist Steve Bannon Is A Conservative ‘National 
Hero,’” Transcript, Morning Edition from NPR News, November 16, 2016, 
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/16/502274853/critics-come-out-against-trumps-chief-strategist-steve-bannon 
(accessed 11/17/16). 
136 Saucier, O’Dea, and Strain, “The Bad, the Good,” 75–85. 
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argues that certain slurs have no “neutral correlate,” meaning that they are not, properly 
speaking, a pejorative alternative, but rather an inherent debasement of the referent.137 
Prima facie reading assumptions virtually require that Paul presumed permission to use 
disparaging in-group banter. If we pay close attention to the attitude Paul expresses toward 
the quotation, we are not likely to arrive at this odd anti-social conclusion. 
Any original, pre-biblical literary context for the quotation is lost, and whether it 
was initially intended to be humorous or ironic is moot; advanced by any non-Cretan, it 
serves to introduce or reinforce an ethnic stereotype. Rather than advancing the quotation 
at face value, Paul indicates that he uses the quotation to serve a logical function (δι’ ἥν 
αἰτίαν, on account of this accusation, 1:13).  He either leans on its content (i.e., because 
Cretans are reprobate) or presents it as evidence (i.e., because troublemakers degrade 
Cretans). The latter makes sense; because, by exposing someone for disparaging the 
Cretans’ intrinsic nature, he anchors his case against the troublemakers in a verifiable, 
concrete act that clearly contradicts his life-transforming gospel (3:3‒7). Paul did not use 
the disparaging quotation as an end in itself. For him, this kind of speech is no joking 
matter. 
Stereotypes are difficult to undo. Even when a speaker is trying to counteract or 
contradict a stereotype through humor or ridicule, hearers have difficulty grasping anything 
but the superficial meaning of the stereotype she critiques. In research that Saucier et al. 
highlight, people tended to grasp only the superficial message of a satirical television show 
rather than understand its subversive irony.138 They explain that with the subversive use of 
racial humor, “the humor may appear to advocate for the truth of those racial stereotypes,” 
and “the deeper subversive message may be missed.”139 The stereotype, Cretans are … 
evil brutes, appears in Titus 1:12, but readers often miss the evidence that Paul did not hold 
this view. The quotation is not a vehicle for his bigotry but evidence in a case against 
people who hold and advance such prejudices. 
Another recent analogy of the misuse of in-group banter comes from fictional 
manager Mike Scott on the television series The Office (U.S. version). In the episode, 
“Diversity Day,” Scott mimicked a famous sketch by real-life comedian Chris Rock called 
 
137 “Gendered Slurs,” Social Theory & Practice 42 (2016): 228–39, passim. 
138 Saucier, O’Dea, and Strain, “The Bad, the Good,” 80–81. Audiences watched Comedy Central’s The 
Colbert Report, which subverts conventional political scripts by delivering American liberal talking points 
through a satirical American conservative mouthpiece. 
139 Ibid., 80. 
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“I love black people, but I hate n----rs.”140 What made Scott’s impression of Rock so 
painful is that he was attempting to pull it off without irony, as though he were Rock. It all 
came off as a horrible lampoon to anyone with the kind of social sense Yoon says humans 
have about the distastefulness of co-opting in-group insult language. 
Ashwell highlights another problematic dimension of out-group parties co-opting 
in-group banter: out-groups recreate offensive pragmatic content, whether intentionally or 
not. This is, in part, because “paradigmatic slurs … do not have neutral correlates.”141 
Echoing slurs risks reconstructing the social prejudices that form their conceptual frame. 
The disclaimer could be as simple as I’m from New Jersey, so I can tell this joke. But, now 
notice the single layer of additional separation in the following setups: I heard this one 
from a friend who’s Polish; or My wife is blonde, so I can say this. Disparaging speech 
reinforces stereotypes and the social status quo, non-propositional effects that I discuss in 
Chapter Three. 
Insulting language seems innocuous, especially when it is just a joke, but there are 
social outcomes. One who invokes an ethnic insult through sly humor or a clever jab can 
react to objections with, What’s wrong? I was only kidding! The stakes are low for the 
speaker but high for the target. But, the Cretan quotation finds itself in a more complex 
context. The quotation does not appear to simply suggest that stereotypes disparaging the 
Cretans are funny, acceptable, or even true. The quotation, rather than having a terminal 
function in the discourse, actually serves a secondary function as either a claim (the prima 
facie reading) or as evidence for a claim (my relevance-guided reading), other rhetorical 
functions notwithstanding. 
People generally sense that playful jabs used by in-groups are unacceptable insults 
when used by out-groups. By way of analogy, Paul would have understood the Cretan 
quotation to be just as offensive in the mouth of a troublemaker as we know d--b blonde to 
be in mouth of a non-blonde.142 So, interpreters need to pay close attention to who is 
 
140 B.J. Novak, “Diversity Day,” The Office (NBC, March 29, 2005). See an extended quotation of Rock’s 
performance in Adam M. Croom, “The Semantics of Slurs: A Refutation of Coreferentialism,” Ampersand 2 
(2015): 30–38. Croom argues that Rock’s liberal use of the epithet “N---a” invites such copycats. 
141 Ashwell, “Gendered Slurs,” 239. 
142 Outside the scope of this study, I wonder what kept the quotation current on Crete, assuming that it was 
centuries old. The appropriation of insults by targeted groups occurs for many reasons. According to 
tradition, the initial insult of the Cretan quotation was leveled by an in-group poet. Could the quotation itself 
have been an appropriation, intended to disarm insults against Cretans? Was it later re-appropriated by out-
groups to re-stigmatize Cretans? For current RT research on appropriation in general, see Claudia Bianchi, 
“Slurs and Appropriation: An Echoic Account,” Journal of Pragmatics 66 (2014): 35–44. 
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speaking and, particularly, whether she is speaking as the member of the target group or as 
an out-group individual. 
Claudia Bianchi explains why interpreters who are not part of the immediate 
audience have difficulty recognizing speakers’ disassociative attitudes: 
The crucial point is that out-groups lack unmistakable public means of 
making their dissociative [sic] attitude manifest. Even when their 
addressees know their non-racist or non-homophobic opinions, bystanders 
and eavesdroppers (especially if they are members of the target group) may 
mistake an echoic (ironic) use for a derogatory one.143 
Bianchi describes what I believe has been happening with the Cretan quotation. Because 
Paul “lack[s] unmistakable means of making [his disassociative] attitude manifest,” I 
contend that modern readers have mistaken his mention of derogatory words as his use of 
them. 
Another reason interpreters need to pay close attention to who is speaking is that 
representations of others are always artificial. Select portions of reality or previous 
representations are re-conveyed (hence, re-presented) to formulate reality for an 
audience.144 The audience that accepts the representation feels obliged to see the world in 
such a way as to perceive empirical evidence conforming to their beliefs, unless or until the 
fault of the representation becomes too glaring to ignore. The troublemakers certainly 
viewed Cretans in this way, regardless of one’s reading of Titus 1:12. Several interpreters 
who have taken the quotation at face value have engaged in a quest to reinforce their 
highly selective knowledge of ancient Cretans with additional facts, even when those facts 
are in most other ways irrelevant.145 This practice is opposed to what I think Paul was 
trying to accomplish. He wanted those re-presenting the Cretans as evil (κακά, 1:12) to be 
silenced, not justified. He indicated how he would deal with those troublemakers, whom 
[someone] should silence (οὓς δεῖ ἐπιστομίζειν, 1:11). Margaret Villanueva discusses this 
problematic kind of anthropological representation of otherness: 
“Representation” in this sense means to re-present, to present again, 
carefully selected elements of reality from a singular perspective. A 
constant re-presentation of particular images and experiences as “real,” even 
in the forms of jokes and cartoons, poses the danger that this will become 
 
143 Ibid., 42–43. She spells disassociative correctly elsewhere. 
144 See Margaret A. Villanueva, “Ethnic Slurs or Free Speech? Politics of Representation in a Student 
Newspaper,” Anthropology & Education Quarterly 27 (1996): 168–85. 
145 See, e.g., Baugh, “Titus,” 499–511; Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 397–99. Note, also, the scathing critique 
of this practice in Thiselton, “Logical Role.” 
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“reality for us,” that facile reification may be accepted as “just the way 
things are.”146 
Studies have shown that people with prejudicial attitudes are more likely to tolerate such 
re-presentation and other prejudicial speech. The research of O’Dea et al. shows a 
consistent correlation between an individual’s racial attitudes and comfort level with 
prejudicial expressions. They survey multiple studies showing that people who have less 
positive attitudes toward out-group individuals and who ascribe to negative stereotypes 
have a significantly higher comfort level with the use of racial slurs. Such people also tend 
to perceive the offensiveness of racial epithets as less severe than people who have positive 
attitudes toward out-group individuals.147 These findings comport with general intuitions, 
but they also reinforce the correlation between the troublemakers’ doctrine of an ethno-
religious pecking order, on the one hand, and explicit insults toward Cretans, on the other. 
This has troubling implications for the comfort level many interpreters have with the prima 
facie reading. Samuel Bénétreau, for instance, finds Paul’s supposedly bigoted remarks in 
Titus 1:12b to have been acceptable for the era, but indelicate nowadays. Rather than 
critiquing the assumptions of this reading, he gives this caveat: This is certainly not the 
tone to recommend in modern debates.148 
Commensurate with a prima facie reading, this passage’s modern history of 
interpretation has exhibited what Christian S. Crandall and Amy Eschelmann call the 
justification-suppression model of prejudice.149 Interpreters follow the impulse to either 
justify what appears to them to be prejudicial speech or to suppress it. Rather than using 
prejudicial speech, the context suggests that Paul was exposing its use. In other words, the 
prima facie reading assumes that Paul was co-opting in-group banter to shame the Cretans 
into shaping up morally, but this very offense appears to be what he was accusing the 
presumptive leaders of doing. To the presumptive leaders, the Cretans were not good 
enough as they were; their pedigree was a moral and religious liability. Therefore, they 
needed to more fully convert by observing the religio-cultural practices that the 
troublemakers prescribed. This was upsetting entire households (1:11); and, when those 
 
146 Villanueva, “Ethnic Slurs,” 169. 
147 Conor J. O’Dea et al., “Out of Bounds: Factors Affecting the Perceived Offensiveness of Racial Slurs,” 
Lang.Sci. 52 (2015): 155–64. 
148 Les Épîtres Pastorales 1 et 2 Timothée , Tite, Éditions de al Faculté de Theologie Évangélique (Vaux-sur-
Seine: Édifac, 2008), 298. In French: “Ce n’est certes pas le ton à recommander dans des débats modernes.” 
149 Christian S. Crandall and Amy Eshleman, “A Justification-Suppression Model of the Expression and 
Experience of Prejudice,” Psychological Bulletin 129 (2003): 414–46. 
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presumptive leaders discovered (or invented) the apropos Cretan stich (1:12), their 
bullying became intolerable to Paul. 
When Paul identified the troublemakers as especially those from the circumcision 
(1:10), he evoked a flawed ethno-religious dichotomy without necessarily endorsing it. 
According to the dichotomy, there were two types of people—Jews and Gentiles. Cretans 
were essentially a subset of the latter. The troublemakers’ insults did not need to reflect 
specific faults of actual Cretans as much as to scorn an ambiguous class of people—those 
on the wrong side of this false divide. Similarly to Ashwell, Adam Croom argues that 
ethnic slurs are not coextensive with descriptors and are, therefore, different in content. To 
explain the correlation between slurs and descriptors, he introduces the notion of 
conceptual anchors.150 The Cretan quotation, in the mouth of a troublemaker, is actually 
not coextensive with ethnic or geographic Cretans but primarily references Gentiles, 
whether converts or not, whose ethno-religious inferiority is highlighted on the basis of 
otherness from a privileged in-group of people who are Jewish or who associate deeply 
with things Jewish. In other words, those advancing the quotation believe that Cretans are 
inferior qua Gentiles, not qua Cretans.151 Paul forces a conceptual reversal aimed at this 
very religio-cultural arrogance when he accuses the troublemakers of being unclean, 
defiled, and unfit for any good work (1:14‒16) after they had labelled the Cretans as evil, 
defiled, and non-working (1:12). 
Croom demonstrates that slurs and descriptors do not necessarily have the same 
referential extension.152 This linguistic reality suggests that the Cretans who were being 
disparaged by the quotation did not strictly correspond to a group identified by the 
geographic or ethnic label Cretan. More likely, Cretan, among the troublemakers in the 
church, is code for church members who are inferior by virtue of being Gentile (or non-
Jewish). Croom argues that pejoratives require a conceptual anchor that is not literally 
synonymous or coextensive with any appropriate, non-pejorative descriptor. Cretan has 
sadly become(!) a pejorative word itself. Paul and Titus seem to have been among the first 
to reckon with this. Croom argues that slurs not only refer but pass judgment. He provides 
a formula for the pragmatic enrichment of conceptual anchors that I parallel: Based on the 
 
150 Croom, “Semantics of Slurs,” 31–37. 
151 Wilson and Sperber explain, “The thought that is the object of the ironical attitude need not be identical to 
the proposition expressed by the ironical utterance but may merely resemble it in content.” Quoted in 
Bianchi, “Slurs and Appropriation,” 40. 
152 Croom, “Semantics of Slurs.” Ashwell’s research also supports such claims. See “Gendered Slurs.” 
127 
book context of Titus, wherein the ethno-religious tensions I outline feature prominently, 
the conceptual anchor for Cretans would actually be something like ethnically, and thereby 
religiously, inferior, and despicable on account of it, Gentile.153 It might be uncomfortable 
for Titus to hear Paul disparaging his young congregation (as per a prima facie reading), 
but it would be socially jarring for Paul to report his awareness of and negative opinion 
toward what the troublemakers were trying to get away with. Paul exposed the problem of 
bigotry in the church by introducing the statement as having come from one of the 
troublemakers, an issue that Titus may have known but been too timid to address (cf. Titus 
2:15).154 
It may be that Paul or his speaker (εἴπεν τις, someone said, 1:12) appropriated the 
statement, Cretans are always liars (with a few added epithets), from Callimachus’s third-
century BCE Hymns (1.8‒9) or from an earlier source (e.g., Epimenides). A Cretan would 
have had the in-group credibility to render social commentary or to use the words 
ironically to subvert insults from out-group individuals; but using the quotation to assert its 
surface meaning silences this credible, subversive voice. So, we recognize two conflicting 
possibilities that many prima facie readings tacitly hold: first, that a Cretan spoke it, which 
means that it is ironic, even paradoxical, in-group banter; and, second, that Paul asserts it, 
which means that the in-group voice has been silenced. I propose a third possibility: Even 
though the troublemakers may have deferred to Epimenides’s Cretan credentials, Paul 
perceived how they were silencing Cretan voices. 
The relevance-guided reading I am suggesting has an analogy in Galatians 2:15-21 
in which Paul, in the dialogue between himself and Peter, corrects a pattern of thinking that 
elevates Jews above Gentiles. When Paul uses the phrase, “Gentile sinners” in Galatians 
2:15, rather than disparaging non-Jews, as his old way of thinking dictated, Paul was 
merely ironically echoing (and thereby critiquing) the fault in that way of seeing the human 
population. It sees the world as us and them. The terms by which people of status tend to 
distinguish themselves from others constantly change. Essential to Paul’s new view of the 
world was a radical realignment of valuation that considered people equal before God, 
 
153 See “Semantics of Slurs,” 31–37. 
154 I explain my use of troublemakers more in Chapter Two under Literary Context. 
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regardless of ethnicity, achievement, gender, religion, or other factor.155 We will now look 
more closely at specific ways Paul defends the Cretans from biased verbal attacks. 
The Irony of Paul’s Scathing Reversal of Religious Designations 
Regarding all forms of irony, Grice taught, “Irony is intimately connected with the 
expression of a feeling, attitude, or evaluation. I cannot say something ironically unless 
what I say is intended to reflect a hostile or derogatory judgment or a feeling such as 
indignation or contempt.”156 Wilson refines Grice’s general view and explains that a writer 
conveys a critical or derogatory attitude toward a sentence by producing an utterance that 
would be pragmatically inappropriate if literally understood.157 She explains that the 
use/mention distinction and hearers’ proven ability to discern appropriately between them 
make irony successful.158 
The Cretan quotation itself seems inappropriate to its context (Titus 1:10‒16) and 
to Paul’s purposes in the book and in the paragraph. If Paul is not derogating the Cretans, 
then what is he derogating? Irony derogates ideas more than persons or behaviors. The 
idea that Paul derogates in 1:12 is entirely appropriate to its context—namely, that 
ethnicity (and its commensurate religio-cultural appurtenances) is a means of attaining 
status with God. I quote Wilson at length as she explains the echoic use of irony, which I 
see applying: 
The speaker in irony does not use the proposition expressed by her 
utterance in order to represent a thought of her own which she wants the 
hearer to accept as true, but mentions it in order to represent a thought or 
utterance she tacitly attributes to someone else, and which she wants to 
suggest is ludicrously false, under-informative or irrelevant.159 
The speaker of irony echoes a statement or attitude (actual or imagined) by a person with 
whom she disagrees or with herself at an earlier time in order to disassociate herself from 
it. Wilson points out that empirical studies of irony demonstrate that hearers perceive 
ironic implicatures most readily when a speaker has conveyed in advance either the idea or 
 
155 John M.G. Barclay draws out this rhetorical move in his paraphrase of Gal 2:15-21. See Paul and the Gift 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 371. 
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157 See Wilson, “Pragmatics of Verbal Irony,” 1727. 
158 See ibid., 1728. 
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the person from whom their echoic statement disassociates.160 The preceeding verses 
suggest that Paul does not hold the speaker in 1:12 to be a reliable witness. 
Sperber and Wilson list three criteria that hearers intuitively use to spot irony: 1) 
recognition of the utterance as echoic,161 2) identification of the source of the opinion 
echoed, and 3) recognition that the speaker’s attitude toward the opinion echoed is one of 
rejection or disapproval.162 Grice and others have argued that irony is normally implicit. 
For interpretations of Titus, this means noting that the second criterion can include sources 
that are ambiguous and that the third criterion usually requires a measure of reasonable 
inference to ascertain the speaker’s attitude. 
Irony is indirect, not descriptive. As Clark writes, “Ironic utterances do not simply 
describe states of affairs; they represent other thoughts or utterances, which may in turn 
describe states of affairs.”163 Irony holds ideas up to scrutiny, revealing speakers’ attitudes 
toward them. Relevance theorists consider such use to be interpretative. With more direct 
kinds of non-literal speech, such as metaphor, exaggeration, or understatement, the speaker 
presents her own thoughts; with irony, the discourse exhibits a more complex, second-
order nature. 
I suggest three relevance-guided assumptions for interpreting irony based on 
Sperber and Wilson’s three intuitive signals for identifying irony (listed above) and 
developed from additional work by Relevance theorists: First, a common-sense account of 
the statement would judge that the speaker is not saying it on her own behalf. In this sense, 
the speaker echoes the idea as if from another’s mouth (or pen). Second, an account of the 
statement that appreciates its verbal context and life context would reason that the 
relevance of the statement to its contexts is a function not of its linguistically-encoded 
content but of the speaker’s power to convey her own attitude toward its content. Third, 
such an account of the statement would also perceive that the speaker’s attitude toward the 
 
160 See ibid. Huang sounds a caution regarding the “‘experimental paradox’—a well-known dilemma in 
experimental psycholinguistics …. The more perfect an experiment, the less like the real speech situation it 
is, and … the more like the real speech situation the experiment, the less easy for the experimenters to control 
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162 Summarized in Seto, “On Non-Echoic Irony,” 240. Derived from Sperber and Wilson, Pragmatics, 29–32. 
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statement is one of disassociation in the form of ridicule, disdain, criticism, or some like 
attitude.164 
The first assumption requires readers to closely follow the general theme of church 
leadership that Paul is addressing in 1:5‒16 and the specific topic of problematic 
leadership in 1:10‒16. Any satisfactory interpretation of 1:12 answers the question of how 
the quotation and its frame emerge from the topic at-hand. Linguistically-encoded signals 
that these are not Paul’s own thoughts or words about Cretans accompany the quotation. 
The second assumption is critical for a relevance-guided hermeneutic. The literary 
context and Paul’s life context (whether historical or literary-canonical) suggest that his 
attitude toward the statement would be more relevant than the content of the statement. To 
recapitulate in brief: The moral concerns of the statement are not prominent in the rest of 
Titus; a concern with the general Cretan populace is not relevant to the paragraph; and the 
disparagement of a Gentile missionary population conflicts not only with any measure of 
ministry sensibility but, more critically, with one of the most prominent characteristics of 
the Paul we all know from the NT.165 
Regarding the third assumption, the context signals that Paul opposes the kind of 
attitude represented by the content of the quotation; he instructs Titus to rebuke them 
severely on account of [this] accusation (δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν ἔλεγχε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, 1:13). It is 
difficult to imagine that Paul intended Titus to save his fledgling church in Crete by 
embarking on a wholesale campaign of ethnically targeted shaming, although some 
commentators come close to expecting such.166 Titus’s rebuke was aimed at the 
troublemakers who had, according to Paul’s knowledge, taken the sentiment expressed in 
the Cretan quotation as their validation for an ethno-religious social hierarchy with 
theological implications contrary to his gospel. The specific points of irony that we will 
explore below include Paul’s use of the title prophet to refer to the speaker of the quotation 
and Paul’s reversal of Jewish religious language to shame the presumptive leaders. 
 
164 Based on a synthesis of common arguments from Wilson, “Pragmatics of Verbal Irony”; Currie, “Why 
Irony Is Pretence”; Seto, “On Non-Echoic Irony”; Garmendia, “A (Neo)Gricean Account”; Sperber and 
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the same subject, “Do the Work of an Evangelist.” 
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1. Prophet 
Comprehending non-literal language does not require a two-step process in which the 
literal meaning is first deciphered and then discarded for a special sense; it is rapid and 
synchronic. Theorists refer to this processing as on-line comprehension. Gibbs discusses 
empirical research that shows how quickly hearers discern “the meanings of words during 
on-line comprehension” based on judging “a speaker’s probable intentions.”167 Paul 
introduced a group of presumptive leaders in the verses preceeding the quotation (1:12b), 
which suggests that these troublemakers (1:10‒11) were the group from which the prophet 
(1:12a) came. This tight sequence of discourse would have influenced the original 
audience’s perception of Paul’s intentions. Titus and his community knew Paul’s attitude 
toward the presumptive prophet immediately. The quotation was an example of 
objectionable behavior. 
The near context indicates that Paul was concerned with leadership malpractice; the 
syntax indicates that the speaker came from the company of presumptive leaders; the 
broader context reveals no interest in gluttony or laziness; and the quotation harmonizes 
with the overall ethno-religious thrust of the unhealthy doctrine that Paul addressed 
elsewhere in Titus. These statements are all explicatures, because they are based on visible, 
verifiable evidence, although not strictly on the semantic value of particular words (as 
might be represented in a lexicon) or syntax (as might be represented in a grammar). 
According to Levinson, hearers reject implicatures if the discourse context negates 
them; because, unlike logical inferences, pragmatic presuppositions are defeasible. That is, 
they are susceptible to negation by added contextual evidence.168 Hearers reject the 
presupposition that Paul uses the term prophet to honor or even to objectively label the 
speaker, because the discourse context casts doubt on the speaker’s trustworthiness. 
I have generally been referring to irony as an echoic use of language, but RT offers 
two major proposals for understanding irony. First, there is Grice’s classic irony as 
pretense or making as-if to say.169 Along these lines, Greg Currie explains that, in irony, 
“one pretends to be doing something which one is not doing: speaking seriously and 
assertively, seriously asking a question, seriously expressing distaste” while targeting “a 
 
167 “Intentionalist Controversy,” 191. 
168 Levinson, Pragmatics, 186–91, esp. 190. 
169 Grice typically used non-technical terms to refer to features of language. See “Logic and Conversation,” 
49–50. Wilson critiques Grice, partly on the basis of his definitional imprecision and partly because even he 
did not appreciate irony’s full pragmatic dimensions. See Wilson, “Pragmatics of Verbal Irony,” 1725–26. 
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restrictive or otherwise defective view of the world.”170 The second proposal, irony as 
echo, is more currently common among Relevance theorists. These accounts are not 
incompatible. Wilson appreciates pretense accounts of irony, such as Currie’s, but also 
critiques them.171 For her, irony is essentially communicative, not expressive. 
Communicative speech—the stock and trade of RT—focuses on audience comprehension, 
whereas expressive speech does not.172 Both the echoic and pretense accounts, 
nevertheless, have explanatory power for a variety of irony types, and both hold that the 
speaker conveys a critical or mocking attitude toward her statement. Paul seems to have 
used the title prophet ironically, because he portrayed the speaker as an untrustworthy 
source. For Paul, the speaker to which he refers is only a prophet in his own mind and 
among the company of presumptive leaders. Paul was allowing the speaker and the listener 
to look on with ridicule as someone made a labelling error. Paul invited his audience to 
sneer at such an inappropriate title for such an offensive person. Paul and Titus know the 
destructive effects of bigotry; and, as everyone in the Cretan church must learn, prophets 
speak gospel truth, not insults.173 
Currie nuances his account by explaining that the pretense is not based upon the 
mode of utterance. A comedy or a tragedy, being entirely pretended, is not also entirely 
ironical. Rather, departures from the normal mode of utterance, signal ironic moments that 
can be humorous, caustic, or otherwise. Pretense itself is not ironic; it has to pretend to 
hold a perspective of things that is faulty from the authentic perspective of the speaker.174 
Further, according to Currie and others, framing irony with explanation defeats or nullifies 
it. He writes, “The kind of pretense we naturally label ironic generally requires a context 
that contains no explicit or conventional signals that what is said or done is pretense.”175 
Readers may not have access to real-time signals such as tone of voice, but they 
nevertheless can see linguistic cues in word choice and context that Paul is engaged in 
second-order metarepresentation. By second-order, Currie and other linguists mean the 
 
170 “Why Irony Is Pretence,” 116. 
171 See Wilson, “Pragmatics of Verbal Irony,” 1735. 
172 For detailed examination of additional distinctions, see ibid.; Garmendia, “(Neo)Gricean Account;” 
Currie, “Why Irony is Pretence.” 
173 Consider the culminating description of the depraved and unredeemed in Titus 3:3 (hating one another) 
before the epiphany of the kindness and love of God our Savior (3:4). 
174 Currie’s fuller but more opaque definition: “Irony is a matter of pretending to a limited perspective in a 
way which is expressive of a view you have about the limitations of some suitably related perspective, where 




abstract thinking that humans engage in every day whereby they evaluate the semantically-
decoded content of utterances in alignment with the attitudes speakers demonstrate toward 
it. In other words, he is conveying thoughts about thoughts. Natural language practitioners 
use it intuitively and reliably, typically without being conscious of it.176 This points to the 
subtlety of irony. According to Grice: “To be ironical is, among other things, to pretend…, 
and while one wants the pretense to be recognized as such, to announce it as pretense 
would spoil the effect.”177 Readers understand that Paul speaks ironically without using 
explicit, mechanical words or phrases by which to explicate, Now, I’m being ironic here. 
His audience realized that labelling the speaker a prophet could not have been taken as 
literally true or descriptive. 
Consider a present-day analogy: Republican U.S. President Donald Trump’s 
controversial reference to Democratic U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren from Massachusetts 
as Pocahontas has exhibited similar interpretational problems. Warren has claimed Native 
American ancestry on the basis of her family’s oral history,178 but opponents called the 
veracity of her claim into question once she began running for a competitive Senate seat in 
2012. Specific actions she took that suggested she was Native American include 
contributing a recipe to a 1984 Native American cookbook titled Pow Wow Chow under 
the name “Elizabeth Warren—Cherokee;” quoting her aunt, who said that her family “had 
high cheekbones like all the Indians do;”179 listing herself in a professional directory of law 
professors from 1986 to 1995 as a minority;180 and referring to her race on Harvard 
University faculty rosters as Native American from 1995 until 2012. 
Trump has disdainfully referred to Warren as Pocahontas on numerous occasions 
since 2016. His tone is snarky, and Warren is one of his political opponents. These facts 
suggest that he is attempting to ridicule Warren. Modern readers do not have access to 
Paul’s tone, but I have highlighted other indicators that suggest his disassociative attitude. 
 
176 See ibid., 127. 
177 H. Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 54; see 
also Clark, Relevance Theory, 287. 
178 Curt Nickish quotes Warren: “These are my family stories. This is what my brothers and I were told by 
my mom and my dad.” See “In Mass. Senate Race, Warren on the Defensive over Native American 
Heritage,” Transcript, All Things Considered from NPR News, May 1, 2012, https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
itsallpolitics/2012/05/09/151784645/in-mass-senate-race-warren-on-defense-over-native-american-heritage 
(accessed 5/5/18). 
179 Jason L. Riley, “Elizabeth Warren Lectures Native Americans About Pocahontas,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warren-lectures-native-americans-about-
pocahontas-1519168877 (accessed 4/24/18). 
180 D’Angelo Gore, “Elizabeth Warren’s ‘Pocahontas’ Controversy,” FactCheck, December 1, 2017, 
https://www.factcheck.org/2017/12/elizabeth-warrens-pocahontas-controversy/ (accessed 4/24/18). 
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Pocahontas serves as a stand-in for the paradigmatic female Native American with all of 
the heroic and tragic honor attached to her story. Trump mentions the name ironically in 
order to hold Warren’s subtle honor claims up to scrutiny and ridicule. As far as Trump is 
concerned, Warren is a Native American only in her own mind, and he exaggerates her 
minor claims to honor by naming the utmost example (in terms of fame and heroism) of 
Native American virtue. Jason Riley comprehends this: “Mr. Trump began calling Ms. 
Warren ‘Pocahontas’ in 2016 to mock her questionable claim of American Indian 
heritage.”181 
Just as commentators have misguidedly taken the Cretan quotation and its 
presumably venerable attribution to some prophet as a signal to look into ancient history 
for corroboration of Cretan disgrace, Warren took Trump’s mention of the name 
Pocahontas as a signal to talk about the Colonial American heroine to the National 
Congress of American Indians, a gathering of Native Americans at which she was not on 
the planned schedule.182 Perceptively, Riley observes, 
Ms. Warren knows that the president’s Pocahontas digs are intended to 
mock her fabulations rather than the heritage of American Indians, but that 
didn’t stop her from conflating the two in her speech. She accused Mr. 
Trump of “reducing native history, native culture, native people to the butt 
of a joke.”183 
Assuming she grasped the intention of Trump’s mention of the name Pocahontas, she 
deflected the attention he was bringing to her dubious claims by lecturing on an alternative 
target. 
I think that interpreters are failing to grasp the irony of Paul’s mention of the 
designation prophet. The historical Pocahontas is a red herring for understanding Trump’s 
mention, just as the historical Cretans are a red herring for understanding Paul’s mention. 
With the Cretan quotation, many interpreters either take Paul’s mention as bigotry and 
 
181 Riley, “Elizabeth Warren Lectures.” 
182 See Martin Pengelly, “Elizabeth Warren Seeks to Use Trump Pocahontas ‘Racial Slur’ as Political Tool,” 
The Guardian, March 11, 2018, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/11/elizabeth-warren-donald-
trump-pocahontas-native-americans (accessed 4/24/18); Amy B. Wang, “‘Let’s Talk about Pocahontas’: 
Warren Addresses Native American Heritage Claims, Slams Trump,” The Washington Post, February 14, 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/02/14/lets-talk-about-pocahontas-
elizabeth-warren-addresses-native-heritage-claims-and-slams-trump/?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.db2de425f072 (accessed 4/24/18); Eric Bradner, “Warren Responds to Trump’s ‘Pocahontas’ Jabs,” CNN, 
February 14, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/14/politics/elizabeth-warren-pocahontas-trump/index.html 
(accessed 4/24/18). 
183 Riley, “Elizabeth Warren Lectures.” 
135 
condemn the author of Titus184 or attempt to justify him by finding historical evidence for 
the veracity of the slur.185 Some of Trump’s critics assert that his Pocahontas metonym 
directly targets Native Americans, and ignore his true aim.186 In Warren’s aforementioned 
speech, she stated, “I’ve noticed that every time my name comes up, President Trump likes 
to talk about Pocahontas … so I figured, let’s talk about Pocahontas.’”187 Whether Trump 
insulted Native Americans is not in question. We are considering his metonymic linguistic 
target, not the collateral damage. Even as Paul seems to have surfaced a paradigmatic 
example of the degrading teaching that the troublemakers engaged in, he ironically labelled 
the speaker a prophet. Similarly, Trump encapsulates a pattern of subtle honor claims into 
one exaggerated epithet as if Warren were claiming to be, not just Native American, but 
the most esteemed and renowned of all—Pocahontas.  
Paul’s use of the title prophet in Titus 1:12 is a case of metonymy, which Song says 
is related to its referent by way of contiguity, whereas metaphor is related to its referent by 
way of resemblance.188 It is not simply a straightforward replacement. Metonymical 
interpretations are associatively activated by the expressions that replace the reference. In 
the words of François Recanati, Metonymy is “sensitive to the linguistic and extralinguistic 
context in which the expression which receives the metonymical interpretation occurs.”189 
Paul distanced himself from a group of people and then quoted someone from that group, 
so uttering the word prophet immediately triggered a negative association. The hearers had 
no difficulty in discerning that Paul intended the referent—a person that had been built up 
as having distasteful associations—to be taken as an unreliable witness. The label comes as 
a punch line immediately before the quotation (εἶπέν τις ... προφήτης· Κρῆτες…, [so] said 
 
184 E.g., Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 133–80; Stegemann, “Anti-Semitic and Racist,” 271–94. 
185 E.g., Baugh, “Titus,” 502, 504; or Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 397–99. 
186 None of this excuses Trump’s cavalier misuse of Pocahontas’s name, but the example illuminates the 
situation in Titus with its emotional and social impact. I suspect that Paul had a more virtuous and generous 
attitude as he denounced the troublemakers in the Cretan church who were seeking advantage by putting their 
neighbors down. Warren stood by her claims until a DNA test proved she had no Native American lineage. It 
is not clear whether she ever gained anything personally, but the institutions she belonged to used her 
purported ethnicity to tout their diversity and inclusion statistics. Trump smirks and delights to ridicule 
Warren for supposedly seeking gain by making unsubstantiated honor claims. Presidential Press Secretary 
Sarah Sanders tries to spin the allegation that Trump was offending Native Americans: “I think what most 
people find offensive is Senator Warren lying about her heritage to advance her career.”Quoted by Gore in 
“Elizabeth Warren’s ‘Pocahontas.’” Michelle Ye Hee Lee quotes a June 27, 2016 Tweet, in which Trump 
retorted, “It’s so unfair to Pocahontas.” See “Why Donald Trump Calls Elizabeth Warren ‘Pocahontas,’” 
Washington Post, June 28, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/06/28/why-
donald-trump-calls-elizabeth-warren-pocahontas/ (accessed 4/24/18). 
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some … prophet, “Cretans …”), grammatically unnecessary, suggesting that it is the 
overextension of Paul’s disassociative reference to the speaker of the quotation. 
Paul could not point to a pre-existing, fully lexicalized referent, so he employed the 
label prophet to refer to a category of people that he described as not very prophetic (i.e., 
not truth-tellers). In the absence of an exact lexicalization of what Paul had in mind, he 
used prophet to convey a complex of ideas, including his own attitude toward them. This 
higher-level explicature includes the notion that he was not necessarily the person who 
placed the label prophet upon the speaker of the quotation. The metonym is echoic—Paul 
attributes the labelling to them. Masa-Aki Yamanashi observes that ironic utterances often 
involve a switch in register or style.190 Seto describes this as a heightening of intensity.191 
Certainly, the use of the word prophet is an elevation of formality or status, even a 
heightening or hyperbolic (and sarcastic) attribution of religious valuation. It is like when 
the swaggering Han Solo referred to the persnickety princess Leia as “your 
worshipfulness.” 
Levinson highlights a crucial contention of the correspondence theory of metaphor, 
originally articulated by Max Black, namely, that effective metaphors typically combine 
two conceptual fields such that the effect of the metaphor is spoiled to the extent that it is 
explained.192 Not all domains are equally compatible; however, stronger correspondence 
between domains leads to more effective metaphors. Metaphors in which the target (the 
object defined) and the symbol (the object defining) have conceptual, phonetic, or other 
correspondences can be especially strong. Prophet has cultural currency for Titus’s 
community. Quinn recognizes the significance of the title, writing, “Prophetic credentials 
were found and valued among the Jewish Christians.”193 It appropriately refers to a 
speaking participant. In the social and conversational contexts of Titus, the conceptual 
correspondence would be strong, so the metaphor works smoothly and effectively. 
Another indicator of irony, according to Seto, is known as topicalization. Theme 
and focus are two kinds of topicalization. Focus topicalization appears in Paul’s use of the 
word prophet. Seto uses the following sentence as an example: A fine friend she turned out 
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to be.194 That the statement is ironic is signaled by the topicalization of friend and the 
implied false complimentary attitude. Similarly, a prophet of their own may be taken as a 
topicalization of the purveyor of this quotation, further suggesting Paul’s disassociative 
attitude toward him. In Titus 1:12a, Paul employed several kinds of emphasis, including 
topicalization, the exaggerated honorary title, and the emphatic ownership phrase one of 
their very own. Combining this with Paul’s apparent disassociative attitude toward the 
group out of which this speaker comes yields a strong case for irony—suggesting that 
Paul’s use of this quotation is by no means to advance the substance of what was said. 
Seto describes how ironic metonymy (e.g., name-calling) works by use of a graph 
(reproduced below). He diagrams a horizontal baseline with a positive field above the line 
and a negative field below it. In the case of personal descriptions, the positive field 
represents a scale of compliments; the negative field represents a scale of insults. Seto 
argues that the degree of irony and the greatness of cognitive effects emerge from the 
measure of distance between what the speaker means and the propositional content of the 
utterance as linguistically-encoded.195 Seto claims that the characteristic function of verbal 
irony is to present an original thought and to show the speaker’s critical attitude toward 
that thought. Ironic speech invokes an idea for the purpose of implicit ridicule. While irony 
is inherently complex, it is still highly economical, because hearers can derive a significant 
cognitive-effect bang for their processing-effort buck. Gibbs and Tendahl argue that 
metaphor does not necessarily require or reward more cognitive effort than literal speech. 
Appropriate metaphors can be the most efficient and effective way to convey a meaning.196 
The inherent complexity of irony has to do with the fact that it requires second-order 
processing (thinking about thoughts). This is irony: to hold up a thought for implicit 
criticism. Expressions that are within the mildly positive level that Seto outlines are not 
typically considered ironic. Seto writes, “We would have to increase the voltage of 
meaning in order to make good ironic statements.”197 Seto recognizes and shows in his 
examples that most echo markers (which include signals of irony) involve highly charged 
or overcharged positive modifiers (either at the sentence or word level) that would not be 
used if the speaker were merely communicating their own positive attitude toward the 
subject. So, for example, when someone does something stupid and a speaker refers to 
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them by saying, [So-and-so] is a genius; it is overcharged. If so-and-so had actually done 
something smart, the speaker might normally have been expected to complement them by 
saying something closer to [so-and-so] is smart. Positive exaggeration (e.g., prophet) is, 
therefore, a signal of echoic and ironic use. We will now look at one last example of Paul’s 
use of irony—the Category Reversal found in the surrounding context of the Cretan 
quotation. 
 
Figure 1: Graph from Seto, “On Non-Echoic Irony,” 245. 
2. Category Reversal 
Another point of irony worth noting is Paul’s remapping of the Cretan quotation’s insulting 
language onto a constellation of concepts laden with religious valuations that were salient 
for Jews. If the Cretan church was developing in an ethno-religious environment such as 
the book of Titus portrays, then they would have recognized the extent to which the 
quotation’s claims were loaded with religious freight in the mouth of contemporary Jews 
that they were not in the mouth of an ancient Cretan (e.g., Epimenides). Paul placed the 
speaker and his supporters on the wrong side of their own valuations. In the final two 
verses of the pericope (1:10‒16), not long after the hexameter quotation (1:12b), Paul 
waxes poetic himself, using parallelism and religious imagery to expose the hypocrisy of 
the people who were advancing the doctrine of Cretan (i.e., Gentile) inferiority within the 
community. 
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Although Paul did not develop the negative qualities ascribed to Cretans by the 
quotation (e.g., deceit, laziness, gluttony) as moral issues later in Titus, its contents are not 
totally irrelevant. The quotation has an existential thrust—that is, it concerns moral being 
more than moral doing, but Paul used it as a foil against which to parody the 
troublemakers. The troublemakers were the true non-working bellies (γαστέρες ἀργαί 
1:12), desiring disgraceful gain (αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν, 1:11; cf. μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ, 1:7) 
but unfit for any good work (πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι, 1:16b). Whereas the 
speaker referred to Cretans as evil beasts (κακὰ θηρία; igr., unclean, 1:12), Paul used 
having been defiled (μεμιαμμένοις, 1:15) and detestable (βδελυκτοὶ, 1:16) to refer to the 
troublemakers. Words for clean [ones] (καθαροῖς, 1:15) and cognates also contrast with 
such features of the quotation. Paul packed epithets that evoked central notions of Jewish 
religious purity into the passage. He compared and contrasted their actual behavior and 
speech with the insinuations levelled against the Cretans in the quotation. So, bellies and 
brutes (1:12), as metonyms, miscategorize their target and are more applicable to the 
speaker’s faction.198 Paul, in turn, labelled them defiled (1:15) and detestable (1:16). He 
seems to have been accentuating a contradiction between the moral superiority implied in 
the condemnation of others and the actual moral condition of people who would purvey 
such ideas. I say more about this reversal when I develop a related theme (Table-Turning) 
in Chapter Two under Literary Context. 
The hearer who infers such ironic speech appropriately receives tremendous payoff. 
By mentioning the quotation, Paul offered evidence for his hearers to judge even as he had 
to judge it. By use of echoic irony, Paul was able to carry his audience along better than 
direct and explicit argumentation, for he demonstrated trust that they would understand his 
message, which would yield his audience positive cognitive effects. Hearers who interpret 
irony well can derive a deeper connection with the speaker. I discuss such social outcomes 
of speech in Chapter Three—The Non-Propositional Dimensions of Communication. 
A sentence uttered ironically, according to Wilson, “is more or less obviously false, 
irrelevant or under-informative.”199 Paul distanced himself from the surface meaning of the 
quotation, just as would be expected of a person speaking ironically, and instead reversed 
its judgments back against its purveyors. Paul accomplished what Wilson describes as the 
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pragmatic function of irony: “the main point … is to express the speaker’s dissociative 
[sic] attitude to a tacitly attributed utterance or thought … based on some perceived 
discrepancy between the way it represents the world and the way things actually are.”200 
Speaker intention has been a significant concern for this chapter, but one of RT’s major 
developments from pragmatics is a focus on utterance interpretation as a process in the 
hearer’s mind. In Chapter Two, we turn to The Hearer’s Role in Communication.
 
200 Ibid., 1724 (again, the common misuse of dissociate when disassociate is meant). 
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Chapter Two – The Role of the Hearer in 
Communication 
Relevance theorists focus on how hearers arrive at meaning. This focus is commensurate 
with the evolution of the discipline of linguistic pragmatics. Whereas Gricean Pragmatics 
is speaker-oriented, RT is hearer-oriented. This chapter spells out some of the implications 
of recognizing the hearer’s role in communication for interpreting utterances and applies 
them to Titus. 
Grice taught that when a hearer observes a superficial violation of the co-operative 
maxims (in his words, “flouting the maxims”), he nevertheless assumes the speaker’s 
deeper adherence to them.1 Levinson explains, “Grice’s point is not that we [speakers] 
always adhere to these maxims on a superficial level but rather that, wherever possible, 
people will interpret what we say as conforming to the maxims on at least some level.”2 
Note the agency of the hearer in Levinson’s explanation. Relevance theorists view 
interpretation as a cognitive process in the hearer. Furlong emphasizes the spontaneous and 
intuitive nature of the hearer’s comprehension process as she contrasts RT with reader-
response criticism.3 This contrast is important. Both hold the reader to be central to 
interpretation, but RT explains what readers contribute to an interpretive process that 
completes speaker intentions. Evaluating interpretations as valid or invalid cannot be the 
unilateral task of the reader; for, as Furlong notes, a reader “is not necessarily an authority 
on his own interpretive process.”4 So, the formulation of meaning is not entirely dependent 
upon the subjectivity of the hearer. The objective of uncovering speaker intention 
constrains the practice of inference in natural language exchanges.5 As Tim Meadowcroft 
points out, “reader responsibility” does not devolve into “unrestrained privilege.”6 
Relevance theorists also hold that speakers do not utter sentences merely to convey 
information that hearers can ascertain through a process (be it ever so systematic and 
careful) of comprehension. Sperber and Wilson see comprehension as too passive and 
proposition-oriented to be the ultimate task of pragmatics. They write, “It is utterance-
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interpretation, not utterance-comprehension, that is the natural domain of pragmatic 
theory.”7 This distinction reflects RT’s development within pragmatics from a speaker- to 
a hearer-oriented explanation of communication. Relevance theorists recognize that hearers 
play an active, not a passive, role in formulating meaning. Hearer contribution, not just 
hearer competence, completes speaker intention and yields meaning. 
Furthermore, speakers use utterances to accomplish effects in addition to and aside 
from comprehension. Speakers aim to alter their environments by affecting listener 
behavior and assumptions, social relations, and so forth.8 The interpretation of an utterance 
can be efficient and relevant, even when the informational payload of the utterance is 
somewhat indirect or equivocal from the perspective of a third party (e.g., modern readers). 
In this chapter, I explain two key aspects of the hearer’s role in communication and apply 
them to interpretations of Titus 1:12. First, I discuss contextual assumptions, which are 
comprised of a hearer’s cognitive environment (conceptual) and implicated premises 
(logical). Second, I discuss salience, which affects the relative prominence and 
accessibility of contextual assumptions. 
I. Contextual Assumptions Mismatched between Ancient Audiences 
and Modern Readers 
In the previous chapter, I explained that hearers infer explicatures based on observable 
linguistic features in a discourse context, especially what the speaker has produced (i.e., 
not the entire material environment). Explicatures must be combined with contextual 
assumptions in order to arrive at utterance meaning. Contextual assumptions, although 
largely shared between a speaker and a hearer, are the content a hearer contributes to 
inferential interpretation. That is, they are a necessary ingredient for interpretation that 
neither the words of a speaker nor the material environment, on their own, supply. Clark 
explains, “Explicatures, which are based on encoded linguistic meanings of linguistic 
expressions, plus contextual assumptions, which are based on life experience and the 
situational context of the conversation, combine to equal implicatures, which constitute the 
meaning of an utterance.”9 
I will focus on two broad kinds of contextual assumptions—one conceptual and 
one logical. A hearer’s cognitive environment is a constantly-changing, complex, and 
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information-rich, albeit incomplete, conceptual world. Implicated premises are 
assumptions that are logically necessary to conclude the correct (i.e., relevant) meaning 
and derive adequate cognitive effects. 
Clark provides a diagram that represents an objective and repeatable process, 
reproduced below (Figure 2).10 The schematic is especially helpful for meta-pragmatics—
the process of interpreting utterances in which the interpreter is not a partner in the 
conversation (as when modern scholars read ancient texts)—because it illuminates the 
points at which third-party interpreters might diverge from original audiences by making 
inappropriate assumptions. Clark writes, “In meta-pragmatics, … we imagine what might 
be available to an individual; and, of course, our model of the relevant set of contextual 
assumptions is radically impoverished compared to what is available to an actual 
individual at a specific time.”11 
 
Figure 2: Graph from Clark, Relevance Theory, 299. 
 
10 Ibid., 299. 
11 Ibid., 333. 
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Clark bases this diagram on Wilson and Sperber’s arguments that pragmatic 
inference is not only necessary to arrive at implicatures, as Grice taught, but that it is also 
necessary for deriving explicatures, as the diagram portrays. As Sperber and Wilson 
explain, “a major development in pragmatics over the past thirty years (going much further 
than Grice envisaged) has been to show that the explicit content of an utterance, like the 
implicit content, is largely underdetermined by the linguistically encoded meaning, and its 
recovery involves a substantial element of pragmatic inference.”12 The most significant 
difference between this Relevance-theoretical outline and a more classic (Gricean) scheme 
is the presence of inference at all levels of the process. In this section, I focus on the center 
level of this diagram, where contextual assumptions contribute to arriving at both final 
utterance meaning (implicatures) and logically intermediate sentence meaning 
(explicatures). As stated before, explicatures are only logically intermediate; because 
processes of natural language interpretation occur so rapidly, intuitively, and virtually 
simultaneously that intermediate steps cannot be practically observed in a natural 
environment. For our purposes, however, this diagram helps to visualize the interplay of 
explicatures and contextual assumptions. 
To discern the meaning of utterances, according to Sperber and Wilson, 
“implicated conclusions must be deducible from explicatures together with an appropriate 
set of contextual assumptions.”13 Some prominent interpreters of Titus, however, have 
introduced anachronistic or otherwise inappropriate assumptions into the interpretational 
process. Because a disparaging statement appears in Titus 1:12b, they assume that Paul 
affirms the substance of the saying in spite of evidence in the broader context of Titus that 
he was trying to ameliorate ethno-religious tensions, especially those that diminished the 
dignity of Gentiles. In order to construe 1:12 as an insult levelled or endorsed by Paul, one 
must introduce assumptions that fail to cohere with the thrust of the letter as a whole or the 
sense of statements in the near context (1:10‒16). I suggest that such a construal would 
have surprised original hearers. Blass recognizes the need for interpreters to grasp what 
was on the mind of original hearers, asserting, “The discourse analyst has to know some of 
the hearer’s assumptions, no matter in what culture the analysis is done.”14 I will now 
clarify how the contextual assumptions of original and modern interpreters can become 
 
12 “Pragmatics” (2007), 470. 
13 Ibid., 482. 
14 Relevance Relations in Discourse, 13. 
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mismatched and outline contextual assumptions that original hearers of Titus plausibly 
held. I begin with an explanation of how the hearer’s cognitive environment contributes to 
these assumptions. 
Cognitive Environment 
A speaker expects her hearer to contribute what he already knows to the meaning of an 
utterance, and she signals which pieces of his store of knowledge are relevant. This subset 
of all of the hearer’s knowledge is his cognitive environment. Clark provides the following 
definition: “The cognitive environment of an individual is a set of assumptions that are 
manifest to him.”15 Whether an assumption is manifest depends upon various contextual 
factors—the utterance itself being one of the most important—but the test is whether the 
hearer “is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation 
as true or probably true.”16 Note that this definition implies that cognitive environment is 
particular to individual people at specific times and can never be fully replicated.17 It 
changes with every experience, word, and thought. In this section, I outline factors that 
contribute to an assumption being manifest. In order for readers of ancient writing to align 
their assumptions most reliably with those of original audiences, literary context is chief 
among these factors. 
Consider the task of disambiguation. Modern readers of biblical texts can only 
properly disambiguate a reference, if the referent emerges from what could plausibly be 
construed as the original hearer’s cognitive environment. If interpreters draw on 
information that is likely outside the cognitive environment of original hearers, they err. 
To reconstruct a cognitive environment as it applies to interpreting the Cretan 
quotation of Titus 1:12, I proceed to outline three considerations: encyclopedic knowledge, 
constraints upon relevance, and literary context. I will progress through these 
considerations as they logically develop from one another. Encyclopedic knowledge is the 
complete set of available information. Constraints upon relevance limit this to a more 
 
15 Clark adjusts Sperber and Wilson’s definition by using assumptions in place of their facts. See Relevance 
Theory, 115. See also, Green, “Relevance Theory and Biblical Interpretation,” 272. 
16 Sperber and Wilson quoted in Clark, Relevance Theory, 115. Pattemore also builds upon Sperber and 
Wilson’s definition, writing, “Context in RT is a cognitive concept—a set of propositions that we hold to be 
true or probably true. The sum of all such ideas is our cognitive environment.” See Pattemore, “On the 
Relevance,” 267. 
17 Two relatively recent PhD dissertations apply RT to biblical studies to reconstruct the cognitive 
environment of ancient authors and audiences and, thus, to illuminate interpretation. Joseph D. Fantin 
examined specific passages in the undisputed Paulines, and Benson Goh examined Ephesians. See Fantin, 
“The Lord of the Entire World: Lord Jesus, a Challenge to Lord Caesar?” (PhD Diss., University of 
Sheffield, 2007); and Goh, “Honoring Christ, Subverting Caesar.” 
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narrow, manageable, and accessible set for cognitive processing. Context is that most 
reliable, and therefore critical, subset for modern readers of the Bible. Green points out that 
context in RT is a subset of all the information available to hearers from their environment. 
The aspect of the original hearers’ cognitive environment that modern readers have access 
to with the most detail is the text of Scripture.18 
1. Encyclopedic Knowledge 
A hearer’s cognitive environment includes encyclopedic knowledge about the real world 
that differs for each individual. Biblical scholars study the ancient world and add to our 
store of knowledge but cannot predetermine what information is most relevant to a given 
utterance. Nothing guarantees beforehand that a certain historical, monumental, or literary 
fact will have relevance for a given context. Regarding both literary and social context, 
Blass writes, “It is a mistake to assume that context is something given in advance.”19 We 
are always at risk of confusing our knowledge of the ancient world, especially ancient 
literature, monumental history, and archaeology, with the cognitive environment of ancient 
interlocutors. The hearer’s cognitive environment, as a component of contextual 
assumptions, not only differs from person-to-person but also in one person from time-to-
time. One’s cognitive environment is indeed contextual. 
Modern interpreters must evaluate the relevance of encyclopedic knowledge 
carefully. Original audiences had a nearly perfect set of contextual assumptions that 
modern readers could never duplicate. We acquire a surplus (but also a deficiency) of facts 
about the world, facts of history and human behavior, lexical and grammatical facts, social 
and religious facts. Green lists various categories and refers to this collection of facts as 
“all the information we need to process an utterance.”20 The hardest set of facts to 
ascertain—the holy grail of biblical studies—is the exact and detailed, local and 
momentary socio-historical situation of writing and reading. Grammars, lexicons, 
encyclopedias, archaeological digs, monographs, and other such apparatus of biblical 
scholarship are standard resources for building a scholar’s encyclopedic knowledge of the 
ancient world. It will never be complete, and it will always be askew on the bases of the 
 
18 See “Lexical Pragmatics and the Lexicon,” 327. As Blass applies RT to a corpus of Sissala transcripts and 
refers to the contextual assumptions required to interpret meaning, she writes, “My analysis ... is not 
necessarily a representation of what was actually thought ... but how the interpretive process might have 
gone.” See Relevance Relations in Discourse, 13. 
19 Relevance Relations in Discourse, 41. 
20 “Lexical Pragmatics and the Lexicon,” 327. 
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distorted perspective of monumental history and the arbitrary nature of archaeological 
discovery, not to mention editorial biases. This kind of study is still necessary, but a 
relevance-guided hermeneutic would counteract a false sense of confidence in general 
knowledge by prioritizing evidence drawn from linguistic context in evaluating relevance. 
For biblical studies, canonical facts—i.e., how the canon portrays situations dealt 
with in biblical texts—are critical components of this encyclopedic background 
knowledge. Some PE scholars argue that this kind of knowledge is especially critical for 
these books, because they view their composition as predicated upon knowledge of the 
canonical Paul as a literary figure. Brevard S. Childs believes that the PE were written with 
a knowledge of the “canonical Paul” and that original audiences would have had this 
conception of Paul in mind. They, then, read and interpreted the PE in light of this 
preconception of Paul. In Childs’s words, “The Pauline corpus was further developed by 
the Pastoral Epistles, which actualized the normative role of Paul’s teachings in his 
apostolic witness to the gospel for the future generations of the Christian church.”21 In 
other words, these books rely on readers, even in the first instance, knowing the back-story 
of Paul and his companions, adventures, and concerns from previous encounters with 
writings that were already popular in first-century churches. 
None of these sources of knowledge are new to biblical studies. They are a 
commonplace for various historical-critical approaches to interpretation. But, even as we 
attend to these sources of encyclopedic knowledge, RT helps us to understand the narrower 
subset of knowledge that is most pertinent to interpretation and how its boundaries are 
formed. The accumulated knowledge of modern datasets is not only a blessing but could 
also be a curse if modern scholars encumber interpretations with irrelevant data.22 So, we 
will now examine factors that constrain the relevance of encyclopedic knowledge so that 
hearers can process utterances economically. 
2. Constraints of Relevance 
Even though communication depends upon the contextual assumption of encyclopedic 
knowledge—basically an arbitrary, immeasurable, and ever-developing collection—natural 
language users are still able to comprehend one another. This is because relevance places 
 
21 Brevard S. Childs, The Church’s Guide for Reading Paul: The Canonical Shaping of the Pauline Corpus 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 192; see also discussion of PE in ibid., 94–96. For a complementary 
canonical approach to the PE, see also Wall and Steele, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus. 
22 E.g., Baugh, “Titus,” 502, 504; Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 397–99. 
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several constraints upon what hearers can or do access. So, what hearers assume within a 
discourse is a subset of the immense store of knowledge theoretically at their disposal. I 
outline three main constraints upon relevance that theorists emphasize: 1) mutuality or 
shared knowledge, 2) accessibility or knowledge that requires the least effort to access, and 
3) conversational context.23 The third constraint includes two kinds of context—setting and 
discourse. The latter kind (discourse) mediates modern readers’ access to the former.24 
Therefore, I emphasize the importance of literary context. 
a. Mutuality 
Mutuality limits what hearers access from their store of encyclopedic knowledge to that 
which is shared between the speaker and the hearer. That is, if the knowledge is not shared, 
it does not yield a relevant assumption. A speaker judges which assumptions are needed on 
the basis of countless subtle evaluations, and she triggers assumptions accordingly. Her 
utterance is as lean as possible, adding to the conversational context only what is needed to 
accomplish her intentions and taking as many of the necessary contextual assumptions for 
granted as she can. This makes her speech efficient. The greater the familiarity between 
interlocutors, the more efficient the discourse and, consequently, the less comprehensible 
to outsiders. Karen H. Jobes suggests this calculus: “The higher the degree of 
communication intended by implication, the smaller the intended audience.”25 
It is important to grasp that the speaker forms her utterance on the basis of specific 
second-order assumptions about the hearer’s cognitive environment. Further, relevant 
assumptions are not just mutually known but mutually manifest and, therefore, possess a 
quality of second-order thinking. That is, each instance of communication depends upon 
both the speaker and hearer making assumptions about each other’s mind. The less the 
speaker judges the hearer to know, the more she feels obligated to say and vice versa. 
Mutually held contextual assumptions can be numerous and subtle, and biblical 
interpreters must appreciate how heavily original interlocutors relied upon shared 
knowledge in order to understand one another. I will use a conversational example offered 
by Gibbs to illustrate this point: 
 
23 Some linguists also study neurological phenomena of language that doubtless have bearing upon the 
question of what constrains the knowledge that hearers access. I am not studying these phenomena directly. 
24 Goh sensitively gathers clues from the discourse of Ephesians in order to reconstruct the shared cognitive 
environment of author and audience. From this close examination of what was transparently on their minds, 
he is able to interpret passages in Ephesians with greater clarity. See “Honoring Christ,” 44–98. 
25 “Relevance Theory,” 790. 
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Joe: ‘Are you going to the big dance tonight?’ 
Sue: ‘Didn’t you hear that Billy Smith will be there?’26 
Semantically, Sue’s response holds no transparent relevance to Joe’s question, but the 
quest for relevance drives him to infer a meaning from which to derive adequate cognitive 
effects. Joe will have to use his knowledge of the meanings of words (lexicon) and their 
arrangement (grammar), how rhetorical questions work (conventional implicature), as well 
as encyclopedic knowledge of the real world, including his own situational context 
(location, schedule, personal acquaintances, etc.). But, all of this will not get him to Sue’s 
meaning if he does not grasp what Sue assumes to be common knowledge—namely, that 
she either dislikes Billy Smith and wants to avoid him or adores Billy Smith and would not 
miss the opportunity to be near him. If they both are right about the other’s assumptions 
concerning this question, Joe will access the correct assumption and arrive promptly at 
Sue’s intended meaning. 
Sue’s intention goes beyond her meaning as I explain in Chapter Three on the non-
propositional dimensions of communication. What she intends to do with her speech is 
more than to inform. In fact, if she assumes that Joe has heard that Billy Smith will be 
there, then she has not informed Joe of much at all. She has, however, entrusted Joe with 
sensitive knowledge, demonstrated familiarity, credited him with personal understanding, 
and other such relational outcomes. 
Not just problematic passages but countless everyday interpretations of biblical 
texts exhibit a disjuncture between the contextual assumptions that ancient audiences 
brought to an utterance and those of modern audiences. Gibbs explains that a shared 
cognitive environment and attention to speaker intention is just as instrumental to the 
interpretation of written texts as they are to live speech: 
Both forms of communication [speech and writing] can vary in their degree 
of contextualization. Certain kinds of oral language, such as formal 
speeches, assume little common ground information between speakers and 
addressees. Many forms of written discourse, such as private letters, 
presume a rich common ground between author and reader.27 
b. Access 
A hearer’s cognitive environment is also constrained by the accessibility of encyclopedic 
knowledge. Several factors affect this access either negatively (e.g., distance in memory, 
 
26 “Intentionalist Controversy,” 186. 
27 Ibid., 190. 
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multi-step processing, or obscurity) or positively (e.g., recency of mention, simplicity, or 
prominence). Tomoko Matsui has argued the congruence of scenario-based activation and 
relevance, and this relation helps us to understand how an utterance can stock a hearer’s 
cognitive environment thereby increasing access to certain encyclopedic knowledge. 
Matsui argues that both activation and inference are required to interpret certain kinds of 
referential speech—namely, that which leaves an inferential gap to be “bridged.” Paul used 
this kind of speech in the context under investigation (Titus 1:10‒16) when, for instance, 
he referred to those who were unclean and defiled (1:15). Paul’s hearer’s were able to 
bridge the semantic gap between these ideas and beasts (1:12); because, in the right 
scenario, each idea evoked religious valuations, as did circumcision (1:10) in the near 
context. This type of speech is called “bridging reference assignment.”28 
This bridging is especially common when a speaker draws upon a scenario that is 
either in encyclopedic knowledge or in long-term memory and calls upon assumptions of 
what belongs to that scenario. A restaurant will have its waiter; a skiing trip will have its 
snow.29 Matsui argues that a speaker designs an utterance to draw on pre-existing scenarios 
of what the world is like and is able to use referents that the hearer can easily access using 
primary processing, which is immediate, rather than secondary processing, which is more 
time-consuming. Secondary processing involves going through the entire utterance again 
and expending more processing effort, but it takes place when primary processing fails for 
some reason. Primary processing typically does not fail for figurative speech, but it 
depends on the competency of both speakers and hearers. Below, under Literary Context, I 
will discuss scenarios (a.k.a. type-scenes) that Paul activates, thereby increasing his 
audience’s access to certain contextual assumptions. But, first, I will outline the third 
constraint upon relevance—Context. 
c. Context 
Context particularizes the cognitive environment. It is difficult to think about anything but 
what a person is talking about. Ostensive inferential communication exercises a strong 
 
28 Tomoko Matsui highlights a distinction between herself and Clark, who claims that a hearer makes an 
inferential bridge to assign a referent rather than having the idea activated immediately. This is a minor 
distinction, but Matsui’s explanation seems appropriate to natural language interpretation; because, as she 
argues, it requires less processing effort. See “Assessing a Scenario-Based Account of Bridging Reference 
Assignment,” RTAI (1998): 123–58, at 123. 
29 Snow and waiter come from Matsui’s illustrations of pragmatic activation: “I went to a French restaurant. 
The waiter was very sexy ... Harry fell several times. He didn’t like skiing at all. The snow was cold and 
wet.” See “Assessing a Scenario-Based Account,” 123. 
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influence upon what portion of a hearer’s encyclopedic knowledge he will access. Because 
every context differs, utterances place unique constraints of relevance upon this vast set of 
ideas. Green explains, “Context is not a preset and well-defined body of information but, 
rather, consists of all the information that is relevant for the interpretation of a particular 
utterance. As such, context is a psychological construct.”30 Two broad types of context 
have bearing—social and discursive. As modern readers have profoundly limited access to 
the exact social situations of biblical writers and their audiences, the most reliable source 
of evidence for ascertaining their cognitive environment is the discursive context which 
serves the double-duty of also illuminating the social.31 
Lexicons, grammars, atlases, and histories are common tools of biblical 
interpretation, and every generation introduces additional resources to the panoply. Such 
resources provide a glimpse into the original interlocutors’ cognitive environment, 
particularly encyclopedic knowledge, but this general knowledge must be constrained and 
adjusted by relevance. A book’s discursive context exercises this fundamental constraint. 
What is in the context is likely to be on the mind. Considerations of relevance govern and 
constrain which facts about the ancient world and what information concerning lexemes 
and syntax are applicable within a conversational context. Gibbs writes, “The context for 
understanding verbal discourse lies within the set of beliefs, knowledge and 
presuppositions that speakers/authors and listeners/readers mutually share.”32 Literary 
context is the most important indicator available to biblical scholars of what constitutes 
this mutually shared cognitive environment. As eavesdroppers, modern readers must infer 
utterance meaning on the basis of reconstructed contextual assumptions. So, because a 
careful examination of literary context is the most reliable means for modern readers to 
discern what was in the cognitive environment of original audiences, I now detail specific 
evidence as it influences the interpretation of Titus 1:12.33 
3. Literary Context (Macro and Micro) 
Discourse itself indicates which contextual assumptions are relevant. As Clark explains, 
“Contextual assumptions used in understanding an utterance need not be known to the 
 
30 “Relevance Theory and Biblical Interpretation,” 268. 
31 Furlong interchanges (as I do at times) context with the Relevance-theoretical designation contextual 
assumptions. See “Relevance Theory,” 60–63. 
32 “Intentionalist Controversy,” 186. 
33 Blass cites several other scholars as she argues this point. She establishes the more objective nature of 
reconstructing contextual assumptions on the basis of literary context rather than on subjective third-party 
assumptions. See Relevance Relations in Discourse, 13. 
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hearer before the utterance is produced.”34 Yael Klangwisan explains that the “mutual 
cognitive environment” is a context that “evolves as the text unfolds.” In other words, the 
text is the reader’s guide to relevance.35 Literary context is the most reliable evidence 
modern readers have for reconstructing the cognitive environment of ancient readers, 
especially with a text whose Sitz im Leben is uncertain or contentious. I will delineate two 
aspects of literary context: Structural and then Thematic and Topical. 
a. Structural 
The literary context of Titus is our access point to discerning meaning at the level of what 
is said, and structure is the first fundamental feature of literary context that we will 
examine.36 Below, I outline logical and topical divisions of Titus, its book-level units and 
their relation to one another. I also demonstrate that 1:5‒16 has a unified theme and that 
observable boundary-making features signal the section’s beginning, ending, and internal 
shifts. Throughout, I explain how this structure influences the interpretation of 1:12. In 
Table 1, I present a summary, comparison, and analysis of the logical structures ascribed to 
Titus by a handful of prominent PE scholars.37 
  
 
34 Relevance Theory, 226. 
35 Earthing the Cosmic Queen, 24. 
36 “What is said” is Grice’s semi-technical term for the explicit, linguistically-encoded content of an 
utterance. See, e.g., Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” 44. 
37 I have tried to represent diverse and influential commentators, but some do not give ample attention to 
structure. E.g., Huizenga’s outline for Titus follows: Ch. 1 “Rungs on the Social Ladder,” Ch. 2 “Staying in 
Your Place,” Ch. 3 “Orderliness Is Next to Godliness.” The titles are pithy and clever but do not illuminate 
the letter’s logic as much as locate objectionable material for readers. See 1-2 Timothy, Titus, viii. Attention 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As Andreas J. Köstenberger puts it, “The various proposals regarding the structure 
of Titus … reveal a certain amount of consensus.”38 My own outline of Titus (Table 2) is 
not innovative. It recognizes as major divisions 1:1‒4, 1:5‒16, 2:1‒15, 3:1‒11, and 3:12‒


















between good (5‒9) 
and bad (10‒16) 
2:1‒15—Particular 
instructions for several 
specific household 
categories within the 
church (1‒10) with 
substantiation (11‒15) and 
λάλει inclusio (1, 15) 
3:1‒11—General 
and substantiatory 
instructions for all 
Christians 
Table 2 
Discourse features in the Greek text reinforce these major breaks in Titus. The body 
(1:5‒3:11) begins after a relatively substantial salutation (1:1‒4) with the standard features 
of a Greco-Roman epistolary opening. The break between 1:4 and 1:5 is clear based on the 
conclusion of the salutatory blessing (1:4b), the topicalization affected by the left-
dislocation of 1:5a (This is the reason I left you in Crete, Τούτου χάριν ἀπέλιπόν σε ἐν 
Κρήτη), and the topical resumption of the following ἵνα clause (in order that, 1:5b). The 
contextual features that denote the coherence of 1:5‒16 include the overarching topic of 
leadership problems, the complementary nature of paragraph subtopics (i.e., leadership, 
good and bad), and the logical connection marked by the conjunction γάρ (for, 1:10). Let 
me describe these features of the section in more detail. 
First, the theme of addressing leadership problems holds this section together. On 
the one hand, 1:5‒9 portrays a vacuum of good leadership that Titus must fill by 
sanctioning leaders of impeccable character. On the other hand, 1:10‒16 portrays the 
harmful influence of people who have presumed the prerogatives and social position of 
leaders but without proper accountability, scruples, or healthy doctrine. Whereas Paul 
instructs Titus to deal with the broader church population under the rubric of a household 
code in 2:1‒10; in the present section, Paul addresses leadership as a discrete issue. Not 
only the whole but also the parts of 1:5‒16 address specific leadership-related matters; 
thus, any interpretation should make clear how each piece, including the Cretan quotation, 
correlates to this obvious concern. 
 
38 Köstenberger, “Hermeneutical and Exegetical Challenges,” 15. 
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Second, the two pericopes that comprise 1:5‒16 describe two kinds of leaders by 
contrasting them along corresponding lines. The following list of features is not 
exhaustive, but it demonstrates thematic coherence—a continuous concern for good and 
bad leaders and what to do about them: 
• Paul said that a good leader’s children should not be prone to the accusation of being 
insubordinate (ἀνυπότακτα, 1:6), then his first accusation toward the presumptive 
leaders was of being insubordinate (ἀνυπότακτοι, 1:10). 
• Maintaining the household theme, Paul instructed Titus that elders were to have faithful 
children (τένκα ἔχων πιστά, 1:6), then he referred to the troublemakers as faithless 
(ἀπίστοις, 1:15). 
• Whereas Paul compared an elder to God’s household steward (θεοῦ οἰκονόμον, 1:7), 
he accused the troublemakers of disrupting entire households (ὅλους οἴκους 
ἀνατρέπουσιν, 1:11). 
• Good leaders, among other things, were not to crave shameful gain (μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ, 
1:7), but for the sake of shameful gain (αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν, 1:11) was precisely 
why the troublemakers took up leadership roles. 
• Whereas Titus’s elders were appointed in order to engage in teaching (διδαχὴν … ἵνα 
... διδασκαλίᾳ, 1:9), the main disruption in Crete resulted from the troublemakers’ 
teaching (διδάσκοντες, 1:11). 
• Whereas good elders were to hold to the doctrine of the faithful word (πιστοῦ λόγου, 
1:9), the troublemakers were empty[-word]-speakers (ματαιολόγοι, 1:10). 
• One of the chief responsibilities of properly sanctioned leaders was to rebuke (ἐλέγχειν, 
1:9) those who contradict; and the first opportunity in the letter to do so came after the 
quotation, where Paul told Titus to rebuke (ἔλεγχε, 1:13) them sternly. 
• Sanctioned leaders needed to be able to encourage the church in healthy teaching (ἐν 
τῇ διδασκαλία τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ, 1:9), and the hope for duly corrected troublemakers was 
that they might be healthy in the faith (ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει, 1:13). 
• Paul’s final, biting judgment against the troublemakers starkly contrasted with the love 
for good (φιλάγαθον, 1:8) that elders were to exhibit; he said that such menaces denied 
God by their works (ἔργοις, 1:16) and were themselves unfit for every good work (πᾶν 
ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀδόκιμοι, 1:16). 
These correlations should suffice to demonstrate the strong complementary nature of these 
two pericopes (1:5‒9 and 1:10‒16). Each deliberate point of comparison illuminates the 
meaning of its counterpart. 
Third, the conjunction γάρ (1:10) marks a clear logical relationship between the 
two pericopes (1:5‒9 and 1:10‒16). I call this relationship hortatory substantiation after 
Bauer and Traina.39 In other words, the material governed by γάρ (likely 1:10‒12) is the 
reason that Paul presents for his prior instructions (1:5‒9). The conjunction γάρ can govern 
a small or large amount of material from a single clause or sentence to a paragraph. Here, it 
 
39 See Inductive Bible Study, 107. 
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seems to be connecting multiple verses. The presence of these troublemakers and their 
activity (1:10‒12) are the explicit bases for placing elders of Paul’s description in each 
town (1:5‒9). In Titus, γάρ marks logical relationships between units that begin at 1:7, 10; 
2:11; 3:3, 9, and 12. It always accompanies an argument in which the reason comes after 
some critical instruction.40 I will now discuss three structural-contextual issues with the 
interpretation of Titus. 
i. Structure-Based Mismatch 
The general consensus on the simplicity of Titus does not prevent interpreters from making 
structure-based errors. Preconceptions regarding structure can introduce mismatches 
between the contextual assumptions of ancient and modern readers. The NRSV, for 
instance, places an editorial division between the quotative frame of 1:12a and the 
quotation proper of 1:12b, but this break is misleading. Separating the quotation from the 
rest of the text presumes that Paul deferred to its authority, but this choice obscures 
evidence that he critiques it. 
In the Greek text upon which the NIV is based, a major editorial paragraph break 
begins after 1:12a. The Cretan quotation appears in a separate paragraph that divorces 
1:12b‒16 from its literary context and obscures the strong logical development, thematic 
unity, and other connecting tissue of the larger section on good and bad leaders (1:5‒16).41 
No objectively discerned boundary of the passage suggests a strong break where the NIV 
Greek text places it. Although the English translation of the NIV does not carry this 
peculiar formatting forward, it makes perhaps an even more egregious embellishment by 
translating the quotative frame εἶπέν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης as “One of Crete’s 
own prophets has said it” (1:12a). The NIV’s translation philosophy notwithstanding, this 
sentence seems more influenced by the history of interpretation than by the language of the 
passage. 
The NIV translates ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀληθής as “This saying is true” (1:13a). 
In English, said and saying are cognate, but the underlying Greek words—εἶπέν (1:12) and 
μαρτυρία (1:13), as they appear in the text—have quite different roots and senses. The 
NLT translates this Greek sentence, “This is true;” and Eugene H. Peterson’s The Message 
 
40 The conjunction γάρ appears less frequently in Titus than δέ (1:1, 3, 15, 16; 2:1; 3:4, 9, 14) and ἵνα (1:5, 9, 
13; 2:4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14; 3:7, 8, 13, 14), which tend to govern smaller portions of material and, of course, with 
their own nuances. 
41 See Richard J. Goodrich and Albert L. Lukaszewski, eds., A Reader’s Greek New Testament, 3rd ed. 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015). 
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has “He certainly spoke the truth.”42 Each of these translations obscures both pragmatic 
and semantic features of the underlying Greek sentence in order to sustain an assumption 
that derives from the history of interpretation and not from the text itself. Relevance-
guided biblical interpretation detects such mismatches and constructively illuminates texts 
through careful contextual observation. I base the remaining two structural-contextual 
points on such observation. 
ii. Leaders and Leadership Malpractice 
Paul instructed Titus to vigorously address leadership problems within the Cretan church 
throughout Titus 1:5‒16, so an appropriate interpretation of 1:12 should demonstrate how 
the Cretan quotation is contextually relevant to this general intention. Two paragraphs 
comprise the unit—1:5‒9, which concerns the appointing and qualification of good 
leaders, and 1:10‒16, which concerns the presumptive leaders who disrupt the church in 
various ways, for various reasons, and with various results. Under the influence of a prima 
facie reading, it is difficult to see how the Cretan quotation fits into this otherwise coherent 
discussion. Thorvald B. Madsen, II surprisingly limits the leadership section of Titus to 
1:5‒11, supposing the Cretan quotation to belong to the section that addresses the general 
church population. This choice is mistaken for reasons I have already presented, but also 
because Madsen is not consistent. He says that the rebukes of 1:14‒15 are aimed at the 
“would-be apostles” (presumptive leaders), but this claim ignores the structural boundary 
he indicated for the passages.43 
Reconstructing the audience’s cognitive environment must take into account this 
context of leadership problems. Paul described the church’s problems and the 
troublemakers’ actions in terms of leadership. For example, they lead, though astray 
(misleader, φρεςαπάτης, 1:11a); they teach, albeit wrongly (teaching that which [they] 
ought not, διδάσκοντες ἃ μὴ δεῖ, 1:11b) and with wrong motives (for the sake of shameful 
gain, αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν, 1:11c); and they make value judgments between persons, 
even when wrongly justified (Cretans [are] always liars, Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, 1:12; cf. 
confession … denying, ὁμολογοῦσιν … ἀρνοῦνται, 1:16). Exemplifying the prima facie 
reading, Barrett assumes that Paul was concerned with Cretan reprobation more than 
leadership malpractice. He misidentifies the source and nature of the problem, writing, 
 
42 The Message: The Bible in Contemporary Language (Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 2003). 
43 See “The Ethics of the Pastoral Epistles,” EG, 219–40, at 225‒226. 
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“Opposition … exists, arising partly out of the notoriously bad character of the Cretans 
themselves.”44 Barrett identifies “Jewish gnostics” as the other source of opposition.45 
Evidence in Titus is probably too ambiguous to support the identification of a specific 
group. The divisions the presumptive leaders were causing troubled Paul, not their proto-
gnosticism, Jewishness, or ethnicity per se. A better case can be made that disruptions of 
the Christian mission in Crete, rather than supposed Cretan notoriety, prompted Paul’s 
concerns. Some scholars have shown that the PE are concerned with the respectable 
behavior of Christians as a lifestyle apologia.46 This being the case, the Cretans are not 
especially notorious, because Paul evidently is just as concerned with the morality of the 
Ephesian churches that Timothy oversees. Paul’s concern with behavior does not explain 
why he would endorse a quotation that denotes the Cretans as incorrigible. The claim that 
the Cretan quotation advances the cause of positive public testimony ignores its immediate 
context within a leadership discussion and its book context in which Paul shows almost no 
concern to address issues of laziness or gluttony. 
Later in Titus, Paul speaks explicitly of a divisive person or heretic (αἱρετικός 
3:10); but the issue of division stems from presumptive leadership, which he addresses 
here (1:10‒16). The actions and attributes ascribed to Cretans by the quotation are not 
heretical (lit. divisive), but the behaviors of the troublemakers are. Among the most 
divisive could be this slur against the Cretans, accusing them of overall reprobation. The 
three epithets of this quotation could be considered a synecdoche for general reprobation 
and worthlessness, highlighting various aspects of corruption—speech (liars, ψσεῦσται), 
being (evil, κακὰ), and action (unworking, ἀργαί). It is indeed tremendously offensive and 
literally dehumanizing (beasts, θηρία). Paul enjoins rebuke (1:13) in a context where, 
although he does not yet name heresy, he nevertheless identifies aspects of bad leadership 
that have dimensions of heresy (i.e., causing divisions). He thus describes misleaders 
(1:10), upsetting whole households (1:11), contradicting (1:9; cf. 2:15), and attending to 
Jewish myths and commandments of people who abandon the truth (1:14; cf. 3:11).47 The 
divisiveness was not theoretical, but social, yielding a framework of superiority and 
inferiority. The base moral delinquency expressed in the quotation was not the cause of 
 
44 Pastoral Epistles, 127. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety; Kidd, “Titus as Apologia.” 
47 Based on this outline of leadership malpractice, Paul offered more detail concerning problems (i.e., heresy) 
in Crete than commentators generally acknowledge. 
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division. The act of attributing such reprobation to Cretans by spreading this slur against 
Gentiles in Titus’s congregation, however, was highly divisive. It called for a stern rebuke 
(ἔλεγχε ... ἀποτόμως, 1:13b) precisely in alignment with Paul’s concern about leadership 
malpractice. 
Leaders were de facto teachers, and teachers were de facto leaders. Problems with 
speech were problems with leadership and vice versa. Paul described the troublemakers’ 
behavior and its consequences in speech-related terms. Huizenga observes that disruptive 
speech was their central behavior: “[Paul] describes their behavior in several strongly 
negative ways; in particular he condemns their speaking and teaching for ‘upsetting whole 
families.’”48 Harmful speech was the very problem that Paul identified as characteristic of 
the presumptive leaders whom he called empty-talkers and deceivers … whose mouths 
must be stopped (1:10-11). This description raises the question, What were they saying that 
was so objectionable? Paul answers by quoting what someone said (εἶπέν τις, 1:12a). 
There was an integral connection between speech and leadership in the church. The 
troublemakers are not vicious in a generic moral sense; their disruptions (upsetting entire 
households, 1:11) constituted leadership malpractice. In such a context, Paul exposed one 
of their most disruptive, divisive, and misleading declarations—the Cretan quotation 
(1:12b). 
Assuming that Paul affirms the prima facie meaning of the quotation seems to 
entail a significant, unexplainable literary-contextual interruption. In an otherwise logical 
and cohesive discussion of leadership issues in Crete (e.g., divisiveness, evil speech, and 
presumptive leadership malpractice), Paul supposedly rails against the general Cretan 
populace. Such a disruption might betoken an interpolation, but no textual support for one 
currently exists. The prima facie interpretation virtually requires one to see it as a tangent 
of some sort, rather than as pertinent to Paul’s argument. Towner writes, “The citation of 
the Cretan saying is almost an aside, and at first glance it appears primarily to disparage 
the Jewish-Christian teachers. Indeed, it does this; but ... [such] Cretan echoes ... also 
prepare the way ... to engage the Cretan social-religious world.”49 Such assumptions do not 
solve the problem of how it functions within its paragraph context, which, internal rupture 
aside, coheres well with the book context and the rhetorical development of Titus. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to assume, instead, that Paul’s use of the Cretan quotation is relevant 
 
48 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 138. 
49 Letters to Timothy and Titus, 699. 
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to the context. Paul did not change the topic of 1:5‒16 when he presented the quotation. 
The pronouns that he used to introduce it seem to refer to the presumptive leaders.50 
Recognizing the straightforward structure of Titus, it seems out-of-place for Paul 
either to abruptly disparage the Cretans or to raise moral issues such as gluttony and 
laziness that he would not address in greater detail later on. Additionally, a couple of the 
topics are not even morally specific but simply slurs about existential attributes (e.g., evil, 
brutish, 1:12b).51 It is no wonder that many careful scholars have wrestled with this 
passage’s coherence. The Cretan quotation does not need to be read as an interruption, 
however. Paul was addressing a leadership issue in the Cretan church. A number of 
presumptive individuals had emerged in Titus’s missionary congregation, and Paul 
instructed him to appoint the right kind of leaders and to rebuke the wrong kind of leaders 
while identifying particular problems. Madsen describes the problem that the epistle 
envisages: “Several would-be apostles—or, at any rate, several aspiring VIPs—have risen 
up with eccentric doctrines and practices that efface the gospel and factionalize the 
churches.”52 The third point of structure that I outline, Table-Turning, concerns one of 
Paul’s corrective strategies. 
iii. Table-Turning 
Within the paragraph that focuses on bad leaders (1:10‒16), Paul appears to echo themes 
from the Cretan quotation in order to characterize the troublemakers instead. Towner 
observes, “These teachers (hyperbolically) embody all that is deplorable in Cretan 
culture.”53 He is right about the thematic echoes in Paul’s critique of the troublemakers, 
but he takes for granted that Paul accepts the quotation as an apt description of the Cretans 
as opposed to a vicious stereotype. In Chapter One, I outlined various ways that Paul 
turned the troublemakers’ insults back upon them under Category Reversal. Here, I 
specifically address how this rhetorical maneuver affects structure and context. 
 
50 Henry Swete comments, “At first sight,” ἐξ αὐτῶν appears to refer to οἱ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς. He does not say 
why he dismisses this possibility. See Theodore, Commentary (1882), comments at Titus 1:10‒12. Jerome 
also intuitively identified the speaker of the quotation with those especially of the circumcision. Following 
Clement of Alexandria, however, he attributed the quotation to Epimenides, Crete’s most famous poet. See 
Jerome, Commentaries, comments at Titus 1:10‒12. 
51 Faber attempts to show how Paul developed these themes throughout the letter. He may not fully convince, 
but he demonstrates the ingenuity required to see the moral issues raised by the quotation as significant 
concerns for Paul. See “‘Evil Beasts, Lazy Gluttons,’” 135–45. 
52 “Ethics of the Pastoral Epistles,” 225. 
53 Letters to Timothy and Titus, 703. 
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Paul’s original readers were cognizant of the ethno-religious nature of the 
contentions in Crete and thus would not have been oblivious to the irony of the 
associations Paul made. Grasping the significance of these conceptual associations for 
Crete’s Jewish Christians (1:10, 14) in particular is critical for modern readers. Paul 
exposed the ones who called the Cretans liars (ψεύστης, 1:12b) and characterized them as 
people who reject the truth (ἀληθεία, 1:14). He prepared original readers with his 
epistolary greeting where truth (ἀληθεία, 1:1) and un-lying (ἀψευδής, 1:2) appear in 
reference to Paul’s message and God. Whereas the troublemakers regarded the Cretans 
with disdain as evil beasts (κακὰ θηρία, 1:12b), which has implications of uncleanness, 
Paul said that it was rather to the defiled (μιαίνω) and faithless that nothing is clean (1:15) 
and that these troublemakers, barring restoration (1:13b), were detestable or abominable 
(βδελυκτός, 1:16). Compare the use of μιαίνω in Deut 21:22‒23, a passage that the Apostle 
Paul demonstrated his familiarity with in Gal 3:13. The same concept of defilement 
appears in Titus 1:15. I say, barring restoration, because restoration seems to have been 
the goal (in order that they may be healthy, ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν, 1:13b); that is, Paul’s intent 
was not to leave the troublemakers in their depraved condition. 
Instances of βδελυκτός (detestable) in the LXX illuminate the thrust of Paul’s use 
in Titus 1:16.54 In the prayer of Jonathan, Nehemiah, and the returned exiles (2 Macc 1:23‒
30, esp. 1:27), βδελυκτός labelled diaspora Jews who had been subject to Gentile rule as a 
result of judgment. This usage suggests that the designation would have evoked negative 
ethno-religious associations. Paul fittingly evoked Jewish wisdom topics as well. Proverbs 
17:15 (LXX) exhibits a striking conceptual analogy: whoever judges the righteous [to be] 
unrighteous or the unrighteous [to be] righteous is unclean (ἀκάθαρτος) and detestable 
(βδελυκτός) before God. In addition to sharing critical lexemes with the proverb, Titus 
1:15‒16 also echoes the conceptual predicate structure of judgment upon someone who 
pronounces that which is righteous and clean to be evil (κακά, 1:12b). As far as Cretans are 
concerned generally, the ensuing discourse views them as made righteous and clean (2:11-
15 and 3:3‒7, esp. δικαίως in 2:12 and καθαρίσῃ in 2:14; cf. λουτροῦ in 3:5). Now that we 
have looked at some ways that literary structure shaped the audience’s cognitive 
environment, we turn to the influence of themes and topics. 
 
54 The Apostle Paul used a cognate participle to refer to his fictional interlocutor’s assumed attitude of 
abhorring idols (ὁ βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἴδωλα, Rom 2:22). 
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b. Thematic and Topical 
In addition to literary structure, thematic and topical aspects of context influence an 
audience’s cognitive environment. Linguists do not always or consistently distinguish 
between theme and topic.55 For the sake of clarity, I use topic to refer to what the speaker 
is talking about—the matter at-hand, even when expressed in figurative language.56 I use 
theme to refer to the way the speaker is talking about it. A theme represents an implicit 
association that the speaker makes between various topics and higher-order schemas. 
Themes can be real-life or imaginary overlays that speakers apply across topics to make 
implicit conceptual connections. A theme structures information by implying relationships 
between things. It places multiple semantic components in relation to one another over 
portions of material. The semantic values of words, phrases, and sentences do not 
themselves convey themes. Themes cross boundaries between the semantically given and 
the pragmatically inferred. Semantic representations do, however, signal topics, which 
require less inferential processing effort to recognize but yield fewer cognitive effects. 
Some overlap exists between these categories of context. Themes and topics both shape 
and are shaped by their context dialectically; they are not disconnected ideas. 
With regard to the linguistic function of topics, María Gómez-González describes 
two major perspectives. First, some linguists argue that any supposed function of language 
(in this case, topicality) must have corresponding formal features whereby it can be 
recognized. Second, others argue that topicality is required for comprehension; thus, it is 
intrinsic to language and will be present with or without formal indicators.57 Relevance 
theorists, coming from a cognitive linguistic perspective, tend to favor the second view; 
but several linguists, and especially discourse analysts, try to identify formal clues that 
frequently signal topics. These approaches are not absolute or mutually exclusive, as I will 
show. 
 
55 The scholarly ambivalence about differentiating these terms does not reflect disagreement at the 
philosophical level. First, linguists divide material along different conceptual lines, calling for different 
terms. Second, these terms (and others that have been proposed) and the concepts themselves are vague or 
multivalent. Runge, for example, regards theme as the given part of information structure, whereas rheme is 
newly asserted, focus information; he uses topic, however, in a less technical sense as whatever the speaker 
talks about. See Discourse Grammar, 200–201. Maria Gómez-González writes, “Studies in this area have 
been characterised by terminological profusion and confusion because very different positions have been 
taken on the appropriate criteria for the definition and identification of the notions of Theme/Topic.” See The 
Theme-Topic Interface: Evidence from English, P&B 71 (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2001), 4. 
56 Some object that the convenient term topic is too vague to be useful. Blass writes, “The notion of topic has 
no adequate theoretical definition and should therefore be dispensed with in theoretical accounts of textuality 
and comprehension.” See Relevance Relations in Discourse, 41. 
57 See Gómez-González, Theme-Topic Interface, 12–13. 
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The topics and themes identified below are prominent regardless of specific formal 
criteria; but they are typically accompanied, if not signaled, by recognizable features. 
These features include the presence of multiple words that activate the same type-scene or 
conceptual frame; the simple recurrence of lexemes, cognates, synonyms, and antonyms; 
left-dislocation and resumption; and subject-predicate order reversal, which is a marked 
construction.58 I will introduce and explain each of these features as they pertain to the 
specific topics and themes that I name below. First, I explain what is meant by type-scene 
or conceptual frame activation. 
Type-scene activation (a.k.a. frame semantics, frame or scenario evocation, and 
conceptual frame activation) makes it possible for hearers to grasp specific meanings of 
ambiguous words (a.k.a. bridging reference assignment), because it allows for narrow 
contextual comprehension of words without lengthy qualifications.59 Such activation can 
be used with any degree of literality or figurativeness. Unfortunately, because of the 
economy of type-scene activation, it is quite possible for non-original audiences to activate 
the incorrect conceptual frame or not to activate one at all, which leads either to a failure of 
comprehension or a non-relevant interpretation. 
Mike Borkent provides a succinct definition of frame semantics. He writes that 
frames include “the broad experiential knowledge necessary for understanding even simple 
words, since a frame is ‘any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand 
any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits.’”60 
The cognitive linguistic notion of frame activation is crucial for understanding the 
role of themes and topics in interpretation. Words can activate entire conceptual worlds 
when they are used within the signaling environment established by a genre. As Barbara 
Dancygier writes, “Linguistic expressions prompt conceptualizations.”61 These 
conceptualizations may be referred to as frames, but they are not static and are themselves 
subject to pragmatic adjustment. No one can predetermine which components of a frame 
 
58 See ibid., 15–16. This list of formal features that accompany (or signal) theme and topic corresponds to 
various conceptual approaches to theme and topic function. For example, left-dislocation is syntactic while 
recurrence is semantic, and type-scene or frame activation organizes information. 
59 Barbara Dancygier, José Sanders, and Lieven Vandelanotte explain, “As cognitive linguists point out, the 
meaning of an expression owes as much to the specific semantics of the lexical items used as to the meanings 
prompted through syntactic form and frame evocation.” See “Textual Choices in Discourse,” TCD, 185–86. 
See also Matsui, “Assessing a Scenario-Based Account.” 
60 Mike Borkent, “Illusions of Simplicity,” TCD, 5–24, at 9. He quotes, in part, from Charles J. Fillmore’s 
“Frame Semantics” in Linguistics in the Morning Calm (Seoul: Hanshin, 1982), 111‒37. 
61 The Language of Stories: A Cognitive Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 19. 
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are necessarily present in the cognitive environment of a listener once a word is spoken, 
but the conversational context is key to uncovering which aspects of the frame are crucial. 
Depending on context, the single word yard, for example, can also activate the 
conception of house, grass, and fence—all of which may be necessary for understanding a 
particular use of yard. However, if a speaker mentions field, then house, for instance, is not 
automatically activated, even though in some instances yard and field are synonymous. 
When a speaker mentions the word restaurant, then wait staff, tables, chairs, kitchen, and 
so forth enter the listener’s cognitive environment. She can then use generic verbs and 
nouns (e.g., bus, tub, tip, order, check, wait) in a sentence but still be understood in a very 
specific sense, because these more ambiguous words have relevance to the frame that she 
has activated. Type-scene activation allows a speaker to use language more efficiently by 
invoking specific components of a type-scene or conceptual frame and relying on the 
hearer to conceptualize relevant aspects from a bank of encyclopedic knowledge about the 
world. Jobes points out that frames can differ across cultures, and she explains some 
implications for translating Scripture: “simply plugging in the equivalent words more often 
than not will fail to preserve the implicatures intended by the original language to the 
extent that the cultural frames of the original audience differ from those of the target 
audience.”62 
Linguists commonly use the frame of commercial transfer as an example: A hearer 
cannot comprehend the word buy without understanding the interactions of people 
involved in commercial transfer. Thus, Charles J. Fillmore, who introduced Frame 
Semantics, argues that using a single word (e.g., buy) often activates a cluster of other 
ideas and associations that are necessary for interpreting the word.63 Empirical studies of 
mind modularity have shown that related ideas are activated together for natural language 
speakers so that recall time is measurably decreased for words related by a conceptual 
frame.64 Further, the words used to activate a given frame can also indicate which 
perspective the speaker is favoring. For instance, a speaker’s choice to use buy instead of 
sell to describe a transaction that intrinsically involved both actions expresses her wish to 
favor the perspective of the buyer, rather than the seller (not that other options must always 
occur to the speaker). 
 
62 “Relevance Theory,” 789. 
63 As explained in Dancygier, Language of Stories, 32–33. 
64 See discussion of studies of cognition and Fodorian mind modularity in Clark, Relevance Theory, 91–97, 
346–49. 
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Our examination of Titus will intersperse several themes and topics in a sequence 
and level of detail commensurate with how they illuminate each other. Each one is critical 
for appreciating how context shaped the audience’s cognitive environment. We will start 
with the thematic frame of a courtroom that Paul activated with its related topics. 
i. Courtroom 
In the first chapter of Titus, several words and information structures suggest that Paul was 
activating the type-scene of a courtroom. He uses words from a juridical domain (e.g., 
testimony, true, accusation, convict, 1:13; confess, deny in 1:16) and structures information 
forensically. The sequence establishes both his own and the troublemakers’ character (1:1‒
4, 10‒11), makes an accusation (1:12), swears an oath (1:13a), then renders a verdict and a 
sentence (1:13b).65 Establishing pathos for specifically forensic purposes may be one of 
the reasons the epistolary introduction of Titus is remarkably longer than the other PE.66 
By evoking a legal proceeding in a semi-official correspondence (perhaps modelled after 
imperial mandata principis)67 that would be read aloud and intentionally overheard by the 
named addressee’s community, Paul makes the trial public.68 Marshall explains that, 
although Titus features a salutation to an individual, the letter is transparently written “for 
the church for which he is responsible.”69 Although addressed to an individual, the 
anticipated audience is actually that addressee’s gathered religious community.70 Within 
the performance of a letter in a certain genre (e.g., mandata principis, which originated in 
the domain of imperial politics), a speaker can activate themes that evoke other type-scenes 
(e.g., a trial). 
 
65 Craig S. Wansink describes components of legal proceedings and forensic rhetoric that are seen in the NT, 
especially in Paul’s undisputed epistles, and we see several in Titus 1. See “Roman Law and Legal System,” 
DNTB (2000): 984–91. 
66 Commentators note the relative length of Titus’s epistolary introduction (1:1‒4) and offer various 
hypotheses. Marshall critiques the hypothesis that it was written to introduce a faux collection: “This 
hypothesis depends completely on prior assumptions.” See Critical and Exegetical, 112, fn 3. 
67 Johnson discusses the genre of mandata principis as it is proposed for Titus. See First and Second Letters, 
137–42. For examples of the genre, see Stanley Kent Stowers, Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity, vol. 
5 of Library of Early Christianity, ed. Wayne A. Meeks (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 103–4. 
68 Wall points out that the closing greeting, which uses a plural pronoun (ὑμῶν, 3:15), “indicates the 
congregational scope of the exhortations and instructions addressed to the [singular] apostolic delegate 
[Titus].”Wall and Steele, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, 373. 
69 Critical and Exegetical, 111. 
70 Peter Lampe and J. Paul Sampley explain that the plural address of the majority of Paul’s undisputed 
letters is unconventional. Their survey of ancient letters indicated “the remarkable rarity of plural or 
communal address in Greco-Roman letters. Letters with a plural or communal address are ... far from 
common ... The Pauline congregational letters, with their communal mode of address, stand out as 
remarkable in this context.” See Paul and Rhetoric, Biblical Studies (New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 157. 
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The Apostle Paul demonstrated some knowledge of Greco-Roman legal 
proceedings,71 and the abundance of juridical language in Paul’s undisputed epistles 
illuminates the use in Titus.72 Paul was appearing in court as a witness on behalf of the 
Cretans. L. Ann Jervis explains that coming to another’s defense was a custom of 
responsibility and honor in Roman courts.73 The custom also comports with Jewish 
standards of honor and integrity regarding witnessing on others’ behalf (Lev 5:1; Deut 
19:15‒21). Paul could bring testimony, oath, opinions of a council (πρεσβύτερος, 1:5‒9), 
and a version of magisterial orders (mandata principis) to bear in building his case. These 
are among the forms of forensic evidence Fredrick J. Long lists in his detailed survey of 
proofs in conventions of ancient forensic rhetoric.74 
The Apostle Paul indicated that Christians should not seek satisfaction from law 
courts but should judge matters themselves (1 Cor 6:1‒11).75 Craig S. Wansink indicates 
that Christians taking others to trial subjected the parties to all of the inequity and 
corruption of secular courts. By judging matters within the community, the church could 
ensure greater fairness between those of higher and lower status.76 Rather than shunning 
juridical proceedings entirely, Paul transports them from the power-differentiated secular 
sphere into the community of the faithful.77 Paul was not threatening to press charges in 
some higher court; he was enacting the type-scene of a courtroom by invoking allusions to 
juridical proceedings and by shaping his discourse according to the conventions of forensic 
rhetoric.78 
 
71 On the use of testimony in ancient forensic contexts and Paul in 2 Corinthians, see Fredrick J. Long, 
Ancient Rhetoric and Paul’s Apology: The Compositional Unity of 2 Corinthians, SNTSMS 131 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47–49, 211–12. On the legal system in Paul generally, see Wansink, 
“Roman Law,” 989. On forensic rhetoric as it sometimes appears in Paul, see Thomas H. Olbricht, “Aristotle, 
Aristotelianism,” DNTB (2000): 119–21. 
72 Lampe and Sampley believe that the PE, as deutero-Pauline writings, exhibit the features of rhetoric, 
including forensic rhetoric because they were possibly written as rhetorical exercises on the basis of a 
Pauline school. See Paul and Rhetoric, 15. 
73 L. Ann Jervis, “Law/Nomos in Greco-Roman World,” DNTB (2000): 631–36, at 634. 
74 See Ancient Rhetoric, 47–49. 
75 James S. Jeffers, The Greco-Roman World of the New Testament Era: Exploring the Background of Early 
Christianity (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1999), 158–59. 
76 See Wansink, “Roman Law,” 988–89. 
77 The church was (ideally) a place where power and status differentials were negated by the cross (Gal 3:26‒
28). Regarding this Galatians passage, Barclay writes, “All the pairings cited by Paul are strongly endowed 
with hierarchical assumptions. For Jews, to be Jewish is not just ‘different’ from being ‘Greek,’ but self-
evidently superior to it—and vice versa for ‘Greeks.’” See Paul and the Gift, 397. 
78 In this way, Paul demonstrated what he was asking Titus to do—prosecute illegitimate teachers and 
leaders. See the often collocated themes of imitation (-μιμ- words) and example (-τυπ- words) in 1 Cor 4:16; 
11:1; Phil 3:17; 4:9; 1 Thess 1:6‒7; 2 Thess 3:9; 1 Tim 4:12; and in Titus 2:7. 
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The logical phrase that connects the testimony (1:13a) with Paul’s command to 
rebuke them sharply (1:13c) is δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν (on account of which reason, 1:13b). This 
phrase can be idiomatic, but the noun αἰτία also had the more specific meaning of 
accusation or “a basis for legal action” in judicial contexts.79 There seem to be three 
possible candidates as the reason (accusation, αἰτία) for rebuke. In order of probability: 1) 
the copulative statement this testimony is true, 2) the testimony itself, or 3) the list of 
reprobate attitudes and behaviors the quotation articulates concerning the Cretans as per 
the prima facie reading. For several of the aforementioned reasons, and on account of its 
proximity as an antecedent of the relative pronoun, the best candidate seems to be the first. 
The reason for the rebuke is the truth of the testimony that Paul had just made. 
When Paul mentioned testimony (μαρτυρία, 1:13), he activated witnesses, judges, 
offenders, and prosecutors in a sort of Gestalt complex cognitive entity. The word reason 
or accusation (αἰτία, 1:13) also corresponds to the activation of a courtroom frame. Paul 
was evoking key components of this type-scene. Because the conceptual frame of juridical 
proceedings was in plain view, his assertion of true (ἀληθής, 1:13) acquired a more 
specific thrust than it would without other components of the frame. Pragmatically, it 
became a verdict. Paul introduced the second-hand quotation as from an unreliable witness 
of whom he had already established the untrustworthy character. Paul was the μάρτυς 
(witness) of the μαρτυρία (testimony). Thus, Paul claimed to bear witness to the speaking 
of the quotation. If Paul was swearing on his own report that someone was disparaging 
Titus’s missionary congregants, then it is Paul’s witness, not the so-called prophet’s, that 
he asserts as true. Long argues that “laws and testimony” were “the two most forceful” 
forms of evidence in ancient judicial rhetoric as identified in his survey of “artificial 
proofs.” He adds, however, that “Quintilian (Inst. 5.7.1) attributed testimony the highest 
place of honor for a case.”80 
Some prominent interpretations assume that the testimony (1:13) Paul pronounces 
as true is that borne by a Cretan poet. They infer that Paul ratifies the substance of the 
 
79 See αἰτία entry in BDAG, 31. The use depends on context. Generic examples include Luke 8:47 (the 
reason why she touched him, διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν ἥψατο αὐτοῦ) and Acts 22:24 (the reason why they were thus 
shouting against him, διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν οὕτως ἐπεφώνουν αὐτῷ). Examples in a judicial context include Acts 
23:28 (and wanting to ascertain the charge for which they were accusing him, βουλόμενός τε ἐπιγνῶναι τὴν 
αἰτίαν διʼ ἣν ἐνεκάλουν αὐτῷ), where the syntax differs, and Acts 28:20 (for this reason therefore I have 
asked to see you and speak to you, διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν παρεκάλεσα ὑμᾶς ἰδεῖν καὶ προσλαλῆσαι). 
Most contexts are generic (e.g., 2 Tim 1:6, 12). 
80 Ancient Rhetoric, 49. 
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quotation—that Cretans, in fact, are intrinsically morally defective. But, In what sense is 
this assertion a testimony when one considers the legal domain in which this word is at 
home? Such interpretations gloss over the semantic thrust of μαρτυρία (testimony, 1:13) 
and the courtroom frame that Paul seems to have been activating. Quinn recognizes the 
courtroom language of the letter here, but he says that Paul was joining a Cretan poet—in 
Quinn’s paraphrase, “one of their own countrymen”—as a second witness against the 
ethnic Cretans.81 According to Mounce, by these words Paul “adds his personal stamp of 
approval” to the quotation.82 It was Paul’s “way of giving apostolic authority to something 
said by a non-Christian.”83 It is not plain, however, that Paul was deferring to the authority 
or vouching for the trustworthiness of the saying’s originator. Assuming so, Harrill 
wonders, “What exactly, however, warrants confidence in the Cretan prophet is not 
explained beyond the apostolic trustworthiness of the author’s own ‘Pauline’ voice.”84 The 
NEB translation of 1:13a as “and he told the truth!” obscures the underlying referent 
embedded in the phrase. These may be examples of mismatched assumptions. If the signals 
of courtroom proceedings mean that Paul was presenting arguments against a group of 
unsanctioned leaders and essentially accusing them of misdemeanors against other 
believers, then this meta-comment probably refers to Paul’s own testimony. Allow me to 
paraphrase and embellish 1:13 to capture this thrust: The testimony that I have presented to 
you regarding these troublemakers who have slurred the Cretans is hereby verified; and 
on account of this accusation, the penalty is a stern rebuke. 
Paul presented a case against the most shocking and blatant offenders among the 
troublemakers—those who justified their presumptiοn on the basis of age-old ethnic 
stereotypes. Paul was not saying that all of the leadership problems in Crete centered on 
this issue, but bigotry was a stinging example. Somehow, Paul had received enough 
evidence to render this accusation against someone from among the troublemakers. It is 
historically likely and demonstrable that the Apostle Paul was able to receive private 
information about distant congregations from unofficial sources (e.g., 1 Cor 5:1), and it is 
plausible that Paul would have heard of the nature of problems from sources in the Cretan 
church. 
 
81 Letter to Titus, 107. 
82 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 397. 
83 Ibid., 398. 
84 “‘Without Lies or Deception,’” 452. 
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The simple recurrence of the topic of truth and lies in Titus accentuates the 
courtroom scene contextually, because occurrences cluster in 1:10-16 and because 
concerns with truth and falsehood correspond in specific ways to the setting of a 
courtroom. Within the quotation, Cretans were called liars (ψεύστης, 1:12), but Paul 
disclosed the most salient disagreement between truth and reality in the crescendo of his 
remarks about the troublemakers—they profess to know God, they nevertheless deny [him] 
by their works (1:16). Idiomatically, Paul’s audience could infer: Who do they think they’re 
calling liars?! It was as the proverbial pot calling the kettle black. Whereas Paul called his 
testimony true (ἀληθής, 1:13), he characterized some of the troublemakers’ actions (ἔργον, 
1:16) as promoting commandments of people who reject the truth (ἀλήθεια, 1:14). Overly 
concerned with peripheral religious works, they nullify their capacity to do any good work 
(ἔργον, 1:16) by their harassment of the Cretans. These collocated contrasts are striking. 
Paul revealed that this topic of truth-telling and lying was already on his mind when he 
uniquely opened the Epistle to Titus with his own salutation as a servant of the unlying 
(ἀψευδὴς, 1:2) God whose purpose includes spreading the knowledge of the truth 
(ἀληθείας, 1:1). 
The correlation between truth, lies, and a court of law is intuitive but has scriptural 
precedent. Consider Rom 3:4—“Let God be true (ἀληθής), though everyone [else] be a 
liar (ψεύστης), just as it is written, ‘So that you may be justified (δικαιωθῇς) in your 
words, and conquer when you judge (κρίνεσθαί σε).’” The context of this verse shows the 
natural relation of more general-purpose words like true and liar with the narrower 
concepts of acquittal and judgment in the context of Paul’s judicial-style confrontation of 
bias and bigotry against Gentiles.85 We will now examine a major topical aspect of context 
that would have shaped the original audience’s cognitive environment—Jewish Religious 
Culture and Customs. 
ii. Jewish Religious Culture and Customs 
In the material surrounding the Cretan quotation, Paul addressed controversies regarding 
several Jewish interests. Mounce writes, “This passage [1:10‒16] clearly shows that the 
teaching was primarily Jewish.”86 Barrett observes that the heresy in Crete “undoubtedly 
 
85 Further examples of this cluster of ideas, in particular swearing of oaths and testifying in a court-of-law-
like setting include John 3:32‒33; 8:13‒18; 19:35; 21:24; Rom 3:21; 9:1; 1 Cor 15:15; 2 Cor 11; Gal 1:20; 3 
John 1:12. See also Exod 23:1 (LXX); Deut 19:15‒21 (LXX), treated below. 
86 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 395. He overstates the evidence when he continues, “and taught asceticism and 
guidelines for ritual purity and defilement.” 
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contained a Jewish element,” citing Titus 1:10, 14; and 3:9.87 He claims that the cluster of 
heretical concerns in 3:9‒11 represents “Jewish Gnosticism.”88 Although I think that 
Barrett overstates the presence of gnostic elements, he rightly sees that these concerns have 
a Jewish root. Aageson writes, “In Titus 1:10‒16, the Jewish character of the opposition in 
Crete is identified in general terms.”89 The opponents were not all Jewish even though the 
ones from the circumcision (1:10) were prominent among them.90 Few interpreters 
recognize that the troublemakers’ disdain for the Cretans probably intensified Paul’s 
concern in Titus. Stegemann, for instance, considers these as separate issues: 
On the one hand it is maintained that these negative characteristics are 
particularly or primarily (μάλιστα) applicable to “those of the circumcision” 
(οἱ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς). Shortly afterwards a warning is given not to subscribe 
to Jewish fables (Ἰουδαϊκοῖς μύθοις). On the other hand, the “opponents” 
are also identified with negative prejudices concerning the Cretans.91 
Given the referential language and literary context, it would be reasonable to say that the 
opponents were not merely identified with but as the promulgators of these prejudices! 
Although Jewish religious culture clearly featured prominently among the 
troublemakers of the Cretan church, that is not to say that Paul found Jews themselves or 
Judaism itself problematic. Mounce points out that, although the divisive element in Crete 
“was primarily Jewish,” not everything “must have centered on the law.”92 Paul was 
combatting distortions of Judaism as much as of his Christian gospel.93 He decried 
corruptions of Jewish faith as much as (or qua) distortions of Christian faith. Even though 
controversy surrounded concerns of Jewish provenance, Paul did not see Judaism as 
inherently contrary to Christianity. 
 
87 Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 12. Under the influence of PE amalgamating tendencies, he emphasizes the 
presence of Gnosticism in Crete. He regards the myths of Jewish myths (1:14) and the genealogies (3:9) as 
primarily gnostic despite such interests being at home in non-gnostic Jewish cultural contexts. I do not fully 
argue against Gnosticism or Barrett’s “Jewish Gnosticism” (14‒15) being an issue in Titus, although others 
have. Paul may have revealed affinity with a gnosis orientation when he identified his apostleship as 
according to knowledge of the truth (1:1, κατὰ ... ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας), acknowledged that once, even we 
were ignorant (3:3, Ἦμεν γὰρ ποτε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνόητοι), or instructed Titus to put aside stupid controversies 
(3:9, μωρὰς δὲ ζητήσεις ... περιΐστασο·). Several references could be construed as having a gnostic outlook in 
view. My argument does not depend upon particular theological details of heresy. 
88 Ibid., 145. 
89 Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, 79. 
90 Guthrie claims that several pieces of evidence “clearly [show] that the heresy in this case had a Jewish 
origin.” He continues, “It is evident that in Crete some form of Jewish controversies of an entirely 
speculative and irrelevant nature had arisen.” See Pastoral Epistles, 14:44–45. 
91 “Anti-Semitic and Racist,” 278; see also Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 139. 
92 Pastoral Epistles, 396. 
93 The Apostle Paul saw himself as being true to Judaism even as he defended the gospel (e.g., Phil 1:7; 3:5). 
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Mounce distinguishes the problematic element in the Cretan church as “aberrant 
Judaism.”94 Marginal or ancillary matters had become central for Paul’s opponents; and, 
instead of bearing fruit of a religious or spiritual nature, their behaviors had produced 
ethno-religious class stratification. The problems that Paul addressed had significant social 
dimensions. The epistle portrays a vacuum of leadership (1:5); and some Cretan Christians 
felt pressured to attend to various interests of a Jewish (Ἰουδαϊκός, 1:14) religious 
provenance (1:10, 14; 3:9‒11), while others held to Paul’s transformative gospel to the 
Gentiles (2:11‒15; 3:3‒7). The conflict in Crete was ethno-religious at core;95 and, in the 
Cretan quotation, Paul saw a smoking gun. 
Although several scholars consider some of Paul’s contentions in Titus to be anti-
Semitic, they still recognize “the Jewish nature of the problem in Crete.”96 The book 
context of Titus suggests that alienating or factionalizing currents in the Cretan church 
stemmed from the comportment of a Jewish contingent (1:10, 14; 3:9‒11). Barrett admits, 
“The introduction of Cretans [in 1:12] is not easy to understand after the reference in v. 10 
to Jewish converts.”97 He recognizes the contextual disjuncture that obtains under the 
influence of the prima facie interpretation, but it is only problematic for him because of his 
assumption that Paul’s speaker was not Jewish but an ethnic Cretan. The English 
translation that Barrett uses (NEB) reinforces this assumption by inserting Cretan into the 
quotative frame of Titus 1:12a. Context, however, suggests that the speaker was one of the 
(predominantly Jewish) troublemakers. 
Jewish interests in Titus have two levels of specificity: First, some items directly 
and explicitly refer to Jewish matters on the semantic level, such as circumcision 
(περιτομή, 1:10), Jewish and commandment (Ἰουδαϊκός and ἐντολή, 1:14; see also 
quarrels about the law, μάχας νομικός, 3:9). Second, some items indirectly but plausibly 
 
94 Pastoral Epistles, lxi. 
95 According to Barrett, “Judaizers of the old kind no longer threaten the peace, and even the existence of the 
Church, and the place of Gentiles is so comfortably assured that the author seems unaware of the theological 
struggles and revolutions which preceded their admission.” It is hard to see how he can read Titus in this way 
without amalgamating it with the other PE. Any attentive reader of Titus can see the struggles Barrett denies. 
He claims that the old ethno-religious contests of the mid-first-century gave way to gnostic heresies in the PE 
that interest him more. Reading Titus on its own, apart from 1 and 2 Tim, the ethno-religious contestations 
appear clearly. See Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 32–33. 
96 Mounce uses these words (Pastoral Epistles, 379), whereas others might see it as the anti-Semitic nature of 
the problem in Paul. Huizenga is among such critics. See 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 139, 140, 188, et passim. See 
also Stegemann, “Anti-Semitic and Racist,” 271–94. 
97 Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 131. He continues, “Either the author has not fully thought through his 
material... or the Jews are to be thought of as in great measure assimilated to Cretan life.” It is interesting and 
amusing how commentators readily pin dullness or incoherence on a writer, rather than a reader. 
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refer to Jewish interests on the basis of context, such as genealogy (γενεαλογία, 3:9), 
prophet (προφήτης, 1:12), and detestable (βδελυκτός, 1:16; cf. Lev 18:30 [LXX], Rom 
2:22). Both levels contribute to the overall sense that ethno-religious divisions were central 
to problems in the Cretan church. Notice that all of these items appear in near proximity in 
the two main sections where Paul directly addressed issues regarding troublemaking 
opponents (1:10‒16; 3:9‒11).98 
I argued in the previous chapter that Paul used the honorable designation prophet 
(1:12)—a significant title in Jewish religious contexts—sarcastically. He did the same with 
commandments (1:14). The prophet was only a truth-teller in his own mind and among the 
like-minded. Towner similarly judges the title to be dismissive.99 Paul compared the 
presumptive leaders with the insults of the quotation. In their central flaw—deceit—the 
presumptive leaders were no different than the quotation’s caricature of Cretans. Regarding 
the quotation, Towner writes, “Paul now springs the rhetorical trap that will vilify the 
opponents in a way most appropriate for the Cretan church.”100 Not incidentally, deceit 
(with corresponding notions of truth and lies) is the only moral issue from the quotation 
that Paul transparently develops elsewhere in the letter, primarily in the first chapter. 
Jewish believers and their sympathetic associates instilled the Cretan believers with 
an ethno-religious inferiority complex analogous to congregations the Apostle Paul dealt 
with elsewhere in the NT.101 This is a topos known to readers of the NT.102 The essential 
substance of their message was that those who would not go in for the trappings of Jewish 
religious culture (e.g., circumcision, 1:10; Jewish myths and commandments of men, 1:14; 
vain controversies and genealogies, 3:9) could not be Christians of the first order.103 Paul 
was primarily concerned with attitudes and practices that were used to denigrate Gentile 
Christian religious status. To gain a following, the troublemakers even deprecated the 
people whom Paul left Titus in Crete (1:5) to nurture. According to prima facie readings 
 
98 Mounce notes that Paul addressed problems of a “Jewish nature” in two particular sections (1:10‒16 and 
3:9‒10). See Pastoral Epistles, lxix-lxx (cf. 453-454). Literary context and comparisons with texts like Lev 
22:5, 8 and Num 19:13, 20 reveal that seemingly generic terms, such as καθαρός (clean) and μιαίνω (defile) 
in 1:15 have profound salience for anyone with Jewish religious sensibilities. 
99 See Letters to Timothy and Titus, 691. 
100 Ibid., 694. 
101 See Acts 15:1‒2, 7‒9; Rom 2:25‒29; 4:14; Gal 2:14‒16; 3:2‒5, 8, 25‒29; 5:6‒12; Phil 3:2. 
102 See Marshall, “Pastoral Epistles,” 284. 
103 Note that the author does not directly implicate the troublemakers with abuses of Torah (cf. 1 Tim 1:7‒9; 
Titus 3:9); only certain, mostly peripheral, aspects of Jewish religious culture were in view. 
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that assume a contextual disjuncture, Paul abruptly shifted from his concern with these 
presumptive leaders to lambaste the general Cretan populace himself! 
Paul labelled a significant contingent of the troublemakers in Crete those from the 
circumcision (1:10), but he did not explicitly indicate that they insisted on Gentile converts 
becoming circumcised (as in Gal 6:12‒13). Circumcision was, of course, a central marker 
of Jewish identity. Mounce explains that from the circumcision was “a circumlocution for 
‘Jewish’” used elsewhere by Paul “of Jews (Rom 4:12) and Jewish Christians (Gal 2:7‒9, 
12; Col 4:11 …).”104 Paul probably used the phrase as an ethno-religious designation to 
refer primarily to Jews. It would only secondarily refer to sympathetic Gentiles who had 
embraced the trappings of Jewish religious culture as a means of attaining acceptance or 
status. The group’s specific composition may elude us, but it is clear that patently ethno-
religious factors measured and mediated contests of status in the Cretan church.105 
We discover elsewhere in the NT that being an uncircumcised Gentile was a key 
feature of Titus’s (canonical) identity (Gal 2:1‒5). Wall suggests that his Gentile identity is 
essential to understanding the book regardless of whether he was a historical or merely 
literary figure in the Epistle to Titus. Wall refers to the Paul upon which the author of the 
Pastorals bases his inscribed writer as the “canonical Paul,” understanding that if the 
Pastorals were written on the basis of a proto-canon, then information from undisputed 
works must illuminate their meaning. We should not, then, disregard other NT texts which 
portray Titus, because this information was likely within the cognitive environment of the 
writer and original readers of the Epistle to Titus. The “canonical Titus,” then, illuminates 
the Titus of Titus.106 Wall writes, “Titus represents God’s approval of Paul’s ‘mission to 
the uncircumcised’ and so of Jerusalem’s decision to initiate faithful Gentiles into the 
covenant.”107 So, Paul’s instruction to let no one despise you (2:15) parallelled the 
correction Titus was supposed to make on behalf of his Gentile congregants.108 Paul had 
instructed Titus to speak and encourage and rebuke (λάλει καὶ παρακάλει καὶ ἔλεγχε, 
 
104 Pastoral Epistles, 396. Mounce also cites ancient evidence from Josephus and Philo that “there were large 
numbers of Jews in Crete (Josephus Ant. 17.12.1 §§23‒25; J.W. 2.7.1 §§101‒105; Life 48 §247; Philo Leg. 
282).” Quinn discusses uses of this term and phrase in Letter to Titus, 16, 98. 
105 Barclay claims that the issue Paul addressed in Galatians and his other undisputed works was the 
misperception that Jews intrinsically held a privileged religious status. See Paul and the Gift, 162. The same 
issues of privilege and status are visible in Titus. 
106 See Wall and Steele, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, 34. 
107 Ibid., 343. 
108 Based on its placement in the household code’s sequence and structure (Titus 2:1‒10) and on the theme of 
imitation elsewhere, it is clear that Paul portrays Titus as a model (τύπον, 2:7) for the entire congregation. It 
seems that Paul wants Titus to defend himself as much as his predominantly Gentile congregation. 
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2:15)—a summary of actions that Paul had instructed him to perform with different 
constituencies earlier in the letter. In particular, a form of ἔλέγχω (rebuke) appears 
surrounding the Cretan quotation in 1:9 and 1:13. The household code (2:1‒10) instructed 
Titus to teach a set of alternative-to-Torah—but not contrary-to-Torah—standards of 
personal, inter-personal, and communal behavior. While Titus did this, he was to assert and 
rely on his authority among the churches of Crete by virtue of Paul’s commission. Unlike 
Timothy, the problem Titus faced was not dismissal on the basis of age (1 Tim 4:12) as 
much as ethnicity—the same basis upon which the troublemakers disparaged the Cretans. 
On the hearers’ minds was not only the clawing for social prominence but the 
pivotal role of ethnic and religious identity within that contest. John Barclay’s construal of 
the historical situation of Galatians is relevant to what we see in Titus.109 Before Paul 
mentioned the quotation, he evoked the ethno-religious composition of the troublemaking 
constituency. Concerning such social contests among the Galatians, Barclay writes, 
A central token of cultural capital within the Jewish tradition [circumcision] 
is here [Gal 2:1‒10] acknowledged to be disposable in the mission to 
Gentiles—certainly not because that mission is of less significance, or the 
status of Gentile converts lower than that of Jews, but because God is at 
work as much in one form of the mission as in the other.110 
The troublemakers in Crete would likely not accept such a proposition. Concerning the 
same type of contest, Barclay later writes, “At issue is not simply the adoption of this or 
that Jewish practice, but the capacity of the Christ-gift to re-found and reorient life by a 
logic that challenges every other attribution of value.”111 In light of the gospel material of 
Titus 2:11‒15 and 3:3‒7, might this also describe Paul’s contention with Crete’s 
troublemakers? 
Echoing the OT—the Scripture of the church (2 Tim 3:16)—is commonplace in the 
NT, although some commentators minimize the extent to which the PE do this. Richard B. 
Hays proposes seven tests to detect, confirm, and interpret such echoes. Of his seven 
criteria—availability, volume, recurrence, thematic coherence, historical plausibility, 
history of interpretation, and satisfaction—the two that have remarkable correspondence to 
RT, especially the idea (below) of implicated premises, are thematic coherence and 
 
109 See Paul and the Gift, 334. 
110 Ibid., 363. 
111 Ibid., 399. 
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satisfaction.112 Simply echoing Scripture would not be of significance for my thesis, but 
some echoes correlate particularly with the Cretan quotation and the topic of Jewish 
religio-cultural interests. 
The Cretan quotation conveniently echoed a Jewish way of referring to people as 
worthless (i.e., not worthy to live). In the Deuteronomic law, Israelite parents could take 
their rebellious son to the elders and call him “stubborn and rebellious … a glutton and a 
drunkard” (Deut 21:20, NRSV). This was a premise for stoning the offender with the aim 
to “purge the evil from your midst; and all Israel will hear, and be afraid” (Deut 21:21, 
NRSV). This alone does not speak to Paul’s intention, but the following verses in 
Deuteronomy illuminate a remarkable correlation with Titus. The goal of this punishment 
was that you will drive out evil (ἐξαρεῖς τὸν πονηρὸν, Deut 21:21 [LXX]; cf. 1 Cor 5:13), 
and the remaining discussion says that if the Israelites leave dead bodies exposed after 
execution, they will defile (μιαίνω, Deut 21:23 [LXX]) the land. These concepts and even 
some lexemes have strong correspondence not only to ideas but to their sequence in Titus 
1:10‒16. The charges that Israelite parents would bring against their rebellious son 
compare with the insult of the quotation against the Cretans. The moral condition of the 
troublemakers (defiled, μιαίνω, Titus 1:152) parallels the fate of the land if Israelites leave 
dead bodies out post-execution. What seems to contrast sharply are the outcomes that the 
accusers expect (namely, ostracism, death, and perhaps defilement) and the outcomes that 
Paul enjoins for the troublemakers (namely, healthy doctrine and restorative justice).113 
This Scripture from Deuteronomy could have been within the cognitive environment of 
Paul’s audience.114 
Within the near context of the Cretan quotation, Paul identified Jewish myths and 
commandments of people who reject the truth (1:14) as matters to which duly-rebuked 
people will cease to (mis)direct their attention. Aageson claims that “the problem of the 
commandments apparently turns on the issue of purity, associated with refraining from 
certain practices and from eating certain foods…. According to the text of Titus, the nature 
 
112 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
Evaluating or interacting with critiques of Hays’s methodology is beside my purpose. His concepts and 
categories are well-known and, therefore, readily understood labels for what I see in Titus. 
113 See Chapter Three on the redemptive nature of sound doctrine in Titus. 
114 Other correspondences include the qualification that elders not have children accused of rebellion (Titus 
1:6) and the fact that Deut 21:23 is adjacent to the passage that talks about the curse of the person hung on a 
tree, which Paul references in Gal 3:13. The phrase is also echoed in the Gospels (Matt 11:19, Luke 7:34). 
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of the opposition is limited to these problems.”115 Paul directly linked these issues to the 
rebuke he enjoined (1:13). If Aageson is right, then it is most fitting for the quotation to be 
in the mouth of a Judaizer whose logic dictates: If Cretans, by birth, are unclean (beasts 
and gluttons), then they can only enter into right relationship with the God of the Jews and 
live the most privileged form of Christian faith by a thorough conversion, which includes 
reforming dietary practices, renouncing their own identity, and embracing Jewish 
religious culture.116 Aageson, for one, acknowledges that “the theological structures of 
Galatians and Titus have one thing [this concern] in common.”117 Aageson dismisses the 
scale of what he calls the “nagging judaizing tendency” in Crete, but it appears to be one of 
Paul’s chief concerns in Titus.118 
Opponents who considered the Cretans to be gluttons might have advised them to 
observe an ascetic diet. They might have even shamed and ridiculed them. This scenario 
comports with Barrett’s view of “Jewish Gnosticism” in the PE,119 but the quotation is on 
the wrong lips in Barrett’s scenario. It only works if the Cretans’ opponents uttered it, not 
if a Cretan uttered it, as Barrett assumes. The quotation may have had a life of its own 
 
115 Aageson, Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, 80. 
116 People customarily take their faith and worldview to be true and universally applicable. Jewish 
philosopher and contemporary of Paul, Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE‒c. 50 CE), held this attitude about 
Judaism. Representing a widespread sensibility in Judaism, Philo assessed that God’s favor accrued to Jews 
on account of their adherence to a universal set of values and ordinances. Philo wrote that Gentiles’ 
instructors (from their nurses to their philosophers) impress inextricable error (ἐνεχάραξαν πλάνον 
ἀνήνυτον) upon them but that God could initiate (συνάγων καὶ μυσταγωγῶν) into his ways any who were so 
inclined (Virt. 178). Gentiles, by virtue of low birth (δυσγένειαν), were misled by foreign laws and 
unbecoming customs (ἐξ ἀλλοκότων νόμων καὶ ἐκθέσμων ἐθῶν) but could turn to that of which truth is the 
governor and overseer (ἧς ἔφορος καὶ ἐπίσκοπος ἀλήθεια, Virt. 219). When Gentiles converted to Judaism, 
they converted to the eternal and universal truth. For Philo, one could be born (φύντας ἐξ ἀρχῆς, lit. issuing 
from the start) or converted (προσηλύτους), but choosing to embark on piety (πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ἠξίωσαν 
μεθορμίσασθαι) made one superior (Spec. 1.51). Converts to Judaism were evidence of its superiority and 
universality. Converting to true piety corresponded to serving the truly living [One/God] (τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος, 
Spec. 309). Philo, Paul, and others used piety (εὐσέβεια) to denote observant (Jewish/Christian) faith. 
Hoklutubbe explains that its currency in the Greco-Roman world made it a handy cross-over term. See 
Civilized Piety. Philo had to allegorize Judaism to universalize it, but he exemplified a common Jewish trope 
that the purported primacy, universality, and instrumentality of (idealized) Jewish doctrine implied its 
superiority. In Barclay’s assessment, Philo thought, “What Jews observe on a daily basis is not some 
ethnically particular legislation, still less some arbitrary collection of customs, but the tangible instantiation 
of the order of the cosmos. To keep the law is to follow the grain of the universe: those who do so are 
obviously most pleasing to God and most worthy of his gifts.” See Paul and the Gift, 233. Philo represented 
but one stripe of Judaism in which this attitude obtained. See Gregory E. Sterling, “’A Law unto 
Themselves’: Limited Universalism in Philo and Paul,” ZNW 107 (2016): 30‒47. 
117 Paul, the Pastoral Epistles, 80. 
118 Ibid., 81. Aageson interprets Galatians as arguing against a theological “covenantal nomism” and does not 
adequately address the social dimensions of Paul’s concern in both books. Aageson focuses on Paul’s legal 
arguments, concluding (or confirming) that the Epistle to Titus is not concerned with improper interpretations 
of the law whereas Galatians is. Barclay argues the narrowness and misleading nature of the “covenantal 
nomism” designation. See Paul and the Gift, 115–58. 
119 See Pastoral Epistles, passim. 
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centuries before Titus; Paul’s contemporary opponents, however, were unconcerned with 
this history since it conveniently served their doctrinal purposes when taken out of its 
original context. Barrett identifies the content of the troublemakers’ teaching as 
“apparently ascetic, representing a combination of Jewish food laws and dualistic rejection 
of the material.”120 This conception of how the quotation was functioning contextually 
leads to the equation between laziness, gluttony, and vice, on the one hand, and Jewish 
food laws and asceticism, on the other. This is an example of how the amalgamation of the 
PE has introduced an artificial mismatch between the contextual assumptions held by 
ancient and modern readers. 
When Paul articulated the redeeming purpose of Jesus’s self-giving work (Titus 
2:11‒15; see also 3:3‒7), he expressed the logic of the gospel that undergirded his whole 
vision of human redemption—the reason he could see Jews and Gentiles as equals before 
God. Paul explained key aspects of Christian conversion that correspond verbally and 
conceptually to aspects of the tension he described in 1:10‒16. Thus, 2:14 reads, [Jesus] 
who gave himself on our behalf, in order that he might redeem us from every lawlessness 
and might cleanse unto himself a distinct people, eager for good works. Verbal 
correspondences include cleansing (καθαρός, 1:15; καθαρίζω, 2:14) and good works 
(ἔργον ἀγαθὸν, 1:16; καλῶν ἔργων, 2:14; cf. 2:7). Conceptual correspondences include the 
idea of the work of Christ being the basis of one’s status and the idea that the result of this 
Christological work is a (singular) distinct people, not a divisive compound. So, Paul’s 
saying to the clean [ones] all things are clean (1:15) was a critique that questioned the 
redemptive status of anyone who would take it upon themselves to call other believers evil 
beasts (1:12)—that is, unclean—regardless of their excuse. If a person had trusted Christ 
for redemption, then they did not need to follow Jewish dietary regulations or other laws. 
The presumptive leaders defied (ἀνυπο[τασσω], 1:6, 10), contradicted (ἀντιλέγω, 1:9; 2:9), 
rejected (ἀποστρέφω, 1:14), and denied (ἀρνέομαι, 1:16) this message. 
Paul topicalized ones who are defiled and unbelieving (1:15), suspending them in a 
δέ development clause. By means of this left-dislocation, he accentuated the self-
condemning effects of judging people’s redemptive status on an ethno-religious basis. It is 
only those sorts of people who find that nothing is clean (1:15). Simply reversing the order 
without changing the grammar yields a more syntactically neutral or unmarked way of 
 
120 Ibid., 132. 
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organizing the information: nothing is clean to ones who are defiled and unfaithful. But, 
Paul placed the information in a cause-and-effect order. So, Why did the troublemakers see 
their Cretan brothers and sisters as unclean? It was because the troublemakers themselves 
were defiled and unfaithful. Grammatically, nothing is clean is the predication; but 
pragmatically, ones who are defiled and unfaithful is the predication. To convey the effect 
of this topicalization, I render it: It is to those who are defiled and unfaithful that things are 
unclean. One senses the biting allegation when so phrased. 
Exposing and correcting these troublemakers was not a form of bigotry—as though 
the history of interpretation should shift from seeing Paul as anti-Cretan to seeing him as 
anti-Semitic. Several dynamic facts make church discipline, not bigotry, the most 
appropriate designation for Paul’s interest in and speech concerning the Jewish opponents. 
First, Paul never renounced or denounced Judaism or condemned Jews. Second, as a 
matter of fact, he said that the ethno-religious composition of the opponent group was 
mostly (but not all) Jewish; but they did, after all, have a significant place in the early 
formation of the church. Third, the issues he mentioned as being foolish, empty, or useless 
(1:10, 14; 3:9) were not central to Judaism. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there 
was a power differential that the troublemakers were trying to expand and take advantage 
of by means of driving a wedge of bigotry and hierarchical social status between Jewish 
and Cretan Christians within the church. So, Paul was concerned for the members of his 
vulnerable missionary congregation as well as for the integrity of the gospel. If the Cretan 
quotation seems simply repugnant and appalling, that was Paul’s point. 
iii. Division 
The foregoing observations suggest the prevalence of ethno-religious tensions in the 
Cretan church. A theme of division is present throughout the epistle, even though Paul did 
not mention a divisive person (αἱρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον, 3:10) until later in the letter. The 
concept of division, us/them distinctions, in/out contests, and the dynamics of superiority 
and inferiority were on the audience’s minds. We derive the English word heretic from the 
Greek word αἱρετικός that Paul used to label that kind of troublemaker, but a set of 
propositional beliefs that contradict another set of propositional beliefs does not appear to 
be what ailed the Cretan church. The ethno-religious social tensions could not be ignored. 
As suggested above, Titus himself was likely a collateral target of such prejudices (2:15). 
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That Paul did not more explicitly outline the false beliefs against which he 
contended frustrates several commentators, but the PE themselves do not necessarily 
maintain that a wrong set of ideas is at issue. For example, Huizenga writes, “We should 
be suspicious of the author’s labels imposed on those who disagree with his teachings, 
especially since he does not describe or engage their ideas in any constructive way.”121 
Bassler is disappointed that “The author’s refusal to engage his opponents in a substantive 
debate does not allow us to identify their theology with any precision.”122 Stegemann 
contends, “We shall not be able to extract the beliefs and teachings, or praxis, of the 
Christians who are so sharply rejected here, from the Pastoral Epistles. They have 
disappeared in the sea of polemic.”123 In historical retrospect, commentators can 
reconstruct forms of heresy as they appeared to evolve, but these reconstructions are based 
on a limited and arbitrary selection of available texts. Most commonly, scholars compare 
Gnostic Christian writings with the ideas Paul refuted in the Pastorals,124 but the heart of 
the problem in Crete does not seem to have been a matter of lining up theological ideas in 
the wrong fashion. It was the social and behavioral outcomes of division that were 
unacceptable. The gospel that Christ accepts people without regard to conventional tokens 
of status confounds the attempts of superiority groups to place additional demands upon 
converts. Christ is the agent of acceptance and his ruling cannot be overturned: Jews and 
Gentiles are equals in grace. 
Establishing us and them, also known as othering, is intrinsic to defining 
boundaries around cultures and ethnicities. In the religious matrix of clean versus unclean 
(1:15), an epithet of evil beasts (1:12) had strong in and out implications. Marianne 
Bjelland Kartzow explains that “The Pastoral Epistles construct opponents through 
‘othering’ them in various ways … The Pastoral Paul’s polemic is built on a technique 
where previously influential insiders are made through degradation to be outsiders.”125 
Othering occurs when speech distances people from the speaker, who is always the 
 
121 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 179. 
122 1 Timothy, 189. 
123 “Anti-Semitic and Racist,” 279. See also Twomey, Pastoral Epistles, 218–23. This seems to be an 
outcome of viewing the PE as an amalgam. 
124 For example, Bassler, 1 Timothy, 27–28; Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 12, 14–15, 32–33, 127, 145; Twomey, 
Pastoral Epistles, 224; Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 396, 402. For examples of countervailing judgments on 
this very issue, see Faber, “‘Evil Beasts, Lazy Gluttons,’” 141 (also 137-138); Benjamin Fiore, The Pastoral 
Epistles : First Timothy, Second Timothy, Titus, ed. Daniel J. Harrington, vol. 12, Sacra Pagina Series 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007), 14–15. 
125 Gossip and Gender: Othering of Speech in the Pastoral Epistles, BZNW 164 (New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2009), 15. 
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protagonist of natural language communication. Ascribing inferiority (e.g., intellectual, 
moral, hereditary, doctrinal) is intrinsic to othering. In an academic environment of 
skepticism and distrust that loathes reading texts in sympathy with writers, othering is 
almost invariably suspect. I think, however, that othering may be a linguistic pragmatic 
tool that can be wielded in just and unjust ways. The Cretan quotation certainly 
exemplifies negative, othering speech. By echoing comparable negative categories for the 
troublemakers (e.g., unclean, defiled, turning from the truth), Paul uses othering speech to 
affect correction and restoration. 
With certain exceptions, insiders in such a framework perceive the other as tacitly 
inferior in some way. In Christian conversion, one changes status and views the old self as 
other. The categories of difference that were once available for ethnic and cultural othering 
are no longer applicable to this new status in Christ. This inapplicability seems central to 
the Epistle of Titus, especially as expressed in 3:3‒5. Contradictions of this new reality 
seem to parallel what Paul contended with in Galatians. As Barclay says of the issue in 
Galatians, “The Christ-event [is] subversive of normative systems of worth.” 
Circumcision, and even uncircumcision (Gal 6:15), may have been “tokens of superiority” 
or “the object of public pride,” but they had no currency in the household of God.126 “The 
Christ-event” in Titus is signified in the language of epiphany (2:11; 3:4). “Tokens of 
superiority” (i.e., signs of participation in a superior group),127 such as circumcision, 
observance of visible ceremonies, or adept participation in controversy may have been 
means of establishing status; but Paul repeatedly instructs subjection, not self-
aggrandizement, within the household of God.128 The anthropological prevalence of this 
type of thinking and social arrangement reinforces the notion that the troublemakers were 
leveraging existing “tokens of superiority” to form primitive social structures, falsely 
dividing the Cretan church into superior and inferior groups. 
If heresy causes or exacerbates division and animosity; then, in this sense, the 
Cretan quotation is an expression of heresy even though its semantic representation does 
not strike the modern reader as holding much theological content. Heresy has come to 
mean straying from an established dogma, but heterodoxy is only one aspect of division. 
The modern impulse to identify this or that particular heresy from a known line-up of 
 
126 See Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 394. 
127 Ibid. 
128 See shortly below under Submission. 
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heterodoxies is anachronistic.129 We cannot tell precisely what theological propositions the 
troublemakers taught, because Paul expresses his concern with them in terms of their 
social effect upon the church (e.g., upsetting whole houses, 1:11). Paul hoped that Titus 
could restore the presumptive leaders (in order that they might be healthy in the faith, ἵνα 
ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει, 1:13b). He was protecting the community’s tenants as much as the 
community’s tenets!130  
Paul gave specific instructions to Titus in dealing with a divisive person (3:9‒11). 
Such persons correspond to the main category of troublemakers that concerned Paul. They 
divided and were divided from the Pauline church, outcomes that correspond to the 
troublemakers’ actions (1:10‒12). Stegemann perceives the association: 
The author of the letter understands [the antagonists] as a sort of ‘party’ (cf. 
Titus 3:10) within the Christian communities of Crete … these negative 
characteristics are particularly or primarily (μάλιστα) applicable to ‘those of 
the circumcision’ (οἱ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς). Shortly afterwards a warning is 
given not to subscribe to Jewish fables (Ἰουδαϊκοῖς μύθοις).131 
He identifies unmistakable references to Jewish religious culture in Titus—circumcision, 
appearing before the quotation (1:10), and Jewish myths, appearing afterward (1:14). Paul 
seems, then, to have been concerned with one main category of troublemakers, some of 
whom express their divisiveness through pithy ethno-religious insults. 
iv. Moral Topics 
The Cretan quotation represents a different set of moral concerns than Paul himself 
presents in the rest of Titus, where gluttony, laziness, and general debauchery are not even 
broached. Hoklotubbe argues that Paul’s concern in Titus had to do with a cluster of 
ethical and religious behaviors that corresponded to the general rubric of piety (εὐσέβεια, 
1:1).132 The contingent most likely to disparage Cretans on account of general moral faults 
 
129 Suspecting that canonized literature represents an inherently oppressive orthodoxy is also anachronistic. 
See Bart D. Ehrman, Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 181. He claims, “Written attacks of the proto-orthodox on Christians 
of other persuasions” led to the tragic loss of so-called heretical writings due to campaigns of eradication that 
have distorted history, thus “the polemical literature from the period looks completely one-sided.” 
130 In his undisputed works, the Apostle Paul commonly addressed divisions of various kinds. See Rom 
11:17‒21; 14:1‒4; 1 Cor 1:10; 11:18; 2 Cor 11:4; Gal 1:6‒7; 4:17, 29; 5:15; Phil 2:1‒2; 4:2; and less so, but 
still present, 1 Thess 5:13; but apparently not Phlm. See also Eph 2:11‒13, 21‒22; 4:1‒6; Col 2:16; 3:15; 2 
Thess 3:6, 14‒15; 1 Tim 1:3‒4; 6:3‒5; 2 Tim 4:3‒4, 16. 
131 Stegemann, “Anti-Semitic and Racist.” 
132 Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety. 
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was one that advocated strict food laws and proto-gnostic moral scruples.133 So, whereas 
Paul addressed one set of character traits, his opponents were preoccupied with another, 
which happened to be reflected in the quotation. Kidd and Faber have attempted to 
correlate the moral concerns of the quotation with the broad moral concerns of the book, 
but the connections are tenuous.134 When Paul speaks in his own voice (that is, not in 
words he attributes to another), a specific set of issues repeatedly concerns him. At the 
center are practices of right teaching (1:92; 2:1, 3, 7, 10) and submission (next heading), 
the personal qualities of σώφρων (sensible, 1:8; 2:2, 5; cognates in 2:4, 6, 12) and σεμνός 
(serious, 2:2, 7), and a number of φιλο- root words (loving [appropriately], 1:82; 2:42; 3:4, 
15).135 The spread of these virtues across every social category that Paul addresses yields a 
remarkable comparison among the expectations of each group. In other words, what Paul 
expects of one category of people has a high degree of correspondence to what he expects 
of otherwise contrasting groups, including leaders and slaves, women and men, young and 
old, Jew and Gentile.136 If Paul was truly concerned with gluttony or laziness, he knew 
how to address those issues (cf. Rom 14:20‒21; 16:18; 1 Cor 5:11; 8:8‒13; 10:7; 11:20‒
22, 33‒34; Gal 6:9; Eph 4:28; 1 Thess 2:9; 4:9‒12; 5:14; 2 Thess 3:6‒15; 1 Tim 5:13), but 
he did not do so in Titus.137 
Paul showed some concern in the rest of Titus with general morals, but the issue he 
exposed through the quotation is bigotry—not gluttony, laziness, or general wickedness. A 
troublemaker enacted bigotry by deploying the quotation, which Paul exposed and 
rebuked. Although bigotry is not in the semantics of the quotation, it is in the pragmatics. 
The quotation they propagated and its subsequent history of interpretation make the 
Cretans out to be much worse than Paul’s instructions in the rest of Titus suggest as he 
called them to thoughtfulness, self-control, devotion, submission, love, and so forth. 
 
133 See Twomey, Pastoral Epistles, 224; Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 402; Bassler, 1 Timothy, 27–28; Barrett, 
Pastoral Epistles, 127, 145. 
134 See Kidd, “Titus as Apologia;” Faber, “‘Evil Beasts, Lazy Gluttons.’” 
135 Marshall says that Titus 2:12 provides the clearest and most complete clustering of cardinal Greek virtues 
in the PE (σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς). See Critical and Exegetical, 183–84. Furthermore, Paul’s 
Hellenistic Judaism bridged this cluster between standard virtues of Gentiles and Jews in the church, so his 
summary strategically invoked a conception of goodness that would resonate with his entire audience. 
136 It is revealing but unnecessary for reconstructing the audience’s cognitive environment and, therefore, 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the overlap of moral expectations among groups. It echoes such a 
core Pauline doctrine as the radical equality of persons before God seen in 1 Cor 12:13; Gal 3:28; even Col 
3:11 and Rom 10:12. This correspondence is particularly visible through an explicit comparative connective 
adverb that Paul used in Titus to move from one category to another (ὡσαύτως, 2:3, 6). 
137 When needed, the Apostle Paul could call a congregation to cease and desist from numerous kinds of 
wrongdoing. In addition to passages above, consider 1 Cor 6:8; Eph 4:25; Col 3:8‒9; and Acts 20:33‒35. 
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v. Submission 
One of the strongest themes throughout Titus is submission. This theme emerges from the 
portrayal of social relationships evoked by many occurrences of Greek words that feature 
˗ταγ˗ roots (ἐπιταγή, command [n], 1:3; 2:15; διατάσσω, command [v], 1:5; ἀνυπότακτος, 
insubordinate, 1:6, 10; ὑποτάσσω, submit, 2:5, 9; 3:1) and from specific words sharing that 
semantic domain such as ἐνκρατής (disciplined, 1:8), ἐξουςία and πειθαρέω (authority 
[figure] and obey, 3:1).138 The theme of submission does not follow a superiority-and-
inferiority scheme but an equals-in-humility program that applies to the entire constituency 
of the church, including Paul himself. Unlike the social dynamic that the troublemakers 
pushed, where others are inferior, submission commits all uses of power and freedom to 
the service of others.139 
After discussing the need and criteria for good leaders, Paul introduced the prime 
leadership problem he perceived in the Cretan church: For many are insubordinate (Εἰσιὶν 
γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνυπότακτοι, 1:10).140 Paul is concerned with obedience and submission 
throughout Titus, and leaders themselves were to model these qualities. Every level of 
church member was supposed to be submissive. These troublemakers, however, saw 
themselves as above all this. 
The troublemakers may have looked at Titus’s Gentile ethnicity as an excuse not to 
show him deference (2:15). To them, he was inherently an inferior and an unacceptable 
leader. The underlying prejudice of the Cretan quotation made any Gentile unacceptable as 
a leader. Titus was no better than a Cretan; because what was at issue was the Cretans qua 
Gentiles, not qua Cretans. It seems that in the Cretan quotation his antagonists had laid 
their hands on a conveniently specific popular saying. 
 
138 This list could be even larger. Paul discourages being enslaved (δουλόω, 2:3) by wine; says that serving 
(δουλεύω, 3:3) various passions and pleasures characterized Christians’ former life; refers to commandments 
(ἐντολή, 1:14), which imply expectations of obedience. The words listed fall into one of three semantic 
domains shared with ὑποτάσσω (2:5, 9; 3:1), the most frequent word of this kind in Titus. The domains are 
33F’ Command, Order; 36C Obey, Disobey; and 37A Control, Restrain as outlined in Johannes E. Louw and 
Eugene A. Nida, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains, ed. Rondal B. 
Smith and Karen A. Munson, 2nd ed. (New York: United Bible Societies, 1989). I acknowledge critiques of 
their philosophy and method regarding semantic domains, but the point remains that concerns for submission 
are remarkably prominent in Titus with respect to all populations. 
139 David Lyon proposes that post-modern shifts toward hermeneutics of retrieval (discussed below) help 
readers to recognize their moral responsibility to “anyone who has valid claims on us.” My relevance-guided 
interpretation reclaims this feature of Titus that I describe in terms of submission. See “Sliding in All 
Directions: Social Hermeneutics from Suspicion to Retrieval,” in Disciplining Hermeneutics: Interpretation 
in Christian Perspective, ed. Roger Lundin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 99–115, at 112‒113. 
140 The presence of a variant that includes καί in this text (discussed earlier) does not affect my point that the 
initial problem Paul points to is insubordination among the presumptive leaders. 
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Unsurprisingly, Paul placed instructions regarding slaves where they would 
normally appear in a household code—at the end (2:9‒10).141 And, as expected, 
submission was a requirement for slaves. Although 2:1‒10 is indeed a household code, 
several familial relations are absent. The only explicit relations mentioned are between 
older and younger women (2:3‒4), between younger women and their own husbands and 
children (2:5), between Titus and younger men (2:6‒7), and between slaves and their own 
masters (2:9). Paul could take for granted that Titus thought slaves within a household 
should be obedient and not talk back (μὴ ἀντιλέγοντας, 2:9; cf. 1:9), but his discussion of 
slaves evoked other associations and the places of people within the household of God—a 
recognized metaphor for the church.142 In this way, the literal household code reinforced 
the metaphorical environment of God’s household and the call toward specific dispositions 
(prominently, submission) in all types of relationships as articulated elsewhere in Titus.143 
Regarding the theme of submission, note the initial prominence of Paul as a slave 
(δοῦλος, 1:1) of God and leaders pictured as household stewards (οἰκονόμον, 1:7, a 
category of slave or servant). Notice also that attributes customarily associated with 
subordinates, such as slaves, are expected even of leaders in God’s (ideal) household. For 
instance, submission, un-greediness, and not-talking-back all appear as expectations of the 
general church population. These qualities appear both in the household code for slaves 
(2:9‒10) and in the leadership discussion (1:7‒10) as desired traits. The troublemakers, 
however, exhibit the opposite qualities, being contradictory and insubordinate (ἀντιλέγω, 
1:9; ἀνυπότακτος, 1:10). When Paul says, Slaves should be submissive … pleasing … and 
not talk back (Δούλους … ὑποτάσσεσθαι … εὐαρέστους εἶναι, μὴ ἀντιλέγοντας 2:9), he is 
repeating several of the key qualities expected of those who execute authentic leadership 
roles with integrity. They are to instantiate the values of submission and sensibility, just as 
Titus was to be a model for them (τύπον, 2:7; cf. 1 Tim 4:12; Phil 3:17; 2 Thess 3:9; 1 Pet 
5:3). 
 
141 See David E. Aune, The New Testament in Its Literary Environment, vol. 8 of Library of Early 
Christianity, ed. Wayne A. Meeks (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), 196; Jeffers, The Greco-Roman World 
of the New Testament Era, 86–87, 228–29. 
142 Much has been made of the prevalence of this metaphor as distinctive of the Pastorals. The Greek phrases 
translated household of God actually appear in Eph 2:19 (οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ); 1 Tim 3:15 (οἴκῳ θεοῦ); and 1 
Pet 4:17 (τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ θεοῦ). The community of faith portrayed as a household is more of a theme in Titus 
than a set phrase, but it was a ready metaphor throughout Scripture. 
143 The troublemakers’ behaviors occupy the pre-conversion end of the submission-insubordination 
continuum. Being disobedient (ἀπειθής) and serving (δουλέυω) all kinds of passions and pleasures 
characterized us, even Paul, before the kindness and love of God our savior appeared (ἐπιφαίνω) and prior to 
rebirth (παλιγγενεσία). See Titus 3:3‒7. 
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Paul’s expectations of slaves and his general expectations of all Christians parallel 
one another remarkably. In the section of Titus regarding general instructions for all 
Christians, Paul urges showing all gentleness (πᾶσαν ἐνδεικνυμένους πραΰτητα, 3:2); 
while in the section of the household code regarding slaves, he urges showing all good 
faith (πᾶσαν πίστιν ἐνδεικνυμένους ἀγαθήν, 2:10). The actual household code of Titus 2:1‒
10 has an additional layer of significance. The portion regarding slaves submitting does not 
complete an otherwise comprehensive code, but it shows that the expectations of every 
member of the household are parallel with the requirements of good leaders. The 
comparison demonstrates that Paul expects the Christian community to exhibit submission 
from the top to the bottom of the social ladder—an attitude the presumptive leaders in 
Crete did not share. The requirements of a true leader were precisely those of 
servanthood—another contrast with the aggrandizing behavior of the antagonists. The code 
applies comparable values to all people—even Paul, who begins the letter by identifying 
himself within this category of slave (δοῦλος, 1:1; cf. 2:9). Paul indicates that submission, 
non-contentiousness, and un-greediness are specific qualities to look for among those in 
higher-status positions. Titus’s leadership section (1:5‒16) and household code (2:1‒10) 
feature striking correspondences between submission or the lack thereof (ὑποτάσσω, 2:9; 
cf. ἀνυπότακτος, 1:10), talking back or contradicting (ἀντιλέγω, 2:9; cf. 1:9), and 
inappropriate gain (νοσφίζομαι, 2:10; cf. αἰσχροκερδής, 1:7; αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν, 11). 
Servants must be good; despots [δεσπόται, 2:9] ought to be gooder! or so to speak. 
We have now covered several critical themes and topics for understanding the 
audience’s cognitive environment as well as pertinent structural matters. The other kind of 
contextual assumption that readers bring to interpretation are Implicated Premises which 
they must logically infer. 
Implicated Premises 
As we have seen, words and ideas within a hearer’s context—from encyclopedic real-
world knowledge to topics and themes emerging within the discourse—shape his cognitive 
environment and delimit his contextual assumptions. In RT, implicated premises represent 
another kind of contextual assumption. Such premises are that subset of all possible 
contextual assumptions which are logically necessary in order to derive adequate cognitive 
effects for the processing effort expended, thereby arriving at a satisfactory interpretation 
of the utterance and concluding what the speaker intends. 
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Implicated premises are not contained in the informational content of either the 
semantic representation or the knowledge-base of the hearer; thus, strictly speaking, they 
are not within the hearer’s cognitive environment. They are logically required, however, to 
arrive at correct conclusions about utterance meaning. Implicated premises are grounded, 
first, in the presumption of relevance that natural language users bring to communication 
and, second, in the fact that an utterance has been made. Hearers process utterances as if on 
a quest for relevance, as the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance assert. 
Respectively, these principles claim that “human cognition is geared toward the 
maximization of relevance” and that “every ostensive stimulus communicates a 
presumption of its own optimal relevance.”144 Below is a basic example of how hearers 
arrive at implicated premises: 
Utterance in context: 
Ken: Do you fancy a cup of coffee? 
Bev: Actually, I’m avoiding drinks with tannin in them at the moment. 
Explicature: Bev is avoiding drinks with tannin in them.145 
In order for Bev’s utterance to be relevant, something must follow from it that provides a 
response to Ken’s question. Bev could intend to obfuscate and dismiss Ken’s question, 
which he would likely discern if there were not a more likely and cognitively rewarding 
conclusion. This is where Grice’s “Modified Occam’s Razor” helps interpreters decide 
between competing possibilities: “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.”146 
Clark outlines the evidence and logical inferences of the above exchange as follows: 
a. Bev has said that Bev is avoiding tannin. 
b. Bev knows that I know that I have just asked whether Bev wants coffee. 
c. If coffee contains tannin then Bev will not want coffee. 
d. So Bev must think that coffee contains tannin. 
Implicated premise: Coffee contains tannin. 
Implicated conclusion: Bev does not want to drink coffee. 
 
144 See Carston and Uchida, Relevance Theory, 298; Clark, Relevance Theory, 29–34. 
145 This summary is adapted from Clark, who analyzes examples in detail in Relevance Theory, 224–34. 
146 See Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), 468–69. They cite Grice’s claim from his 1967 William 
James Lectures at Harvard. The rule helps to determine when to abort the attempt to stretch into an expected 
range of meaning and instead to reach a simpler pragmatic interpretation, such as, The speaker does not want 
to answer my question. Another implication is that one need not infer what is semantically plain. See Grice’s 
own discussion in “Further Notes on Logic and Conversation,” 47–51. 
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An analyst could find no end to the logically intermediate steps required to infer the 
meaning of an utterance, such as the implicated premise that coffee is a drink, which may 
or may not be encyclopedic real-world knowledge to a hearer. Relevance theorists cannot 
be exhaustive but delineate select intermediate steps for illustrative and explanatory 
purposes. Gibbs underscores the broad scope of such premises: 
These assumptions range from recognition of the mutual belief that both 
author and reader are reasonably competent speakers of the same language 
up to very specific mutual assumptions about particular linguistic and 
conceptual knowledge from which readers can draw inferences about what 
is meant.147 
Notice that whether coffee contains tannin can neither be derived from the semantic 
content of Bev’s statement nor be assumed as within the encyclopedic knowledge of the 
common hearer. Nevertheless, the fact is logically necessary to Ken’s arriving at a 
satisfying (i.e., relevant) interpretation. This is what makes it an implicated premise. 
Implicated premises are critical for understanding the Cretan quotation. Hearers 
infer implicated premises on the basis of their presumption of relevance plus the fact that 
the speaker has made an utterance. In Clark’s words, “implicated conclusions are inferred 
from the explicatures of the utterance plus contextual assumptions, and...implicated 
premises are inferred from the presumption of relevance plus the fact that the utterance has 
been made.”148 The strength of an implicated premise depends on evidence that the speaker 
provides that her intended meaning requires it. The strongest implicated premises are those 
that need to be recovered in order to arrive at a relevant interpretation. Implicated premises 
are contextual assumptions by necessity. Clark explains that contextual assumptions will 
count as implicated premises to the extent that they are required to arrive at a satisfactory 
overall interpretation—that is, an interpretation that rewards the listener with adequate 
cognitive effects for the processing effort.149 
Audiences must combine innumerable contextual assumptions with explicatures to 
arrive at utterance meaning. They must bridge numerous gaps unaided by the semantics of 
the sentences uttered. Although hearers cannot consciously evaluate all possible implicated 
premises (e.g., whether a speaker uses English), certain premises will either be necessary 
or more strongly implicated. In natural language, hearers do not need to identify these 
premises; they just need to assume them. Modern interpreters of the Bible, however, must 
 
147 “Intentionalist Controversy,” 190. 
148 Relevance Theory, 228, original emphasis. 
149 See ibid., 227, 238–39. 
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have various means for evaluating the strength of implications. The three key means are 
hearer intuition, satisfactory coherence, and cognitive effects. I now briefly explain these 
three. 
First: hearer intuition. Interpretations and the premises that contribute to them 
should not violate our intuitions. When people who share a natural language have a 
conversation, their inferential intuitions are generally reliable. Of course, there are multiple 
kinds and degrees of separation when modern readers interpret Scripture; so great care, 
humility, and tentativeness are in order. Nevertheless, in a closing chapter on testing 
pragmatic theories, Clark quotes Recanati, describing the “Availability Hypothesis: In 
determining whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of 
what is said…, we should always try to preserve our pre-theoretical intuitions on the 
matter.”150 This yields a general rule: if an interpretation contradicts our intuitions about 
what an utterance could mean, then it is suspect, or we should at least have other strong 
grounds for accepting it. In this light, some prima facie interpretations seem unsustainable 
because, for one thing, to rebuke them (ἔλεγχε αὐτοὺς, 1:13), meaning either a specific 
ethnic group in the church or its host nation, sounds absurd. 
Second: satisfactory coherence. An implicated premise should yield a more 
coherent reading, so an utterance’s becoming more coherent on the basis of a given 
assumption is evidence for its acceptance. If we assume that the Cretan quotation is being 
spoken by someone of status within the group of troublemakers, then Paul’s concern with 
it is immediately apparent. If we do not assume this, then it is difficult to make sense of its 
placement in Titus 1:12. It seems a non sequitur. 
Third: cognitive effects. One can compare the cognitive effects of interpretations 
that either include or exclude a given premise. In Chapter Three, I discuss cognitive effects 
in more detail, but let us consider them briefly here. Relevance theorists delineate three 
basic kinds of cognitive effects: strengthening an existing assumption, contradicting an 
assumption, or synthesizing new information from new and old assumptions which could 
not be derived from either alone.151 If Paul used the Cretan quotation to actually expose 
and address bigotry in the church, then the cognitive effects would be enormous. That Paul 
intended this effect is plausible; and his original audience would arrive at it if they grasped 
 
150 Ibid., 333; quoting from page 310 of François Recanati, “The Pragmatics of What Is Said,” M&L 4 
(1989): 295–329. 
151 Abbreviated from Clark, Relevance Theory, 102. For fuller discussion, see ibid., 99‒104. 
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the implicated premise that Titus 1:12 served Paul’s purpose of exposing the gospel-
denying, mission-destroying bigotry of the troublemakers rather than of repeating an 
overworn trope about Cretan delinquency. Imagine, by analogy, the cognitive effects that 
extended to Corinthian Christians who had just realized that the Apostle Paul knew of, 
objected to, and chastened the church regarding incest (1 Cor 5:1). 
Let us examine the implicated premise that Paul’s utterance in Titus 1:12 aims at 
serving the purposes of the Christian community in Crete by exposing the character and 
behavior of troublemakers on the bases of intuition, coherence, and effects. Intuition 
suggests that Paul’s concern in the epistle is a Christian community that includes ethnic 
Cretans and Jews as well as the troublemakers among them. That is, these troublemakers 
are within the church. Barrett holds this premise explicitly: “The objectors are not outside 
the Church, but within it; the author would not have found it necessary to deal with the 
heathen in this way.”152 Unfortunately, he does not carry its implications forward into his 
interpretation, concluding that Paul had a low view of Cretans generally and a high view of 
the speaker of the quotation irrespective of their relation to the church. One piece of 
evidence for accepting the implicated premise that Paul’s use of the Cretan quotation was 
part of intra-community, as opposed to extra-community, paraenesis is the target of the 
rebuke—i.e., whom it addressed. As throughout the NT, the paraenesis was aimed within 
the community, not at the wider world. Paul’s instructions made sense on the basis of this 
implicated premise. He did not address the character and the sins of those outside the 
church, except as regards believers’ responses to it. Paul instructed Titus in what to do with 
the troublemakers (1:13‒14), not with Cretans in general. One specific instruction that is 
central to the context (1:10‒16) and that is repeated within the letter (1:9, 13; 2:15) is 
Paul’s sanction to convict or rebuke (ἐλέγχω, 1:9, 13)153 those who contradict (ἀντιλέγω, 
1:9; cf. 2:9). This instruction corresponds closely to that of admonishing a divisive person 
(νουθεσία, αἱρετικὸς ἄνθρωπος, 3:10). The reason Paul initially said that elders must be 
able to rebuke (ἐλέγχω, 1:9) those who contradict is because (γὰρ, 1:10) of the presence 
and activity of troublemakers. So, Titus’s rebuke (ἔλεγχω, 1:13) was directed at those 
troublemakers and not at the Cretans in general. Barrett recognizes that the antagonists, 
“rather than heathen” in general, are a part of the Christian community; yet, because he 
does not carry this premise into his interpretation, he maintains that ethnic Cretans merit a 
 
152 Pastoral Epistles, 130. 
153 See entry for ἐλέγχω in BDAG, 315. 
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rebuke on the basis of 1:13—a classic mismatch between the contextual assumptions of the 
original audience and a modern interpreter.154 
In Titus, Paul enjoined different kinds of rebuke (ἐλέγχω in 1:9 and 13; ἐπιστομίζω 
in 1:11; νουθεσία in 3:10) but always toward the same kind of target. He referred to 
antagonists in general terms (e.g., 1:9; cf. 2:8); but original recipients of the letter were 
likely able to successfully correlate Paul’s descriptions to recognized individuals or groups 
according to the character, behavior, and attributes he mentioned. An implicated premise 
that original recipients of the letter likely inferred was that actual troublemakers causing 
actual problems were behind Paul’s discussion of such things. In other words, their 
cognitive quest for relevance would have automatically triggered correspondences between 
items in Paul’s speech and items in their world. Modern readers automatically do this, too, 
but with an unavoidable mismatch. For the historical author and recipient, the references 
would be to a more closely shared set of persons and circumstances. 
The purpose of the rebuke provides additional evidence for accepting the 
implicated premise that the Cretan quotation is commensurate with intra-community 
paraenesis. Although interventions for this serious issue were to be conducted sternly 
(ἀποτόμως 1:13), they were generally restorative and aimed to bring the offending party 
into a healthy (ὑγιαίνω and cognates in 1:9, 13; 2:1, 2, 8) relationship with both the truth 
and the congregation. Again, Barrett judges correctly: “The word [ὑγιαίνω] suggests not 
only freedom from error, but also teaching which is able to impart healthiness, that is, 
salvation.”155 The goal was restoration for the sake of the entire community, including the 
troublemakers. The aim of Titus’s rebuke can be called restorative in that the purpose (ἵνα, 
1:13) was well-being (ὑγιαίνω, 1:13). The intention was that the presumptive leaders 
would be themselves sound in the faith, just as was expected of elders (1:9), older men 
(2:2), and Titus himself (2:1, 8). Those within the church who stirred up strife and misled 
entire Cretan households were not to be utterly and finally shunned; they could be restored 
as long as they heeded Titus’s stern rebuke (1:13; cf. 3:10). 
The purpose of Titus’s rebuke was not to turn those dastardly Cretans toward the 
right way of thinking and living. Such a view does not accept the implicated premise that 
Paul was engaged in intra-community paraenesis and also fails on the basis of intuition and 
coherence. It neglects to reckon with the real problems of going on a wholesale campaign 
 
154 See Pastoral Epistles, 130. 
155 Ibid. 
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to transform a population without any reference to the gospel. Taking the quotation prima 
facie leads Mounce to wonder “if the description … might also include non-Christian 
society in Crete.”156 This question is unnecessary because, in Titus, Paul expressed a 
doctrine of Christian transformation that was incompatible with a description of converts 
as intrinsically reprobate, regardless of ethnicity (2:11‒15; 3:3‒7). Titus was not being 
instructed to rebuke Cretans in general but a group quite distinct from that description—
those who reinforced the doctrine that Cretans had an inferior status as Gentile believers.157 
The goal was restoration within the community of all constituents of the community. Now 
that I have explained implicated premises and observed some examples in Titus, I will use 
an RT-inspired schematic to show the progression from sentence-in-context to 
propositional interpretation. 
Schematic Model 
Sperber and Wilson delineate the logical process of moving from linguistically-encoded 
semantic representations through explicatures to implicatures. The process involves 
forming and testing hypotheses, and they present example schematics that Relevance 
theorists sometimes replicate to outline interpretations.158 At the end of this section, I 
produce an example schematic model that outlines hypotheses formed in the process of 
understanding Titus 1:12‒14.159 Even though the process is rapid, intuitive, and virtually 
simultaneous for natural language users, we logically delineate the following inferential 
tasks for interpretation: hearers enrich the semantic representation (logical form) by 
inference to derive explicatures; they then combine those explicatures with contextual 
assumptions, including implicated premises, to arrive at propositional interpretations 
(implicatures or implicated conclusions). In the schematic model below (Tables 3a‒c), I 
outline these tasks sequentially from top-to-bottom for transparency. I begin with the 
linguistically-encoded semantic representation from a reference in Titus. I draw out 
reasonable explicatures in propositional form. Then, I summarize some critical contextual 
assumptions. According to RT, hearers infer meaning from the interaction of items in these 
 
156 Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 398. 
157 The PE feature restorative justice. Paul imposed discipline to instruct not condemn: whom I have handed 
over to Satan in order that (ἵνα) they might be taught (1 Tim 1:20). Barrett says of this passage, “This may 
mean that they were to be restored by some kind of disciplinary process.” See Pastoral Epistles, 22. 
158 See “Pragmatics” (2007), 482. For variations developed from their conceptualizations, see Clark, 
Relevance Theory, 297–99. 
159 For an example of such models, see Clark, Relevance Theory, 224 (example 24). I base my process on a 
schematic that Clark uses repeatedly, though not in chart form. 
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middle two rows; so, lastly, I present relevant implicatures.160 As noted, it is impossible to 
capture every intermediate logical step on the way to an interpretation, so the schematic is 
illustrative. I go through this process with three example passages to demonstrate one 
transparent approach to the process of a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic. 
Table 3a—Titus 1:12a 





εἶπέν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης 




An unnamed person that belongs to a previously mentioned 
group, who is considered a prophet within that group, has said the 






Paul does not claim ownership of the statement he is about to 
utter, but he emphatically refers to the speaker as one of theirs. 
The trustworthiness of the quotation depends on that of the 
group referred to as them. 
The only group that Paul describes in the immediately prior 
context of several verses was comprised of troublemakers. 
For a person to be considered a prophet among such a group is 
no compliment at all. 
The speaker, therefore, is not trustworthy, and Paul does not 
share or endorse his opinion. 
The context should illuminate Paul’s actual reason for 
mentioning the quotation given that he does not sympathize with it. 
In the context, Paul describes character, behavior, and 
motivations of the troublemakers in contrast to good leaders. 





Paul is framing a quotation with which he does not agree that 
comes from a group of people whom he opposes in order to more 
clearly expose the character, behavior, and speech of troublemakers 
in Crete in stark contrast to the kinds of leaders the church needs. 
He is about to reveal objectionable words that have been spoken 
among this group. 
  
 
160 See ibid., 228. 
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Table 3a—Titus 1:13a-b 





ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀληθής. δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν ἔλεγχε αὐτοὺς 
ἀποτόμως 





Paul swears upon the veracity of the evidence he has presented. 
The claim that Paul has just made is true; and, because the 
accusation that Paul has made is true, Paul orders Titus to severely 






Paul refers to what he has just said as a testimony. 
The last sentence that Paul said was clearly framed as a 
quotation of someone else’s words. 
That sentence was proverbial, not testimonial, and it was 
embedded in a hearsay clause. 
Paul’s own voice is heard in the framing of the Cretan quotation 
from which he distances himself as he mentions it. 
Paul is referring to his full claim that someone has uttered the 
Cretan quotation as his testimony. 
Context indicates that Paul describes the character and behavior 
of the troublemakers, which includes speaking slurs and falsehoods. 
Paul refers to his claim as an accusation that calls for Titus to 
convict the group from which such speech emerges. 
As a mentor who takes the health of the church seriously, this 
suggests that Paul objects to the sort of behavior his voice describes 
(i.e., dredging up old, offensive stereotypes and using them to 




Paul objects so severely to the kind of behavior that the 
troublemakers engage in, exemplified by the currency of the Cretan 
quotation among them, that he uses the sharp, courtroom language 
of testimony, accusation, and conviction to convey the seriousness 





Table 3a—Titus 1:13c-14 





ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει, μὴ προσέχοντες Ἰουδαϊκοῖς μύθοις 
καὶ ἐντολαῖς ἀνθρώπων ἀποστρεφομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 
in order that they might be sound in the faith, not attending to 




The envisioned result of the aforementioned corrective action 
toward the group that concerns Paul includes being healthy in faith, 
which contrasts with paying attention to Jewish myths and paying 






A result is a change in circumstances; therefore, the previous 
state of the relevant group probably contrasts in significant ways 
from that envisioned. 
Both of the behaviors that Paul thinks would end as a result of 
the rebuke explicitly involve religio-cultural interests of a Jewish 
nature (Jewish myths, commandments), so the behaviors that Paul 
objects to and wants Titus to correct emerge from such interests. 
The Cretan quotation does not suggest that its targets (ethnic 
Cretans) have any problem with over-adherence to Jewish myths 
and commandments—far from it; the very opposite seems true. 
The description of Cretans in the quotation corresponds to some 
Jewish sensibilities about the nature of Gentiles in the world. 
This quotation, if accepted, provides ample grounds to promote 
the austerity and restraint that might come from embracing Jewish 
religious culture, even if such would be contrary to Paul’s gospel. 
Therefore, the rebuke is aimed at such people as might hold to 
and advance the contents of the quotation; namely, troublemakers, 
who have been described as having Jewish affinities. 
The rebuke Paul orders is meant to counteract the bigoted 
purveyance of the quotation and does not directly address 




By obeying Paul and correcting those who have kept the Cretan 
quotation current among them, Titus will nurture healthy faith 
among his ethnically diverse Christian community and curb the 
divisive influence of status-driven doctrines that frame fellow-
believers as aliens and inferiors on the basis of empty (ματαιο- 
1:10; 3:9) and misguided (φρεναπάτης, 1:10) comparisons of value. 
Interpretation involves a complex combination of implicit and explicit information, 
and the logical form provides only an indication of speaker meaning. Sperber and Wilson 
write, “The hearer’s task is to use this indication, together with background knowledge, to 
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construct an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning, guided by expectations of relevance 
raised by the utterance itself.” Although abstractly, this describes Titus’s task as he 
processed Paul’s instructions. In summary form, the model above outlines this process.161 
I now summarize key explicatures and plausible contextual assumptions that we 
have covered: Paul was concerned with church leadership throughout Titus 1:5‒16. He had 
just described good leadership (1:5‒9) and had moved on to address bad leadership (1:10‒
16). The quotative frame that Paul used (1:12a) followed directly from his succinct 
description of presumptive leaders (1:10‒11), yielding the contextual assumption that he 
was about to tell Titus something that one of those people had said. The several pronouns 
in this context (οὓς, οἵτινες, 1:11; αὐτῶν, 1:122; αὐτούς, 1:13) had no clearer referent than 
the troublemakers. The prophet was a prophet in their eyes, not necessarily in Paul’s. 
Ethno-religious tensions existed in the Cretan church (or, at least, the literary 
representation we have of such). These tensions involved the illicit elevation of persons 
with Jewish affinities over against ethnic Cretans. Paul’s descriptions of such corresponded 
to Titus’s local, real-world evaluation and previous knowledge of circumstances in the 
Cretan church. An implicated conclusion emerges from these assumptions: It is natural to 
think that Titus expected Paul to address the issue of ethno-religious bigotry in the Cretan 
church in such a way as to shun it and chart a more peaceful way forward. 
Having demonstrated how contextual assumptions critically influence interpretation 
and how they may be mismatched between ancient audiences and modern readers, let us 
consider a crucial factor that affects what readers assume—Salience. We will see that 
interpretations sometimes differ because salience differs between ancient audiences and 
modern readers. 
II. Salience for Original Audiences versus Modern Eavesdroppers 
Why has Cretan come to mean reprobate in Titus 1:12 if that is not what Paul originally 
intended? Here, the role of the hearer is pivotal. The prima facie interpretation probably 
has more salience for modern readers than for those in the original context, even when 
modern readers resist the most damaging implications of the interpretation.162 The 
 
161 “Pragmatics” (2007), 481. 
162 Tracy explains a critical component of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s argument: “The fact is that no interpreter 
in any discipline approaches any text or any historical event without prejudgments formed by the history of 
the effects of the interpreter’s culture.” See “Interpretation (Hermeneutics),” 344. I have pointed out the 
effects of dubious attribution and the history of interpretation for many readers of Titus. 
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quotation is striking and brash; and readers who are removed from the original context, 
where Paul’s critique of known acquaintances would have been mortifying, easily arrive at 
the prima facie interpretation, because it requires less effort for them. Such salience can 
put faulty interpretations on the fast-track for modern minds. Furlong makes one of her 
most significant points about why RT needs to be applied to literary interpretation: 
“Communication creates a presumption of optimal relevance. However, … there is no 
guarantee that an interpretation that satisfies the reader’s expectation of relevance is in fact 
the intended interpretation.”163 The interpretation that rewards modern-day readers with 
cognitive effects may not be the interpretation that gave sufficient cognitive effects to 
ancient readers within Titus’s community and vice versa. 
One consequence of the rapidity of natural language comprehension is that 
whatever is salient for a given audience tends to dominate their attention and 
disproportionately influence interpretation.164 In contemporaneous conversations, this 
tendency makes communication and comprehension both effective and efficient. But, it 
can lead to unfortunate misunderstandings for readers who are not from the original 
audience. Salience, by definition, draws attention to important features of an utterance, 
making real-time decisions easier for the hearer. We must make the humble and critical 
recognition that what is salient to modern-day readers may differ from what was salient to 
original audiences. We can explain this difference, in part, as a result of the human mind 
intuitively applying normal processes of contemporaneous comprehension to the reading 
of (non-contemporaneous) ancient literature. Gibbs discusses the nature—rapid and 
unconscious—and some of the consequences of natural language comprehension: 
All language interpretation takes place in real-time ranging from the first 
milliseconds of processing to long-term reflective analysis. This temporal 
continuum may roughly be divided into moments corresponding to 
linguistic comprehension, recognition, interpretation and appreciation. 
Comprehension refers to the immediate moment-by-moment process of 
creating meanings for utterances. These moment-by-moment processes are 
mostly unconscious and involve the analysis of different linguistic 
information (e.g. phonology, lexical access, syntax) which, in combination 
 
163 “Relevance Theory,” 76. 
164 See Furlong, “Relevance Theory.” Although when she talks about salience she is referring to discourse 
prominence (138‒144), she does talk about intentional versus accidental salience, which corresponds more to 
my usage of this relatively fluid term in RT. What corresponds more to my usage is the contrast she makes 
between a hearer’s quest for optimal relevance, which she calls exegesis, and his alternative quest for 
maximal relevance, which she calls eisegesis (54-56). 
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with context and real-world knowledge, allows listeners/readers to figure 
out what an utterance means or what a speaker/author intends.165 
Consider the following example: After purchasing a new-to-us family vehicle, I 
told my wife, “I’m going to bring home the minivan.” My toddler overheard and protested 
when I returned with a vehicle that did not feature the Disney character Minnie Mouse. 
“Where’s Minnie?” she asked. The Mouse had more salience for her than a prefix 
regarding the relative size of our van in comparison to others. This innocent, even 
adorable, error demonstrates the effect of salience upon interpretation for intended 
audiences versus eavesdroppers. Kecskes Istvan explains that the salience of statements 
can override expectations of continuity and cause hearers to accept interpretations that are 
contextually incoherent.166 In a conversation about transporting a family vehicle (minivan), 
salience triggers my daughter’s attention so that, for her, the conversation is about a 
cartoon mouse (Minnievan). The Cretan quotation appears in the midst of a conversation 
about the presumptive and disruptive behavior of troublemakers and provides an example 
of speech that Paul finds objectionable, but the salience of the ethnic insult causes us to 
ignore Paul’s agenda so that he becomes the bigot. Hámori Ágnes demonstrates how the 
salience of a statement can jar listeners into paying attention to a narrow segment of 
dialogue when they failed to follow the rest of the context.167 Hopefully, interpreters can 
relinquish long-held and favored interpretations when offered historically and linguistically 
plausible and relevant alternatives. 
Mounce observes that most people bring questions of concern to themselves when 
they approach the PE.168 There is some validity to reading the Bible this way—for 
instance, as Scripture for the Christian community. It does not, however, promise to lead 
modern readers closer to historical meanings. Modern interests can unmoor contemporary 
readings from an author’s intent, especially if readers do not recognize those interests as 
foreign to the original conversational context.169 For modern readers of the PE, the most 
 
165 Gibbs, “Intentionalist Controversy,” 196–97. 
166 See “The Role of Salience in Processing Pragmatic Units,” ALH 51 (2004): 309–24. 
167 Many of her examples come from political speeches. See “Illocutionary Force, Salience and Attention 
Management: A Social Cognitive Pragmatic Perspective,” ALH 57 (2010): 53–74. I discuss illocutionary 
force in Chapter Three. 
168 See Pastoral Epistles, x. 
169 I am focusing on the hearer’s role, taking speaker competence for granted. According to their abilities and 
preferences, speakers say what they think is relevant enough for the effort of the hearer, but the calculus does 
not always work. See Wilson and Sperber, “Pragmatics and Time,” 8–9. They list reasons that an utterance 
may be less relevant than expected. Among them: “The speaker may not have the information that the hearer 
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crucial questions seem to be authorship and views on women. Others, of course, exist, but 
several scholars identify these as at the forefront of modern concern.170 It is why Dibelius 
and Conzelmann can read the Cretan quotation and conclude that its purpose was to 
preserve the ruse of Pauline authorship. Such a conclusion does not help interpreters to 
understand the quotation in its context—historical or literary. Preoccupied with signals of 
authorship, Paul’s intentions become secondary.171 Many readers begin with questions in 
their minds that likely did not concern Titus’s earliest readers, and their sensibilities are 
triggered by a different set of socio-cultural concerns than original audiences held. This is 
not to say that modern concerns or valuations of socio-historical matters are inferior to 
ancient ones, but simply to point out that difference can lead to divergence and, thus, 
dubious interpretations. 
If salience, like a squirrel to a dog, can cause modern readers to attend to a different 
set of concerns than those that interested original audiences, we will want to understand 
two things to mitigate this tendency: What factors lead to salience? and What can modern 
readers do to recover what was salient for ancient audiences? 
Means of Salience (a.k.a., Prominence) 
Accessibility, intensity, and conspicuousness contribute to the salience of a concept. 
Within a hearer’s cognitive environment, certain contextual implications are more 
accessible than others. Studies of Fodorian modularity of mind have shown that people 
recall words more quickly when they have heard either those words or related words 
recently. These studies have been tested repeatedly with confirmatory results, showing that 
recency is a factor in making implied assumptions accessible.172 Another important factor 
 
 
would find most relevant; she may be unwilling to give it, or unable to think of it at the time ... lack of time, 
lack of ability or stylistic preferences may prevent her expressing herself in the most economical way.” 
170 See, e.g., Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, x; and Collins, “Pastorals.” 
171 Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral Epistles, lviii. For them, authorship was a settled question prior to 
interpreting Titus. 
172 Clark, along with Sperber, Wilson, and others, identify Relevance Theory with commitments to Jerry 
Fodor’s modularity of mind hypotheses. Clark writes, “Relevance theory is Chomskyan in that it assumes 
that the linguistic system is independent of other kinds of knowledge and Fodorian in that it assumes a 
modular architecture.” See Relevance Theory, 347–49. Fodorian modularity basically posits that the mind, 
with general but as-yet largely unexplored correlations to the brain’s neurological architecture, is made up of 
functional modules that accomplish discrete processes related to sound, patterns, memory, reason, etc. For 
explanation of the correspondence between RT and Fodor’s hypotheses as well as discussion of specific 
experiments, see ibid., 91–97. See also Ernst-August Gutt, “Relevance and Translation,” in In the Mind and 
across Minds, Agnieszka Piskorska, et al, eds. (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 292‒310, at 296. 
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in making contextual assumptions accessible is the prominence of the contextual 
assumption. Relevance theorists tend to use prominence and salience interchangeably; but 
prominence can have the added sense of being conspicuous or unavoidable, whereas 
salience is usually a conceptual designation. 
I adapt here an illustration from Clark about the salience of a child’s cut finger in 
determining that a speaker’s utterance has to do with the results of the injury. Because the 
mother and the son share the assumption that the boy is wailing on account of his cut 
finger, the boy is poised to interpret whatever she says as relevant to this inescapably 
salient concern. So, if she says, You’re not going to die, then he does not take this as an 
absolute prediction that he will defy the fate of all living things. Neither does he regard it 
simply as a non-relevant prediction that he will not die in the near future—although this is 
closer to the truth, it is otherwise non-relevant.173 Rather, he understands, by way of 
implicature, that she is telling him that he will not die in the near future as a result of this 
cut, so stop overreacting! By her talking about death in the face of a minor flesh wound, 
she is echoing his overreaction ironically and thereby critiquing it. When something is 
prominent enough in a hearer’s mind, its salience triggers contextual assumptions of 
relevance that factor into interpretation.174 
A salient concept saves a hearer time and processing effort and increases relevance; 
thus, when a concept is salient for an individual hearer—even though it was not expected 
to be so by the speaker—the risk of misinterpretation increases. The prima facie 
interpretation of Titus 1:12 leans on the salience of the quotation as an insult. It sticks out 
so much to modern readers that they lose track of the grammatical, topical, rhetorical, and 
social contexts in which it appears. In other words, its intensity as an insult increases its 
salience for modern audiences. The divergence between what was salient for the original 
audience and what is salient for a modern audience can cause interpreters to succumb to a 
red herring. This explains why many accept readings that, upon closer examination, appear 
misguided. 
To illustrate, imagine the difference in the level of salience between a person 
speaking to you about adultery (somewhat salient) and a person accusing you of adultery 
 
173 I use the term non-relevant in place of irrelevant because I am speaking more technically about the failure 
of an interpretation to satisfy the requirements of relevance dictated by RT. 
174 For Clark’s less dramatic version of the cut finger illustration, see Relevance Theory, 151–52. Clark 
explains how salience potentially decreases processing effort, thereby increasing relevance. For his 
discussion of factors that decrease processing effort, see his fourth chapter (123‒155). 
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(extremely salient). For the epistle’s original audience, Paul’s mention of the insult would 
not have been nearly as salient as his accusation that exposed the offenses of members 
within their community against their fellow-believers and against Paul’s gospel. Removed 
from this singular ancient social context, modern readers accentuate the residual salience 
of the insult. In an article on race written at the popular level, Michael Shermer discusses 
the salience of racially prejudiced talk. He points out that “negative words have more 
emotional salience than positive words.”175 
Interpreters accept various prima facie readings; because, apart from the 
conversational context, the quotation itself is salient as an expressive insult. Expressives 
can convey a speaker’s attitude toward what she says unambiguously. They have a 
pragmatic effect beyond their semantic meaning; they can jar listeners by heightening 
emotional intensity. Suwon Yoon (also quoting Christopher Potts) explains, “The hallmark 
of expressives is that when uttered, they have ‘an immediate and powerful impact on the 
context.’”176 The Cretan quotation features negative expressives, which explains why it 
leaps out to modern readers as salient; but, to the original audience, its salience may have 
been no greater than a hackneyed stereotype in comparison to the shaming effect of Paul 
bringing this closed-door speech to light and taking the troublemakers to court (as 
described above).177 
All of the contextual assumptions delineated above in this chapter have 
implications for what was salient to the ancient readers. For instance, Paul’s designation of 
the troublemakers as abominable (βδελυκτοὶ, 1:16) had strong religious overtones. It 
turned the tables on the Cretans’ critics. Paul used this word with a cluster of other 
religiously charged words to describe the true economy of clean (καθαρός, 1:153) and 
defiled (μιαίνω, 1:152). This rearrangement of religious designations exposed the 
troublemakers’ misalignment with Paul’s gospel. For the Cretan church, conversant with 
Jewish religious culture as they apparently were, the connotations of this kind of speech 
would have been salient. According to the troublemakers, the Cretans were unfit for 
Christian community and good works, but Paul strikingly reoriented the means of religious 
and social value on these presumptive leaders—it was they who were unfit, defiled, 
 
175 “Are We All Racists Deep Inside?” Scientific American, August 1, 2017. 
176 Yoon, “Semantic Constraint,” 48. 
177 In addition to the difference in the modern reader’s mind of what is salient, the modern tendency to read 
and interpret shorter, disconnected passages of Scripture contributes to distortions of meaning. We disallow 
the broader context to illuminate meaning, and we are gripped by a different set of interests. 
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unfaithful, abominable, and unworthy (1:15‒16). With some understanding of how to 
identify what is salient, let us consider some possible ways to recover salience for original 
audiences. 
Recovering Aspects of Salience for Ancient Readers 
How can we recover what was salient for original audiences? Hermeneutical approaches 
that are geared toward amplifying stifled voices could be an asset to relevance-guided 
biblical hermeneutics. Such approaches, although sometimes thorny and suspect for other 
reasons, assume that the comfortable bourgeoisie modern interpreter’s own intuitions are 
prone to self-interest and oblivious disregard for the voices of the disenfranchised.178 In the 
ears of modern interpreters, original authors and audiences are often the last to have a 
hearing. Two complementary hermeneutical approaches that may illuminate the ethnically-
charged text of Titus and interpretations of it have been called hermeneutics of retrieval 
and hermeneutics of suspicion. I call them approaches, because they are not methods in a 
technical sense. A common criticism of these approaches is that they lack consistency and 
precision when applied by various scholars.179 We may use them, nevertheless, to 
illuminate ancient sensibilities regarding what was salient and what was relevant. 
The phrase hermeneutics of retrieval typically refers to approaches that endeavor to 
give voice to populations stifled by patriarchal or, using Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s 
term, kyriarchal interpretations.180 Such approaches do not need to have a pre-chosen 
“ideological position” by which to yield “advocacy readings.”181 In the case of Titus, I 
contend that Paul’s, Titus’s, and the Cretans’ voices have been stifled by previous 
hegemonic interpretations.182 In contrast to typical retrievals, I aim to recover these, so I 
 
178 Kune Biezeveld, along with the pioneers of “Reading Otherwise,” Gerald O. West and Musa Dube, 
advises that it is crucial to “reckon with one’s own subjectivity as a biblical scholar.” See Biezeveld, “The 
Role of ‘The Other’ in the Reading of the Bible: Towards a New Roadmap for Bible Reading in the Western 
World,” AERBD, 123–39, at 134. See also Gerald O. West, ed., Reading Other-Wise: Socially Engaged 
Biblical Scholars Reading with Their Local Communities, Semeia Studies 62 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2007). Eric Anum encourages “the biblical interpreter to become aware of his or her own hidden 
preconceptions or antipathies.” In the practice of “Reading Otherwise,” we do this through dialogue with a 
culturally different person. How else can we see our own blindspots? See “Collaborative and Interactive 
Hermeneutics in Africa: Giving Dialogical Privilege in Biblical Interpretation,” AERBD, 143–65, at 149. 
179 See the critique by Werner Kahl in “Growing Together: Challenges and Chances in the Encounter of 
Critical and Intuitive Interpreters of the Bible,” RO-W (2007): 147–58. 
180 See “Feminist Studies in Religion and a Radical Democratic Ethos 1,” R&T 2 (1995): 122–44. She first 
coined the term in But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Boston: Beacon, 1992). 
181 See Richard S. Briggs, The Virtuous Reader: Old Testament Narrative and Interpretive Virtue, Studies in 
Theological Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 37. 
182 Lyon encourages interpreting “from an acknowledged perspective,” as opposed to the “imperial, 
authoritarian, paternalistic, patriarchal.” See Lyon, “Sliding in All Directions,” 114. 
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have traced some of the interpretive misdemeanors regarding Titus to assumptions 
introduced by the history of interpretation. 
A relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic would attempt readings that are sensitized 
to unheard voices and ambivalent to dominant interpretations. The aim must include “the 
retrieval of forgotten perspectives.”183 When David W. Tracy, a pioneer in hermeneutics of 
retrieval, originally spoke about the forgotten perspective of the “classic” text as the 
“other” that we come to encounter, what he meant largely by “retrieval” was the retrieval 
of the meaning of texts, liberated from the distortions of convention, interpreted through 
dialogue with diverse persons. Later scholars developed from Tracy a foundation for 
retrieving more and more nuanced layers of forgotten (not presumed) meaning.184 
I ask, Whose perspective is more forgotten than that of ancient Cretan Christians? 
Tracy urged that interpreters have a responsibility to recall “the subversive memories of 
individuals and whole peoples whose names we do not even know.”185 With a hermeneutic 
of retrieval, we may begin to grasp the perspective of members of Titus’s Cretan church. 
Such a hermeneutic is especially appropriate for ethnically-charged texts, where a reader’s 
prejudices may increase the likelihood of distortion. Interpretations of Titus 1:12 often 
betray ethnography “under the influence” of previous well-meaning but dubious and 
unsustainable explanations. Klangwisan asserts that an RT approach to interpretation 
“presupposes a will to listen emphatically to the voice of the text. A hermeneutic of 
consent must be at work. The consenting reader agrees to follow the voice to its 
origins.”186 Guided by RT, the close reading that I have demonstrated complements a 
hermeneutic of retrieval (plus consent), which may help readers gain new insights into the 
meaning of this text within its ancient environment. 
I have applied a hermeneutic of suspicion to influential secondary literature on 
Titus that tends to favor the othering of the Cretans. When interpreters apply a hermeneutic 
of suspicion, they aim to identify when one voice is silencing the other. This silencing 
happens tacitly when readers reiterate conventional interpretations of the text that are 
salient for modern readers rather than listening carefully and sympathetically to the text 
 
183 Michael Barnes, “Tracy in Dialogue: Mystical Retrieval and Prophetic Suspicion,” HeyJ 34 (1993): 60–
65, at 60. 
184 See ibid., 60–65. See also David W. Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987). 
185 David W. Tracy, “The Dialogue of Jews and Christians: A Necessary Hope,” Chicago Theological 
Seminary Register 76 (1986): 20–28, at 23. 
186 Earthing the Cosmic Queen, 21. 
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itself. Applying such an approach to interpretations of Titus exposes the gravitational 
influence of prima facie readings. Given that the silencing of the other seems to be 
happening most clearly at the level of the secondary literature, I have critically examined 
several major interpretations of the Cretan quotation and its context. Applying a 
hermeneutic of suspicion to interpretations requires one to hold the conclusions of 
secondary literature and modern readers, including one’s own, tentatively.187 
Interpreters of Titus need to be questioned concerning their so readily reading 
othering speech into the text.188 Consider how these interpretations would sound to those 
who are disparaged. Several commentators want to come to the defense of those insulted 
from the onslaught of Paul’s bigotry, but their assumptions and proclivities do not allow 
them to consider whether Paul was acting in their defense in the first place.189 I contend 
that this history of interpretation has been too satisfied with the scenario of a presumptive 
and uncouth biblical pseudonym uttering off-handed (yet somehow sophisticated and 
poetic) slurs to hear Paul coming to the defense of Cretan believers by exposing and 
rebuking bigotry. In the words of Tracy, pioneer in the hermeneutics of retrieval, 
“Retrieval now demands both critique and suspicion.”190 
A hermeneutic of retrieval can assist in hearing the lost voice of the Cretan 
missionary congregation. Much of the writing on hermeneutics of retrieval regards 
feminist and postcolonial interpretation, and other attempts to listen for unheard voices in 
the biblical text have been growing in currency among scholars for a generation. The aim 
of retrieval is not to obscure Scripture’s plain meaning or to acquire justice for the 
oppressed in spite of or in contradiction to the message of the Bible. Rather, it attempts to 
interpret Scripture more equitably toward persons without the power to attain peace or 
justice on their own behalf. It is based on two assumptions: first, the concerns of the 
 
187 Tracy articulates the rationale for retrieval being crucial to interpretation, which is why Titus 1:12 must be 
examined in this way: “No classic text comes to us without the plural and ambiguous history of effects of its 
own production and all its former receptions ... Plurality seems an adequate word to suggest the extraordinary 
variety which any study of language shows ... Ambiguity may be too mild a word to describe the strange 
mixture of great good and frightening evil that our history reveals.” See “Dialogue,” 20–28, at 24. 
188 See Biezeveld, “Role of ‘The Other,’” 129. For her, listening to “the other” means “hearing of the voice 
from an unfamiliar context and an unfamiliar perspective which disturbs what is familiar.” 
189 E.g., Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 139; Stegemann, “Anti-Semitic and Racist,” 288–91, et passim; 
Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, 190. Twomey contends that Raymond Collins downplays the force of 
Paul’s bigotry. See Twomey, Pastoral Epistles, 192. Ronald Charles is certainly both vulgar and extreme 
when he writes that the Apostle Paul is no less than “a rapist of the nations.” Quoted in Don Garlington, 
review of Paul and the Politics of Diaspora, by Ronald Charles, RBL [http://www.bookreviews.org] 2016. 
190 “Dialogue,” 26. 
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powerless are typically stifled in human enterprises at meaning-making; and, second, peace 
and justice for the powerless is what is lacking in the absence of peace and justice globally. 
Many scholars involved in hermeneutics of retrieval point to Tracy as a pioneer in 
constructive theology and in the recognition that interpretation requires dialogue.191 The 
approach may be open to criticism, but it deserves a hearing as interpreters recognize that 
more conventional critical interpretations are not themselves without bias.192 Using this 
approach, we may discern whether Paul’s genuine voice has been stifled by our history of 
interpretation, rather than by the “Paul” of Titus, and perhaps whether this Paul is actually 
speaking up on behalf of the Cretans. 
To increase the likelihood of capturing what was salient for original audiences and 
to diminish the volume of what is prominent for modern readers, we must become aware 
of ourselves as eavesdroppers into an ancient conversation. When we have a strong 
reaction to a statement, we can examine why, rather than assume that we are responding as 
original audiences would have. What we find most scintillating may not be what interested 
them. This is where a hermeneutic of retrieval, when applied sympathetically, can aid our 
recovery and interpretation of voices stifled by a contentious, confusing, or convoluted 
history of interpretation. We hear scintillating vulgarity in Titus 1:12, whereas they heard 
loss of honor as troublemakers were exposed. In Chapter Three, we now turn to examine 
such emotional and social outcomes of speech as scintillation and loss of honor and other 
Non-Propositional Dimensions of Communication.
 
191 With hope for the peace-making implications of such efforts, Tracy writes, “Seething beneath that great 
grey western virtue of reasoned public discourse is, I believe, the desire really to hear one another once again 
and the passion to overhear together the still disclosive and emancipatory power of the Christian tradition.” 
See David W. Tracy, “Modes of Theological Argument,” ThTo 33 (1977): 387–95, at 395. 
192 E.g., Jeremy Punt, Postcolonial Biblical Interpretation: Reframing Paul, Studies in Theology and 
Religion 20 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 48, 109, 150, et passim. 
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Chapter Three – The Non-Propositional Dimensions of 
Communication 
The end products of relevance-guided interpretation thus far have been more clearly 
articulated propositions. The final insight that I will cover involves the recognition that 
speech has purposes beyond even the most lucid propositions. Some biblical scholars have 
taken interest in the contribution that Speech-Act Theory (SAT) makes to understanding 
some of the non-propositional dimensions of communication. As Relevance theorists 
endeavor to offer a comprehensive account of communication that incorporates these 
dimensions, they frequently rely on the grammar of SAT to describe features of language 
they observe. 
Whereas previous chapters featured detailed examinations of words and phrases, 
ideas and their relationships in Titus, this chapter concerns the broader paraenetic thrust of 
the book and of Paul’s use of the Cretan quotation. When one reads Titus according to the 
insight that communication inherently involves non-propositional dimensions, one 
recognizes that Paul aimed to affect readers not merely at the level of what they thought. 
As I address particulars of Titus below, I argue that Paul aimed directly at life-change, not 
by arguing from proposition to behavioral implication. For him, sound doctrine was not 
simply a motivation or rationale for good behavior; sound doctrine entails it. 
I. The Relevance of Speech-Act Theory 
Language does more than inform. It affects minds and changes circumstances.1 The task of 
interpretation is not complete when the hearer has simply enriched the informational 
content and extracted a set of truth-conditional propositions from an utterance. Pragmatics 
examines the real-world implications of speech as well as how humans intuit meaning 
from incomplete representations. Carston indicates that Grice’s what is said is the truth-
conditional content of an utterance, whereas what is implicated is its pragmatic content.2 
Pragmatic has two senses here. All along we have been referring to the processes of 
pragmatic inference to derive meaning from utterances; this is usually rendered in an 
enriched propositional form. This chapter focuses on how speech has pragmatic effects 
 
1 As Briggs puts it, “Text and action are bound together, we might say, in the reader.” See Virtuous Reader, 
211. 
2 See Carston, “Truth-Conditional Semantics,” 284–85. 
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upon the world beyond the discourse. That is, how language—and Paul’s language in 
Titus, specifically—affects real-world circumstances, not just how ideas relate to one 
another. 
The meaning of speech is not only shaped by its context(s), but it alters its 
context(s)—not only the discursive context but also the social, legal, religious, and 
economic. Because these are real-world effects, the output of pragmatic processes are not 
merely propositional, and utterances do not strictly or simply convey information. An 
interpreter who can expound the propositional meaning of an utterance is still not finished. 
Propositions may be descriptions of either real-world or imaginary circumstances, but they 
are “fictitious entities” in that they are ideological and conceptual.3 To the extent that they 
can exist solely in the mind, whether an “interpretation” is correct or incorrect (i.e., 
corresponds to the speaker’s intentions or not) is inconsequential. Such abstractions, as 
detailed as they may be, can proliferate, but hearers properly evaluate them when their 
real-world effects correlate to what they ascertain of the speaker’s intent. Pragmatics 
attempts to account for the full force of utterances. 
Speech-Act theorists provide a useful grammar for the concepts necessary to 
discuss this full force. Relevance theorists have adopted some of this grammar, so we will 
briefly consider the development of SAT and its relation to Relevance. John L. Austin, 
credited with the initial conception of SAT, argued that there were two kinds of speech—
descriptive and performative. Austin’s most developed thoughts on the topic, based on his 
lectures at Oxford and then at Harvard, were published posthumously in How to Do Things 
with Words.4 John R. Searle, one of Austin’s students, became the chief heir and developer 
of SAT afterwards. Searle built on what Austin was unable to finish. He is responsible for 
the more precise, albeit (some have argued) tangential, articulations of SAT.5 That 
theorists since have noted some of the discontinuities between Austin and Searle is a fact 
that does not concern us, because I am only highlighting the insights of SAT that are most 
pertinent to my exploration of RT as it relates to Titus. 
Among the most useful insights for understanding the real-world dimensions of 
language, Austin and Searle have provided definitions for what they called the locutionary, 
 
3 See Austin, “Meaning of a Word,” 60–61. 
4 Austin, How to Do Things. The first edition was published in 1962, two years after his death. 
5 Important works by John R. Searle include Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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illocutionary, and perlocutionary forces of speech. A brief definition of each and their 
inter-relationship adequately illuminates the aspect of communication that concerns us 
here.6 
Locution: the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and reference7 
Illocution: the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence, by 
virtue of the conventional force associated with it 
Perlocution: the bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the 
sentence, such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance 
According to Austin, a speaker saying virtually anything coherent achieves a 
locutionary act. Illocutionary acts are directly achieved by the conventional forces 
associated with an utterance; so, for instance, an utterance following the formal 
conventions of an oath made in an appropriate context achieves an oath that is legally or 
socially binding.8 The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is 
important. SAT differentiates acts that are accomplished by virtue of speaking from acts 
that are accomplished in consequence of or in response to the utterance. A speaker’s 
comprehensive intention for an utterance includes appropriate perlocutionary results, but 
theorists generally draw the line between illocution and perlocution at the direct agency of 
the speaker. Austin uses an intuitive “hereby” test. Whatever the speaker may add 
“hereby” to is the illocutionary act accomplished by the agency of the speaker, whereas 
whatever intentions the speaker wishes her utterance to accomplish that sound absurd 
when adding “hereby” may be perlocutionary acts that depend upon a listener’s uptake.9 
For example, observe the distinction between the two following sentences: 
1A: I hereby argue my point. 
1B: I hereby convince you of my point. 
The distinction between the first and the second sentences is the presence or absence of 
uptake. This differentiates illocution and perlocution. Discussing the insights of SAT for a 
“relevance-oriented pragmatics,” Sperber and Wilson explain that speakers implicitly 
convey a “recommended” attitude toward their utterances. The hearer may not adopt this 
 
6 Definitions based on Levinson, Pragmatics, 236. 
7 “Determinate sense and reference” is a crucial phrase, because Austin constructed his theory from the 
ground up regarding components of language (starting with noises, phones). Fuller forms of speech included 
a number of the more basic undeveloped components. So, e.g., every illocution must involve locution. For 
the building blocks of these simpler components, see lectures VII and VIII; How to Do Things, 83–108. 
8 Ibid., 109–20, Lecture IX. See also Levinson, Pragmatics, 237. 
9 Austin, How to Do Things, 53–66, Lecture V. 
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recommendation, but to understand the utterance properly is to understand this 
recommendation.10 Consider now the following pair of sentences: 
 2A: I hereby order you to wash the dishes. 
 2B: I hereby wash the dishes. 
This example represents the explicature that the speaker intends for the hearer to wash the 
dishes, but it goes beyond perlocution by requiring response. Perlocution involves uptake, 
which is not strictly voluntary. As within any discipline, Speech-Act theorists exhibit some 
diversity, but Levinson argues that, from the perspective of pragmatics, the most plausible 
version makes two basic claims: First, “All utterances not only serve to express 
propositions but also perform actions.”11 Second, the “privileged level of action,” that is, 
the action directly accomplished by speaking, “can be called the illocutionary act.”12 
Perlocutionary acts are essentially indirect, but they are, nevertheless, of prime importance 
to any speaker. 
Austin’s observations and proposals are not only helpful for understanding what 
speech does, Serban points out that they influenced “the pragmatic turn” in linguistics.13 
That is, they were part of the wave of late-twentieth-century linguistic thinking that shifted 
away from objective-representational and toward subjective-hermeneutical ways of 
analyzing language; that recognized the active dimensions of speech beyond information 
transfer; and that saw communication as negotiation, a cooperation between parties, and 
not essentially comprised of semantics and syntactics.14 Levinson argues, however, that 
SAT is now superfluous to a comprehensive pragmatic theory. He is among those who 
now consider all valid claims of SAT to have been subsumed under some aspect of 
Pragmatics.15 In large measure, the kinds of speech acts correlate to grammatical and 
lexical features of language. For example, “Please” associates with requests. This link to 
form makes it difficult for Relevance theorists to accommodate speech acts as a separate 
and necessary component of language. Clark explains that the dependence of SAT upon 
 
10 See “Pragmatics” (2007), 491–92. 
11 Summarized in Levinson, Pragmatics, 243. Whereas Austin maintained a distinction (albeit imprecise) 
between performative and constative language uses, Searle’s development of speech act theory regarded 
virtually every use of language to have performative dimensions; therefore, Levinson’s characterization of 
speech act theory as regarding all speech to be performative (above) depends upon what some might argue is 
an overextension of Austin’s original theory. See Briggs, Words in Action, 63–66. 
12 Levinson, Pragmatics, 243. 
13 Serban, “Gricean Pragmatics and Text Linguistics,” 96–97. 
14 Austin uses and critiques “semantics and syntactics.” See “Meaning of a Word,” passim. 
15 See Pragmatics, 226‒83. 
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conventional (i.e., formal) aspects of language prevent it from full acceptance within RT, 
which conscientiously focuses on inferential aspects of language.16 There would be no 
need for a separate theory if, properly understood, a robust pragmatic theory such as RT 
includes all features of language that SAT accounts for. Sperber and Wilson find concepts 
from SAT useful, but they acknowledge that the theory tends to depend on encoded signals 
such as normal grammar (e.g., imperatives and interrogatives) and “illocutionary force 
indicators,” which are basically formal. Such aspects of language would be circumscribed 
within a fulsome “relevance-oriented pragmatic” theory.17 
Three main reasons have been posited for understanding RT as a comprehensive 
model without including SAT as a separate and necessary discipline. First, RT has its own 
account for the linguistic phenomena about which SAT makes claims. Even when one 
embraces the underlying concepts of SAT and the basic tenet that words do things, Sperber 
and Wilson point out that one still needs a robust, relevance-oriented theory of pragmatic 
inference to “resolve illocutionary indeterminacies” and “in order to decide what speech 
act the speaker intended to perform.”18 
Second, SAT is too connected to formal features of language, such as lexemes and 
syntax, to be useful in the domain that RT endeavors to account for—namely, the 
underdeterminacy of language. Discussing developments and limitations in SAT, Sperber 
and Wilson point out that the syntax of sentences is frequently ambiguous with regard to 
the kind of contextual force they have, thus necessitating a theory of pragmatic inference.19 
If the space that Relevance theorists have carved for themselves in linguistics has to do 
with the underdetermined aspects of language, then the coupling of form and function that 
is typical of SAT renders it unnecessary. Levinson explains that the most viable forms of 
SAT are those that tether form to function (e.g., an imperative sentence illocutes a 
command; an interrogative sentence constitutes a request for information), although room 
for special uses exists. He critiques several forms of SAT, and he preserves what he sees as 
their most valuable insights for pragmatics.20 
Third, SAT is not a unified theory of language that even seeks to account for all 
aspects of usage; it is, therefore, inherently supplemental (some theorists attempting to 
 
16 See Relevance Theory, 210. 
17 See “Pragmatics” (2007), 491–93. 
18 “Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-Reading,” M&L 17.1/2 (2002): 3–23, at 4. 
19 See Pragmatics, 4. Given this, they surmise, “Speech act theory may turn out to be much less central to 
pragmatics than many people have supposed” (26). 
20 See Pragmatics, 226–83. 
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provide a comprehensive account of language by means of the theory notwithstanding). 
SAT generally divides speech into two kinds—description and indication—and focuses 
explanations on the second. Even if the narrow domain is appropriate, Sperber and Wilson 
still observe that “not all indicators are analysable in speech act terms.”21 The observations 
and proposals of Speech-Act theorists are still worth consideration even if another, 
presumably comprehensive, system now accounts for them in its own terms. Although 
major proponents of RT see SAT as already entailed in RT (and hence superfluous), 
Relevance theorists, nevertheless, continue to use the terms and concepts developed in 
SAT, because thinking about speech in terms of locution, illocution, and perlocution has 
clarity and explanatory power. 
What speakers do with words is just as critical as the propositional content of their 
utterances. They may inform hearers; they may instruct hearers; they may ask hearers; they 
may pronounce true what only becomes true in the act of pronouncing (e.g., I take thee to 
be my lawfully wedded husband); and so forth. In Chapter One under The Speaker’s 
Attitude, I discussed disassociation—when a speaker utters a sentence that she distances 
herself from and attributes it to someone else implicitly or explicitly. The effectiveness of 
this behavior depends upon communication involving more than the conveyance of 
information through the meanings of words.22 Focusing only on the semantic values or the 
propositional content that speech encodes neglects a major aspect of what language does. 
Language argues; language instructs; language influences, commands, and requests; 
language pronounces, comforts, and heals; language convicts and offends; language 
creates. So, communication is not strictly (if even primarily) about information transfer. 
Echoing Austin’s seminal title in a Relevance-theoretical context, Yan Huang cogently 
observes the truth that “Language is a way of doing things with words.”23 He pronounces 
the axiom in a context where he is highlighting an example of this claim—the specific 
concern of critical pragmatics, which illuminates the power of language to consolidate and 
 
21 “Pragmatics” (2007), 492–94. Briggs discusses the debate among speech act theorists on whether and how 
the theory may be a comprehensive theory of language. See Words in Action, 69–70. 
22 For a classic treatment of the question whether words carry meanings, see Austin, “Meaning of a Word.” 
Briggs summarizes Searle’s taxonomy to include “Assertives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, 
Declarations, and Assertive Declarations.” I do not use this technical language for two main reasons: 1) My 
main interest in the non-propositional dimensions of communication is not limited to illocution. 2) Theorists 
have proposed other schemas, and Briggs questions the warrant for privileging Searle’s. Words in Action, 51. 
23 Huang, “Micro- and Macro-Pragmatics,” 145. 
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abuse power, liberate or subvert. Communication has only done its job when the 
environment has changed.24 Put symbolically, context1 + utterance = context2. 
In order to grasp the non-propositional dimensions of Titus 1:12 and its context, we 
must understand The Economy of Cognitive Effects (immediately below), including the 
factors that affect processing effort and the potential of non-literal utterances to offer 
substantial effects for their added processing cost. We must also understand the intrinsic 
paraenetic quality of ostensive inferential speech, including its social outcomes and the 
ethical and redemptive nature of sound doctrine in Titus. 
II. The Economy of Cognitive Effects 
Relevance theorists refer to the results of interpretation as cognitive effects.25 These 
constitute small or large changes in the hearer’s mind, the conversational context, and even 
the social context. The cognitive effects, for instance, of the sentence Will you marry me? 
spoken in the proper circumstances and rightly interpreted are profound, whereas those of 
You want fries with that? are slightly less so. 
An utterance conveys both the speaker’s informative and communicative intent—
not only what she is saying but why she is saying it. Utterances do not just answer the 
question, What are you telling me? but, crucially, Why are you telling me? The answer to 
this second question does not have to be separately articulated; it is implicit in the 
utterance and its situational context. 
The following example highlights the insufficiency of semantics-based 
interpretation to capture the full thrust of utterances: We could render the propositional 
content of the sentence Are you sure? apart from the interrogative mode of the sentence, as 
[addressee] is (state of being) sure (i.e., confident). A semantically oriented interpretation 
might lead one to expect that the sentence is normally used either to reinforce (declarative 
force) or ascertain (interrogative force) confidence. It is quite normal, however, for 
speakers to use this sentence, even with the form and inflection of a question, in order to 
interject or express doubt (illocutions). Speakers often use it rhetorically to cast or cause 
doubt (perlocution) when they intend to nudge a listener to reconsider his position. 
 
24 Bonnycastle states, “Language does not merely represent the world, it also organizes the world.” See In 
Search of Authority, 122. See also Furlong’s comments on this issue in literary theory from Bonnycastle’s 
earlier work in Furlong, “Relevance Theory,” 12. 
25 See, e.g., Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (2007), 473. Furlong discusses several socially affective 
examples. See “Relevance Theory,” 63–68. 
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Gibbs surveyed research into the influence of speaker intention upon hearers, 
especially what aspects of utterance interpretation formed lasting memories. He wrote, 
“Many studies have shown that people are very likely to remember a pragmatic implication 
of an utterance rather than the utterance itself or what it directly asserts or logically 
implies.”26 The cognitive effects that result from comprehension, according to RT, are not 
identical to the propositional forms that derive from a process of interpretation. As Gibbs 
found, these non-propositional effects constitute the real takeaway of communication. 
Speaking in economic terms, Sperber and Wilson summarize as follows: 
“Cognitive efficiency, like any other kind of efficiency, is a matter of striking the best 
possible balance between costs and benefits.”27 They outline the following “Relevance-
theoretic comprehension procedure: 
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects. In particular, test 
interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) 
in order of accessibility. 
(b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.”28 
Hearers are justified in stopping once their expectations of relevance have been met, 
because an expectation of relevance implicitly involves a presumption of economy. This 
usually leads to successful natural language communication, but a mismatch between what 
seems relevant to a reader who is far removed from the initial context and what seems 
relevant to the original audience can short-circuit this process. We will now briefly look at 
the basic kinds of cognitive effects and what makes utterances economical. 
Three Basic Types of Cognitive Effects and Their Impact on the Cretan Church 
Let our understanding of the kinds of cognitive effects hearers might derive begin with 
human intuition. To enumerate natural types of cognitive effects, Green quotes Wilson and 
Sperber: 
When is an input relevant? Intuitively, an input (a sight, a sound, an 
utterance, a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with 
background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to 
him: say, by answering a question he has in mind, improving his knowledge 
 
26 Gibbs, “Intentionalist Controversy,” 186. 
27 Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-Reading,” 13. 
28 Ibid., 18; This is a standard description, invoked by almost all relevance theorists. See, e.g., reiterations in 
Clark, Relevance Theory, 37, 69, 120; Gibbs and Tendahl, “Cognitive Effort and Effects,” 381, 386; Gutt, 
“Relevance and Translation,” 299‒300. 
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on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a 
mistaken impression.29 
The possibilities listed above correspond to a standard set of three categories of positive 
cognitive effects. Clark summarizes them as follows: 1) contextual implication, 2) 
strengthening an existing assumption, and 3) contradicting an existing assumption.30 
Uchida and Carston define the first category, contextual implication, as “a conclusion 
inferred on the basis of a set of premises consisting of both contextual assumptions and 
new assumptions derived from the incoming stimulus … and not derivable from either of 
these alone.”31 The other two are specific outcomes of the first. Biblical interpreters must 
keep in mind that, just as I have shown with cognitive environment and salience, 
mismatches between original audiences versus modern readers can exist with respect to 
cognitive effects. 
Paul’s audience might derive all three kinds of cognitive effects as a result of his 
mentioning the Cretan quotation in Titus 1:12. First, one contextual implication might be 
that Titus and other sanctioned leaders need to take stern action (1:9, 13) with respect to 
bullies in the church (cf. πλήκτης, bully, 1:7). Second, Paul also might have spurred action 
by strengthening an existing assumption of Titus that presumptive leaders were having too 
great a negative impact in the community (upsetting whole houses, 1:11). Third, Paul 
mentioning the quotation plausibly contradicted existing assumptions, such as the 
following: Paul did not know about the troublemakers’ behaviors and influence;32 Paul was 
not concerned about this congregation’s troubles; these presumptive leaders could get 
away with upsetting the church through their bigotry. These were mistaken notions. 
Being corrected about a misconception has a strong cognitive effect, and here it had 
implications for their social context. These cognitive effects are positive in the sense that 
the hearer experiences a net gain in the accuracy of his perception of the world, although 
they may have negative emotions associated with them, since being in the wrong does not 
feel good. These cognitive effects coincide with propositional forms derived from Paul’s 
 
29 Green, “Relevance Theory and Biblical Interpretation,” 268. He is quoting from Wilson and Sperber, 
“Relevance Theory,” in Handbook of Pragmatics, 2004, 208. 
30 See Relevance Theory, 364. 
31 Relevance Theory, 296. 
32 We know that news, even about very sensitive matters, could get back to the Apostle Paul (e.g., 1 Cor 5:1). 
214 
utterances, but they reach beyond informing his audience to affecting his audience. We will 
now address the question: What makes cognitive effects economical?33 
Factors That Affect Processing Cost 
According to Sperber and Wilson, RT holds that hearers arrive at the best interpretation of 
an utterance by “process[ing] it in such a way as to maximize the number of its contextual 
implications and minimize the processing cost of deriving them.”34 Therefore, assuming 
that hearers will acquire the cognitive effects that correspond economically to their level of 
effort, a crucial question is, What factors make an utterance require more effort to process 
or less? Wilson and Sperber explain, 
The processing effort required to understand an utterance depends on two 
main factors: the form in which it is presented (audibility, legibility, dialect, 
register, syntactic complexity and familiarity of constructions all affect 
processing effort); and the effort of memory and imagination needed to 
construct a suitable context.35 
Several specific considerations fall under their two broad headings that have special 
pertinence with reference to biblical interpretation. We will examine more closely the 
following three narrower considerations: 1) the level of complexity of the utterance, 2) the 
size of the context, and 3) the accessibility of necessary concepts in the hearer’s cognitive 
environment. By adjusting these factors, speakers can make utterances economical in 
various ways. By neglecting them, interpreters can distort meaning. 
Professional jargon allows communicators within a field to abbreviate utterances 
and relate packets of dense information to one another more economically as long as 
speakers and hearers are able to access basically the same concepts. Even if those packets 
of information stand in for complexly layered ideas, the relations between them can be 
simple. Jargon is essentially a collection of preset ways of referring to more complex 
concepts. With Titus and the other PE, the recurrence and strategic importance of the 
expressions piety, prudence, and sound doctrine suggest that Paul and his colleagues had 
preset notions about the complexes they labelled as such.36 
 
33 Theorists occasionally use economic terms to refer to the relationship between processing effort and 
cognitive effects. See, e.g., Sperber and Wilson, Pragmatics, 31; and Clark, Relevance Theory, 105, 110. 
34 “Pragmatics” (1981), 283. 
35 “Pragmatics and Time,” 8–9. 
36 Some works draw out the historical significance of this shorthand. E.g., on piety (εὐσέβεια), see 
Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety; Angela Standhartinger, “Eusebeia in Den Pastoralbriefen: Ein Beitrag Zum 
Einfluss Römischen Denkens Auf Das Entstehende Christentum,” NovT 48 (2006): 51–82; on prudence 
(σωφροσυνη), see Thomas E. Bird, “Exegetical Notes: Self-Control (ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ),” CBQ 2 (1940): 259–
63. We will consider sound doctrine below. 
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As pertains to reducing complexity and context size, Sperber and Wilson suggest, 
“One way of economizing on the costs of linguistic processing is to leave unstated any 
contextual assumptions that the hearer can be expected to supply for himself.”37 This 
serves to decrease the size and detail of an utterance, but it depends upon the speaker 
accurately assessing the access her hearer will have to necessary contextual assumptions. 
According to Sperber and Wilson, two results obtain, when a speaker requires her hearer to 
search a broader verbal context for clues as to her intention: first, the quantity of 
implications of possible meanings increases along with the resources for ascertaining 
speaker intent; and, second, processing costs increase, thus potentially decreasing 
relevance.38 Modern readers are less concerned about the second result, because they are 
not restricted to live processing. Awareness of the first result, however, leads us to 
examine Titus 1:12 on the basis of its book and corpus contexts, because they supply a 
number of clues as to possible meaning that are less clear from only the verse or paragraph. 
Furlong explains a key reason for interpreters, especially of literature, to examine the 
broader context of a work: “Varying interpretations can be partly evaluated by the degree 
to which they account for all the evidence of the work in a way that is plausible.”39 At the 
same time, we deliberately focus on the narrower paragraph and section contexts, 
increasing our likelihood of finding a relevant interpretation. Thus, we examine what clues 
from the broader book context of Titus help to interpret the Cretan quotation and what the 
narrower context of 1:5‒16 suggests about Paul’s intentions. 
When the readily-accessible interpretation of an utterance comes to mind, all other 
lines of interpretation are disallowed.40 By way of analogy, Why are your lost keys always 
in the last place you look?41 An easily accessible anaphoric interpretation of the pronouns 
in Titus 1:12 would render other, more labor-intensive, interpretations unlikely. Yet, under 
the influence of a history of interpretation that assumes Paul is quoting directly from a 
specific ancient poet, readers accept the reference as cataphoric, even though it would 
require more processing effort in a natural language context. Under these circumstances, 
modern readers have to exert more processing effort to counteract the assumptions of 
interpretive history. 
 
37 Pragmatics, 31. 
38 See Sperber and Wilson, “Pragmatics” (1981), 284. They label this broadening of the search for clues and 
implications of relevance “evocational processing.” 
39 See Furlong, “Relevance Theory,” 37. 
40 See Wilson and Sperber, “Pragmatics and Time,” 14–15. 
41 Because that is the first place you find them. 
216 
Whatever makes a given utterance relevant for an audience (i.e., whatever reading 
yields satisfactory cognitive effects) will cause the audience to stop seeking an alternative 
interpretation. The closer the audience is to the context of the speaker, the more likely it is 
that they will come up with her intended meaning. The original audience that Paul had in 
mind probably grasped something close to his intended meaning. Modern interpreters, on 
the other hand, distanced by many intervening years, may have a difficult time coming up 
with an interpretation that was readily accessible to Paul’s initial audience.42 The economy 
of cognitive effects is thus impacted by the convenience of an interpretation, which can be 
affected not only by natural linguistic factors like conceptual salience but also by 
anachronistic “givens” and interpretative preunderstandings. Now let us consider how non-
literal language seems to defy the economy of cognitive effects. 
The Potency of Non-Literal Utterances 
Even though non-literal uses of language can be more complex than more literal uses in 
that they require second-order thinking, they can also produce greater cognitive effects, 
which makes them potentially quite economical. Theorists generally do not consider literal 
and figurative uses of language to occupy two exclusive categories; they occupy, rather, a 
sliding scale. The implicatures of a sentence uttered figuratively are a subset of the 
sentence’s total possible implicatures; so, as soon as the hearer knows that the speaker is 
using figurative language, he begins to access a shorter list of possible meanings. Hearers 
are typically able to make these determinations in real time, diminishing the otherwise 
heavier processing cost of metaphorical speech and making figurative language quite 
potent, as long as the speaker makes a reasonably accurate judgment about the hearer’s 
uptake capacity.43 
Because he assumed that literalism was the default mode of speech, Grice 
described the process of interpreting figurative speech as requiring extra steps and, thereby, 
more effort.44 Although theorists now generally think that his two-step comprehension 
model inadequately reflects the online processing of natural language, his intuitions about 
 
42 See Wilson and Sperber, “Pragmatics and Time,” 15–17. 
43 See Clark, Relevance Theory, 253–79. 
44 Grice describes various kinds of non-literal speech under the rubric of “flouting the maxims,” which 
intrinsically involves the hearer in extra effort to process, because the speaker has not (at the surface level) 
behaved cooperatively. Grice explains that the hearer, nevertheless, assumes cooperation and proceeds to 
interpret as though the speaker has acted cooperatively. See “Logic and Conversation,” 52–56. 
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the increased effort that figurative speech requires were not completely wrong.45 Adults 
are able to process metaphor and irony more successfully than children, suggesting that it 
is a skill humans learn through effort. The pay-off of cognitive effects motivates them.46 
Studies of language acquisition suggest that non-literal speech requires more processing 
effort but not because it is a two-step process. It is still quick, but adult speakers are not as 
easily derailed from on-line processing by words coming from disparate semantic domains. 
Gibbs, referencing empirical research on the comprehension of non-literal and ironic 
language use, argues that evidence points to humans having a streamlined process for 
comprehending utterances that convey meaning beyond their linguistically-encoded 
content: 
There is a tremendous amount of research in psycholinguistics to show that 
readers can determine speakers’ figurative meanings without having to first 
analyse the literal or sentence meanings of metaphors, sarcasm, indirect 
speech acts, and so on…. The speed with which readers are able to interpret 
figurative expressions suggests that the recovery of speakers’ intentions 
occurs very early in the course of comprehension.47 
Accordingly, audiences can leap to the short list of relevant figurative meanings quite 
efficiently. 
Although figurative speech may require more processing effort, literal speech does 
not always offer the more economical means of communicating. There are two reasons: 
First, literal language can require details that are unnecessary and clumsy if a metaphor can 
replace an entire concept, making the leap to second-order thinking less burdensome. 
Second, figurative language—irony or metaphor, for instance—can have profound 
cognitive effects, making its additional processing effort worthwhile. Some of these effects 
correlate to more visceral, emotional, social, or psychosocial experiences for the listener. 
Grice argued that the assumption of co-operation and the maxim of relevance 
helped listeners to track with speaker meaning, even when speakers failed to observe (i.e., 
flouted) other maxims (e.g., quality, quantity, and manner). Flouting the maxims, as he 
referred to it, was a means of increasing what Relevance theorists would later call 
 
45 For an explanation of what is meant by comprehension being “online,” see Gibbs and Tendahl, “Cognitive 
Effort and Effects,” 385–86. They argue that the increased cognitive effects of figurative language make 
additional effort worthwhile. They do not claim that figurative speech must require more effort. 
46 See consistent, tentative findings under “Relevance Theory Responses to the Experimental Evidence” in 
ibid., 382–85. 
47 Gibbs, “Intentionalist Controversy,” 191. 
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cognitive effects for listeners.48 Relevance theorists agree upon the pivotal importance of 
relevance for ensuring comprehension. Nevertheless, the scheme he proposed required a 
two-step process in the hearer’s mind—first, the hearer detects a violation of 
conversational maxims, then he decodes the meaning through a secondary process. The 
hearer rejects a literal interpretation before arriving at and accepting a non-literal one.49 
Grice’s delineation of the process may be logically helpful, but Huang argues that it is 
probably too complex to accurately explain what happens in the process of natural 
language comprehension. The problem, as Huang identifies it, was that Grice assumed that 
literalism was the default mode of speech.50 
Literary analysis may exhibit this two-step process, especially with discourse in a 
non-original setting, but natural language communicators process too rapidly to assume 
that this is the best explanation of how they comprehend non-literal uses. Perhaps, the key 
difference between live speech and writing, when both are viewed as ostensive inferential 
communication, seems almost too obvious—the amount of time one has for interpretation. 
Aside from this difference, which permits eyes to return where ears cannot, Furlong 
explains that “many of the problems besetting theories of critical practice are the result of 
assuming that spontaneous utterance comprehension is somehow unrelated to the 
interpretation of literary works.”51 Readers form enduring opinions as quickly as hearers. 
A hearer knows almost immediately whether a speaker is speaking non-literally, the 
moment she hears the word ox or ass in the sentences You’re an ox or You’re an ass. It is 
normally virtually a one-step process. The same is true when Paul’s original listeners heard 
him refer to one of the troublemakers as a prophet (Titus 1:12) or to his own report as a 
testimony (1:13) or to the doctrines of the troublemakers as commandments (1:14). In 
analyzing an ancient text, we slow the process of comprehension down, parse it out 
logically, and note in a far more conscious way than natural language hearers do where a 
word or concept falls on a scale of relative literalism. 
Paul’s uses of prophet, testimony, and commandment (among other words) were 
figurative, but not as a departure from some presumed literal norm. Speakers use language 
literally, figuratively, or loosely as needed in order to produce the most appropriate results 
 
48 See, especially, Grice’s delineation of the “Group C” class of seemingly uncooperative utterances in 
“Logic and Conversation,” 52–56. Grice does not speak in terms of “cognitive effects.” He refers to flouting 
utterances as being more “striking” or superlative in some way. This correlates to RT’s “cognitive effects.” 
49 See Levinson, Pragmatics, 109–10. 
50 See Huang, “Micro- and Macro-Pragmatics.” 
51 “Relevance Theory,” 52–53. 
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(i.e., the greatest cognitive effects) that they can in their audiences. The communicative 
principle of relevance refers to “a presumption of … optimal relevance.” Inferences based 
on this presumption depend on the communicator’s preferences and abilities.52 Paul’s 
metaphorical language may have required additional processing effort; but it was 
worthwhile because of the effects listeners derived, including mortification, intimacy, trust, 
and humor. 
Consider how dramatic these figurative uses of language are in Titus, how they 
build on the pathos of the preceding discourse, and how they lead to the vigorous 
injunction that follows. Paul speaks figuratively, but he anchors prophet, testimony, and 
commandments to shared functions and values within the community he addresses (i.e., 
their religious and social values).53 Saarinen Risto writes, “The author presupposes that the 
[Pastoral] epistles will be read and circulated in the churches.”54 Explicitly, Paul first 
encourages Titus and affirms that he is near and dear to him socially within the community 
by expressing great affection (Τίτῳ γνησίῳ τέκνῳ, 1:4), by reaffirming his sanction 
(ἀπέλιπόν σε ἐν Κρήτῃ, 1:5), and later by backing his authority (μηδείς σου περιφρονείτω, 
2:15), for example. But, he also does so implicitly when he trusts Titus to interpret 
figurative language, provide ellipsed material, and respond appropriately to signals of 
approval and disapproval. 
Speakers may use non-literal language for a number of reasons, but the speaker-
intended effect is the crucial factor for RT. Relevance theorists contend that hearers may 
note choices of style and semantics but that they unconsciously evaluate them on the basis 
of relevance—i.e., cognitive effects for processing cost. Counterintuitively, literal 
utterances sometimes take more processing effort to interpret than metaphorical utterances. 
Nam Sun Song explains this economic reality as he describes the process for interpreting 
metonymous utterances as well as the reasons that speakers use them.55 Literal 
 
52 Clark expands “the presumption of optimal relevance” with two basic claims: “The ostensive stimulus is 
relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s effort to process it;” and “The ostensive stimulus is the 
most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences.” See Relevance Theory, 
108. 
53 Paul addressed Titus to an individual (1:4), but he greets a plural audience (3:15)—a community. Many 
critical scholars show angst, bewilderment, and rejection. They think thar they perceive inconsistency or the 
pseudonym’s blunder. An elementary fact about ancient letters, especially in the church, is that these letters 
were always community documents. The author expected semi-public reading for increased accountability 
and ethos. See Marshall, Critical and Exegetical, 347–49; Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, 459. 
54 The Pastoral Epistles with Philemon & Jude, Brazos Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 
2008), 23. 
55 See “Metaphor and Metonymy,” 100–103. 
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representations can necessarily involve complexity that figures of speech can capture 
simply. A company with a number of passenger vehicles for on-road use may refer to this 
collection as a fleet. The literal meaning barely occurs to users. Such metaphorical 
language achieves cognitive effects efficiently mainly by saving processing effort, but 
metaphor and metonymy can also amplify cognitive effects. Consider the example of 
Donald Trump calling Elizabeth Warren Pocahontas. In one word, he conveys a complex 
of ideas—inappropriate and unauthorized honor claims, for example. The public forum and 
the relationship between these political figures contributed to the shaming effect of the 
metonymy. Paul had no previously lexicalized version of what he meant by prophet, so it 
has an ad hoc meaning that he trusted Titus to comprehend. Speakers do this around the 
clock. 
Metaphor may enhance the style and pathetic effect of writing aside from altering 
the propositional content, but such enhancements are not merely aesthetic. Relevance 
theorists consider them functional—pragmatic.56 Figurative language creates shared 
knowledge, insider ideas, which have the effect of developing social bonds. Song writes, 
“Creation of this kind of affective mutuality outweighs the extra processing effort incurred 
by the use of metonymy.”57 The less literal and the more echoic a speaker’s language is, 
the more the interpretation of those utterances achieves ethos with the hearer, trust and 
rapport.58 Titus was an open letter to a community (3:15) and not simply to the individual 
who was named (1:4). By building bonds with Titus publicly through his use of non-literal 
language, Paul was endowing Titus with authority and demonstrating his trust and 
intimacy. Let us now consider related social and behavioral outcomes. 
III. The Social and Behavioral Outcomes of Ostensive Inferential 
Communication 
Grice proposed what Relevance theorists now take for granted—that the act of speaking 
involves the communication of intention. This is distinct from the linguistically-encoded 
meaning of the words and carries with it the implication that the speaker wants the hearer 
to think or do something in response to her intention. As Searle explains, “The speaker 
intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect in the hearer, and he intends to produce 
 
56 See ibid., 95–97. 
57 Ibid., 101. 
58 See Jobes, “Relevance Theory,” 790. 
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this effect by getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce it.”59 So, Levinson 
writes, “Communication is a complex kind of intention that is achieved or satisfied just by 
being recognized.”60 This recognition occurs in the hearer. Gibbs notes the currency within 
linguistics of the idea that “communication exploits the human ability to attribute 
intentions to each other.”61 Most theorists assert the centrality of intention, and this 
intention includes a change of some kind in the hearer. Of course, the hearer may not act 
according to the speaker’s wishes, but expectations of hearer uptake (perlocution) are 
intrinsic to communication even if speakers cannot control or predict the response. This is 
a specific claim under the general principle that context1 + utterance = context2. 
The speaker expects the hearer to participate (as patient and agent) in the creation 
of context2. I use the term paraenetic to label this aspect of language that expects 
commensurate response from listeners. A commensurate response, in Relevance-
theoretical terms, means effects involving the hearer that correspond (positively or 
negatively) with speaker intentions.62 It is a step beyond what the speech itself 
accomplishes, but it is an outcome that the speaker intends from her utterance. In favor of 
theological and historical interests, I think that the paraenetic nature of language is 
underappreciated in many examples of biblical interpretation, particularly of the NT 
epistles. So, let us now consider The Essential Paraenesis of Natural Language. 
The Essential Paraenesis of Natural Language 
Clean your room! conveys, informationally, the proposition, The speaker is ordering the 
listener to clean the room that pertains to the listener, but this is not without remainder. If 
I speak that sentence to my son, the enriched meaning, informationally, may come out as, 
Barney’s father is ordering [and, by implication, desires and expects] Barney to clean 
Barney’s room. Notice that only two of the words from the propositional form (clean and 
room) are represented explicitly in the original form, and that the verb clean (without 
morphological alteration) changes inflection from second-person imperative to 
 
59 “Indirect Speech Acts,” in Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, vol. 3, Syntax and Semantics 
(New York: Academic Press, 1975), 59–82, at 59. 
60 Pragmatics, 16. 
61 “Intentionalist Controversy,” 182. 
62 In the development of SAT, many have attempted to delimit a range or to enumerate the kinds of possible 
acts. For RT, the number could be infinite or minute as long as they correspond to speaker intention. Any 
introductory work on SAT explains this delimiting issue. See, e.g., Levinson, Pragmatics, 226–83. 
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(complementary) infinitive, removing the conventional directive force.63 The sentence 
does not supply the additional information required to derive this propositional form. One 
must hear the utterance in context and enrich it by attention to pronomial and social deixis, 
cognitive environment, and so forth—ideas we have already discussed in detail. 
Nevertheless, for one to know this information, as enriched and completely expressive as it 
may seem, does not in any degree fulfill the ostensive purpose of the utterance, which can 
only be fulfilled by a certain room, pertaining to my son, being cleaned by the person so 
instructed. If speaker intention is truly central to comprehension, as RT contends, then 
interpretation is incomplete at the stage of deriving mere propositional meaning. This is 
not a theological argument; this is the nature of language. 
Clearly, not all speech is command, therefore not all commensurate response is 
obedience. Imperative language provides a perspicuous example of the claim that speakers 
intend hearers to participate in the creation of context 2 as patients and agents. For other 
moods, the truth may be less obvious, but speakers expect even the most seemingly 
innocuous utterance couched in milk-toast declarative grammar to have some real-world 
effect. Although accounting for the felicity conditions of every kind of speech would be an 
exhaustive prospect for Speech-Act theorists, Relevance Theory does not require them, 
because ostensive intention (from the speaker’s perspective) and inferential recognition 
(from the hearer’s perspective) are sufficient for interpretation. A hearer may comprehend 
the meaning of an utterance without taking the action the speaker wishes (i.e., a volitional 
step beyond perlocution).64 
With command language, he does not need to obey her in order to understand her. 
But, he will not understand her without attributing the appropriate intentions to her and 
considering the implications of such. Comprehending requires him to be conversationally 
cooperative; obeying or disobeying requires an independent volitional response, which 
may necessarily be subsequent to the satisfactory comprehension of her utterance but 
which, nevertheless, is conceptually latent in it. Particular hearer responses (involving 
volition) are not necessary to comprehending meaning as long as the hearer cooperates 
with the speaker by attributing appropriate intentions and deriving appropriate 
 
63 Briggs provides a nuanced discussion of the relationship between formal features of language (e.g., 
vocabulary) and illocutionary force. See Words in Action, 98–102. In my example, order carries the 
conventional force of a directive, but the proposition includes it on the basis of pragmatic inference. Once it 
is placed into this declarative form, it no longer has the same effect for the hearer. 
64 To distinguish an illocution from an involuntary perlocution, consider one’s response to James is cheating 
on you. 
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implicatures. Interpretation that merely results in more elegant or elaborate, simplified or 
sophisticated theoretical constructs—interpretation that does not recognize that authors are 
making claims upon readers, expecting them to feel, think, choose, and act—is not true to 
the nature of communication. 
Commentators on Titus recognize its ethical thrust, but they often see this as a 
factor of Paul’s twofold concern with belief and behavior, orthodoxy and orthopraxy, gift 
and task, indicative and imperative (or however the particular scholar labels these 
categories). Mounce, for instance, outlines a development from faith to knowledge to 
action in his comments on Titus 1:1.65 In Paul’s usage, however, the term πίστιν (faith, 
1:1), may entail just as much moral action as the term εὐσέβιαν (piety, 1:1). Barrett 
differentiates consistently between doctrine, which for him more narrowly designates 
theological tenets, and behavior, especially when discussing heresy in the Pastorals.66 For 
some, Paul seems to display a higher proportion of paraenesis in the PE than in the 
undisputed works. This may be the case if we assume that Paul’s doctrine is based on a 
dichotomy and relation between theological proposition and ethical consequence. Mounce, 
however, also notes that “in the [PE], … right belief and right behavior are inseparable.”67 
For Mounce, the dichotomy is fused but preserved. One could argue whether this is a 
mistaken understanding of Paul, but what concerns me is whether this is even an adequate 
understanding of language. I reassert, language is paraenetic. What seems more appropriate 
to the PE, and Titus in particular, is to understand doctrine as encompassing all that is 
taught, thus incorporating truth in life, comprising faith and practice. Doctrine (or heresy 
for that matter) may include propositional content, but it is not merely propositional. I will 
now develop this claim with reference to a couple of specific non-propositional uses of 
language in Titus—the relational outcomes of Paul’s speech and what he means by the 
prominent concept of sound doctrine. 
Relational Outcomes 
Recognizing the non-propositional dimensions of communication illuminates Paul’s 
intentions within Titus’s community. Song explains some of the relational effects of the 
use of metaphor.68 Some contextual implications, some strengthening of existing 
 
65 See Pastoral Epistles, 379. 
66 See Pastoral Epistles, passim. 
67 Pastoral Epistles, 379. 
68 Song, “Metaphor and Metonymy,” 94. 
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assumptions, and other cognitive effects involve camaraderie, trust, a sense of privileged 
insight, a sense that the speaker is vulnerable and trusting, drawing listeners into an 
experience of greater intimacy, and so forth. Some of these effects are based on weak 
implicatures; but they are rhetorically powerful effects that lead, in particular, to increased 
ethos. It is implicitly trusting for a speaker to use ambiguity, because she is relying upon 
her hearer to make meaning out of her utterance. Take irony, for example. It is a complex 
use of language, but the payoff can make it economical. Suppose something goes horribly 
wrong and a speaker says, Nice. By mentioning a single word, she conveys a number of 
implications with tremendous cognitive effects for a hearer who is able to interpret 
properly. The rewards of successful utterance interpretation involve a valuable social 
connection with the speaker—sympathy, insight, even trust. 
Grice famously illustrated the difference between natural and non-natural meaning 
in a manner that I adapt here:69 Imagine the difference between showing Mrs. Smith a 
photograph of Mr. Smith behaving inappropriately with Ms. Scarlett and drawing Mrs. 
Smith a picture of the same scene. The photograph has a natural meaning such that, even if 
Mrs. Smith did not grasp your intention in presenting it to her—in fact, even if Mrs. Smith 
accidentally found it—it would carry the same meaning (namely, my husband is having an 
affair). In the case of drawing the same scene, Mrs. Smith would only ascertain that 
meaning if she grasped your intention. In the same way, merely knowing that the Cretan 
quotation circulated among troublemakers within the congregation did not prompt Titus to 
act. Paul portrayed the situation and implicated his own attitude toward it (1:12‒13). Once 
Titus (and the audience of Titus) grasped this implication, he had a basis for appropriate 
action, and Paul’s consequential instructions could appear wise, fair, stern, and reasonable, 
even kind, in that he did not treat them as enemies to be opposed as much as household 
members to be restored. 
Relevance theorists identify the strongest, or most relevant, cognitive effect that an 
utterance can have to be a contextual implication where new information follows from the 
combination of new and existing assumptions but would not follow from either alone.70 
Suppose that the church in Crete, including Titus, was aware that presumptive leaders were 
disparaging Cretans; they did not know, however, that Paul was aware of this behavior; 
further, they did not know how disfavorable it was to Paul or whether Paul would be so 
 
69 Described in Serban, “Gricean Pragmatics and Text Linguistics,” 97. 
70 Clark, Relevance Theory, 102. 
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bold as to act on the knowledge in such a way as to significantly affect them (e.g., by way 
of shame or other social consequence). Imagine the cognitive effect of discovering that 
Paul has heard (as we know he would be able to about issues in distant churches), did 
adamantly disapprove it, and was bold enough to address it. This would lead to tremendous 
cognitive effects, and Paul expressed his hope and expectation that it would also lead to 
repentance and restoration. 
The near literary context suggests that Paul was focusing on issues of leadership 
malpractice (Titus 1:5‒16), and the broad book context suggests that the Cretan church 
was disturbed by brokers of inappropriate ethno-religious valuation (see, e.g., 1:10‒16; 
2:7‒8, 15; 3:9‒11). Therefore, an interpretation will achieve maximal relevance, by 
understanding that Paul uses the quotation to address religious leadership malpractice 
involving problematic ethno-religious valuations. If both the narrow and the broad literary 
conversational contexts do not suggest a persistent concern with laziness, gluttony, and 
viciousness, then the conclusion that the quotation was Paul’s bald assessment of the 
Cretans seems an unjustified departure from context. It does not meet the criterion of 
relevance as efficiently as the conclusion that Paul is speaking against ethno-religious 
valuations and leadership malpractices that are contrary to healthy doctrine rather than as 
an evaluator of persons on the basis of ethno-religious affiliations contrary to his gospel to 
the Gentiles. 
It is clear from 2 Cor 10:10 and its surrounding context (10:1‒18) that, as a key 
leader in the church, the Apostle Paul was able to receive news from distant congregations 
and represent critical portions in reported speech. He included as much detail as was 
needed to ensure his original hearers were able to identify the nature of the speech and the 
speakers and to draw inferences that had appropriate effects. Particularly, when reporting 
the speech of opponents, the cognitive effects that came from recognizing that the speaker 
was publicly exposing objectionable actions and attitudes would have been impressive. 
This is just what Paul seems to be doing in Titus, perhaps even using a courtroom type-
scene.71 Now, let us consider what Paul means pragmatically by sound doctrine. 
 
71 Craig S. Wansink points out that in Roman trials that had no precedent established, the manner of 
obtaining evidence was unrestricted. He writes, “In trials heard extra ordinem, the magistrate had no 
limitations placed on how he came to his knowledge (cognitio) of the crime.” See “Roman Law,” 986, at 
986. 
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Ethics and Redemption in the Sound Doctrine of Titus 
It is common to characterize ethical discourse in the NT epistles, particularly of Paul, as 
bipartite—theological warrant and ethical mandate. Thorvald B. Madsen, II sets out to 
discern whether the structure of ethical argument in the Pastorals follows the same “gift 
and task” logic or “indicative and imperative” movement that he perceives in the 
undisputed Paulines.72 I take issue with the ex ante assumption that this form of ethical 
reasoning typified the Apostle Paul’s teaching at a macro or micro level. This 
preconception may tacitly limit the possible structures of any ethical argumentation. 
Furthermore, Madsen finds “gift and task” (theology-to-ethics) reasoning by pairing 
explicit ethical injunctions with rationale that Paul formally expressed in various contexts. 
Such a clear-cut analysis does not appreciate holistic ethical argument or systemic grounds 
for ethical instructions in the absence of case-by-case explanations. In contrast to this 
common characterization, Paul displayed more continuity between the attitudes and 
behaviors he mandated and any logical rationale. He moved seamlessly between ethical 
expectations, strategic witness (Titus 2:7‒8), theological truth (2:11‒13), and intrinsic 
motivation (2:14). He also fluidly refers to both concrete behaviors and theological truths 
as doctrine (διδασκαλία, 1:9; 2:1‒10, esp. 1, 7, and 10; cf. parallel statements in 1:13; 2:2). 
In cases where Paul’s instructions had no explicit underlying principle, it seems adequate 
to accept that he considered certain behaviors (e.g., serious, 2:2; not slaves to drink, 2:3; 
cf. 1:7; lovers of [their] children, 2:4; submissive, 2:5; cf. 1:6, 10; 2:9) to simply be good 
doctrine. Paul’s doctrine comprised ethical content, not merely consequence, in the same 
way that language affects behavior, not by first passing through cerebral processes by 
which it is consciously ratified in a multi-step process but by affecting listeners at the point 
of hearing. 
Not only is comprehension a rapid “online” process, but cognitive and behavioral 
responses to ostensive inferential communication are frequently immediate, too. Finding 
yourself waving in response to someone who was not waving at you demonstrates just how 
promptly humans are wired to respond immediately upon comprehension, even when 
mistaken about the communicator’s intentions. Even to a toddler, a parent’s predication, 
 
72 Madsen, “Ethics of the Pastoral Epistles,” 219–40. He is heavily indebted to Rudolf Bultmann, “Das 
Problem der Ethik bei Paulus,” ZNW 23 (1924): 123-40. The conception of a relationship between Paul’s 
theology and ethics such that one provides rationale for the other is commonplace. See comments on the PE 
in Georg Strecker and Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, Theology of the New Testament (Theologie Des Neuen 
Testaments, English), ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, trans. M. Eugene Boring (New York: de Gruyter, 2000), 
593–94. 
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“Hot!” while tapping the stove causes a gut-level effect in the child, so that he recoils and 
customarily avoids touching the thing that his mother indicated would be painful to touch. 
Conveying the informative proposition “this stove can become hot and painful to touch” 
falls short of both her communicative intention and his actual reaction. The stove has 
become hot in the child’s mind as soon as Mommy said it was a hot thing. I use an 
illustration from early language acquisition to show that behavioral outcomes are 
fundamental to communication. In adult experience, as soon as we are told that a loved one 
has died, we begin grieving and considering the wide-ranging implications, just as the 
speaker expects. The speed at which speech affects humans suggests that ethical response 
does not require a multi-step cognitive process. Next stop is Jackson Heights—Roosevelt 
Boulevard has various kinds and degrees of relevance to passengers, but it rarely fails to 
affect the neurons and the feet, depending on its level of relevance. Ostensive inferential 
communication affects the world through the human agency of hearers. Love letters do 
something physiological to readers that not only exceeds their informative power but 
betrays their underlying intention.73 Again, I am not making a theological argument here, 
but a linguistic one. 
Careful, multi-step argumentation in ethical reasoning generally or in the NT 
epistles specifically is both present and appropriate; but I am emphasizing the power and 
purpose of utterances to affect behavior and that behavior, in turn, to affect argument. Paul 
articulates the is in close connection to the ought, but his communication of the is and the 
ought affect response and reinforce one another.74 Madsen is right in his judgment that the 
conventional wisdom regarding the PE—and, as always, by implication, Titus—has led 
students to read and to believe Titus’s ethical instruction to be “prudential and derivative” 
in tone, never vital and responsive.75 In truth, the term ὑγιαίνω (I am healthy, 1:9, 13; 2:1, 
2) and cognate ὑγιής (healthy, 2:8) in Titus is shorthand for the total constellation of 
theological and ethical claims Paul makes, including the positive and negative instructions. 
But, for those steeped in the conventional thinking regarding the PE, sound doctrine = safe 
doctrine. In other words, it does not represent an example of the Apostle Paul responding 
creatively to live issues in the church using the resources of the Jewish faith as interpreted 
 
73 On the Song of Songs, Klangwisan discusses the lover’s words as provocative speech. See Earthing the 
Cosmic Queen, 10‒11. 
74 I take Madsen’s language a step further by applying linguistic insights that he did not have in view. See 
“Ethics of the Pastoral Epistles,” 224. 
75 Ibid., 238. 
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through the Christ event. In this vein of interpretation, sound doctrine = stale doctrine. 
Reading the text with this assumption perpetuates a self-fulfilling prophecy as 
undergraduates, having been primed by professors, read these texts for the first time and 
form opinions on the basis of these biases.76 Prejudices in place, the dynamism and 
creativity of Paul’s sound doctrine is obscured by misplaced suspicion and dubious 
preconceptions.77 
One may agree with Madsen that the “core ‘logic’ and content [of Titus] agree with 
the major epistles” but still disagree with its characterization as bipartite—indicative and 
imperative.78 Paul’s ethical logic in Titus does not argue from truth to proper action, since 
he refers to both under the same heading—sound doctrine and its corollaries with faith and 
word (1:9, 13; 2:1, 2, 8). 
Huizenga claims that Paul “does not describe or engage their [the troublemakers’] 
ideas in any constructive way.”79 On the one hand, it might have beeen artificial and 
extraneous for Paul to describe any situation that was already in Titus’s situation-
contextual knowledge, especially given that elliptical language is more trusting and 
efficient; on the other hand, I contend that many interpreters for the foregoing reasons have 
not seen that Paul might have been quite directly addressing one of the particular 
expressions of the problem in Crete. Furthermore, Paul did so constructively, because the 
purpose of Paul’s instruction ultimately was in order that they might be healthy in the faith 
(ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει, 1:13). Reconciliation was Paul’s endgame. A conviction 
(ἔλεγξις; cf. cognates in 1:9, 1:13; 2:15) with such an effect in mind may be called 
restorative justice. 
Huizenga, along with others, suggests that the author was being unfairly divisive 
toward the opponents, not affording them space within the Christian community on 
account of his bigoted attitudes. The divisive phrase she points to is αἱρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον 
 
76 Consider R. Walter L. Moberly’s formative story about his pre-ministry university experience (particularly 
related to critical issues in the PE) in the opening paragraphs of “Biblical Hermeneutics and Ecclesial 
Responsibility,” in The Future of Biblical Interpretation: Responsible Plurality in Biblical Hermeneutics, ed. 
Stanley E. Porter and Matthew R. Malcolm (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2013), 133–56. Johnson 
describes the dilemma of short-circuiting critical inquiry in undergraduate institutions by insisting upon 
adherence to established conventions regarding the PE. See First and Second Letters, 55. 
77 M. Harding, taking Titus to be pseudonymous, nevertheless, sees the author as “not just as a theologian of 
the Pauline tradition, but as a creative and persuasive communicator of the Pauline heritage in his social 
context;” quoted in Marshall, “Pastoral Epistles,” 286–87. 
78 Madsen, “Ethics of the Pastoral Epistles,” 238. I do not address all of the particulars upon which I agree or 
disagree with Madsen. His reading of the Pastorals favors particular theologically conservative objectives. 
79 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 179. 
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… παραιτοῦ (put aside/avoid a divisive person, 3:10; note the ellipse I have left in the 
Greek), and she assumes that to label someone heretical (αἱρετικός) is inherently 
divisive.80 Interpreters who indict Paul for divisiveness, however, are too dismissive of the 
intervening qualification of the full statement—αἱρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον μετὰ μίαν καὶ 
δευτέραν νουθεσίαν παραιτοῦ (put aside/avoid a divisive person after a first and a second 
reminder, 3:10). But, more importantly, they tend not to relate Paul’s rebuke type language 
in 3:10 with that in 1:13—δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν ἔλεγχε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ 
πίστει (for which reason, [I instruct you to] rebuke them vigorously, in order that they 
might be healthy in the faith)—which I argue conceives rebuke as a necessary precursor to 
reconciliation, because no relational progress can occur until the parties own up to the 
truth. As I explained above, Relevance theorists claim that processing a broader context (as 
is necessary to connect 1:13 with 3:10) may require more effort, but it allows interpreters 
to consider appropriate implicatures that would not have been available to them on the 
basis of a narrower context. The sequence of the connection here between Titus 1:13 and 
3:10 makes the size of the context inconsequential; because, as I argue, the nature and 
purpose of rebuke in 1:13 should illuminate that in 3:10. Anyone reading the letter in its 
entirety, as the original audience did, would not mistake Paul’s mention of a heretic as 
unwarranted divisiveness, because they would see his restorative concerns in both the far 
and near contexts. I have already argued that the pronoun αὐτούς (them, 1:13) refers to the 
troublemakers and not the subjects of the Cretan quotation. In her defense, the influence of 
prima facie reading assumptions probably prevent Huizenga from connecting Paul’s 
instructions in chapters one and three; because she thinks that, in 1:13, Paul is trying to fix 
the Cretans rather than correct, restore, or rebuke the troublemakers, as I argue. 
Paul contrasts Titus’s speech with the presumptive leaders’ speech (Σὺ δὲ λάλει, 
you however [are to] speak, 2:1; note the clear inclusio completed by Ταῦτα λάλει καὶ 
παρακάλει, Speak and encourage these things, 2:15). As an alternative to their myths and 
commandments (1:14), Titus is to pronounce the logic of the Christ-life (i.e., the Christian 
gospel, 2:11‒15). In contrast to a faith that is preoccupied with observing specific ethnic, 
religious, or cultural traditions or shunning others, the Christian gospel reorients faith and 
 
80 The qualification could be translated more strictly after one and [or] two warning[s], but I am trying to 
capture the sense of the conjunction and the cognate for mind within the word νουθεσίαν. I am interacting 
with comments by Huizenga. See ibid. 
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proclamation around the person and work of God.81 The ethically-oriented instructions 
Paul gives Titus to propound in 2:1‒10 constitutes sound doctrine as much as the more 
theologically-oriented gospel summary of 2:11‒14. Titus 2 has the highest concentration of 
soundness language in the New Testament (2:1, 2, 8).82 The others need rebuke in order 
that (ἵνα) sound doctrine may prevail (1:13). 
The subject of the purpose clause ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει (in order that they 
might be healthy in the faith, 1:13c) is not explicit; but, in light of the referential speech 
throughout the passage, it is most likely the troublemakers. Paul hoped for their 
restoration. He extended the meaning of ὑγιαίνω (to be in good [physical] health) 
figuratively to mean good moral, spiritual, and doctrinal health by pairing these ideas in 
each occurrence (Titus 1:9, 13; 2:1, 2, 8; cf. 1 Tim 1:10; 6:3; 2 Tim 1:13; 4:3). Purpose 
usages involve movement from one state to another, which suggests not only the sense that 
the subjects be healthy but that they be health-conducive, an appropriate aspiration for 
influential people. Paul envisioned a restoration of the presumptive leaders to a right 
relationship with the church and with God, rather than a simple write-off on account of 
their wrongdoing. 
If one imposes an artificial sequence or dichotomy between belief and behavior, 
then Titus seems to contain a higher concentration of ethical instruction in comparison to 
the undisputed Paulines. This imposition requires aligning Greek and Hellenistic Jewish 
notions of πίστις (faith, loyalty, trust) with Anglo-Saxon and Western European notions of 
belief, but it leads some to read Titus’s highly moralized gospel as un-Pauline. We assume 
that Paul was against any sort of “works righteousness,” so we are dubious of the clear 
moral assertions of Titus and the call toward godly (εὐσεβῶς, Titus 2:12; cf. cognates in 
1:1 and 2:12) behavior. It has been transpiring for over a generation, but interpreters are 
 
81 Barclay writes that because Paul was “all things to all people” (1 Cor 9:22), “his converts can be faithful to 
the truth, remaining within, but not beholden to, their various cultural traditions and social positions.” See 
Paul and the Gift, 177. 
82 The moral nature of sound doctrine also obtains, for example, in 1 Tim 1:10, which contrasts ὑγιαινούσῃ 
διδασκαλίᾳ with a behavior-oriented vice list. Such a message is fitting to sound doctrine, because it is sound 
(i.e., healthy) doctrine. Although I have deemphasized classic lexicography in favor of lexical pragmatics, 
standard definitions of ὑγιαίνω have significant social implications. See entries in Henry George Liddell and 
Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Revised and augmented by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick 
McKenzie. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940), 1841–42; and Danker et al., BDAG, 1023. 
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learning that morality was always a strong component of Paul’s gospel.83 Huizenga hits the 
nail on the head when she recognizes that 
Titus’ instruction must match up with what is called ‘sound doctrine’ (2:1), 
but the teachings that follow in the rest of the chapter are not really the sort 
of topics that most modern Christians would consider to be ‘doctrine.’ The 
author does not insert any creedal sayings or Scripture verses, such as we 
read in 1 Tim 2:5‒6. Instead, Titus must teach the believers about right 
actions, especially in fulfilling their household roles and in proper moral 
behavior.84 
This non-propositional dimension of communication is not a unique feature of the 
instruction in Titus and the PE or of the Pauline Corpus. The thrust of the Sermon on the 
Mount and the entire NT is to affect readers; so How does the speaker intend to affect 
hearers? is not a secondary question to be raised optionally, after interpretation. The 
question is as integral to interpretation as any historical, grammatical, or theological 
question if we appreciate that change is a function of language. 
The gospel summary passages in Titus (2:11‒15; 3:3‒7) articulate a doctrine of 
life-change and are not mere rationale for morality. This gospel does not have a moral and 
a theological side; it is a comprehensive argument in which the theology and the ethics of 
Titus (and Paul’s gospel as far as this epistle is concerned) cohere. Paul uses various words 
for rebuke at various times (1:9; 2:2, 8; 3:9‒10), but whatever strays from this life-change 
gospel logic deserves rebuke. Although Paul and others can develop ethical logic from 
indicative to imperative, they do not have to. Direct ethical teaching as doctrine does not 
contradict Paul’s gospel, at least in Titus. 
Barrett looks for a bipartite ethical logic in the PE; and, coming up short, assumes 
that Titus fails to integrate ethics and theology transparently. By comparison, he says, the 
genuine Paul “always makes clear the theological and Christocentric basis of [his] moral 
demands,” whereas the reason for the ethical injunctions of the PE are “far from 
evident.”85 He may be right that reason and basis (Barrett’s categories) are not the 
prerequisite building blocks of ethical instruction in Titus, but the contrast diminishes 
when one realizes that the basis of right behavior is the radical life-change that Paul 
describes in 2:11‒14 and 3:3‒7 (cf. Rom 7:21‒8:2; 2 Cor 5:17; Gal 5:1‒23). Reading these 
 
83 E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1977); Michael F. Bird, “When the Dust Finally Settles: Coming to a Post-New Perspective 
Perspective,” CTR 2 (2005): 57–69; Barclay, Paul and the Gift. 
84 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 146. Note that herein she also rightly admits of a distinction between Titus 
and another of the PE. 
85 Barrett, Pastoral Epistles, 25, 28. 
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Pauline passages without superimposing a bipartite ethical logic reveals that Titus is not so 
different. Paul enjoining love of aliens (φιλόξενος, 1:8; cf. φιλοξενία, Rom 12:13) is 
doctrine, not based on doctrine. 
Exemplifying the amalgamating tendency of many commentators, Barrett identifies 
three main reasons for ethical behavior in the PE: the commands of God, the eschatological 
rewards, and public approval. Only his third—public approval—is arguably of any real 
significance in the moral logic of Titus.86 The prominent language of the command of God 
(1:3; 2:15) in Titus has mostly to do with the matter of calling, not the logic of moral 
behavior—that is, morality is not simply obedience.87 Rather than seeing the cohesive 
relationship between the gospel’s theological claims and its ethical expectations, Barrett 
says that Paul “digresses” in 3:3 “to present the ground of Christian obedience.”88 For Paul 
in Titus, the basis of good behavior is actual life-change, not a rationalized morality. Paul 
does not parse its deeper truth into cause and effect. 
Commensurate with the nature of intention in communication, interpretations 
without real-world consequences for the church (and the reader) that harmonize with 
plausibly discerned authorial intentions should give way to those that have appropriate 
practical outcomes for the community. Application of Scripture is not an optional step after 
interpretation reserved for “true believers;” it is the necessary complement to finish the 
task of interpretation.89 Biblical studies can become quite esoteric in its pursuits; but until 
it reaches for and grasps something close to the speaker’s vision of the world, it has failed 
to fully interpret. Interpretation does not end with propositions or theological ideas. 
Comprehending ostensive inferential communication involves considering the social, 
behavioral, and attitudinal implications of the writer’s utterances, not just the 
informational. Interpreters must push a step further than dogmatics to pragmatics. 
The logic of interpretation does not always shift in sequence from orthodoxy to 
orthopraxy. Writers communicate throughout Scripture, intending ethical and redemptive 
results. The Bible is properly interpreted when the Christian life is canonized in behavior. 
 
86 Several have argued this point. None better than Hoklotubbe, Civilized Piety. 
87 English readers of the Bible have little access to the correlation between Paul’s command (ἐπιταγή, 1:3; 
2:15; cf. 1:5) language and the prominent concept of submission (ἀνυπότακτος, 1:6, 10; ὑποτάσσω, 2:5, 9· 
3:1) in the moral landscape of Titus. 
88 Pastoral Epistles, 133. 
89 Whereas we often think of truth as intellectual, Scripture does not skip a beat in referring to truth in terms 
of behaviors. For instance, 1 John 1:6; 2 John 4; 3 John 3‒4, 8; and elsewhere refers to doing the truth, 
walking in the truth, and actions required to become co-workers in the truth. 
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Wall gives extended and careful treatment to the notion of canon, especially for the PE, 
texts with a deutero-Pauline stamp. One of Wall’s points is that the church’s performance 
of the text canonizes a certain behavioral norm, not just in the reading and teaching on the 
texts in a corporate worship setting, but in the life and community of believers as they 
enact their interpretations of Scripture.90 How does one consider the ethical outcome of 
biblical utterances? Ask what attitudes and behaviors all readers of the text should inhere. 
The logic of this gospel is not about good reasons to obey the demands of Christian 
morality; it is about a transformation that occurs through the gospel that cannot exist in 
anything other than a changed life (e.g., it cannot be enshrined in confessional 
propositions). Therefore, attention to ethno-religious observances, debates, and aspirations 
(1:10‒16; 3:8‒11) on top of this gospel are misplaced and problematic. The Cretans have 
been transformed as Cretans, and do not need to be changed from Cretans. The Cretan 
quotation (1:12b) locates moral deficiency in one’s heredity, and the solution the 
troublemakers offered was in surface-level conversion by adherence to particular religio-
cultural attitudes and behaviors. The deep, personal and spiritual transformation that Paul 
eloquently describes in his gospel summaries (2:11‒14; 3:3‒7) comes about by divine 
power. This is why the quotation is so repugnant to Paul; it questions the thoroughness of 
God’s power and his gospel of salvation.
 
90 This emphasis aligns with the Two Horizons Commentary series. See 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, 24–27. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
It should be clear from this study that the Epistle of Titus preserves two ancient opinions 
regarding Cretans in the church, not one. Troublemakers in the community described the 
Cretans as existential reprobates (1:12); whereas Paul described them as “At one time, 
foolish … hateful; but now … reborn, renewed … heirs by grace” (3:3‒7).1 Countless 
readers of the Bible have accepted the troublemakers’ opinion of the Cretans as their own 
under the influence of the prima facie interpretation. My thesis was that prevalent readings 
of Titus 1:12 and its famous Cretan quotation are unsustainable on linguistic, literary and 
historical grounds; so I applied key insights from Relevance Theory to incisively evaluate 
previous interpretations and to discern a historically and linguistically responsible 
reading, thereby also suggesting the promise of a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic. I 
trust that this dissertation has amply demonstrated the merit of my case and the 
constructive possibilities of a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic. 
Each chapter’s Relevance-theoretical insight yielded two kinds of innovation: Not 
only did I present original critiques of previous interpretations of Titus 1:12, but I also 
offered fresh Relevance-based solutions to interpretive problems. For instance, in Chapter 
One—The Inferential Nature of All Communication, we saw that speaker attitude is crucial 
to interpretation and inferred that Paul was distancing himself from the quotation in 
various ways; in Chapter Two—The Hearer’s Role in Communication, we saw how the 
salience of Paul’s accusation was greater for the original audience than that of bigotry, 
which strikes modern audiences as more salient; and in Chapter Three—The Non-
Propositional Dimensions of Communication, we considered how matters of social 
intimacy and trust, public exposure and pressure, and ethical behavior were integral to 
Paul’s message. In each chapter, I demonstrated how a relevance-guided biblical 
hermeneutic helps modern readers evaluate previous interpretations, attend to critical 
linguistic evidence, and appreciate the ancient audience’s cognitive processes. 
I have provided many specific examples of the prima facie interpretation—a 
synthetic composite of problematic readings and their accompanying assumptions. No 
particular scholar holds this reading in toto; but, as I described in my Introduction, one can 
identify the prima facie reading on the basis of a scale of relative adherence to a cluster of 
 
1 My dynamic equivalent translation. 
235 
five assumptions: 1) Paul’s authorial sympathy with the quotation’s linguistically-encoded 
contents, 2) contextual discontinuity between the thrust of the quotation and the 
surrounding material, 3) ancient literary or archaeological corroboration of the veracity of 
the quotation, 4) conflation of the troublemakers and the general Cretan church populace, 
and 5) dubious attribution to the Cretan poet Epimenides. 
In summary, interpretations that rely on these assumptions, exhibit some of the 
following contradictions: Paul, the canonical “Apostle to the Gentiles” (Rom 11:13; see 
also 1 Tim 2:7; 2 Tim 1:11), categorized Gentile Cretans as existentially vicious by virtue 
of their heredity. Although Paul indicated that those of the circumcision (Titus 1:10) 
constituted the most significant contingent of troublemakers in Crete, he instructed Titus to 
rebuke (1:13) the general Cretan populace. While addressing issues of leadership 
malpractice, Paul suddenly disparaged Titus’s host population for general moral failure, 
making it look like his missionary strategy was to alienate and deprecate the native 
population. I have offered a plausible alternative to this interpretation. 
In my view, Paul does not originate or accept the quotation in its substance. He is 
concerned with what is happening in the church on two levels—the leadership in specific 
(1:5‒16) and the believers in general (2:1‒3:11). The moral issues raised in the quotation 
are not prominent in the rest of the letter. Among the troublemakers, in accordance with 
their own prejudices, someone (τις, 1:12) has ripped this quotation from its native context 
and co-opted it to disparage Cretans. The presumptive leaders and their sympathizers held 
the attitude that Cretan converts were culturally, religiously, and thereby morally inferior. 
This is a plausible reading, given that Paul associates the main contingent of troublemakers 
in ethno-religious terms. Their doctrine is disgraceful in light of Paul’s gospel of 
transformation (3:3–7; see also 2:11–14). Hence, he orders a narrowly targeted restorative 
rebuke (1:13). 
I contend that Paul is not instructing Titus to embark on a wholesale campaign of 
severe rebuke (1:13) toward his missionary congregation and their neighbors on account of 
moral faults as innate and intractable as their ethnicity. The quotation does not even 
represent the moral topics Paul seems concerned with throughout the letter, with the 
exception of deception, which would operate paradoxically if a Cretan originated the 
quotation. This paradoxical feature made it attractive to sustain out of its poetic context. In 
the mouth of any non-Cretan, the poetry and paradox of the quotation dissolves, and it 
merely becomes an ugly ethnic slur. Paul exposes it in a stark light. 
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If my reading is accepted, then Paul is not making an assertion about the Cretans 
qua Cretans in 1:12, but rather his testimony (1:13) pertains to the leaders who concern 
him in 1:10‒12. Paul appears to be a bigot on the basis of a prima facie interpretation. 
Various interpreters have attempted to mitigate or excuse his bigotry, and I have 
demonstrated several of the problems with those attempts. Although it may be 
unconventional with respect to the history of interpretation, the reading I suggest emerges 
from a relevance-guided biblical heremenutic. 
Now that I have demonstrated a reading strategy that is sensitized to three key 
insights of Relevance Theory (RT), I will describe what I see as the scholarly contribution 
it makes and the scholarly context into which it fits. The remainder of this Conclusion 
outlines how this present work engages and contributes in four areas: 1) biblical 
hermeneutics, 2) secondary literature on Titus and the PE, 3) the modern-day appropriation 
of the original message of Titus, and 4) possible implications for the canonical esteem of 
Titus. 
I. A “Relevance-Guided Biblical Hermeneutic” 
RT is not a method of interpretation, but I have shown that its insights can aid 
interpretation and can support the critical evaluation of existing interpretations. 
Throughout this study, I have interacted directly with the work of scholars who have 
written at this juncture of interests—RT and Biblical Studies. I have articulated three key 
insights and shown how they can illuminate this problematic passage (i.e., a passage with a 
contentious history of interpretation) by applying these insights in the critical examination 
of the biblical text and interpretations thereof. Although I have not outlined a methodology 
per se, I have demonstrated the promise of a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic for 
ameliorating interpretive impasses. I have grounded the rationale for each aspect of my 
approach in central insights of RT, which in turn is grounded in the success of human 
language. This project provides a valuable example for the critique and foundation for the 
development of a properly transparent and repeatable methodology. 
II. A Critical Contribution to Titus and Pastoral Epistles Scholarship 
Although other scholars have already placed RT on the workbench for biblical 
interpretation, mine is one of the only concentrated studies of Titus or the Pastorals using a 
relevance-guided hermeneutic. I have suggested a fresh approach for biblical 
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interpretation, guided by core insights of RT, and it has yielded promising new results that 
make a valuable critical contribution to scholarship on Titus and the PE. 
On the basis of this approach, I have shared several original critical judgments. I 
have explained several reasons that conventional interpretations of Titus 1:12 are 
unsustainable. I have argued that interpretations that depend on attributing the Cretan 
quotation to a certain ancient personality in Crete, although commonplace, are misguided 
and misleading. The quotation may have incorporated a popular saying, and hearers may 
have thought that a Cretan originated some or all of it, but I have shown that Paul seems to 
have other specific concerns with it. 
Following Thiselton, I have critiqued the practice of gathering incriminating 
evidence against Cretan people in concert with the tenor of the quotation.2 Such efforts to 
justify or explain Paul’s assumed sympathy with this quotation on the basis of contrived 
historical evidence that Cretan people were somehow more vicious than their 
contemporaries smacks of the bigotry that interpreters are unreflectively pinning on Paul. 
This proposal addresses aspects of the historical, literary, and grammatical issues in 
Titus that have not customarily been dealt with in other treatments. It does not exclude the 
fine proposals that have been made regarding the logical devices Paul may have employed, 
but it does judge certain readings unacceptable. 
The question of whether one takes either the pseudonymity or the authenticity of 
the Pastorals as a starting point has become a tacit litmus test for interpretational validity—
a problematic assumption that a relevance-guided biblical hermeneutic may ameliorate. 
This shibboleth does not prove to be an obstacle for my proposal. My thesis stands whether 
Titus is pseudonymous or authentic. We can discern from the encoded content and our 
knowledge of the world and language—quite apart from any conviction about the 
historical identity or circumstances of “Paul” and “Titus”—that Paul was giving an 
example of bad behavior that has come to his attention and needs to be rebuked by his 
local representative. 
III. Modern-Day Appropriation of the Message of Titus 
In line with the non-propositional dimensions inherent to communication, I have suggested 
that Paul advances a conviction to not accept bigotry in the church but to address it sternly. 
For the sake of integrity to my own argument, I must say that my interpretation would be 
 
2 Thiselton, “Logical Role.” 
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incomplete without a practical conclusion. The results of the hermeneutical process I am 
formulating and demonstrating shows a coherent message in Titus. It is a moral teaching 
for the church, exposing the evil and the harm of holding and spreading prejudices, 
especially amongst leaders in the church. The canonical Paul (if also the historical Paul) 
thinks that bigotry and heredity- and religion-based classism is a blemish to the Christian 
faith that deserves severe rebuke. Furthermore, a pastor should not ignore such a fault but 
should lead the way in correcting it. That the wording of the slur may have originated from 
a person of the disparaged ethnicity is not an excuse for perpetuating it—à la, I can tell 
this Cretan joke; I heard it from a Cretan; even they admit it to be true.3 This 
interpretation is not a lesson we typically hear from Titus, yet I am convinced that it was 
crucial to the situation in which it was written. 
Paul’s use of this quotation exposed an ugly truth about some leading individuals in 
the Cretan church community—namely, that their religio-cultural posturing and sense of 
superiority had gone as far as veiled and self-justified bigotry against Titus’s missionary 
congregation. Deprecating the population one is assigned to reach with the gospel could 
not be tolerated, but Paul’s goal with the perpetrators was restoration, not mere 
punishment. The intention of Paul testifying (μαρτυρία, 1:13a) and Titus convicting 
(ἐλέγχω, 1:13b) was that the troublemakers (if also the entire church) would be healthy and 
health-conducive (ὑγιαίνω, 1:13c) with respect to the Christian life. 
Historically responsible hermeneutical processes do not guarantee politically 
correct or publicly palatable results. This thesis does not address what many interpreters 
see as Paul’s regrettable one-sidedness or, more pointedly, anti-Semitism or misogyny.4 I 
acknowledge that my proposal has done nothing to alleviate the burden of this picture of 
Paul. I can only suggest that Paul’s condemnation of Jewish religious culture being 
leveraged to degrade Gentiles is not in itself anti-Semitic. In fact, I would contend that it 
was in respect to his Jewish heritage and to defend the integrity of his faith and honor the 
truth of the God of Israel—as well as the Israel of God (Gal 6:16)—that Paul planted his 
foot concerning these rogues (Titus 1:10). 
 
3 As Guthrie explains, “Because a well-known Cretan condemns his own people the apostle cannot be 
charged with censoriousness for his exposures.” See Guthrie, Pastoral Epistles, 14:200. 
4 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 139–41; Regret and onesided are words used by Marshall, “Pastoral 
Epistles,” 273, 280–81 to cite A. Weiser’s 2003 assessment from his contribution to the Evangelisch-
Katholischer Kommenar on 2 Tim. Marshall also highlights the misogyny seen in the Pastorals by R. 
Saarinen. 
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Furthermore, I add to the argument that, inasmuch as accommodation to social 
conventions played a role in the moral logic of Titus, Paul’s advance of a lifestyle apologia 
equally justifies a present day reexamination. To be specific, whereas accommodating the 
gospel in a complementarian sense to patriarchal and kyriarchal customs in the ancient 
world may have been a strategy that Paul saw as serving the needs of the church, he has set 
a precedent for affirming an egalitarian social structure in the present day, as either social 
convention may cohere with Titus’s transformative gospel and radically submissive social 
ethic.5 
Given the legacy that some of our interpretive assumptions regarding this passage 
have left for Cretans through the centuries, I think we owe someone an apology. How have 
our assumptions affected both Cretans and generations of Christians who have 
unquestioningly accepted that ethno-religious prejudice is harmonious with biblical faith? 
For the community of faith, a reading of Scripture that does not lead to loving God and 
loving neighbor better is not a good reading.6 
IV. Implications for Canonical Esteem 
Titus and the Pastorals are under a cloud of suspicion for being misogynistic, racist, anti-
Semitic, artless, and incoherent. In light of this, pseudonymity may be the most 
complimentary attribute some scholars have ascribed to these books. At least the Apostle 
Paul is off-the-hook! Right? As canonical literature, however, such evaluations have grave 
implications for their confident use in liturgy and proclamation, doctrine and discipleship. 
In this section of my Conclusion, I draw heavily upon the articulations of two scholars to 
frame this problem—Annette Huizenga, who contends that they are pseudonymous, and 
Luke Timothy Johnson, who argues their authenticity. It will become evident that they 
 
5 Among interpreters who see misogyny, see, e.g., Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 133–84. This is a 
commentary written entirely from the premise of critiquing androcentric and kyriarchical ideologies. 
Although it is not within the scope of this thesis to mount a full argument, it would be a glaring ommission to 
ignore the accusations of anti-Seminism and misogyny, especially given my more narrow concern with 
ethno-religious bigotry. Kyriarchy is described in Schüssler Fiorenza, “Feminist Studies in Religion,” 128–
29, et passim, but initially introduced in her But She Said. My brief argument here for a reexamination of the 
precise form of cultural accommodation complements Marshall’s summary of R. Saarinen found in Marshall, 
“Pastoral Epistles,” 280–81. He writes, “Saarinen is not uncritical of what he sees as the Pastor’s misogynism 
and argues that following literally his tendency to accommodate church practice to contemporary social 
standards may achieve today the opposite effect from what was intended.” 
6 Briggs introduces this very simple, yet profound (from the perspective of interpretive ethics), qualification 
from Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine. Briggs explores the complexities and subtleties of such a reading 
ethic. See Virtuous Reader, 135–66 He also provides this quotation from Augustine: “So anyone who thinks 
that he has understood the divine scriptures or any part of them, but cannot by his understanding build up this 
double love of God and neighbor, has not yet succeeded in understanding them” (Doctr. chr. 1.41), 141. 
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both recognize similar implications. Afterward, I will explain how my thesis modestly 
addresses what I regard as an issue of esteem. 
Huizenga expresses quite frankly the tension that exists for people who assume the 
prima facie interpretation of Titus 1:12. “We could just possibly ignore the author’s racist 
and anti-Semitic statements as a random fragment of a long-ago culture, except that it has 
ended up in our own scriptures under the name of the famous apostle.”7 She is correct that 
something is wrong with this negative attitude toward Cretans and, of course, she is right 
to object to anti-Semitism. The only problem is that she and many other “advocacy” 
interpreters have predisposed themselves against the text in a posture of suspicion that will 
not countenance a sympathetic reading of Scripture.8 I contend that the anti-Semitism is 
superimposed by the interpretation and not intrinsic to the mention of things Jewish, which 
reflects the author’s concern for true faithfulness (see, e.g., πίστις and cognates in 1:1, 4, 6, 
13, 15; 2:2, 10; 3:82, 15) as opposed to merely obsequious socio-cultural performance. 
Regarding the place of the Pastorals in the Christian scriptural canon, Johnson 
writes, “They are not technically outside the canon, but they may as well be for all the 
attention they receive.”9 The suspicion has led to their neglect. Along these lines, Huizenga 
writes, 
In liturgical traditions, worshipers do not often hear readings from the 
Pastorals at the services. Only short and divided passages have been 
selected, and these appear just eleven times in the Roman Catholic 
Lectionary, with nine of these also adopted for the Revised Common 
Lectionary. The chances that a sermon might be preached on one of these 
texts must be slim, and when it does occur, the wise preacher ought to be 
reluctant to tackle the subject of how a pseudonymous author came to be 
included in the NT canon.10 
As stated in my Introduction, Paul’s apparent ethnic bigotry is one of the key 
reasons that Titus is not accepted as authentically Pauline, but I think that I have shown 
that Paul appears to be such a bigot largely because of the history of interpretation, not 
because of the message of the letter. Johnson also recognized the problem with stale, 
uncritical, predetermined interpretations and lamented the state of research on the Pastorals 
as he wrote: 
 
7 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, 141. 
8 For an understanding of “advocacy readings,” see Briggs, Virtuous Reader, 37. 
9 Johnson, First and Second Letters, 57. 
10 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, xlvi. 
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What makes the present state of scholarship on the Pastorals so 
disheartening is that the difficulties (which are of a fundamental character) 
are seldom even acknowledged, and even less frequently engaged. As a 
result, the conventional wisdom concerning authenticity moves farther and 
farther from any grounding in evidence and argument, farther and farther 
from the best and most recent scholarship on Paul himself, and perpetuates 
itself mainly by force of inertia based on an unexamined majority vote by 
an increasingly uninformed electorate.11 
Johnson is not alone in his concern for what could be called the canonical esteem of the 
Pastorals. In Huizenga’s words, “The suspicion of a pseudonym allows these letters to be 
diminished in influence since they have lost their apostolic stamp of approval. In fact, 
some scholars who argue for Pauline authorship are especially concerned that the Pastorals 
do not become devalued as Christian texts.”12 Donald Guthrie shares this concern: “Over a 
considerable period serious doubts have been cast upon their authenticity by many scholars 
and this has tended to decrease their authority.”13 Consequently, Huizenga describes 
common approaches to the Pastorals: 
A straightforward and widespread approach to the Pastorals is to minimize 
their presence in the New Testament canon. One may simply avoid reading 
them or just select a few trouble-free verses for devotional or liturgical 
purposes, as the lectionary committees have done. One could deny the 
religious authority vested in these letters or set aside the Pastorals’ 
teachings with a statement like ‘that was then, this is now.’14 
Each of these approaches is manifest wherever the Bible has some level of currency (e.g., 
churches, seminaries, Christian homes). In a modest way, I believe that my thesis may 
amend some of the suspicion and reclaim a measure of Titus’s canonical esteem. 
If the Paul of Titus was addressing problems of an ethno-religious nature in which 
subtle conflicts between Jewish and Gentile Christians prevailed, then the concerns of 
Titus have more in common with the undisputed letters of Paul than is typically 
acknowledged. Many scholars do not, however, allow these books to illuminate one 
another without unmeasured qualification. 
Against claims that Titus lacks rhetorical crafting and theological depth, my thesis 
shows a good deal of Titus’s coherence and insight. Rather than an awkward tangent, the 
quotation was a crucial piece of evidence in Paul’s argument against the troublemakers. It 
 
11 Johnson, First and Second Letters, 90. Of course, this was published in the early 2000s, but I have not seen 
a major sea change in the areas of his primary concern since then. 
12 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, xlvi. 
13 Guthrie, Pastoral Epistles, 14:9. 
14 Huizenga, 1-2 Timothy, Titus, lii. 
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represents a substantial instance of leadership malpractice, a major concern of Paul within 
Titus. The message of the letter coheres with other NT books and the canonical portrayal 
of Paul’s missionary practice (e.g., to all people, 1 Cor 9:19‒23; apostle to the Gentiles, 
Rom 11:13; see also Gal 2:2, 8; 1 Tim 2:7; 2 Tim 1:11). If my account is correct, then the 
“Paul” of Titus, by disassociating from the negative thrust of the saying and explicitly 
calling for the chastisement of those who advanced the insult, appears more consistent with 
the Apostle of the magisterial letters. Ethno-religious divisions evident in Titus parallel 
those of the undisputed Pauline epistles, suggesting that they could have come from a 
similar era.15 The contention that they were fictionalized on the basis of earlier records 
does not have compelling support. 
On the basis of my research, I argue that the writer of Titus is not participating in 
bigotry. Rather, as we would expect from the Apostle, he is addressing bigotry as it 
extends from ethno-religious elitism in the church. He exposes the problem; and he 
corrects the distortions that had justified the troublemakers’ bigotry—distortions of 
religious value systems (e.g., clean versus unclean 1:15; detestable 1:16), of what 
constitutes capacity for good works (1:16; 2:7, 14; 3:1, 5, 8, 14), and of what is entailed in 
healthy teaching (1:9, 13; 2:1, 2, 8). He ultimately calls for a restorative rebuke (1:13). 
However, upon returning to the topic of the troublemakers later in the letter (3:9‒11), he 
admits that sadly not every divisive person (3:10) will accept restoration.
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